N9 180
BRAZIL - CONDITIONS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY
Mario Henrique Simonsen
-BRAZI L - CONDI TI ONS FOR ECONOMI C RECOVERY
1. I NTRODUCTI ON
From 1920 ~hrough·1990 Brazil has crea~ed a repu~a~ion of a high savings and high gro~h coun~ry. Real ra~es of gro~h of GNP were kep~ around 6 percen~ a year for ~his si~y year period: moving up~o approxima~ely 7 percen~ a year be~ween 1960 and 1980. Infla~ion ra~es were also unusually high compared ~o ot.her coun~ries, making price ins~abili~y par~ of ~he Brazilian way of life, average annualinflation ra~es staying at approximately 30% be~ween 1960 and 1990. A1 ~hough there is no evidence that infla~ion con~ribu~ed to economic gro~h, ~he fac~ is tha~ ~he Brazilian experience dismissed ~he old parable according ~o which chronic inflation and sustained gro~h cannot be reconciled. Widespread indexation was probab1y ~he reason why inf1a~ion at ra~es from 20 to 40 percent a year were norma1ly accepted from the mid si~ies ~o the late seventies.
Suddenly. in the 1980s the Brazi1ian economy lost a11 its momentum. Average annual economic gro~h rates receeded to 1.6%. less ~han the rate of population gro~h. Infla~ion rates moved up ~o 100% per year in 1990 • 200% in 1983 and after 1986 ~o er·ratic figures ranging from ~emporary price stabilization to hyperinfla~ion. Until mid 1994 ~he economic slowdown was na~urally explained by the need ~o adjust the balance of paymen~s, firs~ ~o the second oil shock. ~hen
in~ernational interes~ ra~es. and finally to vo1untary e~erna1 1ending by commercial banks.
to ~he In the rise of collapse of facto what ~hen happened in Brazil was also occurring throughout Latin America. 1arge1y as lhe lagged impacl of the 1981/82 world recession. Yet. the e~ernal problem appeared to be solved in 1984 by a 13 bil1ion do1lar lrade surplus. and in the second half of lhe year the economy was already recovering at a 8 percent annual gro~h rate. sustained unlil early 1987. Inflation. now running at 240% a year appeared as the only remaining big economic disease. Even under widespread indexalion. that. waS viewed as too much price instability. Now. indexation .... as a1so diagnosed as part of the problem. since i t was lhe source of
infIationary inertia.
On
February. 28. 1986 President Sarney announced a "heterodox" stabilizalion programo the Cruzado Plano The lheory was to cure inflalion by a painless standsill 01"1 indexation. The practice was nol much more than a naive general price freeze. The inilial response was ·euphoria. lhe final result a dismanlling af the real side of the economy and the resumplion of inflalion al unprecedenled rales. The rise and falI of lhe Cruzado Plan will be discussed in detail in seclion 3 of this paper. since i l played a crucial role in the subsequent deveIopmenls of the Brazilian economy.The problem is lhal lhe reaclion of Brazilian policy
-+-makers to the failure of hererodox shocks was to challenge lhe principIe of !nduclion. namely. if an experimenl fails. lry i l again unlil i t proves to be a success. This unusual phylosophic post.ure t.ransformed Braz!l into a laboratory of macroeconomics. the Cruzado PIan being followed by four other helerodox shocks. t.he Bresser Plan (june. 1987). t.he Summer Plan (january. 1989). the Collor PIan I (March. 1990). t.he Collor Plan 11 (February. 1991). In t.his five year period t.he boiling imaginalion of offic!al economic advisors produced not.hing. less than lhree monelary reforms. which means that. Brazil had four differenl legal currencies in less than five years; five price freezes; t.hree "t.ablit.as" t.hat. changed cont.raclual values so as t.o adjusl them t.o imaginary changes in inflalionary expeclalions; a capilal levy on financiaI asset.s (Collor I). ato rales from
a
lo 35 percenl; a violenl sequeslrat.ion of financiaI asset.s (Collor I; numberless changes in indexat.ion rules. including to at.lempls lo prohibit. escalalor clauses (Summer Plan and Collor 11); various different. exchange rale rules. counlless changes in lax laws and capital markel reguIalions. In domeslic frolll. various lypes of public seclor defaull. including debentures of Slale o~led companies wilh lhe guaranlee of lhe Nalional Treasury. In the externaI front. a formal noisy moralorium in 1987. followed by a resumplion of paymenls in 1988. lhen a polile suspension of payment.s in 1989 lhal became aggressive in 1990 and polile again in 1991. In t.he meant.ime a new Const.itulion was voled as a symbol of t.he ret.urn of t.he count.ry t.o democracy.highly complicaled. i l is romanlic. nat.ionalistic
Besides b€"ing and populisl.
Ye~. i~ pro~ec~s individual righ~s ~o a reasonable exten~ ~ha~ has been ignored by ~he he~erodox shocks.
In shor~. wha~ happened a~~er 1986 is ~ha~ Brazil was ~rans~ormed in~o a marke~ economy where ~he rules o~ ~he gama can be changed a~ any momen~ by a Presiden~ who ~rus~s his he~erodox advisors. Changes a~~ec~ proper~y righ~s. valid con~rac~s. of~en disrespec~ing ~he Cons~i~u~ion. a disrespec~ ~ha~ can be easily perceived even by ~hose ~ha~ never a~~ended any class in a Law SChool. Collor Plan l. ~rom ~his poln~ o~ view. elabora~ed by a ~ew economis~s wi~h a marxis~ background bu~ recen~ly conver~ad 'lo capi~alism •. is a caleidoscope of ilegali~ies.
The conclusion is ~ha~ ~he main obs~acle ~o ~he resumplion o~ economic gro~h in Brazil is macroeconomic ins~abilily and uncer~ain~y. There are. o~ course.
bu~ none o~ ~hem appears ~o be ~ha~
~echnical economic problems. di~~icul~ ~o solve. The external deb~ is easily manageable. given i~s propor~ion ~o GDP and ~he oppor~unit.ies o~ a Brady Plan agreemen~. Fiscal de~icils should be elimina~ed. bu~ more impor~an~ ~han ~hat. is ~o reslore 'lhe credi~wor~hiness o~ governmen~ deb~. domes~ically and abroad. Brazil.' indeed. has never been an overindeb~ed coun~ry by in~erna~ional standards. in ~erms o~ objec~ive parame~ers. The problem is ~ha~ a bur~ch o~ academics decided ~ha~ the country could no~ honor its obliga~ions. Once ~ha~ was es~ablished as a hypo~hesis. i~ became a self ~ul~illing prophecy. In ~ac~. external ~inancing dryied up. and domes~ic real in~eres~ rates escala~ed ~o ~igures ~ha~ canno~ escape some ~ype o~ de~aul~. The objec~ive lesson is ~ha~ a main condi~ion ~or economic prosperity is the removal o~ uncer~ain~ies by sel~-esleem. This is exactly wha~ Brazil has los~ since ~he ~ailure o~ ~he Cruzado Plano
2. THE EXTERNAL DEBT PROBLEM
In 1974 ~he new Geisel adminis~ra~ion ~aced unprecedenled ~rade and current account de~icits. $4.7 billion and $7.1 billion. respect.ively. This was partly the result of the quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC but also and to a large extenl the laqq~d response to the expansive monelary policies in 1972 and 1973. The additional oi1 import bill was almosl matched by exporl
growlh. from $6.2 billion in 1973 ~o $8 billion in 1974. The real ~rouble was ~he 104~ increase in dellar impor~s. from $6.2 ~o $12.6 billion. Average impor~ prices had increased 50%. bu~ impor~ed quan~i~ies also expanded 3ô~. sugges~ing ~ha~ Brazil was ~rying ~o grow beyond i~s possibili~ies.
Tha~ adjus~men~ policies were necessary and ~ha~ ~hey should be bridged by a ~emporary increase in e~ernal indeb~edness was ~oo obvious ~o be a ma~~er for con~roversy. Where opinions were largely spli~ was on how adjus~men~ should be achieved and a~ whal speed~
The compromise solulion kep~ Brazil growing no~ a~ 10~ bu~ al a 7~ annual average be~ween 1974 and 1979. An ambi~ious inveslrnen~ prograrn financed by bo~h dornes~ic and e~ernal savings was irnplemenled ~o fos~er expor~ growlh and fur~her irnpor~ subsli~ulion. I~ was recognized. however. ~ha~ i~ could only yie1d long-~errn resul~s and ~ha~ irnrnedia~e ac~ions were necessary ~o reduce ~he curren~ accoun~ defici~. The rnos~ na~ural choice mighl have been a real exchange-ra~e deva1ua~ion. This was discar~ed for ~wo reasons. Firs~. because policy-makers feared ~ha~. given ~he backward-looking wage indexalion regime. a real exchange-ra~e devalua~ion would perrnanen~ly lif~ ~he inf1a~ion
ra~e. Second. because i~ wou1d irnpose heavy losses on e~ernally
indeb~ed firrns. underrnining confidence in ~he exchange-ra~e rule and discouraging fur~her borrowing abroad. Hence. Brazil once again chose ~he roule of cornplica~ion: increased subsidies ~o rnanufac~ured expor~s. higher irnpor~ du~ies. increased ~axes on oi1 produc~s and prior deposils wi~h zero nominal in~eres~ ra~e on a 1arge lis~ of irnporl i~erns. Moreover. some non-essencial irnpor~s. sush as aulornobiles. were sirnply prohibi~ed.
Al~hough highly deba~able in lerrns of efficien~ resource al1oca~ion. ~he expor~ incen~ives and impor~ surcharges yielded some imp~essive resul~s un~il 1977. A simula~ion made by the Minis~er of Finance in ear1y 1975 sugges~ed ~ha~ an annual irnprovemen~ of $1.3 billion in ~he non-in~eres~ curren~ àccoun~ balance was consis~en~ with a con~rolled increase in externaI indebtedness. Ne~ foreign deb~ would escala~e ~o a $35.5 biIIion peak in 1991. ~hen gradually decline. The rnagic policy number. $1.3 billion a year. cor r esponded ~o one fifth of the non-in~eres~ curren~ accoun~ defici~ in 1974. The simulation. an
in~eres~!ng documen~ on how balance of paymen~s projec~ions were made in Braz!l in ~he mid-seven~ies. helps ~o !den~ify when ~he Brazilian adjus~men~ program ac~ually began ~o slow and why ~he deb~ incresase ran ou~ of con~rol.
Wha~ ac~ually happened was ~he !ncrease of ~he country·s foreign deb~ ~o 90 billion dollars in 1982. because of the second oil chock. and because of ~he escala~ion of ~he dollar interest ra~es. Since early 1981 ~he government decided to implemen~ ~igh~ mone~ary and fiscal policies ~o preven~ the deple~ion of exlernal reserves. forcing the country ~o feel bitter taste of recession for ~he first ~ime since World War 11. Breaking the old rules of prudent debt management. the country was able ~o delay an externaI liquidi~y crisis by heavy shor~-~erm borrowing. even by overseas branches of' Brazilian banks. which used lheir access to money markets ~o exlend balance of' paymen~ loans ~o lhe coun~ry. The uns~able equilibrium was ~o come to disruption in la~e 1982. when the current account defici~ escalated to $16.3 billion and ~he Mexican mora~orium ~riggered the collapse of commercial bank recycling. To complica~e ~hings. Brazil·s export credi~s to a number of' developing countries became illiquid. As a resulto exlernal reserves were quickly depleied and Brazil had ~o apply ~o an IMF-suppor~ed adjustmen~ programo
The ini~ial programo approved by ~he IMF in February 1983. is ~o be remembered as a piece of ~echnical inep~itude. It assumed ~ha~ ~igh~ monelary and fiscal· policies. combined wilh a one-percen~ a month real exchange-rate devaluation. could increase Brazil·s ~rade surpIus from $700 miIlion in 1992 ~o $6 billion in 1993. It f'ailed lo dislinguish nominal from real public seclor defici~s in a largely indexed economy. Il assumed ~ha~. in spi~e of widespread backward-looking income i ndexali on and subslan~ial indirecl ~ax increases and subsidy culs. inf'la~ion rales could easily recede from 100~ in 198Z lo 70% in 1993. Il appears. in relrospect. lahl lhe haslily prepared program was in~ended lo convince commercial banks lo roll-over lhe principal. mainlain commercial creàit and inl~rbank f'acililies. and increse ~heir Brazilian exposure by a projecled $4 biIlion.
In February 1983 lhe Brazilian authorilies concluded that a 30% real exchange-rale devaluation was absolutely necessar·y in
order to improve the country's external performance. Acccordingly. a second letter of intent to the IMF. revising the inflation target to 90%. substituted the one previously approved. S1nce inflation rates escalates immediately to 200% a year. lhe public sector deficit iocreased swiftly in nOT~nal values Calthough not in real terms). And since the performance cri teria agreed upon with the IMF were deterrnined in current cruzeiros. the country was considered as not complying with the terms of it~ second letter of intento As a resulto in May the IMF decided to suspend the disbursement to the second insta11ment of .the extended credit facility. Commercial banks. who trusted blindly in IMF wlsdom. did the same wlth the new money facllity and reduced both money TAarkel exposures and commercial credits to lhe country.
As a resulto Brazil had to face an unprecedented credit crunch. which forced externaI adjustment as a budget conslraint. Exports grew from $20.2 billion in 1982 to $21.9 billion in 1983. and could have grown much more had they been supported by adequate commercial credit facilities. Imports fell from $19.4 to $16.4 blllion. partly because of the increase in domestic oi1 pro~uction and the 3.2% decline in real GNP. but especially because' they were subjecl to slricl rationing. The trade surplus consequently increased to $6.7 billion. and lhe non-interest currenl accounl balance lo a $2.7 billion surplus. Foreign exchange controls were made inevilable and as a consequence. lhe black markel rale prernium escalaled from lhe lradilional 25% level lo nolhing less than 90%.
A new agreemenl with lhe IMF was evenlually established in December. 1983. The IMF had conceded lhal fiscal policies should no longer track lhe nominal bul rather lhe real public seclor deficil Cwhich. incidentally. should turn into a surplus). It also recognized lhat inflation was hard to fighl as long as backward-Iooking wage indexalion rules were in force. Whal mighl have been a reasonable solution. namely. adjusling rents. wages and mortgage inslallments for 80% of pasl inflalion. was rejecled by lhe Congresso An unforlunate compromise solution was to keep lhe 80% dampening coefficient for rents and to adjust wages according to a regressive rule. which fully compensaled lower wages for past inflation while squeezing middle-class incomes.
In any case. i~ accep~ed by the I~W.
Under ~he new adjus~ment programo commercial banks supplied a $6.5 billion new money ~acili~y in early 1984. I~ basically served ~o clear in~eres~ arrears and restore ~he coun~ry's reserve posi~ion. In ~ac~. in 1984 Brazil did no~ absorb e~ernal capi~al since i t was able ~o score a small curren~ accoun~ surplus. The $13 billion trade surplus ~ar exceeded ~he IMF-supported targe~s.
Par~ o~ ~he improvemen~ o~ Brazil·s trade balance in 1984
can be a~~ribu~ed to economic gro~h in OECD especially in lhe Uniled Slates. Mostly. however. i l even~ual ou~come o~ lhe struclural adjuslmen~ policies in the mid-seven~ies. The coun~ry now exporled previously impor·~ed. such as sleel products. paper capilal goods. pe~rochemical produc~s. aluminum. e~c. in spi~e o~ impor~ liberaliza~ion (a~ leas~ in ~erms o~ s~andards). impor~s ~ell from $15.4 ~o $13.9 billion.
counlries. was the sel down wha~ i l and pulp. Moreover. ~he 1983 while ~he
economy was already growing a~ 4.6% a year. Thi s 1 argel y reflecls ~he effec~iveness o~ impor~ subs~i~u~ion policies. especially ~he increase in domes~ic oil produc~ion.
The capaci~y to sus~ain high ~rade surpluses should naturally bring Brazil·s foreign debl problem ~o an end. as happened with Sou~h Korea in the early eigh~ies. Excep~ ~ha~ 'lhe coun'lry decided ~o deplele i~s e~ernal reserves in la'le 1986 'lo
sus~ain a general price freeze. Then. e~ernal indeb'ledness was
of~icially ~rea~ed as a poli~ical problem. and on February. 20.
19a7. Presiden~ Sarney decreed ~he unila~eral suspension of in~eres~ and principal paymenls to commercial banks abroad. excep~ in ~he case o~ shor~ ~erm credi~ lines. A new agreem~T1'l
wi~h the IMF and commercial banks led ~he moralorium 'lo an end in la~e 1988. Then. once again. Brazil did no~ comply wi'lh 'lhe per·formance cri~eria on Tt\one~ary and fiscal policies. The IMF' suspended i~s e~ended Fund ~acilily. lhe same being done by commercial banks wilh parlial inleresl re~inancing. as usually 1 abel ed as "new money". And once again Brazil reciproca'led by sloppi ng lhe paymenl of i nleresl t.c the banks in mi d ,1 q;:::lq.
Excepl fer a recenl agreemenl on i nlerest arrears. lhe dt.=--bl preblem is slill lo be solved.
The figur·es under discussion are far frem i mpressive. lhe
'lo'lal public sec'lor debt wi'lh commercial banks being li mi ted to 52 billion dollars. 1 ess than 15 percen'l af GNP. The issue is 'lhat national pride requires some deb'l reduc'lion under a Brady Plan arrangemen'l. which in 'lurn depends on a IMF support.ed adjust.ment programo
It appears. retrospectively. that the Brazilian morat.oria benefited other Latin American coun'lries. such as Mexico and Venezuela. By playing 'lough wi'lh its credi'lors. Brazil encouraged banks 'lo strenghen 'lheir loan loss reserves and t.he Uni'led S'lates governmen'l 'lo sponsor deb'l reduc'lion programs. Except 'lhat. by doing,' 'lhis service 'lo i'ls Spanish speaking neighbors. Brazil damaged i'ls repu'la'lion a concep'l largely neglec'led even by some sophis'licated game theoris'ls. The cost.s af the los'l reputa'lion in 'lerms of reducedaccess 'lo foreign official credi'l. direc'l inves'lment and increased capi'lal flight. are hard to measure. bu'l hardly can be just.ified by 'lhe cash-flow benefits of in'leres'l arrears. Trade liberaliza'lion is probably 'lhe bes'l item of Presiden'l Collorts agenda for economic reformo Ye'l. i'l cannot produce meaningful dividends for a coun'lry wit.h res'lric'led access credi'l and capi'lal markets.
3. ruE RlSE ANO FALL OF ruE CRUZAOO PLAN
In 'lhe early eighties Brazilian economists became increasingly concerned with 'lhe supply side of inflat.ion. Widespread indexation leads to s'lrong infla'lionary inert.ia because of indexing lags. The effec'liveness of demand cont.rels througb monetary and fiscal policies is
unfavorable Phillips curves. As largely
challenged by highly known. s'licky nominal wages produce price rigidities. Indexation moves 'lhe prablem t.o 'lhe first deriva'live of 'lhe logari'lhm of prices. namely. 'lo rigid inflation rates. overexposed to supply shocks. In fact., successive adverse supply shocks could easily explain why infla'lion jumped by successive degrees from 20 percent. a year in 1970 to 250~'ÍÍ a year i m 1985.
On February. 28. 1986. Presiden'l Sarney announced his first he'leradox shock. t.he Cruzado Plano intended t.o st.ap infla'lion by a stands'lill on indexa'lion.
'lhe following:
8
a) Prices were frozen and the exchange rate was fixed at 13.80 Cz/$US. The pubIic was enIisted to defend vigorously the controls and the government cornrrdtted to a zero inflation target.
b) Wages were converted into cruzados by computing their average purchasing power in the last six months with an increase of 8% in general. and with a 15% bonus in the case of the min1mum wagei a·trigger point indexation clause was introduced with a threshold of 20%i
c) The same rule. except for the 8 percent increase. was extended to rents and mortgage payments;
d) Cruzeiro bills and demand deposits were immediately converted into cruzados. without write-offs. by a cut
zeros. Conversion rates for cruzeiro denominated
of three liabilities with future maturities were set to decline by a daily factor. start1ng February 28th. of 1.0045 until matur1ty. This convers1on rule did not appIy to indexed 11abilities.
The immediate success of the program was overwhelming. Consumers could compare supermarket prices with the listed official maximum prices and denounce violators to the police. according them the feeling that their voices could be heard. The fact that nominal wages were cut in some c~ses and adjusted substantially below past inflation in alI cases did not coaI off the popular support for the programo
Unt11 late May the Cruzado honeymoon was incredibly happy --- too happy to be sustainable. as the author!ties should have suspected. Inflat10n not only 1mmediately stopped wilh no recession. but retail sales expanded by 25% in real lerms. real estate prices doubled and stock prices exper1enced an unprecedented boom. In the wave of optimism Brazil was described by the Min1ster of Finance as a country with Swiss inflation and tw1ce Japanese growth. and the President decided lhat the price freeze that brought him so much popularity should be kepl unlil the memory of 1nflation was defin1tely erased. As for lhe bus1ness commun1ty. 1ts few concerns w1th low profit margins and with the political management of lhe price system were largely superseded hv euphoria arising from higher sales.
That this was a silualion ripe for demand inflalion to take off was the lesson ignored by BraziIian policy-makers. They did nol even react to some disquieting signals. such as lhe steep
increases in commodi~y ~u~ures and ~he rapid gro~h of ~he black-marke~ exchange-ra~e premi um. Plainly. demand was overhealed because o~ real wage increases. because ~he public sec~or defici~ aclually remained a~ 4.7% of GOP and because in~erest ra~e controls no~ only led to generous increases of M
1•
but a1so to a sizeable ex~ansion o~ M4' In short. monay was crea~ed much fasler than required ~o compensa~e for ~he decline in o~her financiaI assets help by the publico
Tha~ ~he Plan was ~o collapse a~ some point was plainly obvious. Oddly enough. the ~rigger-point was a new austerily fiscal package·announced six days a~~er the November eleclions (when the PMDB scored an overwhelming viclory). t,he so-called "Cruzado lI". The package was parliculary unforlunale, since i t skipped bolh expendilure. culs and income-~ax increases. Once again. economic advisors convinced Presiden~ Sarney thal. 1 n order to spare the 1 ower -i ncome groups. addi ~i onal t.ax revenues should be provided exclusive1y by excise ~ax increases on automobiles. cigarettes. beverages and liquors. gasoline and elec~rici~y. This ac~ually meant that a few products were submitted ~o price increases so high ~ha~ ~he inflation rate in November soared lo 6.5% a mon~h. Inflationaryexpectations
now reignl~ed to the'point o~ ~rans~orming the end of the freeze lnto a self-~ulfllling prophecy. The governmen~
wer-e price still tried to substitute price administra~ion for the previous price freeze. threatening viola~ors with strong penal~ies. However.al this pcint government threats were no longer credible. especially since the promise ~o keep prices unchanged had been broken by lhe Cruzado 11. The general perception of the business communily was now that costs o~ vio1ating price controls were substantially lower than benefits. since violations were to beccme the rule and no longer the exception.
Whether a more adequately designed fiscal package miqhl have rescued the Cruzado Plan is a controversial issue. Not only were relative prices plainly out of equilibrium. but nominal wages had already expanded too much to provide the neces:.ary credibility to support the "zero inflation target".
the balance of payments had already been ruined. In ~he remote possibilities of managing an unstable became sti1l more remote with the Cruzado 11.
10
Moreover. any case, equilibrium
P~iee explosion fo~eed Lhe gove~nmen~ Lo ~einL~oduee
sho~L:""~e~m indexa~ion. f'i~sL fo~ Lhe exchange ra~e (Lo prevenL a fu~~he~ collapse in e~e~nal reserves) Lhen on capi~al markeL ins~~umenLs (Lo prevenL capi~al flighL). As Lo wages. Lhe 'l~igge~-poinL Lhr'eshold of .Lhe C~uzado Plan became eff'eeLive in Janua~y 1987. forcing nominal wage adjusLmenLs a~ leasL every 'lwo monLhs.
Loose mone~a~y and fiscal policies. combined wiLp reindexa'lion. lif'led monLhly inflaLion ~aLes f~om 5.5% in Novembe~ 1996 ~o an unprecedenLed 21% figure in April. 1997. Even fo~ a counLry LhaLo p~oved Lha'l eh~onic infla'lion can be reconciled wiLh sus~ained economic g~o~h. Lhe ~wen~y-plus percen~ mon~hly infla~ion ~a~e seems inconsis~enL wiLh anything such as gro~h o~ imp~oved welfare.
The~e is li'l'lle 'lo commen~ abou~ ~he B~esse~ Plan (June. 1997) and Lhe Summer Plan (Janua~y. 1999). Bo~h we~e inLended Lo st.op infla~ion now by a mix of fiscal ~efo~m. moneLa~y aus~eriLy and a s~ands~ill on indexaLion. ExcepL Lha~ ~he fundamental ing~edien~. fiscal ~ef'orm. neve~ was implemen~ed: i~ was limit.ed ~o a few t.ax increases immediat.ely ma~ched by oLher ine~eases in public expendiLu~es. Unde~ ~hese ci~cums'lances. income policies we~e e~~emely shor~ lived. going in'lo pieces afLe~ a few mon'lhs.
A
mo~e d~ama~ic consequence was 'lha'l 'lhe f~equen'l change in indexa'lion rules. ~abliLas. e'le. des'labilized 'lhe demand for mone'la~y agg~ega~es. from M1 'lo M4' As a ~esul'l no'l even the eon~rol of money supply would be able ~o keep prices under eon'l~ol. The p~oblem g~adually ~an ou~ of con'l~ol afLe~ mid 1989. when economic agen~s became increasingly suspieious LhaL ~he new P~esiden'l. Lo be empowe~ed on Ma~eh. 15. 1990. ...ollld dec~ee a mo~a'lorium on domes'lic public debt. as t.he only posslble way 'lo avoid hyperinfla'lion. Tha~ opinion. in fac~. was openly def'ended by alI lef'L-wing candida'les. and also by a number cf ~igh'l-winged eeonomisLs. Needless 'lo say. i'l was 'l~ansformed in a sel'l-fulfilling p~ophecy. The f'ligh'l ouL of government. bonds led 'lo an increase in Lhe income veloci'ly of M4 ~ha'l could
'l~igger hyp~rinfla'l10n. Se. infla'lion ~a'les escala'led Lo only
84
pe~een'l a mon~h in Ma~ch. 1990. ~he end of Sarney·s government.. I~onically. Sa~ney·s las~ eeonomic Leam had 11t.~le t.o do wi'lh p~iees ~unning ouL of conLrol. since nobody expecLed 'lhal team
~o decree a domes~ic mora~orium. Wha~ provoked hyperinfla~ion was ~he knowledge ~ha~ ~eam would be replaced.
Wha~ would have happened had Collor's ~eam chosen ~o fully honor ~he domes~ic deb~. will never be known. since ~he
ac~ual choice was ~he moratorium rou~e. Conceivably. renewed confidence in public bonds would crea~e a s~rong defla~ionary pressure by res~oring the demand of M4' A new s~andstill on indexa~ion would be necessary to break infla~ionary iner~ia. bu~ the results migh~ have been sound and durable. if coupled wi~h a fiscal reformo Moreover. real in~erest ra~es migh~ have fallen subs~an~ially. as a resul~ of the reduc~ion of ~heir risk pre~.um components.
The actual choice was much safer in ~he very shor~ term bu~ highly doub~ful in the medium and long run. The sudden sequestration of 75 percent of the existing liquidi~y immedia~ely s~opped inflation in ~he firs~ si~y days of ~he plano I~ also dismantled ~he real side of ~he economy. Then. par~ of ~he seized liquidi~y was res~ored. since the blocked cruzados could be used to pay ~axes. deb~s and payrolls. Fiscal equilibrium was achieved only in ~he very shor~ run ~hrough a once for alI capi'~al I evy. A few mon~hs 1 ater i ~ became' obvi ous ~ha~ the whole magic had been a bluff. The liquidi~y freeze had reduced not only ~he supply. but also the demand of financiaI asse~s. wi~h no durabIe effec~ on price s~abili~y. The ~ax reform had been a temporary one. The durable effec~s were only further erosion in confidence in macroeconomic s~abili~y and financiaI markets. and in the capacity of ~he governmen~ to manage ~he economy. Infla~ion once escala~ed again ~o 20 percen~ a month in January 1991. while real GN? fell 4.6%. A new shock was then decreed. Collor 11. wi~h a ~emporary price freeze and the elimination of indexation. Once again the inflationary cycIe was repea~ed with a new economic team. inflation acceleratin0 to close to 20 percent a month in Oc~ober. 1991.
4 . CONDITIONS FOR RENEWED ECONOMIC GROWTH
From 1970 through 1979 Brazil's real GNP expanded at an average 7.6% a year. gross capi~al forma~ion corresponding to 22.6% of GNP. F'rom 19BO ~hrough 1989 the average rate of growt_h
receeded ~o 1.6~ a year. less ~han ~he ra~e o~ gro~h o~ popula~ion. while gross capi~al ~orma~ion s~ill averaged 20.8% o~
GNP. fhis s~a~iscal evidence clearly sugges~s ~ha~ wha~ made ~he
1990s a los~ decade ~or Brazil was no~ ~he decline in Foreign and governmen~ savings were ac~ually reduced.
was largely o~~se~ by an.increase in priva~e savings.
savings. bu~ ~ha~ ~a~ led ~o ~he collapse o~ gro~h was ~he increases in ~he capi~al/ou~pu~ ra~io.
Tha~ par~ly can be explained by· ~he increase in ~he
rela~ive price o~ capi~al goods. A~ cons~an~ 1990 prices. gross ~ixed capi~al forma~ion fell from 23.3 percen~ of GN? ~o 17.6
percen~ of GNP in ~he ~wo ~en year periods. The reasons were ~he escala~ion o~ ~he prices of public works. due ~o poli~ical injunc~ions; ~he chances in ~iscal policy. ~rom subsidiza~ion ~o heavy ~axa~ion o~ capi~al goods. And pro~ec~ionism. ~orcing inves~ors ~o purchase capi~al goods a~ higher prices ~han ~he in~erna~ional ones. The in~orma~ics law was ~he mos~ extreme. and even carica~ural model of pro~ec~iora of ~he 1980s.
Ye~. even ~he decline of inves~men~ in real ~erms hardly explains ~he falI of ~he ra~e of gro~h of GN? Capi~al cos~s increased. bu~ capi~al was~e was also eviden~. Tha~ par~ly can
be explained by ~he need ~o adjus~ ~he balance of paymen~s in ~he early years o~ ~he decade. as men~ioned in sec~ion 1. Ye~. a~~er
~he s~rong recovery be~ween 1984 and 1986. ~he following period of s~agna~ion and recession mus~ be explained by ano~her fac~or: macroeconomic noise. In fac~. capi~al was~e is made inevitable when ~he rules of ~he g~me are changed no~ only frequen~ly. but also in unpredictable ways. The five he~erodox shocks from 1986 ~hrough 1991 are an incredible ~ale on hys~erical economic managemen~.
Presiden~ Collor·s economic agenda includes some impor~anl i~ems ~o modernize ~he economy and ~o provide ~he basis for renewed economic gro~h. such as ~rade Iiberalization and privatiza~ion. Trade liberaliza~ion should not only fosler produc~ivily gro~h by compe~i~ion. bu~ a1so lower capital cos~s. removing one o~ ~he obs~acles ~o gro~h in ~he 1980·s. More impor~an~. perhaps. is ~he indirec~ effec~. Once an economy is opened policies ~o need in~erna~ional ~o be 13 compe~ition. macroeconomic
in~erna~ional s~andards. especially when ~rade liberaliza~ion is' coupled wi~h ~ree capi~al movemen~s. In shor~. policy-makers loose ~he power ~o implemen~ exo~ic economic policies. since ~hey will immedia~ely deple~e ~he coun~ry·s ~oreign reserves. For badly managed economies. ~his limi~a~ion on sovereign~y is a plus. and ~his now appears ~o be ~he case o~ Brazil. Even Mercosul. a limi~ed experimen~ in ~erms o~ economic in~egration promises ~o be help~ul as long as i~ will ~orce Brazil ~o keep a~ leas~ ~he s~andards o~ economic ra~ionali~y o~ Uruguay.
As ~o priva~iza~ion. ~he reason is clear: an overindeb~ed firm should sell par~ o~ i~s asse~s ~o pay off par~ o~ bo~h. i~s e~ernal and domes~ic deb~. Coe may argue ~ha~.
in~erna~ional s~andards. ~he Brazilian public
by objec~ive sec~or is no~ ac~ually overindeb~ed when compared ~o a· number OECO
coun~ries. The poin~. however. is ~ha~ lhe Brazilian governmen~ spoiled i~s credi~wo~hniness by successive mora~oria. Moreover. ~he public sec~or should inves~ in a number of sec~ors. such as highway cons~ruc~ion. are has no resources ~o do i~ a~ ~he !
momen~. Besides ~ha~. ~he capaci~y ~o save of governmen~ has been reduced. and some indus~rial sec~ors are likely ~o be much be~~er managed by ~he priva~e ~han by ~he public sec~or. All ~hese reasons add up ~o a s~rong emphasis on priva~iza~ion.
Fiscal re~orm is a inevi~able ingredien~ of ~he adjus~men~ policies. leading ~o some~hing as a 3 percen~ o~ GNP primary budge~ surplus. The problem is no~ ~he size o~ ~he publíc de~ici~t bu~ of ~he unwillingness o~ ~he popula~ion ~o finance ~he governmen~ because of ~he lack of con~idence on bo~h. money and public bonds.
AlI ~hese are necessary condi~ions ~or renewed economic gro~h. and na~urally ~hey should include' an IMF supportéd agreemen~ wi~h commercial banks ~o eIimina~e ~he deb~ overhang. o~herwise ~rade liberaliza~ion will be an useless exerci se. A psychological ingredien~ mus~ be added ~o make ~hese conditions no~ only necessary. bu~ also su~ficien~: ~he res~oration q~ governmen~·s credibiIi~y. Tha~ can only be achieved by sel~-res~rain~: ~he governmen~ should resign ~o par~ of its powers. subs~i~u~ing rules ~or discre~ion.
ENSAIOS ECONÔMICOS DA EPGE
(a partir do nº 100)
100. JUROS, PREÇOS E DíVIDA Pd3LICA VO~U~:E I: ASPECTOS TEÓRICOS
- Marco Antonio C. Martins e Clovis de Faro - lSa7 (esgotaoo)
101. JUROS, PREÇOS E DíVIDA PÚBLICA VOUn:E II: A ECG~Cf-:IA 8r('~\SILE.iRA - :';"7118:
- Ar'ton:c Sslazar P. Bra.ndão, ClólJis c<=
r-2I'O
~ ~\-"1lUJ A. Co i'artiro - 1937 '~G::I~T.a.-:O)10 2 o M ~. C R O E C :1 :'i DrU A K A L E C K I p, : ~ A - R u b e n 5 P e n h a C y s n e - 19 8 7
103. O PR~MIO
JO
DÓL~RNO
~ERCADo PARALELO,O
SUBFATURA~ENTODE
EXPORTAÇôES E O S~PERFAT~RA~~NTO DE IMPC~TAÇjES - Fernando de H~larda
Barbosa - Rube~s Penha Cysne e Marcos Casta ~oland3 - 1987 (esgctado)
104. BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE ~ITH EX~ERNAL DEBT ANO PROSPECTS FOR
GRC~TH-Fernando de Hol.anda 8a.;bosa and r'~3n1Jel S::;~C'r.8Z de_ La Cal - 1937 (:;::,ç'J:ÕJ:':::)
105 • KFYNES _ I ,j ~'A rr~T~ii~ .:l(:.i..J_~HU "A U' t.~L..U --~nLH" ri p(,o' U:JL. ICA' ,... - MI-, ... cnlO . , .. "ioua -l c'l ;:)1. VBlra-. 19"'~' !J/(2~;:::"''::0,. \
106. O TEoRE1"1.1l. DE FROBE~;IUS-PERRGN - Carlos Iva~l Simoflsen Leal - 1587
107. PoPULAÇ~O BRASILEIRA - Jess~ Montello-1987 (escotejo)
108. MACRO~CC~,;mnA - CAPíTL;LO 'JI: "Dn1P.~:DA POR ;:;OED.L\ E: A CURVA U-i!!
- Mario Henrique Simonsen e Rubens Penha Cysne-1967 (e3gctsdc)
109. M A C R O E C O i~ íJ rvJI A - C A
p!
T U L O V I I: li DE i"i;. ~J D A P 3 R E G A D A E A C U R V l\ ::::';- Mario Henrique Sir.iOnsen e Rubens PEnha Cysne - 1987 - (esgotacC!)
110. MACROECoNOMIA - MODELOS
DE
EQUIL1aRIO AGREGATIVOA CURTO
;~s:~- Mario Henrique Simonsen e R~bens Penha Cysne-1gB7 (esgcta~c)
111. THE- BAYESIAN FOUNDATIONS DF SOLUTION CDNCEPTS
DF
GA~ES - S6r~ioRibeiro da Costa W2rlang e TO:":1my Chir.-Chiu Tan - 1987 (esgotado)
-112. PREÇOS_ LíqUIDOS (PREçeS DE VALOR ADICIONADO) 'E SEUS DETERM!~~~TESi
DE PRODUTOS SELECIONADOS,
NO
PERíODO 1980/1º Semestre/1966-- Raul Ekerman -- 19B7
113. EMPR~STIMoS BANCARIoS E SALDo-M~DIo: O CASO DE PRESTAÇÔE3
- Clovis de Faro - 1988 (esgctaQo)
114. A DINAMICA DA INFLAÇAo - Mario Henrique Simonsen - 1988 (es~c~2do)
115. UNC~RTAINTV AVERSION A~lD THE OPTIMAL CHOISE DF PoRTFOLIO
-James - Dow e S~rgio Pibeiro da Costa Werlang-198a (esgotaoc)
116.
O
CICLO ECONÔMICO - Mario HenriqUE Simonsen - 1968 (esgctado)117. FOREIGN CAPITAL ANO ECONOMIC GROWTH - THE aRAZILI~N CASE ST~~Y
Mario Henrique Simonsan - 1988
118. C Dr1rJl O N K N O W L E D G E - S
é
r 9 i o R i b e i r o d a C o s t a We r 1 a n 9 - 19e
5( E~;~t!:a:tJ)119. OS FUNDAMENTOS D~ A~ALISE ~ACRDECONÔMICA-Prcf.Maric Henriq~2
Simonsen e Praro Rubens Pe~ha Cy,=ne - 1988 (es~o~2do)
120. CAPíTULO
XII -
EXPECTATIVA5S RACIC~AIS - Maric :~enriqu~Simonsen - 1988 (esgotado)
121. A OFERTA AGREGADA E
O
MERCADO DE TRABALHO - Prof. Mario Henriqu25 i m o n s e n e o r o f. R u b e n s P e n'h a C
y
s r. e - 1 9a
!3 (2 S 9 o t a do)122. HJtRCIA Ij\J;:-LPCIm·!~~:-\IA E HIFLAÇÃO n;Ei1ClriL- - Prof o r-1ario He'l:-: -:'J(~
Simonen - 1988 (esgotado)
123. ~lODELOS DO riOr-1[íl: ECC~;:::;i':IA [ P,D:'lI{n~jTRr\ç~G - ;.\ntonio r/iJl'i2 ' : :
Silllel.r;3 - 1:3:-':J
124 o 11 ~J ;I :::
rn
r·; IJr.
Ir:
r; ; I,~c
F E >< P C~ R T S,!] V [ R Pl V D I ~= I p,! r; LJ F Ir" P [HH S, M: [) T Hr:
DCl~,'\R Pf-'~f-:IU:: tJ~l T;I~: ilUH=K i"P.RKET - ;cruf. ;-F:!:"n~!rl(jc Cí: f!tJl ~n,-:J ~; ,-",': ;.1,
n f' n \ -- I [' " ,
c-
t'- ,~ '-, ,- 1('fJ" (~ .. ,-. .. "I'J)) 7. ~.
o
R [ 1r: ri
r ...
A
[,
J C O D D C Ho
Q LI [ H [ T ~r{
o
D (l)io -
F E' r fl a ri d o d f:I H 01 u ri d;) [3 ~ t' ti (lAntora5o 5LlID7.i.Jf Pf:::-'SCJú EJl"dnCi.JO c CIClvis de rafO - 1900 (esYl1tad
) 2 (,. P L Af.! ti C R U UI D CJ: C C r;~. [ p
ç
1HJ [
O E R R (1 D [ P O L 11 ] C A rIS C A L - R u b [' n ~Penhu
~y~n~-
190B
127.
lAX/J. [)[ JUr.D? rLU1Uf,!nE VERSUS CORREÇr\Q t-~Ot;[l4F:IA O'"SPRESTJlç.UE:
ur",; cor·~'prd·;:r,ç.hlJ r~o C;'.50 DO 5flC ( JrJFLAÇT\O COf,SlhtnE - C)ovi~ de-féJro - 198[,
128. CAPíTULO lJ - ~Of~E1AP.Y
CORREC1IO!\
ArJD REAL IN1ERES1 ACCOUrnli;C;-
.Rub~ns P~nh2Cysne -
1988129.
CAPi1UlO 1:1 -
I~CO~[ ANDDEMA~OPOLICIES
l~BRAZIL -
Rubcn~Penh~ CyEn~
-
1908
130.
CAP11ULOIV -
BRAZILIA~ ECO~OKYIN
lHEEIGHlIE&
AND lHEOEBl
CRISIS -
Rub8r.E PEnha Cysne -
190B131.
lHE
8R~Z!llANAGRICULTURAL
POLICY
EXPERJENCE:
RATIO~AlEAND
fUIUR[ D1R[['110r~S -Antonio 5ê1õzar PesEoa Brandão - 198e
132.
r·~Of\f:,O~:IA lrnEF.!~h, D1vIDA PÚBL1CA EJUROS
RUnS -r-'.ariõ
Silviê8asto~ n2rqu~s
e SÉ:-gio Ribeiro da Costa
l~erlõng- 1985
133.
C A P1
1 U L O I>: -
1 E O R 1 A D O C R [ S L: I ~í EIn
Q E C O t-;ô
r-a c
O - t'i a ri
o H e n ri
C; lo; 2Sirr,ons2:-1 - 1988
13l; • COt~GEU\r'~U:T8 COr-j I\BOtW SALARIAL GERANDO EXCESSO
DE
D01M~DA-- JOéc;uim \Iie:irc. Ferrei!'ê: Levy e SÉrgio
Ribeiro
dêCosté
lLierléng 19:'135.
AS ORIGENS E CONSEQutNCIAS
DA
I~FLAÇAoNA
A~ERICA lAT!~Afernando de Holande Barbosa - 1988
136. A
CONIA
7CORRENTE DO GOVERNO -
1970-1988 - Mario Henrique
Simonsen - 1989
137.
A REVIEU OIJTHE
THEORY DF cor!.:"or~ KNOlL1LEQGE-
S~rgi~Ribeiro da Costa Werlang - 1989
138. KACRCECG~OMIA
- Fernandc de Holanda Barbosa - 1989 (esgotadu)
139.
TEORltl
DO EhLp.I~CO DE PAGAr·~ENTOS:Ur--1A ABORDAGEM
SIMPLIFIC~[)A-- João Luiz
Ten~eiroBarroso - 1989
..1 ~ O. C O t~ TA 8 I l I D!>, D E C O t-', J U R O S R E A J S - R U B Ui S P E li li A C Y 5 tJE - 1 989
1~1. "CF:EDli Rt\TIONlr~G At.;[) THE PERI'~M:[I\T It:CO~'1~ HYPOTHESIS" - Vicente ~f.adriçJlt
Tommy Tan, Daniel Vicent, S~rgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang -
1989
1~2. liA AI-lAZONIA BRASILEIRAJI
- Ney Coe de Oliveira -
1989
143.
D~S!G!ODAS LFTs E A PROBABILIDADE IMPLICITA DE
MORA1(~IA ~~ri2 Silvia Eastos ~arquEs e S~rgio Ribeiro da Costa14~. THE LDC DEBT PROBLEI-l: A GAME-THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Mario Henrique Simonsen e Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa \.Jerlang - 1989
.
145.
ANALISE CONVEXA NO Rn - Mario Henrique Simonsen -1989
146.
A CONTROvERSIA MONETARISTA NO HEMISFERIO NORTE Fernando de Holanda Barbosa - 1989..
("" J . •147. FISCAL REFOR~ /\ND ST/\8iLIZATION: THE BRAZllIr.N EXPERIENCE - FcrnClndo de Hn1.,õl(Ll
1 'i 8. l~í';TOíLO::; El·1 EDL;C;,,;J:O
C~tlos Iv~n Si~on3cn
NO ARASIL: 1976-1986
Leal e Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa \\0rlang - 1989: 149. PREF\~Rr.~:CF-;S I CO:-El0:-: KNO~IJLEDG8, ANO Spr;CUL,\TIVE TfL\DE - James DO'.-I,i
Vicente Macicigal, S~rgio Ribeiro da Costa Wcrlang - 1990 150. EnUCACXO 8 DISTRIBUrçXO DE RENDA
Carlos IV.::ln Sirnons0n - LeÇll o Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa - 1990
151. OBSERVAÇUES À 1·1ARGS~r DO TRABALHO "A Ai,iA zO~n A BRAS I LEI RA" Ney
Coe de Oliveira - 1990
152. PLA~O COLLOR: UM GOLPE DE MESTRE CONTRA A INFLAÇ~O? - Fernawlo de Holanda Barbosa - 1990
153. O EFEITO DA T'.~XA DE JUROS E DA INCERTEZ.r, SOBRE A CURVI\ DE PHn.r,H'S
DA ECONOMIA ERASILEIRA - Ricardo de Oliveira Cavalcanti - lSJQ
154. PLANO COLLOR: CO~TRA FACTUALIDADE E SUGESTOES S03RE À CONDUÇ~~ DA POLíTICA ~ONETÁRIA-FISCAL - Rubens Penha Cycne - 1990
155. DEPÓSITOS ~O TESOURO: NO BANCO CENTRAL OU NOS BANCOS COME~CI~IS? Hubons Penna Cys:1(: - 1990
156. SISTEMA FINA~C~IRO DE HABITAÇAo: A QUESTÃO DO DESEQUILíBRIO DO FCVS - Clovis de Faro - 1990
157. COi'lPLEr'íE~~'I'O DO FAScíCULO NQ 151 DOS "ENSAIOS ECO:·10r-lICOS" (h. !",~'i!\
ZuNIA 'BRi\SILEIRA) - Ney Coe de Oliveira - 1990 158. POLíTICA MCNETÁRIA ÓTIMA NO COMBATE À INFLAÇÃO
- Fernando de' Holanda Barbosa - 1990
159. TEORIA DOS JOGOS - CONCEITOS BÂSICOS - Mario Henrique Sihlon~n~ --- 1990
160. O MERCADO ABERTO BRASILEIRO: ANÂLISE DOS PROC~DIMENTOS OPCR~~:iJ·
~AIS - Fernando dE Holanda Barbosa - 1990
161. A RELAÇAo ARGITRAG~M ENTRE A ORTN CAMBIAL E A CRTN MO~IETÂRIA
-- Luiz Guilherme Schywura de Oliveira - 1990
162. SUI3!\DDITIVE lJ!,OB,\EnLITIES At"J) POHTFOLIO INERTL\ [,li'lL"jo 11vI::
Simonsen e S~rgio Ribeiro da Costa Wer1ang - 1990
1G3, W,CROECG::~':;F\ cC'\~ ~14 - c.v:1os Ivan Simons(m L0éü e Séroio Ribd ro <3,1 Cr ·!'.l
Wedang - 1990
164. ~ RE-EXÕ:iT~;r'.T1()7·J ()? ::(jLO~]'S GROt'ITH ~'O[)P.L t'JTTH ~\PPLTC~'j'r()~!~ '1'('
C,\PI':',o,I, ll;)·~'i:::::~·:ri':~ - ~:(:,ntro :::'--',')IjC'Cll-''''' riVi'no - I.'~)(;O
l(~~). '{,:!: ~)U(1.LJC C~~C:IC~.~ ~;;~í;I1'J()··J: ·V;\:~I1\'r,r):·~s O~l 'rp~·: '1'jfEr"1[': ()F :-... ·::Ti.:.' i" 1'"
\ : .'\ í\ F' .'\
;z ::: - ,\
n t c' r i o : 1 l1 r i" (1 : ' ~ i 1 V" i L r.' _. 1 () CI OlGG. 'fIlE nt),LIC criO[C!-~ 1-'!~r(SPECTIVE l\ND }":1'lIGIII1"S lf\i:;q'I'T'U'T'IO\ll\LlS'J' !',i';','
- l\ li t· C L ; o ; ::, C t ! d ,I :~ i. h' '. ~ j, l~':-i -- 1 9 () O
..
168. JAPANESE DIRECT INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL - Neantro Saavedra Riva no - 1990
169. A CARTEIRA DE AÇÕES DA CORRETORA: UMA ANÁLISE ECONOMICA-Luiz Guilherme Schymura de Oliveira - 1991
170. PLANO COLLOR: OS PRIMEIROS NOVE MESES - Clovis de Faro -1991 171. PERCALÇOS DA INDEXAÇAO"EX-ANTE - Clovis de Faro - 1991
172. NOVE PONTOS SOBRE O PLANO COLLOR 11 - Rubens Penha cysne-19991 173. A DINÂMICA DA HIPERINFLAÇAo - Fernando de H. Barbosa, Waldyr
Muniz Oliva e Elvia Mureb Sa11um - 1991
174. LOCAL CONCAVIFIABILITY OF PREFERENCES ANO DETERMINACY OF EQUILIBRIUM - Mario Rui Pascoa e Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Wer 1ang - Maio de 1991
175. A CONTABILIDADE DOS AGREGADOS MONETÁRIOS NO BRASIL - Carlos Ivan Simonsen Leal e Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang
de 1991.
maio
176. HOMOTHETIC PREFERENCES - James Dow e Sérgio Ribeiro da Cost~ Werlang -"1991
177. pARREIRAS Ã ENTRADA NAS INDÚSTRIAS: O PAPEL DA FIRMA PIONEIRA Luiz Guilherme Schymura de Oliveira - 1991.
178. POUPANÇA E CRESCIMENTO ECONÔMICO - O CASO BRASILEIRO - Mario Henrique Simonsen - agosto de 1991.
179~ EXCESS VOLATILITY OF.STOCK PRICES ANO KNIGHTIAN UNCERTAINTY -James Oow e Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang - 1991.
180. BRAZIL - CONOITIONS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY - Nario Simons"en - 1991 .
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