It would seem that a structured response to the report from Iceland will have to await the government freeing itself from dealing with economic crisis, though for the time-being Iceland can be expected to go along with plans for coopera- tion in maritime response and, in view of the volcanic eruption in southern Iceland in April 2010, there will no doubt be a special interest in disaster re- sponse cooperation.
reservations about two aspects. The first is not one of Stoltenberg’s proposals as such: Støre took a couple of shots at the idea of a standing Nordic force.
While in favour of putting together units at short notice that train together, he also noted that standing deployment forces tend to ‘remain in place, cost huge amounts of money and lead to frustrations about their being used.’69 However, that was not what Stoltenberg put forward in his first proposal, where he sug- gested that any stabilisation force specifically ‘will…not be a standing unit.’70 Støre seemed to have had in mind the previous Nordic experience with stand- ing forces, such as SHIRBRIG (see above), which he was reluctant to repeat.
The other area where the Norwegian foreign minister had apparent reser- vations was the Nordic declaration of solidarity. He made it clear that such a declaration should not conflict with that contained in NATO’s Article 5, a point that Stoltenberg himself made. Interestingly, Støre detracted from the immediacy of the declaration by referring to Norway’s Nordic neighbour:
Even now some would claim – with some justification – that Sweden has taken the biggest step in that direction [the mutual security policy guaran- tee] by saying that Sweden would not be unaffected by the fate of another Nordic country.71
While the Nordic proposal was not rejected, Støre, 2009 felt that it ‘is not de- signed for 2009, but it can lie and mature over a timeframe of 10 to 15 years.’72 That period still fits in with the time-frame suggested by Stoltenberg, but is out of the area of vision of most politicians.
The reaction of the Norwegian defence ministry to the Stoltenberg pro- posals seems to have been more reserved than that of their foreign ministry colleagues. The outgoing defence minister made a reference to the report in brief remarks in August 2009 and to the possible mutual benefits of integra- tion in selected areas of defence, and then reminded her audience that Norway
69 Støre, 2009: 48.
70 Stoltenberg, 2009: 8.
71 Støre, 2009: 51.
72 Ibid.
has, in absolute terms, the largest defence budget of the Nordic countries.73 Nordic cooperation on the ministry’s Norwegian website refers primarily to Norway’s chairmanship of NORDEFCO in 2010. In the minister’s annual keynote speech to the Oslo Military Society given in January 2010, there was no mention of the Stoltenberg proposals or of Nordic cooperation. This may be unsurprising given that the talk developed a Norwegian initiative to get NATO to rebalance its outlook as between ‘in area’ and ‘out of area’. However, there was reference to other international cooperation, but without the Nordic Prince Hamlet:
In international operations such an approach [the need for close coopera- tion with other international actors] means cooperation with organisations such as the UN, the EU and the African Union. In the High North the parties could well be the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the Arctic Council and the institutions under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.74
All the above are international institutions of one form or another. Neverthe- less, as the Stoltenberg proposals were crafted to appeal to Norwegian interests in the High North, the defence minister’s list could have been expanded to include the Nordic countries, either individually or collectively.
Like his Norwegian counterpart, the Danish foreign minister at the time, Per Stig Møller, generally welcomed the report and noted that some of the recommendations had already been implemented, while others required fur- ther work. Favourable mention is given to studies for joint diplomatic repre- sentation and increased cooperation between Nordic Computer Emergency Response Teams. Another area for wider international cooperation was con- sidered to be satellite systems, but here the minister also specifically referred to the non-Nordic European Space Agency and the Global Monitoring of Envi- ronment and Security within which the Nordic states could coordinate their action. To that end a Nordic expert group was established.
73 Strøm-Erichsen, 2009.
74 Faremo, 2010.
Particular Danish interests then became more prominent. As befits a minister from the one Nordic country that is in both NATO and the EU, Møller mentioned that consideration should be given to whether proposals were best implemented in an EU or NATO framework rather than a Nordic one. Furthermore, the minister brought in straightaway the question of re- sources and noted that the Stoltenberg report did not deal with the economic consequences of its proposals – indeed, it had not been asked to – but that the Danish government had to do just that.75 The Danish foreign minister thought that some arrangements should be open to other participants, and in this context he mentioned the non-Nordic Arctic coastal states. He also referred to the Baltic States as other partners for Baltic Sea cooperation. As chair of the Arctic Council, Møller took responsibility for following up the Arctic issues in the report, and he mentioned that the Ilulissat declaration in- cluded a shared commitment to search and rescue. However, this declaration excluded the Icelanders, Swedes and Finns and, as Møller also pointed out, for search and rescue to be meaningful in the Arctic, the US, Canada and Russia have to be included.76
Like Støre, Møller was cautious about the Nordic declaration of solidarity, merely remarking that the foreign ministers’ statement in Reykjavik took into account the differing security policy bases of the Nordic states, as well as their common interests and geographical proximity.77
It is in the military area of cooperation that Denmark has other reserva- tions. The idea of an amphibious unit (proposal 12) needed ‘further work’.78 On military cooperation, Møller mentioned the unification of NORCAPS, NORDAC and NORDSUP into NORDEFCO, stating that this ‘in general is more expansive and integrated than proposed by the Stoltenberg report’79 However, the minister was remarkably silent on other aspects of military coop- eration, and for good reasons. At the time that Nordic ministers were accept- ing the Stoltenberg report, the main political parties in Denmark were signing
75 Møller, 2009.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Møller, 2009 [author’s translation].
79 Ibid.
a defence agreement for 2010-2014 that followed on the historic 2005-2009 agreement. This latter five-party deal had oriented Danish defence forces to- wards having ‘(i)nternationally deployable military capacities and…the ability to counter terror acts and their consequences’.80 These politicians were able to make the sort of definitive statement that their Norwegian counterparts would not risk: ‘the conventional military threat to the Danish territory has ceased for the foreseeable future. There is no longer a need for the conventional ter- ritorial defence of the Cold War.’81 While the Norwegian strategic concept had the same message that ‘Norway is currently facing no clear or imminent threat’, it continued with the reservation that the ‘possibilities for limited military pressure against Norway with the aim to alter Norway’s policy cannot be ruled out however.’82 The then chief of Defence in Denmark was able to write:
Future threats against Denmark will not be determined by Denmark’s geo- graphical position. Instead, there is a need to counter the threats where they develop and/or emerge.83
In contrast, while the Norwegian strategic concept talked about globalisation and the variety of risks and challenges in today’s world, of the eight tasks as- signed to the Norwegian armed forces, six referred in one way or another to Norway and its adjacent areas.84
The 2010 defence agreement continued with Denmark’s global vision. The transformation process of the armed forces undertaken by the 2005 agreement was continued. The current agreement made specific mention of Nordic coop- eration when touching on UN peacekeeping operations:
This could be achieved partly through focused cooperation in Nordic cir- cles. The already ongoing Nordic cooperation on the training and instruc-
80 Defence Command, Denmark, 2010.
81 Ibid.
82 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2009: 21.
83 Helsø, 2010. This was written in 2004 in his capacity of Chief of Defence, a position he retired from in 2008.
84 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2009: 11.
tion of African peacekeeping forces will be continued and intensified, and potential opportunities for joint Nordic peacekeeping operations within the UN framework will similarly be pursued.85
The growth in the level of importance of the Arctic – a strong theme of the Stoltenberg report – is mentioned in the agreement, but the response is seen in national terms rather than through any association with other Nordic coun- tries: ‘The rising activity [in the Arctic] will change the region’s geostrategic dynamic and significance and will therefore in the long term present the Dan- ish Armed Forces with several challenges.’86 Furthermore, the opportunity to conduct surveillance of the Arctic region together with other states such as the Nordic ones, US, Canada, Russia and the United Kingdom was to be analysed in terms of shipping near Greenland to see whether this would ‘improve the ability of the Danish Armed Forces to develop an assessment of the situation in and around Greenland.’87
The strong theme in the 2010 Defence Agreement is again the transforma- tion of the Danish armed forces from ‘traditional mobilisation defence to a modern deployable defence force’, and Denmark’s capacity to contribute to the prevention of conflicts and war, as well as to ‘the promotion of democracy and freedom in the world.’88 While the agreement has a special section on Green- land, there is no mention of BarentsWatch or the maritime monitoring on Arc- tic issues with which the Stoltenberg report was dealing at the same time. Apart from references to traditional Nordic cooperation, there is little indication in the agreement that working together with the other Nordic countries might be an essential part of current or future Danish foreign and security policy. In contrast, the Norwegian strategic concept – albeit serving a different purpose than the Danish defence agreement – has a number of references to Nordic co- operation, ranging from the Nordic Battlegroup, cooperation within PfP with Sweden and Finland, NORDEFCO, and the surveillance of Icelandic airspace.
85 Ministry of Defence Denmark, 2010: 2.
86 Ministry of Defence Denmark, 2010: 2. The Danish Defence Commission’s report in 2009 talks about the ‘possibilities’ of Nordic cooperation in the Arctic both generally and, with other Nordic states, for surveillance; Forsvarsministeriet, 2009: 74, 274.
87 Ministry of Defence, Denmark, 2010: 12-13.
88 Ministry of Defence, Denmark, 2010: 1.
While the Norwegian ministry of defence may be more careful than the min- istry of foreign affairs about what are suitable subjects for Nordic cooperation, it is certainly more generous than its Danish counterpart.