Europeanization means the impact of the EU on domestic structures or, in other words, the political system. Since the subject of this research relates to the ratification of the EU Constitution, the research can be framed around the following question: what is the influence of EU standards on domestic ratification processes. This document discusses the three ratification procedures (constitutional reform, parliamentary ratification and referenda) and the actors involved (constitutional courts and political parties) with the aim of eventually establishing a "constitutional convention" on the ratification of the Constitution.
The second edition of the American experience with paradigmatic value for the EU refers to the procedures for the ratification of the Constitution. This constitutional convention may become essential for determining the nature of governance in the long run. The next three sections review the procedures for ratifying the constitution in the 25 member states.
National constitutions continue to be the source of legal validity of the EU constitution, as constitutional clauses enabling membership provide the essential provisions.
The view from advisory bodies and constitutional courts
However, the Council argued that there may be a possible conflict between the primacy of EU law (Art. I-6) and the Spanish provision on constitutional supremacy (Article 9.1).4 Because of this, the Council believed that the Constitutional Court must declare whether is a contradiction between the Spanish Constitution and the EU Constitution. The Spanish Constitution (Art. 95.2) states that the Government or one of the Houses of Parliament may request the Constitutional Court to declare whether a treaty is in conformity with the Spanish Constitution (although the Government is not automatically obliged to do so). The Council immediately proposed the possible reforms: the introduction of an "integration clause" allowing a general opening of the Spanish legal order to EU law in such a way that the compatibility of EU law with the Spanish Constitution is presupposed.
Furthermore, the Council suggested the idea of "Europeanizing" the Spanish constitution by means of a clear reference to the EU. The French court decided5 that in two of the cases examined (the primacy of EU law and the Charter) there was no need for a previous reform. 4 Some drafters of the Constitution (Miguel Roca, José Pedro Pérez Llorca, Gabriel Cisneros, Manuel Fraga) thought that constitutional reform on these specific grounds was not required, although one argued the opposite (Miguel Herrero).
In Spain, a preliminary ruling was not mandatory, but the opinion of the Council of State and pressure from opposition parties forced the government to seek it. Existence or non-contradiction between the Spanish Constitution and Article I.6 of the Treaty. Existence or non-contradiction between SC and Articles II-III and II-112 of the Treaty.
Whether or not Article 93 of the SC is sufficient for the ratification of the Convention. The statement of the Constitutional Court gave a negative answer to questions 1 and 2, a positive answer to question 3 and declared an answer to question 4 impracticable. two legal orders.
Parliamentary Ratification
However, even after ratification was completed, the issue was not resolved and disputes persisted over the interpretation of the ratification procedures. Locke's anthropological-cum-organicist view of the political body explains his view: the state being a single person and the international one. These restrictive views had gradually turned into an almost universal acceptance of the role of parliaments in ratification.
Thus, in the UK, the ratification of an international treaty requires only an executive act on the part of the Secretary of State, acting on behalf of the Crown in the exercise of royal authority. In practice, the ratification of treaties such as the Constitutional Treaty requires a law because of the domestic and budgetary implications of such amending treaties. However, Member States have used protocols and opt-out clauses to negotiate specific application of the acquis.
Authorization of Austria A simple majority of Congress (and of the Senate if its powers are affected) of two-thirds of Congress (and of the Senate if as above), if the transfer of powers means constitutional reform (Articles 50, 42 and 44). If they affect the competences of the Regions, they must also be approved by the Councils of both (Article 163). Authorization of the Czech Republic Congress and Senate approval, three-fifths majority in both cases (Articles 10 and 39).
A two-thirds majority of the Bundestag and a two-thirds majority of the Bundesrat (Articles 23 and 79). Every reform of the EU requires a parallel reform of the constitution with a referendum (Articles 29, 46 and 47). Lithuania Mandate Parliamentary ratification; referendum required for treaties affecting important aspects of the life of Lithuanians (Articles 135, 1 and 5).
The draft law on the ratification of the constitution will be presented to the Swedish parliament by September 2005 with a view to adoption in December 2005. In summary, parliamentary ratification has so far supported the government's positions by a strong majority, in all cases well above the required threshold, which reveals that parliamentary acceptance of the treaty is very high so far contrary to trends in public opinion.
Referendums on the Constitution
Ratification through referendums as result of domestic tactical considerations
In several of the referendums on the EU constitution, party political factors (i.e. strategic calculation of the effects of referendums on the domestic electoral campaign) may explain the use of this specific institution of direct democracy. Whether their calculations are accurate or not, politicians seem to base their behavior on a common calculation of the hypothetical benefit. Several of the cases in this paper confirm that the decision to call the referendum was also the result of a calculation of its electoral and partisan impact (UK, France, Germany, Czech Republic, Poland).
Some historical experience with EU reform-related referenda confirm this tactical practice: Mitterrand's 1992 decision to call a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty was based (apart from other considerations) on the idea that the vote would favor its political opponents undermine. But the two Czech opposition parties (the citizen democrats -ODS- and the communists) opposed the constitution and Czech president Vaclav Klaus is an outspoken critic of the constitution. However, the ability of a weakened prime minister to forge a parliamentary majority for the constitution raised serious doubts.
In fact, the opposition parties called for referendums during the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in almost all member states except Italy and the Netherlands. In the fall, the leadership of the SDP declared to hold a referendum if reforms to the constitution could be implemented by December 2004. Since the CDU's approval was necessary for this reform and the CDU opposed the holding of a referendum, the proposal was implemented. must be interpreted as a tactical one that tried to undermine the CDU, also because its sister party the CSU supported the call.
Referendums can also serve to resolve situations in which majority parties are divided within themselves along anti-integration/pro-integration lines. This is a powerful element in explaining the policy of the British Labor Party on this issue (although it is not the only one). In this way, Blair prevented an issue that threatened the internal cohesion of the Labor Party from tainting the campaign (apparently, pressure from Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, Secretary of State Jack Straw and Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott proved decisive in the U. - turn).
The emerging of a European convention on ratification through referendums
In doing so, the Dutch government disregarded the opinion of the Council of State, for whom the EU constitution did not affect the Dutch constitution and it did not involve a new transfer of powers. In this area, the government followed the claims of the opposition parties who argued that the referendum would increase citizens' role in EU politics and their awareness of EU issues in general (Hussain, Maitland and Whitman; 2005). They emphasized that decisions to reform the EU had a cross-political nature and affected the nation in a different way than normal politics.
In Germany, the FDP submitted two legislative proposals11 for the reform of the basic legislation with the aim of holding a referendum on the EU constitution. The reasoning argued that the EU constitution represents a fundamental change of the EU, which conditions the future development of both its nature and its competences. The Greens also argued that the EU Constitution is qualitatively different from previous treaties and increases efficiency, transparency and democracy in the Union.
In Germany, the issue of the EU referendum was mixed with past and ongoing discussions about the need to reform the constitution to introduce elements of direct democracy. The party said a referendum would "meet citizens' demands to be fully informed and determine Greece's future in the EU." In summary, domestic political and electoral reasons explain why the calling of referendums, but the EU constitution, also raised a strong doctrinal case for the necessity to ratify through referendum.
Ti parlamentario a panangratipikar ket sumurot pay ti kapada a padron ti naiparna ken ti Batay-linteg ti EU ket nangited ti batayan para iti pannakapartuat ti pan-Europeano a quasi-konstitusional a konbension iti panagusar kadagiti reperendum para iti panagratipikar. Dagiti panid ti Batay-linteg ti Europa ken dagiti Nailian a Batay-linteg (Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch) Panagratipikar ti Batay-linteg ti EU: Dagiti Reperendum ken dagiti Implikasionda’, Serye ti Panag-analisar ti E.U.-Europa, Ti Institusion ti Brookings, pp. Pérez Tremps (reg.) Dagiti panid ti Batay-linteg ti Europa ken dagiti Nailian a Batay-linteg (Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch).
