While very interesting and fruitful, I find that addressing Levinas and Sartre's thought through the lens of the notion of transcendence can (besides some very interesting results) also bring some complications along the way. The intentionality of consciousness is one of the most fundamental themes of Husserl's phenomenology, one that he continued to address repeatedly throughout his highly productive career. In this part of the thesis, I will also address the often disputed point of Husserl's opinion regarding the motivation of this change of attitude.
Remaining paragraphs in this chapter are dedicated to Sartre, and the general topic is again his interpretations and discussion of the validity of Husserl's insights. It is shown that Sartre, similar to Levinas, uses certain appropriation of Husserl and develops his own interpretation of the nature of consciousness. Final segment – Chapter V., will conclude the thesis by paying full attention to the phenomenological versions of the other as they are presented in mature works of both Levinas and Sartre.
The meaning of self-awareness. From Descartes to Husserl
Descartes' work gave new impulses to Husserl's own movement towards such a phenomenology in the first decade of the twentieth century. For Husserl, the essence of the justification (foundation) he seeks is connected to the idea of proof. But when it comes to the analysis of the concept of "proof", Husserl does not stop here.
However, in Husserl's view, there is another kind of perfection of evidence, and it is superior to evidence of the adequate type. Husserl does not seek to postulate the world as an integral part of transcendental subjectivity. It is safe to say that the notion of reduction (whether eidetic, phenomenological, transcendental or some other) is one of the most central ideas of Husserl's phenomenology.
The meaning of cogito – from Sartre to Levinas
At the given moment there is only an awareness of the "activity" in question with no ego-like characteristic actually present. This being – of consciousness – is self-contained and is typical of the lack of the aforementioned inertia and identity. The soi, on the other hand, represents the position of the moi in Being; it is his fact of being (or his "is-ness").
We can therefore state that the subject is located in the world without the need to look for evidence outside the intentional structure. The description of the subject as situated refers to the fact that it (the subject) stands in constant relation to the world. In his interpretation, I revealed the multifaceted structure of consciousness together with the conception of a "value" which is ultimately linked to the embedding of the subject in the.
Reception of Husserl’s phenomenology in France
Second, I will return to the Cartesian meditations—our core resources in Husserl's thought—only this time addressing the problem raised at the end of the previous chapter, the question of the other. In light of that, I provide the English translation of the entire review in the footnote.193. However, the geopolitical situation also initiated another phase of reception – by causing a wave of migration from the central and eastern parts of Europe to the west.
The essence of Šestov's criticism is Husserl's distinction between wisdom (sagesse) and science (science), whereby, according to Husserl, philosophy must be understood in the sphere of the latter. Šestov overlooks these and other rather important nuances because he does not know the true knowledge of the second volume of Logical Investigations and the first edition of Ideas. 212 Husserl expressed his admiration for Hering (and his loyalty) in one of R.
It focuses primarily on describing the central place of intuition (...the "principle of all principles") in Husserl's thought. But also, and secondly, it must be interconnected with the representation of the other's body as a corporeal property like any other." FRANCK, Didier: Flesh and the Body. However, this apperception is specific in some special way that differs from the cases of sense objects - in their case, in principle, there can always be a fulfillment - the back side of the house can become the last, while in the case of the other we appreciate the second original sphere.
At this point, however, we cannot conclude the analysis of the relationship to the other - it must be enriched by taking into account another essential aspect that originates from our incarnation. A body appears, which is part of my prasphere, but of course it is not yet "other" in the true sense of the word (but actually just a "body"). But it has also been suggested that there might be another and perhaps more productive way of describing the mechanism of Husserl's grouping, namely through the responsiveness of the other in terms of behavior (as opposed to visual similarity).264.
Smith also points out in his analysis of Cartesianische Meditationen, what may lie at the root of empathy is a basic attunement to the other's response.
Intentionality and representation – from Levinas to Sartre
It is interesting to note that the subjects of the courses Levinas attended were phenomenological psychology and the constitution of intersubjectivity. Regarding intentionality itself, Levinas further adds that it is not remarkable for him by virtue of subsuming the correlation of the subject to the object, in other words by the presence of the subject. On the one hand, we have the representation – in other words, the intentionality of the objectifying act of consciousness.
The main rebuke is directed at Husserl's conception of the Other as happening in the realm of knowledge, in other words by means of totalizing re-presentation (or imagination). By virtue of the fact that the other is a-presented, its "assimilation" into the Same cannot take place. What serves as proof of the existence of the other is rather its effect in the sphere of my immanence (or originality to use a more Husserlian term).
Without the existence of the other, this objectification on a pre-reflective level would simply be impossible. However, it is important to note that what Sartre describes as the phenomenon of the gaze is not just limited to the situations in which we are actually observed. It is common knowledge that Husserl would correct his previous comments and approve the notion of transcendental ego.
Now let me return to the main question - the manifestation of the ego and its objective nature. This creation is based on nothing but the execution of intentional action, on intentionality itself. In the passage quoted above, we can see the first outline of the notion Nausea in its ontological outline – above all, it is a salient.
The clear mediator of the contact between consciousness (nothingness) and an object (identical being) is physicality (corporéité). Due to the incarnation of Being-for-itself and this always in a situation (and therefore in the world) in confrontation with the absolutely complete existence of the cross-intentionally apprehended material being, the insight382 of deficiency of Being-for-itself in relation to itself (the nothingness). Nevertheless, there is no doubt that one can benefit from reading the novel informed by Levinas's accounts of passivity and corporeality.
The Look and the Face
Placing this famous chapter in the third part of the book (out of a total of four parts), it plays a key role in the general work entitled Being for Others (être-pour-autrui). So how do we have access to the concept of the other according to Sartre. The situation in which we are exposed to the gaze of the other implies another interesting discovery about the other – as Sartre says, the object cannot look.
402 Rudolf Bernet goes so far as to claim that the Gaze of the Other completes Husserl's phenomenological reduction. The otherness of the other reveals a dimension of 'height' (hauteur): he/she comes 'from on high.'" For Levinas, the freedom of the subject is not prior to the freedom of the Other – only by confronting the Other in the way just described, can the subject become free.
Could this ethical domain be the sphere to which Sartre situates our knowledge of the existence of the other. All this, says Sartre, can only happen if I come to the conclusion that I am responsible for the being of the other. The subject is not the origin of freedom in the sense of its creator.
The very face of the other brings an infinite demand and forbids me to kill him. Given the fact that others actually exist and we encounter them (what Sartre says is an accidental fact), my freedom would be condemned to hold back in the gaze of the other. In conclusion, I think it is safe to say that the encounter with the other plays a key role in the process of grounding subjective freedom in both philosophical systems in question.
447 “He shows that the certainty of the other's existence does not come from knowledge, but from the 'pre-reflective awareness' we have of his existence. Finally, in the concluding chapter V. I discuss le visage and le respect, two phenomenological descriptions and examples of the encounter with the other. This part builds on the previous one, insofar as the question of the other has already been addressed in Chapter III.
