He argues that the state's role in managing investment in the extractive sectors has gradually strengthened, but its direct involvement as an investor has waxed and waned. This is documented in another document, Land and Natural Resource Rights in Tanzania (2/2): Reclaiming the Country. It has recently returned again through state co-ownership in joint venture operations, as documented in another paper, Land and Natural Resource Rights in Tanzania (2/2): Reclaiming the State (Jacob et al. .
The main features of the colonial administration of land and natural resources were retained after Tanganyika's independence in 1961. The President could still quite easily acquire land in the name of the public good, which meant extensive administrative discretion at the expense of customary rights (URT) 1994; Tenga and Mramba 2014). The settlement scheme under the Act covered only 0.04% of the population in 1967 (Ellman according to Sundet 1997, unpublished).
LAND AND EXTRACTIVE RIGHTS IN THE ERA OF AFRICAN SOCIALISM
After independence, direct governance in the economy was accelerated in 1962 with the creation of the Tanganyika Development Corporation, the forerunner of what later became the National Development Corporation (NDC), taking control of Williamson Diamonds, the latter driving the growth of the economy continued. much of the surplus of NDC in the first year of independence. While NDC was initially aimed at catalyzing private indigenous investment, for example through joint ventures, it quickly became a tool for the state to acquire and maintain large stakes in key sectors of the economy, including the extractive sectors, with the aim of state interest of at least 50%. property. However, the closure of gold mines is also reported and the third five-year plan recognizes a "downward" trend in mineral production.
The petroleum sector followed a different trajectory, partly because of the later development of the sector and partly because the sector was so demanding in terms of capital, skills and technology that the involvement of foreign, private companies was difficult to avoid. It was classified with the chemical industry to preserve confidentiality, in all likelihood because it was related to the construction of the 1,680 km long Tanzam pipeline (shared ownership between Tanzania and Zambia) which supplies refined petroleum products to Zambia to reduce dependence on the to reduce apartheid. regime in neighboring Rhodesia (Silver 1984; Gleave 1992). TPDC was not mentioned in the second development plan, published in the same year, and its creation was therefore most likely a reaction to the agreement with the Italian oil company AGIP, also in 1969, which allowed it to explore oil (Jourdan 1989). ;URT 1980).
It also took a share in the TIPER oil refinery, which was initially fully paid for by ENI, but on the condition that the government could take over a 50% share after a given period (ibid; Nyerere 1965). The most notable change in constitution was the passing of the Land Acquisition Act of 1967, which provides the legal basis for the acquisition of land for 'public purpose'. In many ways it is a continuation of the colonial era land rule with an interpretation of.
In 1967, President Nyerere published his paper "Socialism and Rural Development" in which he stated that "land is the only basis for the development of Tanzania; we have no other" (Nyerere 1967). In 1975 these villages were home to nine million people, a very significant part of the rural population.
LAND AND EXTRACTIVE RIGHTS UNDER EARLY LIBERALISATION
These changes in the ownership structure in the extractive sectors were part of broader changes in the economic policies of the period. The poor performance and lack of capital in the parastatal sector meant that the state increasingly rejected demands for majority control of companies (Mukandala 1989), although the possibility of acquiring stakes in operations was retained. In the mining sector, a more friendly attitude towards foreign investors was followed by the liberalization of the mineral trade (which had been controlled by state agencies since 1967) in 1987–89.
A huge increase in gold production followed, not only due to increased production, but also due to the registration of the unregistered but existing production in the artisanal mining sector. While the early reforms aimed to strengthen the rights of investors, the idea that land was a means of development was also maintained; the customary right to land was only gradually strengthened in the following decades. The President may choose to allocate non-alienated land to the holder of the petroleum permit for development purposes.
The policy had a dual purpose: first, to promote medium and large private farms, both domestic and foreign (marking a change from Nyerere's anti-capitalist peasant rhetoric of the 1960s), and second, to improve property security for villagers . Chachage 1993a; Sundet 1997, unpublished).6 The latter involved subletting to villagers, enabling them to own land for a longer period of time. By then, the villagers had gradually returned to the land from which they had been forcibly expelled in the 1970s. The returning villagers gave rise to a number of land tenure conflicts – a problem that was attempted to be resolved with a 1992 law, the Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act, which removed rights to pre-village land in Ujamaa. , nullified.
However, the Act was rejected by the Supreme Court and the 1999 Constitution recognized all existing rights to land, but left open how to decide between competing claims (Sundet 1997, unpublished). The fact that most of these changes happened through changes in policies, not in new laws – they only happened with the 1999 Constitutions – can be seen as a sign of how politically sensitive this sector was.
LATE LIBERALISATION AND MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY
In 1993, a private-public partnership (PPP) in the form of a project was launched with donor support from the World Bank, the European Investment Bank and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), which aims to develop the gas resources that were in 1974 in found the Songo Songo gas field in the southern part of Tanzania, but remained undeveloped due to a lack of private sector interest. For example, in the case of relocation, it should be limited as much as possible and, if it does happen, it should follow principles of due process and fair administration. This is particularly promoted by a new Wildlife Act, passed by Parliament in 2009, which provides for a re-centralization of Tanzanian Wildlife management by giving state authorities more power to intervene in the management of village land.
For the extractive sectors, this is analyzed in more depth in a second article, Rights to land and extractive resources in Tanzania (2/2)–- The return of the State (Jacob et al 2016). DIIS WORKING PAPER In the mining sector, the commercial importance was greater and substantial in the legislative area. The Mining Act of 1998 was the result of a World Bank-sponsored mining reform program aimed at helping Tanzania create a new regulatory framework that would improve the investment climate and increase private sector involvement in the mining sector (Butler 2004).
Overall, the new Mining Act represented a break with much of the discretionary power that had been vested in the executive branch since colonial times. The provisions on the state's right to acquire interests in mining disappeared in the new law. The transfer of mining rights, which had previously been subject to ministerial approval, now became much more a right of the investor (URT 1998), especially if it was stipulated in the mining agreements (MDAs) – a new feature introduced at the beginning of 1990s and institutionalized with the law - which investors negotiated with the Tanzanian state.
They had the same rights to apply for mining licenses as large-scale miners, but with limited capacity to do so and limited outreach from the authorities, this was more often de jure than de facto; a few were incorporated into the formal sector, but most were not (Fisher 2008). While artisanal miners dominated foreign exchange earnings in the early 1990s, this shifted in favor of large-scale miners at the end of the decade (Nyankweli 2012).
CONCLUSION
Thus, the article has assessed the historical changes in extractive sector legislation in conjunction with economic development models up to and including the peak in commodity prices around 2007-2008. Basically, property rights regimes and economic development models are characterized by covariation. However, as changes in the legal frameworks for vulnerable lands and the extractive sectors tend to be slower than those in economic policy, there is considerable continuity from one phase to the next.
While the literature sheds some light on these changes in laws and policies, their actual implications for the distribution of benefits within and across groups are often less well studied. Although colonial and post-colonial authorities thus disadvantaged artisanal miners, we also know that the latter continued to operate. What we do know is that the strength of rights among stakeholders is changing further in the most recent period from the late 2000s.
Not only does the latest development mean increased direct government involvement as an investor in the extractive sectors.
Industrial policy and the political settlement in Tanzania: aspects of continuity and change since independence. Williamson Diamond Mine, De Beers and the Colonial Office: A Case Study of the Quest for Control. Land law in Tanganyika since the British military occupation and under the British mandate of the League of Nations, 1916-1946.
Aspects of Colonial Land Law In German East Africa: The German East Africa Company, the Crown Land Ordinance, European plantations and African reservations. Uppsala, Sweden: Ministry of Land, Housing and Urban Development, Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.
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