Sistema político brasileiro: disfuncional ou má gerência?: custos de governabilidade no presidencialismo de coalizão

(1)

Sistema Político Brasileiro:

Disfuncional ou Má Gerência?

Custos de Governabilidade no Presidencialismo de Coalizão

Carlos Pereira

Professor Titular EBAPE/FGV

Workshop A Crise Políti a Brasileira

(2)

Democracia Sustentável em Regimes

Presidencialistas Multipartidários

Este conceito tem sido considerado quase impossível. É quase unanimidade

na literatura especializada a afirmação da improvável sobrevivência da

o

i ação difí il de preside ialis o o ultipartidaris o

M o t i v a ç ã o

Entretanto, presidencialismo multipartidário é a combinação dominante em

regimes com separação de poderes. O que explica então a estabilidade

democrática nestes

regimes

? Quais as condições necessárias para um

sistema como este funcionar?

(3)

3 Condições

Necessárias:

O presidente necessita se constitucionalmente

forte

e capaz de exercer o poder de

agenda

P o d e r e s d o P r e s i d e n t e

A Lealdade partidária e a ideologia não são suficientes para determinar o

comportamento de voto dos parlamentares.

D i s p o n i b i l i d a d e d e b e n s - d e - t r o c a

Um conjunto de institucionalizado e efetivo de

checks

capaz de estabelecer limites a

ações do presidente

(4)

• Manutenção de um executivo forte

• Manutenção da representação proporcional:

Fragmentação partidária

• Re-centralização política e enfraquecimento dos

governadores

• Governo de coalizão e institucionalização de

mecanismos de bens-de-troca

–

Ministérios, empregos públicos

–

Recursos orçamentários

• Institucionalização de uma rede de accountability

–

Judiciário Independente

–

Ministério Público Independente

–

Polícia Federal Independente

–

TCU/CGU Independente

–

Agências Reguladoras Independentes

–

Mídia investigativa e Independente

Constituição de 1988: Novo

Equilíbrio

!

Executivo Forte

(Ausência de

Gridlock)

Legislativo

e outros

(5)

(6)

5min

10min

15min

20min

25min

30min

T

E O R I A D A

G

E R Ê N C I A D E

C

O A L I Z Õ E S

T

EMPO

:

• Coalizões

grandes

, com maior

diversidade ideológica

e com uma maior

concentração de poder

em apenas um de seus membros seriam mais

difíceis de serem coordenadas e gerenciadas e, por consequência, mais

custosas

.

H I P Ó T E S E S

• Quanto mais

desproporcional

for a coalizão do presidente, quanto

maior

a diversidade ideológica

e o

número de partidos aliados

, maior o

número e o

volume de gastos

do executivo na gerência de sua coalizão.

• Quanto

maior

o número e

volume de gastos decorrente da má gerência

de coalizão

,

menor a produção

de políticas e

menor o sucesso

legislativo

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

Restrições Exógenas

PCdoB PDT PFL PL PMDB PP PSB PSD PSDB PT PTB

Floor Ideology = 6.29 Floor Ideology = 6.29 Floor Ideology = 6.29 Floor Ideology = 6.29 Floor Ideology = 6.29 Floor Ideology = 6.29 Floor Ideology = 6.29 Floor Ideology = 6.29 Floor Ideology = 6.29 Floor Ideology = 6.29 Floor Ideology = 6.29 Coalition ideology = 6.24 Coalition ideology = 6.24 Coalition ideology = 6.24 Coalition ideology = 6.24 Coalition ideology = 6.24 Coalition ideology = 6.24 Coalition ideology = 6.24 Coalition ideology = 6.24 Coalition ideology = 6.24 Coalition ideology = 6.24 Coalition ideology = 6.24 Coalition Ideological Range = 3.13

Coalition Ideological Range = 3.13 Coalition Ideological Range = 3.13 Coalition Ideological Range = 3.13

0 30 60 90

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Ideology

S

e

at

s

Not a Coalition Member Coalition Member

Brazilian Chamber of Deputies − Cardoso 1 − Mar 1995

(13)

Restrições Exógenas

PCdoB PDT PFL PL PMDB PP PPS PSB PSDB PT PTB

Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2

Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.6

Coalition Ideological Range = 5.6 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.6 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.6 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.6

0 30 60 90

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Ideology

S

e

at

s

(14)

Restrições Exógenas

PCdoB PDT PFL PL PMDB PP PSB PSDB PT PTB

Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2 Floor Ideology = 6.2

Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition ideology = 6.4 Coalition Ideological Range = 3 Coalition Ideological Range = 3 Coalition Ideological Range = 3 Coalition Ideological Range = 3

0 30 60 90

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Ideology

S

e

at

s

Brazilian Chamber of Deputies − Cardoso 2 − Mar 1999

(15)

Restrições Exógenas

PCdoB PDT PFL PL PMDB PP PPS PSB PSDB PT PTB PSL

Floor Ideology = 5.86 Floor Ideology = 5.86 Floor Ideology = 5.86 Floor Ideology = 5.86 Floor Ideology = 5.86 Floor Ideology = 5.86 Floor Ideology = 5.86 Floor Ideology = 5.86 Floor Ideology = 5.86 Floor Ideology = 5.86 Floor Ideology = 5.86 Floor Ideology = 5.86 Floor Ideology = 5.86 Coalition ideology = 2.89

Coalition ideology = 2.89 Coalition ideology = 2.89 Coalition ideology = 2.89 Coalition ideology = 2.89 Coalition ideology = 2.89 Coalition ideology = 2.89 Coalition ideology = 2.89 Coalition ideology = 2.89 Coalition ideology = 2.89 Coalition ideology = 2.89 Coalition ideology = 2.89 Coalition ideology = 2.89 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.21

Coalition Ideological Range = 5.21 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.21 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.21 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.21 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.21

0 25 50 75 100

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Ideology

S

e

at

s

(16)

Restrições Exógenas

PCdoB PDT PFL PL PMDB PP PPS PSB PSDB PT PTB PV PSC PSOL

Floor Ideology = 5.46 Floor Ideology = 5.46 Floor Ideology = 5.46 Floor Ideology = 5.46 Floor Ideology = 5.46 Floor Ideology = 5.46 Floor Ideology = 5.46 Floor Ideology = 5.46 Floor Ideology = 5.46 Floor Ideology = 5.46 Floor Ideology = 5.46 Floor Ideology = 5.46 Floor Ideology = 5.46 Floor Ideology = 5.46 Coalition ideology = 3.74

Coalition ideology = 3.74 Coalition ideology = 3.74 Coalition ideology = 3.74 Coalition ideology = 3.74 Coalition ideology = 3.74 Coalition ideology = 3.74 Coalition ideology = 3.74 Coalition ideology = 3.74 Coalition ideology = 3.74 Coalition ideology = 3.74 Coalition ideology = 3.74 Coalition ideology = 3.74 Coalition ideology = 3.74 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.54

Coalition Ideological Range = 5.54 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.54 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.54 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.54 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.54 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.54 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.54

0 20 40 60 80

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Ideology

S

e

at

s

(17)

Restrições Exógenas

PCdoB PDT PFL PMDB PP PPS PSB PSDB PT PTB PV PSC

Floor Ideology = 4.66 Floor Ideology = 4.66 Floor Ideology = 4.66 Floor Ideology = 4.66 Floor Ideology = 4.66 Floor Ideology = 4.66 Floor Ideology = 4.66 Floor Ideology = 4.66 Floor Ideology = 4.66 Floor Ideology = 4.66 Floor Ideology = 4.66 Floor Ideology = 4.66 Floor Ideology = 4.66 Floor Ideology = 4.66 Coalition ideology = 3.64

Coalition ideology = 3.64 Coalition ideology = 3.64 Coalition ideology = 3.64 Coalition ideology = 3.64 Coalition ideology = 3.64 Coalition ideology = 3.64 Coalition ideology = 3.64 Coalition ideology = 3.64 Coalition ideology = 3.64 Coalition ideology = 3.64 Coalition ideology = 3.64 Coalition ideology = 3.64 Coalition ideology = 3.64 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.29

Coalition Ideological Range = 5.29 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.29 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.29 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.29 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.29 Coalition Ideological Range = 5.29

0 25 50 75

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Ideology

S

e

at

s

(18)

• Número de ministérios e

posições na burocracia

• Log natural do total de gasto

com a execução das

emendas individuais dos

legisladores no orçamento

(Pork)

• Log natural do total de gasto

dos ministérios

• Dados de Janeiro de 1995 a

Dezembro de 2013 (228

months)

• Anélise de Componente

Principal (PCA)

Custos

de

Coalizão

Número de

Ministérios

Gasto

Ministerial

Pork

(19)

(20)

(21)

(22)

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Custos de Gerência de Coalizão no Brasil, 1995-2013. ICG

(24)

(25)

Conclusões

• Gerência de coalizões importa para o custo de

governabilidade e sucesso legislativo do presidente em

um ambiente multipartidário

• “e o preside te ão faz o dever

-de-

asa ao o tar

coalizões com um menor número de parceiros,

ideologicamente homogêneas e não compartilha poder

de forma proporcional com os seus aliados, não

importa o quanto o presidente gaste, este não

consegue mais apoio do legislativo.

(26)

(27)

Crenças do Eleitor e Avaliação do

Governo

(28)

• Technical steps

–

Formative Index: causality

flows from the indicator to

the construct

(Diamantopoulos and

Winklhofer, 2001; Edwards

and Bagozzi, 2000).

–

Instead of defining weights

arbitrarily, we let the data

variance define it.

–

Time series decomposition to

handle seasonal variation and

random variation.

–

One factor extraction,

accounts for 70% of the

variance.

Índice de Custo de Governabilidade - IGC

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Scree Plot CGI

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(29)

Governing Cost Index - GCI

Limitations

Nature of variables: mixing stock

(cabinet and jobs) variables and flow

(budget and pork) variables in the same

index.

Scale problem: PCA demands

standardization. Is it feasible to have a

composite index with so different

measures?

Innovation and advantages

It measures different levels of

resources

mobilization to buy

support.

However, with the advantage of

comparing between and within

presidents

15 20 25 30 35 40

94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14

Year T o tal n um b er of c ab ine ts term Cardoso1 Cardoso2 Lula1 Lula2 Rousseff1 23.5 24.0 24.5 25.0 25.5

94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14

(30)

Coalition Management

Matter...

–

Ideologically heterogeneous coalitions and disproportional cabinets tend to be more expensive

over time;

–

Presidential decisions about how to manage coalitions influence governing costs, even when

controlling for exogenous constraints;

–

Spend more political and financial resources with coalition allies does not necessarily lead to

greater political support for the president in Congress.

...and do so over time



partners get tired of being mistreated

–

Increasing

coordination problems

can lead to

political crisis

due to

presidential coalition

choices

rather than institutional malfunctioning

• Implications to the literature:

–

We may need to consider downplaying the role of constitutional and agenda

powers of the executive overcoming the centrifugal governability problems and

costs of multiparty presidential regimes.

–

If the president does not do the homework of managing well his/her coalition,

increasing the cost of governing does not necessarily generate more legislative

support, but rather it leads to intertemporal cycling majorities and presidential

defeats in Congress.