Political Cooperation between the EU and ASEAN:
Searching for a long-term Agenda and Joint Projects
Yeo Lay Hwee, Executive Director & Senior Research Fellow, SIIA
Paper presented at Workshop on “The EU and ASEAN Facing Economic Globalisation”, 21-22 July 2005, Bangkok, Thailand
1. Introduction
Cooperation between the EU and ASEAN has gone through ups and downs in the last thirty years since informal dialogue first took place in 1972. The dialogue started with initial focus on narrow issues on trade and market access, but ties between the two regions have broadened to include political dialogue and functional cooperation.
Despite more than thirty years of dialogue and cooperation, ASEAN-EU ties continued to be low key, fraught with challenges and some say even “benign neglect”.
Yet there is also growing understanding that there are opportunities to nurture and grow this partnership which will be in the long term interests of both regions.
This paper first gives an historical review of ASEAN-EU relations. Generally, the ties between ASEAN and the European Community in the last 30 years can be divided into four different phases – the first phase from 1972-1980 was the period of courtship; the second phase from 1980-1991 was a period of consolidation; the third phase (1991-2001) was one of turbulence with frosty ties from 1991-1993, but a new dynamism from 1994-1996, and then stagnation from 1997-2001. The current phase of relationship which started in 2002 was one of re-discovery. We are entering into a new phase of rebuilding our ties in view of the changing regional and global dynamics.
The second part of the paper looks into some of the key changes within the global context and within the Southeast Asian region and the European Union. How will these changes in turn impact the further development of ASEAN-EU relations, and what should be the long-term agenda?
2. Thirty Years of ASEAN-EU Relations in a Nutshell
1ASEAN was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, amidst uncertain times in Southeast Asia. At the time of its formation, ASEAN was scoffed at by many political observers, both in the region as well as beyond. In a region marred by war and intra-regional conflicts, it was difficult to perceive that the leaders of these independent, sovereign states with different historical experiences would have the political will to overcome their suspicions and latent hostilities.
ASEAN’s growth as a regional organisation proceeded at a slow pace in the initial years. There were very little real integrative efforts as sovereignty was jealously guided. In any case, ASEAN was never intended to be an instrument of integration with supranational authority. ASEAN’s raison d’etre was, and still is, to turn a region in turmoil and instability into a region of peace and tranquility. It was to be an instrument for managing and containing intra-regional conflicts, and in so doing maintain and strengthen national sovereignty.
ASEAN from its onset has been an outward-oriented organisation. Most of ASEAN’s success really came by way of common stance vis-à-vis third parties. This was reflected, for instance, in the role it played in the Cambodian issue in the 1980s. It has also sought to establish friendly ties with key players in the region and the world in order to secure its own interest. One channel in which ASEAN used to articulate its interest was through the dialogue sessions that it established over the years with the major powers and other key countries in the region. Its dialogue partners include the EU, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, China, South Korea and most recently, Russia and India. In many ways, it was through such interaction with the others that helped ASEAN define its identity.
First Phase (1972-1980):
The EEC was ASEAN’s first dialogue partner. Informal dialogue between ASEAN and the EEC first took place in 1972 between ASEAN Ministers and the Vice- President and Commissioner of the European Commission. Initially, the dialogue was aimed exclusively at achieving greater market access for ASEAN’s exports and a price stabilisation scheme for ASEAN’s primary commodities.
After a few annual informal meetings, it was decided in 1975 that an ASEAN-EC Joint Study Group be set up not only to look into trade matters but also to evaluate other possible areas of cooperation, such as joint ventures in the exploration of ASEAN resources, the possibility of encouraging some degree of EC participation in
1This section is drawn extensively from an earlier paper I wrote on “The role of ASEAN in EU- East Asian relations”.
ASEAN manufacturing activities and of mobilising capital for financing ASEAN projects (Luhulima, 1992).
ASEAN-EC relations were given a boost and greater political significance with the inaugural ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) in 1978. Under the direction of the AEMM, the ASEAN-EU Cooperation Agreement was formulated and signed during the 2nd ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in March 1980.
Second Phase (1980-1991):
The signing of the ASEAN-EC Cooperation Agreement in 1980 was to mark the beginning of a new stage of cooperation. With the signing of the Framework Agreement, links between ASEAN-EC were institutionalized. The main emphasis of the Agreement was on economic cooperation and development. The Agreement extended the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to the contracting parties. More importantly, it opened up an exclusive channel for the exchange of information and requests that paved the way for EC assistance in several developmental projects. It opened up a second track of cooperation which specifically covered the EC and the signatories of the Cooperation Agreement. Under the Agreement, objectives for commercial, economic and technical cooperation were established, and a Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) was formed as a mechanism for monitoring ASEAN- EC cooperation.
Despite all these positive developments in general, however, ASEAN economically remained at the bottom of EC’s hierarchy of relations until the 1980s, below even that of the African, Caribbean & Pacific (ACP) and Latin American countries. The low priority accorded was reflected in the fact that the ACP countries received more favourable trade benefits covered by the Lome Convention and the irregular attendance of the AEMM by the EC ministers. ASEAN-EC relationship was seen very much as a donor-recipient relationship. It was an unequal relationship in which the ASEAN countries were inevitably in a weaker bargaining position (Ruland 1996:16- 17).
In contrast to this unequal economic relationship, political cooperation between ASEAN and the European Community was markedly more successful in the 1980s.
Political cooperation was stepped up to deal with what was seen as a Soviet expansionist threat. Specifically, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia (then Kampuchea) in December 1978 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 were impetuses for the two regions to work closely in coordinating their positions and supporting each other’s positions on the Cambodian and the Afghanistan issues in international fora such as the United Nations. During the 1980 AEMM, an unprecedented joint statement was indeed issued deploring the armed interventions of Cambodia and Afghanistan.
An analysis of the votes for the UN General Assembly Resolution from 1979 to 1984 showed that ASEAN and the EC voted as a bloc in support of calls for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia (Robles
1998:16). These two issues also remained dominant subjects of political discussion at every successive AEMMs until their resolution in 1991.
Third Phase (1991-2001):
The political relations, however, took a turn for the worse in the early 1990s due to the East Timor incident in 1991, differences over how to treat Burma in the midst of the Burmese ruling junta’s violent suppressions of pro-democracy movements. It was also the triumphant mood in the West following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the break- up of the Soviet Union and the wave of democratisation movements in the former Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe that led the Western countries to start pushing other developing countries toward greater democratisation. Free from the Cold War necessities of courting authoritarian but pro-Western countries, Europeans introduced a policy of conditionalities linking trade and aid to issues on human rights, democratisation and environmental protection. The politicisation of aid and economic cooperation policy heightened tension with the ASEAN nations. This new moralism of the West was criticised as “neo-colonialism” by leaders such as Dr. Mahathir of Malaysia.
The past decade of continued economic growth in the ASEAN countries, the general dynamism and growing economic prowess of the East Asian region in which ASEAN is located as well as ASEAN’s success as a diplomatic community has made the latter more confident and assertive. A new sense of pride drawn from the decade of economic achievements translated to the ability to stand up in challenging the decisions or actions of Western countries. The 9th and 10th AEMMs held in 1991 and 1992 respectively were thus marked by heated exchanges over East Timor and the new conditionalities of EC aid and cooperation policy.
The confidence and dynamism of ASEAN was also reflected in other more pro- active and positive measures it took in response to the new challenges in its environment. For instance, in the face of an uncertain politico-strategic situation with the rise of China and wavering commitments of US to the security of the region, ASEAN first sought to bring all its dialogue relationships under the ambit of what was to be called the Post-Ministerial Conference which is held immediately after the annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meetings. It then went a step further by developing an ambitious multilateral framework for security and political dialogue, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The creation of ARF was especially significant as it reflected the willingness of ASEAN to assume new functions and responsibilities in order to shape its strategic environment.
Faced with intensified economic competition, ASEAN announced the establishment of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) at the 1992 Summit in Singapore by the year 2005. This, deadline was subsequently brought forward to the year 2000 for certain products and by 2003, 95% of manufactured goods and services had been included in
AFTA. Work also commenced on drawing up an ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) to attract more direct investments into the region.
Examining the past twenty years of ASEAN relations with the EU on a bilateral basis, it is worth noting that while promotion of economic cooperation has translated into absolute increases in the absolute values of trade and investments, it has not altered the relative importance of each region to the other. The challenge then is to imagine new channels and identify new areas for cooperation. In the midst of EU reassessment of its strategy towards Asia, ASEAN was quick to cash in on this and promote itself as the gateway to the wider Asia-Pacific region and an interlocutor for the wider dialogue between Asians and the Europeans. ASEAN also recognised that future efforts at creating a new dynamic would have to involve European production in Southeast Asia. Hence, ASEAN has been relentless in driving the message that peace and stability in the region and the launch of AFTA and AIA would provide a secure and profitable environment for European direct investments.
On the background of the economic success and growing self-confidence of the ASEAN states, the EU was sold to the idea of ASEAN being the linchpin of its wider Asia-Europe relations. ASEAN’s attraction as a rapidly growing market of 500 million people (in anticipation of an ASEAN-10) was also in the minds of key European decision-makers when a consensus decision was taken by the EU (especially by the four big powers - UK, Germany, France and Italy) to put aside sensitive political issues and return to a pragmatic course of focusing on economics. This, of course, must be seen together in the context of EU’s general shift in policy towards Asia as reflected in the July 1994 EC Communications “Towards a New Asia Strategy”
(NAS).
The pragmatic course taken was reflected in the 11th AEMM held in Karlsruhe in September 1994, which revealed that ASEAN has gained the upper hand in determining the topics, style and procedure of the meeting (Ruland 1996:31). The meeting was congenial unlike the past few meetings. East Timor was not raised and human rights issues were only briefly mentioned. Another concrete example of this pragmatic approach was the sidestepping of the issue on a new agreement that was blocked by Portugal. The Ministers resolved to continue and expand their dialogue through other existing channels and also commissioned an ASEAN-EU Eminent Persons Group to develop a comprehensive approach of ASEAN-EU relations towards the year 2000 and beyond. The European Commission’s Communications “Towards a New Asia Strategy” also pinpointed ASEAN-EU relations as the cornerstone of the new partnership that Europe would seek in Asia.
However, recommendations in both the 1996 report by the EEP on “A Strategy for a New Partnership” and also the Communication from the Commission to the Council on “Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN relations” on revitalizing the ASEAN- EU ties did not materialir in the form of concrete measures. A series of events, notably the Asian financial crisis, the launch of ASEM, the enlargement of ASEAN to include Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, and the enlargement of the EU changed the
fundamental dynamics and further impacted the state of ASEAN-EU relations. There was a period of stagnation, but from the beginning of the 21st century, the changing dynamics within both regions and the wider global context “forced” ASEAN and EU to once again place emphasis on their partnership. Hence, we are now into this fourth phase of rediscovery and are searching for a long term agenda that will bind the two regions more closely together.
3. The Changing Dynamics
Much has changed in the global and regional environment in the first few years of the 21st Century. The two regional organizations themselves have also undergone transformation and are confronting a different set of issues and challenges. It is therefore appropriate to re-evaluate the long-standing relationship between ASEAN and EU and to consider the appropriate agenda for cooperation over the longer term.
3.1. The Global Environment – Dominance of American Power and its Repercussions
The 1980s and early 1990s saw American influence on the wane in both Asia and Europe. However, America entered the 21st Century with a booming economy and regained confidence. This confidence was shaken with the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, but the response was an overwhelming show of American might.
President George W. Bush has steered the US on a path which has brought serious repercussions for the international community. A conservative, inward-looking nationalism now pervades US policy thinking. While the roots of American foreign policy have always been national, the US has rather successfully realized its foreign policy goals through international institutions that it helped to create and which enjoy a good deal of legitimacy. Since Bush came into power, American unilateralism has become particularly “virulent”.
The events of 9/11 offered the opportunity for hawks in the Bush administration to develop an agenda that privileges security and securitises globalization to the extent that all broader issues in the global economy are being subjugated to the imperatives of the US security agenda (Richard Higgott, 2005).
The US is the only country capable of projecting military power throughout the globe, and its unipolar dominance in this era has no serious rival. Yet the invasion of Iraq also highlights the limitations of the exercise of such military might. It also highlights America’s economic vulnerabilities. The war in Iraq has made a fragile fiscal position dramatically worse. For all its military might, the US remains
dependent on other countries – especially in East Asia – to continually fund its debt and consumption patterns. The war in Iraq has also accentuated differences not only between nations but within societies, especially those with significant Muslim communities.
The need to temper US unilateralism and its disregard for international institutions and norms as well as the necessity to strengthen a multilateral international system which remains benign to all nations, big and small, and allows for cooperation and diversity at the same time is all the more urgent. What could EU and ASEAN inject in its agenda for political cooperation to make up for the increasingly uncertain and unstable global order?
3.2. EU at a Crossroads
The enlargement of the EU in 2004 from a union of 15 to 25 was hailed as an historic moment for Europe. There was much euphoria that peace and stability has been extended to the heart of Europe, and the rhetoric was generally positive. However, such a massive enlargement thus requires a rethinking of how existing institutions and procedures need to be streamlined. The EU therefore embarked on an ambitious project for a new Constitution aimed at streamlining EU institutions and decision- making processes, thereby offering further prospects of enlargement. Unfortunately, the ratification of the Constitution hit a snag when two founding members of the European Community, France and the Netherlands, rejected the Constitution during their respective referenda.
The rejection of the Constitution by the peoples of France and Netherlands was seen as a major setback for the European Union project. There was speculation that the rejection would carry in its wake an end to the further enlargement of the EU and could weaken the EU’s stabilizing influence over its immediate neighbours such as the Balkans. Following the rejection of the Constitution, confidence in the euro fell dramatically, slipping by some 10%.
There are many analyses as to why the French and Dutch voted “no” to the Constitution. Many attributed this to the lack of explanations by European leaders on the need for reforms as embodied in the Constitution. The convoluted, impenetrable and incomprehensive nature of the Constitution only reminded the people of what they see as an excessively bureaucratic institution that has become disconnected from its citizens. There is a sense that the EU is moving in a direction in which citizens do not want to go. Domestic politics and social factors, particularly in France, further compound the problems of disenchantment. At the root of the rejection, however, was the feeling that the new Europe does not offer its citizens security, prosperity and a clear identity. The rejection revealed the extent to which the EU has become disconnected from its citizens.
However, Jean-Pierre Lehmann, professor of international political economy at IMD in Lausanne perhaps hit the nail on the head when he pointed out that “the French and the Dutch have voted “no” not so much against the Constitution, but as a visceral reaction to the perceived malaise induced by globalization.” (ST 23 June 2005).
European woes were further compounded with the failure of the 1st EU summit – which came after the setback in the ratification of the Constitution – to agree on budgetary reforms and a workable budget. The rejection of the Constitution and the collapse of the budget talks in Brussels revealed the growing strength of national sentiments in major member states. Across the continent, countries are turning inwards, and nationalism has been much more persistent that was imagined in Brussels. The EU has also become the convenient scapegoat for nationalistic concerns.
EU claims to represent a new form of internationalism is now in tatters.
The double blow of the rejection of the proposed Constitution and the collapse of the EU budget talks in the June 2005 summit could leave the EU in crisis and paralysis. EU decision-making could be paralysed for months, the process of admitting new members could be stalled, while imposing discipline on members’ spending and inflation levels could become difficult.
What would this mean for Asia and ASEAN? European policies in Asia have always been diverse, and despite rhetoric, Asia is still not judged as central to European interests. The rise of China and India have the EU looking east, but this is confined to these two main rising giants at the detriment of other smaller Asian states and, particularly, at the neglect of Southeast Asia. Europe’s internal discord and problems would not make the situation better, though one could be an eternal optimist and turn the logic around to speculate that Europe would look outwards for unity of purpose to pepper over its internal disunity.
3.3. ASEAN at a Crossroads
ASEAN as an organisation is slowly regaining its confidence after the devastating Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. ASEAN’s minimalist approach to cooperation and preference for informality rather than institutions and rules accounts for the difficulties in formulating a collective response to prevent economic and political disruptions in the region. After being called irrelevant at its seeming inability to respond collectively and effectively to the Asian crisis, ASEAN has made some attempts to salvage its reputation and repudiate the claim that ASEAN is a sunset organization.
Egged on by the lessons drawn from the Asian financial crisis and fuelled by the democratizing process within Southeast Asia itself, ASEAN has embarked on building new regional capacities inspired by the European experience. Calls for more institutionalized processes and mechanisms to govern ASEAN’s affairs were prevalent
in the immediate aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. Oddly enough, however, the slow transformation of ASEAN from a league of sovereign nations to a more interventionist institution has stopped recently. This seems to have happened as the balance was shifting towards democracy among ASEAN members. ASEAN countries seem to have retreated into the management of their domestic problems and political transitions, and their external agenda is dominated by the shadow of China’s influence and the games of bandwagoning or power balancing that this situation requires.
(Francois Godement, 2005).
The term “integration”, frequently invoked in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, has recently lost the connotation of institutionalization and regime-building and seems to be increasingly applied to the multitude of initiatives of loose cooperation ASEAN has been proliferating over the last few years. The principle of “coalition of the willing” and the acceptance of the ASEAN 2 + x principle is a testimonial to the return of the classic realist approach towards cooperation.
At the same time, tension is building within ASEAN as it faces a potential public relations disaster and problems with external dialogue partners like the US and the EU as its date with a Burmese chair in 2006 grows nearer. The more democratic states are willing to loosen the non-interference rule to “force” Myanmar to give up its chair, but strong reservations are expressed by those who hold dear to the principle of non- interference that this would set a bad precedent; ASEAN’s incoherence and disunity in this matter could again fuel talks of its irrelevance.
While there is increasing recognition within and outside ASEAN that the association needs to develop into a more coordinated, integrated community if it wants to remain relevant as a grouping, it is also increasingly clear that the political will to do so is lacking. ASEAN governments remain unwilling to invest regional mechanisms and institutions with any supranational powers and are determined to hold on dearly to the final say over any ASEAN policies and their implementation.
After a short phase of enthusiasm about the reforms of ASEAN structures and building norms and institutions, rules and procedures that would enhance regional integration, ASEAN seems to be back on the old “ASEAN way”, with its traditional emphasis on nation-centred and decentralist structures highlighting non-interference as well as decision-making based on consensus and lowest common denominators. What does this signify for regional and inter-regional cooperation? Can a “loose” ASEAN remain in the driving seat or will ASEAN fade into the background as the ASEAN + 3 process gathers pace and transforms into the East Asian community building project?
ASEAN is at another crossroads after failing to fully re-invent itself after the Asian financial crisis.
3.4. Political Cooperation – Searching for a Long-term Agenda
The changing global and regional dynamics in addition to problems within the two regional organizations themselves will no doubt impact the search for a long term agenda in inter-regional cooperation. Political agenda for both ASEAN and EU will be driven by both regional and international concerns.
The latest ASEAN-EC Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) held in February of 2005 and the 15th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting that followed shortly thereafter reaffirmed commitment of both sides to strengthening and enhancing ASEAN-EU cooperation through a more comprehensive and balanced agenda. Trade and investments remain the key priorities seen particularly from the ASEAN perspective.
For example, the Trans-regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI) was launched in 2003 in reaction to the establishment of the three-pillar ASEAN Community by 2020. This would allow the EU and any two ASEAN members to engage in a project which can be implemented according to an agreed-upon road map while remaining open to all ASEAN partners. At the September 2004 meeting in Jakarta between ASEAN Economic ministers and Commissioner Pascal Lamy, agreement was reached to relate TREATI activities more closely and directly to the sectoral initiatives prioritized by ASEAN in building its Economic Community through accelerated integration in the vital sectors of automotive, electronics, textiles and clothing, agrifood and fisheries. Consequently, the EU-ASEAN cooperation will concentrate on sanitary and phytosanitary standards in agrifood and fisheries, technical standards for electronics and wood-based industries. These sectoral activities will be complemented by cross-sectoral cooperation on trade facilitation and investment, which are of particular importance to the business communities in Asia and Europe.
The same EU plus ASEAN-2 principle is applied to non-trade dialogue and cooperation through the Regional EC-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI). During the 15th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in March 2005, an Informal Coordinating Mechanism task force has been asked to meet in the near future to finalise the implementation modalities and mechanisms and to discuss and agree upon possible areas for dialogue. TREATI and READI are EU responses to the lessons learned with regard to EC-ASEAN cooperation. It was spelled out and elaborated on in the European Commission’s 2003 Communications on “A new partnership with Southeast Asia” that “most EU development assistance shall be implemented through bilateral channels. Regional approaches will, however, be chosen when economies of scale are evident, where the development of country-neutral toolboxes makes sense or in support of dialogue conducted at regional level…”.
While recognizing the realities of lack of integration and finding a way forward in ASEAN-EU relations through initiatives such as TREATI and READI, the EU also remained committed to supporting ASEAN integration as a basis for stability and prosperity in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN-EC Project on Regional Integration Support (APRIS) is a framework programme to assist ASEAN member countries in regional
integration. It aims at drawing lessons from the experience of the EC in forging regional economic integration, contributing to improving ASEAN mechanisms and communications systems and supporting capacity building activities for the ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN member states. More importantly, it is hoped that through APRIS and also through the EU’s participation in Initiatives for ASEAN Integration (IAI), development gaps between ASEAN members can be closed, which would in turn facilitate the further economic integration of ASEAN.
In short, one can identify three major instruments with regards to EU’s cooperation with ASEAN – APRIS in support of ASEAN integration and region-to-region dialogue, TREATI for trade-related dialogues among members who are ready, and READI for dialogue areas such as transport, justice/home affairs and the environment.
The EU, however, which raised its foreign and security ambitions a decade ago with the CFSP and the appointment of Javier Solana as Mr. CFSP, still has not developed its full potential as a global player. EU foreign and security policy attentions remain focused on its immediate neighbourhood and near-abroad. Southeast Asia as a region continues to be neglected in EU strategic considerations. Using inter- regional (EU-ASEAN) and trans-regional (ASEM) dialogues may have served well in building symbolic and diplomatic ties, but this has not translated into a coherent strategy for long term cooperation. In some cases, dialogues become prisoners of their own rules. For example, it is frustrating that the Myanmar issue – as important as it is – can be allowed to derail EU cooperation with ASEAN and the ARF. With little progress in sight for reforms within Myanmar and as the country’s turn at the chairmanship of ASEAN approaches in 2006, the “Myanmar problem” will again dominate EU-ASEAN relations.
How can EU and ASEAN look beyond such immediate problems to focus on the long-term cooperation agenda? Is it realistic to expect any new initiatives and ideas from the EU at this juncture, when the latter is mired in crisis over the rejection of the draft constitution and the collapse of the budget talks? Will the lack of solidarity within ASEAN with regards to the Myanmar issue and the lack of political will for institutional reforms become obstacles in the search for a common agenda? How can one realistically move forward in such a climate?
TREATI and READI are two distinct instruments that should be effectively used to hold ASEAN-EU relations on track. More importantly, however, the practical way forward is to allow relations to be project-driven rather than meeting-driven. Beyond dialogue, there must be some concrete deliverables: information sharing and capacity building to help fight terrorism; programmes for human resource development – whether in skills training, business education or in general higher education;
environmental programmes for Southeast Asia aimed at providing sustainable development; and poverty alleviation programmes to help ASEAN countries achieve its Millennium Development Goals.
References
GODEMENT, FRANCOIS. (2005), “Europe-Asia: the power of soft relations”, Paper presented at International Conference on The EU-Asia relations: Building multilateralism? 20-21 May, Hong Kong.
HIGGOTT, RICHARD (2005), “Unity and Multipolarity” Eleventh ASEF University Lecture, 12-26 February, Paris.
LEHMANN, JEAN-PIERRE. (2005) “We all lose when whiners hijack the moral high ground”, The Straits Times, 23 June 2005.
RUELAND, JUERGEN. (2001) “ASEAN and the European Union: A Bumpy Inter-regional Relationship”, Center for European Integration Studies, Working Paper C95, 2001.
YEO, LAY HWEE. (1999), “The Role of ASEAN in EU-East Asian Relations” ASIEN, No 72, July 1999, pp 19-28, Hamburg: German Association for Asian Studies.
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION “A new partnership with South East Asia”
REGIONAL INDICATIVE PROGRAMME 2005-2006 ASEAN
JOINT CO-CHAIRMEN’S STATEMENT OF THE 15TH ASEAN-EU MINISTERIAL MEETING, Jakarta, 10 March 2005
15TH ASEAN-EC JOINT COOPERATION COMMITTEE (JCC) JOINT PRESS RELEASE, Jakarta, 26 February 2005
