Rev. Adm. (São Paulo) vol.51 número4

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Revista

de

Administração

http://rausp.usp.br/ RevistadeAdministração51(2016)355–365

Environmental

management

Evidence

of

co-production

in

public

service

provision:

the

case

of

the

administrative

arbitration

centre

in

Portugal

Evidências

da

coprodu¸cão

na

presta¸cão

de

servi¸cos

públicos:

o

caso

do

centro

de

arbitragem

administrativa

em

Portugal

Evidencias

de

la

coproducción

en

la

prestación

de

servicios

públicos:

el

caso

del

Centro

de

Arbitraje

Administrativo

en

Portugal

Hugo

Consciência

Silvestre

a,∗

,

João

Ricardo

Catarino

b

,

Joaquim

Filipe

Ferraz

Esteves

de

Araújo

c

a_Universidade_da_{Integra¸cão}_{Internacional}_da_Lusofonia_{Afro-Brasileira,}_Núcleo_de_Políticas_e_{Administra¸cão}_Pública,_CE,_Brazil b_Universidade_de_Lisboa,_Instituto_Superior_de_Ciências_Sociais_e_Políticas,_Centro_de_{Administra¸cão}_e_Políticas_Públicas,_Lisboa,_Portugal

c_Universidade_do_Minho,_Centro_de_{Investiga¸cão}_em_Ciência_Política,_Braga,_Portugal

Received31May2015;accepted9May2016

Abstract

Co-productionincludesallactionswherecitizensassist,asvolunteers,intheprovisionofservicesbypublicagenciesinordertoincreasethe efficiencyandefficacyofthepublicservicesprovided.Thispractice,knownasco-production,isbeingadoptedbygovernmentsintheresolution ofconflicts,particularlythoseregardingadministrativeandfiscalmatters.However,isco-productionamoreefficientandeffectivewayofsettling disputesinadministrativeandtaxareasthanthetraditionaladministrativemodel?Andwhy?InPortugal,theAdministrativeArbitrationCentre wascreatedin2009withtheaimofresolvingdisputesbetweenpublicadministrationandtaxpayers/serviceusersbymeansofco-production.The availabledatasupportthethesisthatefficiencyandefficacyarehigherundertheco-productionmodel.Nevertheless,usersarenottotallysatisfied sincethecostsassociatedwiththeuseofthisserviceprovisionmodelarealsohigher.

©2016DepartamentodeAdministração,FaculdadedeEconomia,AdministraçãoeContabilidadedaUniversidadedeSãoPaulo–FEA/USP. PublishedbyElsevierEditoraLtda.ThisisanopenaccessarticleundertheCCBYlicense(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Keywords:Co-production;Publicservices;Efficiency;Effectiveness;Portugal

Resumo

Acoproduçãocompreendetodasasaçõesemqueoscidadãosauxiliam,numabasevoluntária,aprestaçãodeserviçospelasagênciaspúblicas demodoamelhoraraeficiênciaeeficáciadosserviçospúblicosprestados.Estaprática,denominadacoprodução,éummodelo quemuitos governosestãoaadotarparaaresoluçãodeconflitos,nomeadamenteemmatériaadministrativaefiscal.Masseráacoprodu¸cão,comparadacom omodeloadministrativotradicional,ummodomaiseficienteeeficazderesolu¸cãodelitígiosnocampoadministrativoetributário?Eporquê?

EmPortugalfoicriadooCentrodeArbitragemAdministrativa,em2009,comointuitoderesolveroslitígiosentreaAdministrac¸ãoPúblicano

PeerReviewundertheresponsibilityofDepartamentodeAdministrac¸ão,FaculdadedeEconomia,Administrac¸ãoeContabilidadedaUniversidadede SãoPaulo–FEA/USP.

∗_{Corresponding}_author.

E-mail:[email protected](H.C.Silvestre).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rausp.2016.07.007

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campoadministrativoetributárioeosseusutilizadores,numalógicadecoprodução.Osdadosdisponíveissuportamatesedequeaeficiênciae eficáciasãomaioressobalógicadacoprodução.Contudo,osusuáriosnãoestãototalmentesatisfeitosdevidoaoscustosassociadosàutilização destemodelodeprestaçãodeserviços.

©2016DepartamentodeAdministração,FaculdadedeEconomia,AdministraçãoeContabilidadedaUniversidadedeSãoPaulo–FEA/USP. PublicadoporElsevierEditoraLtda.Este éumartigoOpenAccesssobumalicençaCCBY(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Palavras-chave: Coprodução;Serviçospúblicos;Eficiência;Eficácia;Portugal

Resumen

Lacoproduccióncomprendetodaslasaccionesenlasquelosciudadanosayudandeformavoluntariaalosorganismospúblicosconelfinde mejorarlaeficienciaylaeficaciadelaprestacióndeserviciospúblicos.Estaprácticaesunaalternativaquemuchosgobiernosestánadoptando parasolucionarconflictosenámbitoadministrativoyfiscal.¿Peroserálacoproducción,encomparaciónconelmodelotradicional,unaalternativa máseficienteyeficazpararesolverdichosconflictos?¿Yporqué?EnPortugalsecreóelCentrodeArbitrajeAdministrativoen2009,conelfin deresolverlosconflictosentrelaAdministraciónPúblicaylosusuariosdesusservicios,enlasesferasadministrativaytributaria,apartirdeuna lógicadecoproducción.Losdatosanalizadosrefuerzanlaopinióndequelaeficienciaylaeficaciasonmayoresenunalógicadecoproducción. Sinembargo,losusuariosnoestánplenamentesatisfechosrespectoaloscostosrelacionadosconelusodeestemodelodeprestacióndeservicios. ©2016DepartamentodeAdministração,FaculdadedeEconomia,AdministraçãoeContabilidadedaUniversidadedeSãoPaulo–FEA/USP. PublicadoporElsevierEditoraLtda.Esteesunart´ıculoOpenAccessbajolalicenciaCCBY(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Palabrasclave: Coproducción;Serviciospúblicos;Eficiencia;Eficacia;Portugal

Introduction

Theengagementofcitizensintheproductionofpublic ser-viceshas recentlybecome an importanttopicin thestudy of publicpolicyandpublicmanagement(Eijk&Steen,2014).This

engagementhastakenontheconceptofco-production,which

hereweassumetobeallactionsinwhichcitizensassistpublic agenciesonavoluntarybasisinordertoimprovepublicservice provision(ibid,p.2).Theseactionsonthepartofthecitizens includeanycontributionintermsof time,effortand informa-tiontoprovidepublicservicesorproducegoods(Alford,2009).

Theterm co-productionfirst appearedintheworkof Oström

andher colleagues inthe 1970s. Thisconcept was first used todescribethepossiblerelationshipbetweenthosewhodeliver services(civilservants)andtheusersoftheseservices.These usersthuscontributedtheirknowledgetoimprovetheservices theyused.Inthissequence,“byco-production,(...)(wemean)

the process through whichinputs used toproduce agood or

servicearecontributedbyindividualswhoarenot‘in’thesame organization”(Oström,1996,p.1073).

ThecurrentsituationresultsaftertheinfluenceofNewPublic

Managementwhichpromotedprivatizationandcontractingof

publicservicestotheprivatesector(Silvestre,2010).Although thereareseveralcriticismsofthismovement,itsideasstillfind

alotofsupportnowadaysamongthe governmentsof various

countriesandtheirdefenders(Joshi&Moore,2004).Originally,

this approach promoted power in professional management;

theuseofexplicitmeasuresofperformance;greateremphasis oncontrollingtheproduct;the breakdownof units;increased

competition;emphasisonmanagementstylespracticedbythe

privatesector;andgreaterdisciplineandparsimonyintheuse ofinputs(Hood,1991).Whatiscertain,however,isthatnoone knowsspecificallywhichorganizationalarrangementsarebest suitedtoprovidinghigh-quality,efficientlydevisedpublic ser-viceswhose results canbe substantiated (Alford &O’Flynn,

2012;Hodge,2000).Ingeneralitcanbestatedthat“thegeneral

beliefoftheexpertsisthatmostcountriesareagnostic”(Joshi

&Moore,2004,p.31)regardingtherightsandwrongsofthis

approach.

Theapproachproposedearlierwasbasedonthe susceptibil-ityofchoiceofserviceuserswho,bytheiractioninselecting whichgoodsandservicestheywouldliketouse,wouldincrease competitionamongpublicorganizationsoperatinginthesame sectorofactivity(Araújo,2013).Withgreatercompetition,one couldthenmakebetteruseofscarcepublicresourcesandthereby reduceorganizations’costswhileincreasingservicesquality.At

the sametime, therewould beevenmoreeffectiveness when

users evaluatedthe performanceandmeasured the qualityof

organizations thatprovidepublicservice.Theseorganizations

would theoreticallybe committedtoacomprehensivereform

both intermsof their structure andof their culture,as is the caseintheprivatesector(Jung,2010)wherecustomer satisfac-tion isparamount.Citizen thusbecamecitizen-consumers, or clients,exercisingtheirchoiceintheconsumersociety(Clarke,

Newman,Smith,Vidler,&Westmarland,2007).

One of the major criticisms of New Public Management

concernsitstheoreticalbasis,i.e.,itisbadlydefinedandbuilt

(Araújo, 2004).AccordingtoRadnorandOsborne(2013)the

movement’stheoreticalinfluencewasbasedontheexperience ofagenericmanagementtheorywhosecontributionsessentially resulted fromtheexperiencesof theprivatesectorandwhose activity,inturn,wasplacedatthemanufacturinglevel,where theproductwasconsideredcrucial(Radnor&Osborne,2013). Accordingtotheauthors,publicservicesdealprimarilywith ser-vicesratherthanproducts,sothetheoreticalsupportemployed in public sector reform is,under this theoretical perspective, poorlyconsidered.Theyalsoclamthatwhileproductsare tan-gible,servicesareintangible;hencetheobservedinconsistency, because themainjudgesof servicesshouldbetheirusersnot

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Thisinconsistencycanbeseeninthereformproposed,which valuedissuesrelatedtoefficiencyandeffectiveness,becausea reductioninpublicspendingwasrequired(Osborne,2013).This occurredthroughtheuseoftoolsandmodelsoriginatingfrom theprivatesector,suchastheLEANmodel,SixSigma,Process

Reengineering andTotal Quality Management. Although the

focusofthesemodelsandtoolstendstopromotetheserviceuser asakey partoftheorganization’saction,inrealitytheywere overlookedinprovidingthoseservices.Thus,insteadoflistening tousers,thisreformgaveprioritytotheevaluationsofthecivil servantsintheoperational base– thosewhodirectlyprovide thoseservicestousers–andwithachievingthegoalsdecided uponbytheirsuperiors(Radnor&Osborne,2013).Intheend, theemphasiswasonthemodeofoperationofexistingpublic

organizationsand ontryingto change theway theyoperated

internally,ratherthanontheintentionandnecessityofmeeting therealneedsoftheirusers.

Torectifythetheoreticaldeficienciesidentifiedinthe

pub-licmanagementmodelproposedbyNewPublicManagement,

thereemergedthegovernancemodel(Araújo,2013;Osborne,

2010),particularlyco-productionofpublicservicesasa mecha-nismforprovidingthoseservices.Co-production,aswasalready mentioned,hasbecomeanimportanttopicinthisareaof

knowl-edge because it requires the engagement of citizens in the

provision of public services (Eijk & Steen, 2014; Alford &

O’Flynn,2012).Thisapproachresultsfromthe inefficiencies

ofthepreviousmodel,onethatdidnotconsideruser require-mentsalthoughtheoreticallythat premisedid exist.Basedon thetraditionalmodelofpublicservicesprovision,inthiscase the administrative courts, we can ask the following research question:

Isco-productionamoreefficientandeffectivewayofsettling disputesinadministrativeandtaxareasthanthetraditional

administrativemodel?Andwhy?

Theresearchquestiontendstoconnectthreecentralconcepts inthisstudy:co-productioninregardtoefficiencyand effective-nessinprovidingpublicservices.Theanalysiswillfocusona researchdesignofthecasestudytype(Yin,2009).According

toYin(2009),casestudiesareveryusefultoanalyzethe

reg-ularityofaparticularsocialphenomenon.Tothisend,theaim ofthisstudy,inacomparisonwiththetraditionaladministrative model,seekstodescribeandunderstandwhetherco-production ismoreefficientandeffectiveintheprovisionofpublicservices whenbasedontheparticipationof itsusers.In thisparticular case,thisdescriptionconsistsindemonstratinghowindividual andcollectivecitizens’participationhasevolved inregard to theresolutionofconflictswiththetaxauthorityinPortugal.It shouldbenotedthat thisstudy focusesontheAdministrative ArbitrationCentrethatwascreatedinPortugalin2009withthe aim of resolvingtax-relateddisputes betweenthe Portuguese governmentandusersoftheservices.Thisoptionisjustifiedby thelackofstudiesofsimilarcases.Afteradescriptionofthe phe-nomenon,wewillseektounderstandthereasonsthat explain therelationshipbetweentheconcepts nowunderanalysis,by meansofasurveyamongthearbitratorsoftheabovementioned arbitrationcentre.

This paper starts by presenting the framework of

co-production, namely the conceptual characterization of this

approach.Next,the methodology seeks todefinethe choices

of the research.Thenwewill show theresults anddiscussed thembasedontheapproachthatisused,concludingthepaper withafinalreflection.

Co-productionofpublicservices

Asmentionedabove,theconceptof co-productionusedin

thisstudy isonethat considers allactionsinwhichinwhich citizensassist publicagenciesonavoluntarybasisinorderto improvepublicserviceprovision(Eijk&Steen,2014).The col-laborationofcitizensinprovidingpublicservices hasexisted formanydecadesinthepublicsector(Bovaird,2007).

Accord-ingtoPestoff,Osborne, andBrandsen (2006),theterm refers

toacitizen’sparticipationintheproductionofpublicservices, wherethatparticipationisdelimited.Althoughtheauthorsdonot mentionit,co-productionhascommonlybeguntobeusedinthe productionandprovisionofservicesbyprivateorganizations.

Unlikepublicorganizations,privateorganizationshavefora longtimekeptupalong-standing“arelationshipofexchange thatisaffordable,voluntaryanddirect”withtheusersoftheir servicesbecauseusersarenotobligedtoinfactpurchasethose services(Jung,2010,p.442).Thisrelationshipisbasedonthe interestsofconsumerswho,inturn,arewillingtodemandmore and better conditions from their service providers (Hilton &

Hughes,2013).AccordingtoHiltonandHughes(2013)these

requirements stem from consumers’ needs and expectations,

such as speed,convenience andaffordability when providing

theservice, asinthecaseofautomaticpayment at supermar-kets, self-service cheek-in when boarding aeroplanes (Hilton

& Hughes, 2013) or banking operations online or at ATMs.

Theauthorswouldlike tonotethatinthesecases,such prac-ticesdependontworequirementsinparticular:onconsumers’ demandforbetterservicesandatthesametimebeingwilling tousenewtechnology, forexample;andalso ontheir ability toacquiretheequipmentnecessarytoaccesstheseservices– consideringheretheservicesthatrequireinformation technol-ogy(IT).Attheendoftheprocess,customerswhouseITwill becomepartialcollaboratorsbecausetheyhelpprivate organiza-tionstoimprovetheirservicesbasedontheformer’sexperience. Thereis,however,oneaspectthatstandsoutfromthese exper-iments:theprovisionofservicesisregularandoccursthrough asupplier-serviceprofessionalrelationship(whatever the sec-tormay be),whereallparties contributewiththeir resources

(Bovaird,2007).

The provisionof public servicesisnot exclusivetopublic administration.Therecouldbecountlesscombinationsofforms of service provision that were especiallydeveloped inrecent decades(seeSavas,2000).Whichevercombinationisanalyzed

it is common toidentify numerous actors, apartfrom public

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serviceortheproductionofagood.Accordingtotheauthors,the reasonforthisliesintheneedtoconsidertheusersofpublic ser-vicesasafundamentalelement.Thishappensbecausetheywill betheoneswhodefinewhattheywanttouse,aswellasthe qual-ityofwhattheyareprovidedwith.Withouttheir consultation orengagement,itisdifficulttoconsolidatethis.Forexample, inthecaseofhealthservicesthecollaborationandparticipation ofthe patientthroughouttheprocessiscritical tothe success ofmedicalprocedures.Thesamegoesforrecyclingof house-holdwaste,wherethecollaborationofcitizens’collaborationin separatingwasteiscriticaltothesuccessofthispolicy.

Theco-productionofpublicservices:concept

Theconceptofco-productionhasaninaccurateand ambigu-ousmeaning inthe literature.The truthis that co-production

can take on various facets and moments, for instance:

co-governance, where third-party actors participate in planning andprovidingpublicservices;co-management,wherethe

third-party actors collaborate with the State in providing public

services;orco-production(notinanarrowsense),whichrefers tocitizens’participationinproducing,atleastinpart,thepublic servicestheywillbenefitfrom(Pestoffetal., 2006). Accord-ingtotheauthors,thelattertypecanincludeserviceswherethe relevantpublic authoritiesfund andregulatethembutarenot directlyinvolvedinprovidingthem.

InJoshiandMoore(2004)’sview,co-productionisdefined

asanyactionthatinvolvesserviceusers.Ingeneral,this involve-ment is not perfectly typified, since it is carried out on an

informal basis between users and State agencies. When this

informalityceasestoexistduetotheformalizationofaspecific law,itbecomesinstitutionalizedco-production.This institution-alized co-productionin turn requires that the engagement of usersintheprovisionofpublicservicesbecontinuedbetween publicagenciesandusers,soitisnotinformalasaresultofthe long-termrelationshipbetweentheparties.They alsosuggest thatthisdoesnotrequireacontractualrelationshipbetweenthe partiesinvolved,asisclaimedbytheadvocatesofNewPublic Management.Thisisbecausecontractsproscribevoluntary con-tributionandthiscannotbeconfusedwithcommercialtypesof arrangementssuchaspublic-privatepartnerships,forexample. According to Eijk andSteen (2014), the ability and will-ingnessofcitizenstoparticipateinimprovingtheprovisionof publicservices hasbeenshowntobe essentialfor thismodel toemergeasacredibleandfeasiblealternative,andis depend-entonthehumanandsocialcapitaloftheparticipants.Human capitalisbasedonsocioeconomicvariablessuchasthelevelof educationorfinancialcapacityofitsmembers,whilesocial cap-italdependsoneachmember’savailabilitytocontribute(Eijk&

Steen,2014;Joshi&Moore,2004).

Inthesamesequence,BovairdandLöffler(2013,p.100)base

their opiniononGovernance International(2011),for whom

co-productionaimsat“thepublicsector’suseoftheassetsand

resources of usersand communities toachieve better impact

and lowercosts”. According to them,the participants inthe processshouldpossesssomeessentialcharacteristics, namely thatservice users,thankstotheactualcontacttheyhavewith

thoseservices, knowhow toidentify thefeatures that canbe improved;andiftheyareabletodoso,theircontributionmay helptoimprovetheservice.Ifthecontributionisdependenton thewillingnessofusersandthereisnocontractualbasisbetween the parties,theorganization will benefitfromthisknowledge without having to offera financial reward for it. The citizen can influenceand improve the service,but alsocontribute to theimprovementinthequalityoflifeoftheentirecommunity he belongs to. Finally, the ruleis broken accordingto which public organizations should adopt apaternalistic relationship withtheusersoftheirservicesbecausetheybecomeparticipants; partnersandnotjustmererecipientsofpublicservices.

Thepositionofauserofpublicservicesinthismodeltakes ondifferentcontoursandfeaturescomparedtothosetheformer model.Inthepreviousmodel,thosewhomadeuseoftheservice should beconsidered ‘clients’,as isthe casein the commer-cialrelationshipthatindividualshavewithprivateorganizations, whosemainpurposeisprofit(Silvestre,2010).Theterm‘client’ meansthatthereisadirectrelationship,bymeansofapayment, betweenthosewhoconsumeacertainproductorserviceandthe organizationthatprovidesit;therefore,thereisadirect relation-shipwiththeorganization’sprofit(Radnor&Osborne,2013). Becauseoftheirimportance,‘clients’owntheempowermentas aresultofthefinancialconsiderationinvolved,ofselectingwhat theywillmakeuseof,havingthechoicerejectorconsumea cer-taingoodorservice(Jung,2010).Instead,citizenswhoareusers ofpublicservicesshouldtakeadifferentapproachbecausethey maybeinterestedtherewardsarisingfromtheirparticipation, thesolidarityenjoyedwithothermembersoftheircommunity, orjustthesatisfactionofcontributingtoacausethattheyfeelis

just(Eijk&Steen,2014).

To sum up, we can assert that the engagement of public

serviceusershasgraduallybeentakingplaceinrecentdecades, andthatlatelythedynamicshavebegrowinginthisapproach. Thisisduetotheincreasingscarcityofresources,whichdoes notallowthemtobewasted(Eijk&Steen,2014).Toavoidthis waste,itisimportantthatthemainbeneficiariesofpublic ser-vicestakeanactivepartinthedefinitionofthoseservices.Itis alsoaresultofthefailureofNewPublicManagementtoengage citizensandfostertheirparticipationinpublicserviceprovision

(Araújo,2013).Ifuserscanvoluntarilycontributetomakethis

happen, itis theoreticallyadvantageousfor public authorities becausebygatheringexpertisetheycanimprovethequalityof services.Itwillalsoaidintheconstructionofamorepluraland participatorypublicadministration.Forthesereasons,itis per-tinenttoexamineaspecificcasewheresuchacontributionhas beengiven.

Methodandtechniquesused

Researchdesignandselectionofthesector

Asmentionedintheintroduction,andbasedontheresearch questionanditsoverallobjectiveofstudy,theresearchdesign used will be of the case study type (Yin, 2009). According

to the author, this design is appropriate when studies are

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He alsomaintains that such researchdesigndoes not require controlofeventsandfocusesoncontemporaryoccurrences,so it should considerinternalvalidity (through the respondents’

understanding of the answers they submitted) and external

validity(whosegoalisthecorrectconnectionbetweenthetool

used for data collection and the conceptual approach used)

(Bryman, 2004). Internal validity is thus ensured since the

respondentsarewithintheconceptof co-producersasdefined

byOström(1996,p.1073):the“contributionofsubjectswhodo

‘not’belongtotheorganization”.Externalvaliditywasassured too,becausethequestionsthatrespondentswereaskedreferto the understandingof two distinctforms of dispute resolution withintheadministrativeandtaxfield–arbitrationcourtsand arbitrationcentres–regardingtheirefficiencyandeffectiveness. Inthatsense,respondentsdohavetheknowledgefromtheboth typesofserviceprovisionselectedforthisanalysis.

Forthepurposesofthisstudyaspecifictypeofco-production wasselected:co-planningandco-use,i.e.,thepartnership estab-lishedbetweenorganizations/subjects tocreatethearbitration court anduse that both public and private users make of it. Thisoptionisjustifiedbythedearthofstudiesonco-production outsideAnglo-Saxoncountries,whosesocial,politicaland eco-nomicproportionsaremarkedlydifferentfromotherrealities, includingthePortugueseone.Moreover,thisisanexploratory studyinwhichtheanalysisisperformedinviewoftheagents of the arbitration courts involved in providing the available services. It should be noted that responding agents are real

sourcesof knowledge,because theyare experienced usersas

wellasprovidersof services(they arejudgesof the adminis-trativecourts). Thus,these agents are ableto assesswhether thissolutionusingco-productionismoreefficientandeffective thanthetraditionalmodelofconflictresolution.Basedonreal andspecializedknowledge,itisjustifiabletoaskthem,which isespeciallyrelevantforthisstudyinternalvalidation.

Datacollectionandsources

Forthisexercisetobepossible,thedatawasinitiallycollected fromexistingdocumentationandfiles(Hood,2011)inorderto describethesocialphenomenonthatwillbetheaimofthestudy. AccordingtoYin(2009),thegreatadvantageofthesesources are:theyarestablebecausetheycanbeconstantlyupdated;they arenotobstructivesincetheydoesnotresultfrompreviouscase studies;theyareaccuratebecausetheycontainnames,references anddetailsofthesocialphenomenontobeaskedabout;andthey coverawiderangeofdataoverlongtimeperiodsandvarious events.However,therearesomeweaknessesintheselectionof thesesources,especiallybecause: theyaredifficulttoaccess; it ispossible toselect informationthat does not contemplate orcapturetheentirereality;andpossiblybecausemuchofthis informationisnotavailable.

For the purposes of the advantages and disadvantages in

choosingthesedocumentary sources,wetookspecial care to

accessthedatabasesavailableontheInternetwhichincludeall legal andjudicial development, justification andintervention ofsubjectsandavailabledatathatareactuallynewmethodsof initiatingstudyinthisareaofknowledge(seeHood,2011).This

way,theweaknesseswerecancelledoutandwecontemplated

a moreaccurate contextso that the solution canbe properly structured (Pollitt, 2010). The validity of the information is ensuredbythisprocedureandweessentiallysoughtstatistical types of data. These data will be presented only toattest to theevolutionofthephenomenonunderdiscussionhere.Based

on the central research concepts, it was possible to access

the statistics provided by the Directorate-General for Justice Policy (http://www.dgpj.mj.pt/sections/estatisticas-da-justica, last accessed on 3 April, 2016).Here we collected datathat

pertain to the traditional model (Supreme Administrative

Court,NorthCentralAdministrative CourtandSouthCentral

Administrative Court) and toAlternative Dispute Resolution

(includingaggregateddatafromArbitrationCentres,Courtsof

PeaceandMediation). About these, wecollected dataon the

efficiencyrate(whichtranslatesintothenumberofcompleted casesversusthenumberofnewcasesandcasescarriedforward fromthepreviousyear)andtheaveragedurationofcompleted cases, to ascertain efficiency; and the resolution rate (if the indicatorindicatesaratehigherthan100%,thismeansthatthe

numberofcompletedcasesisgreater thanthenumberofnew

cases),toascertaineffectiveness.Thedatacoverthe2010–2014

period,toenablecomparisonwithCAADdata.

Atthesecond stageofdatacollection,we usedthesurvey toolofself-administeredquestionnairesdirectedatthejudgesof thearbitrationcourt.AccordingtoBryman(2004),thistypeof surveyisfilledindirectlybytherespondent.Thesesurveyscan alsobeself-administeredwithorwithoutaninterviewerpresent. Inthisspecificcase, itwascarriedoutwithoutaninterviewer becauseIT(theInternet)wasthevehicleused,particularlythe

sending to respondents’ e-mail.A pre-testwas conducted by

meansofthesendingofthesurveythroughaquestionnaireto threejudgeson5June,2014.Theresponseswerereceivedby 15June,2014,andtheseenabledustoascertainissuesrelatedto theadvantages,disadvantagesanddifficultiesofAdministrative ArbitrationCentres,theirresults,theparticipationofusersand thesuccessfactorsofparticipation,comparedtothetraditional model.

Thesurveywasofthestructuredtype(Bryman,2004).We tookcaretoaskquestionsthatcoveredtheareaofthe respon-dent’sownpointofviewandthatcanlaterhelpintheperception ofthesocialphenomenaunderstudy.Oncethepre-testhadbeen carriedout,24surveysbyself-administeredquestionnairewere senton20June,2014,toalljudges-arbitratorsofthearbitration court.Theanonymityofrespondentswasensured,and16duly

completedsurveys werereceivedby26July,2014– a66.7%

responserate.Thejudgeswereselectedamongagentsofthe

co-productionprocess whowere notemployees or contractually

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is the accuracy of the data regarding the names involved. In thisparticularcasethenamesofthearbitrationcentre’sjudges areidentifiedonthecentre’swebsite,whichfacilitatescontact withthem.Moreover,againaccordingtotheauthor,oneofthe disadvantagesisthatitisnotalwayspossibletohaveaccessto them.Inthisspecificcase,theresponserateishigh,particularly keepinginmindthe viewsof peopleinvolved intheprocess. Therearethreestakeholdersinthisprocessofcreationanduse of the arbitration centre, namely public administration inthe fieldoftax,taxpayerswhoaretosomedegreeindisputewith publicadministration,andalsotheaforementionedarbitration judges.Thesejudges,as willbeshownbelow,haveadutyof independence, impartiality andintegrity, being neither repre-sentativesnoragentsofanypartythatappointsthem.Therefore, theyareprivilegedactorsexperiencingthissocialphenomenon becausetheyknowthetraditionalmodelofpublicservice pro-vision–inthiscase,thefiscalcourtsasagentsofthoseservices –andbecausetheyperceivetheadvantagesanddisadvantages ofthismodelregardingtheserviceprovidedtousers.

Resultsanddiscussion

Traditionaladministrativecourtsandalternativedispute resolution

The Laws on Voluntary Arbitration (Law No. 31/86 of

29August),ontheGeneralContractualClauses(Decree-Law

446/85of25October),onOrganization,Competencyand

Oper-ationofCourtsofPeace(Law78/2001of13September),and

ontheExperimentalProcedureScheme(Decree-Law108/2006

of 8 June), were turning pointsin the Portuguese legal sys-tem inregardtothe modesof provision ofservices aimedat alternativeconflictresolutioninrelationtoTraditional Adminis-trativeCourts.Thegeneralprincipleofexclusionofarbitrability in administrative litigation was in force for centuries in the nationallegalsystem, asaresultoftheFrench modelof pub-licadministration.Thelatterisseenasapowerdirectedatthe pursuitof publicservicesprovision.Consequently,theruleof law isobserved, wherepublic administration enjoysahigher legalpositionthancitizens(Serra,2010).Disputesthatemerged wereusuallyresolvedwithinpublicadministrationitself, with-outevencontemplatingthepossibilityofresortingtootherforms ofprovision(Catarino&Filippo,2011).

Theuseofotherformsofprovisionwasnotallowedonthe groundsofthegeneralideathatpublicadministrationcouldnot freelyhaverightsandpublicobligationsatitsdisposal,sinceit wascommittedtotheprimacyofpublicinterestandtheprinciple oflegality(Serra,2010).TheStatecouldnotconceptuallybe presentinpublicrelationsmerelyasaparty,butasprimusinter pares(Catarino&Filippo,2012).

However, the wideningof the State’s functionsgenerated

newsocialrights,madepublicmanagementmorecomplexand

requiredtheparticipationofcitizensinpublicadministration.It wasonlyin2004,withthereformofprocedurallawin adminis-trativecourts,whichgraduallyreplacedthePortuguesemodelof objectivistjusticetocontroladministrativelegalitybymeansofa German-rootedsubjectivistmodelfortheprotectionofcitizens’

subjectiverights.Arbitration,forexample,amongthepossible alternativedisputeresolutionmethods,arisesintaxlawina con-textwheretheintentionistoavoidconflictorasanattemptto resolvesuchconflictsbetweenstatesandtheircitizens(Catarino

&Filippo,2012).

In fact,the Stateisstartingtobecomemoreopen toideas ofco-productioninitsvariousforms(Bovaird,2007).Such cit-izens’ rightshavebeen complemented,in administrativelaw, byestablishingmechanismsforpriorconsultation.Theserights envisagetheparticipationofcitizensinthepoliticaland admin-istrative activities of the State. This citizen engagement has

generally been shown to be an effective andefficient means

inprovidingconflictresolutionservices.ByanalysingTable1

andconsideringtheperiodbetween2010and2014,Alternative Dispute Resolutiondemonstratedhigher efficiency rates than the average oftraditional courts:39.77% in2011,41.82%in

2012,44.67%in2013and39.83%in2014.Theexceptionis

2010,whentheaverageefficiencyrateoftraditionalcourtswas 84.65% versus78.56%foralternative means.Itcantherefore besaidthatalternativemeansaremoreefficientthantraditional waysofprovidingthisservice.Duetoalackofavailabledata,the averagedurationofcompletedcasescouldnotyetbeanalyzed. Ifweconsidertheresolutionrate,itappearsthatthefigures for traditional courtsare asfollows:84.65%in2010,79%in

2011,88.37%in2012,112.34%in2013and91.60%in2014.

The figurespresented byAlternativeDispute Resolutionhave higher resolutionrates in all the yearsconsidered except for

2013–seeTable1.Itcanthusbeended,againbycomparison,

that the effectiveness alternative dispute resolution is greater thanthatoftraditionalmeans.

However,thisanalysisshouldincludeusers’assessmentsof theserviceprovidedbyalternativemeans.Thiswasdonebythe

Directorate-GeneralforJusticePolicy(2013),whichconducted

asurveywith505usersand,usingascaleof1(verydissatisfied) to10(verysatisfied),endedthatdisputesettlementspeed (aver-ageof 7.99),costofaccess (averageof 7.99)andpunctuality instartingsessionswhen planned(averageof 7.94),werethe indicatorswiththelowestscoresamongthoseconsideredinthe inquiry.Incontrast,theassessmentoftheworkofthe judges-arbitrators, justiceof the peaceor mediator(averageof 8.65) andoperationofthearbitrationcentre,courtofpeace, media-tion(averageof8.43except,andasnotedabove,punctualityat thestartofsessions)weretheindicatorswiththehighestscores. Inshort,alternativedisputeresolutionshowsbetterratesof effi-ciencyandresolutionthantraditionalcourts.Thereis,however, lessusersatisfactionwhenconsideringassociatedcostsandthe speedwithwhichcasesareresolved.

TheAdministrativeArbitrationCentre

TheadoptionoftaxarbitrationinPortugalasanalternative meanstotraditionalpublicmeans(theCourts)forconflict reso-lutionis basedonthegeneralideathat itisbeneficialfor the

public sector to use the resources of users and communities

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Table1

Statisticsontraditionalcourtsandalternativedisputeresolution.

Supreme

AdministrativeCourt

CentralAdministrative Court(North)

CentralAdministrative Court(South)

AlternativeDispute Resolution*

2010

Newcases 937 1275 1996 2667

Endedcases 1038 1086 1438 2548

Pendingcases 414 1555 2925 576

Efficiencyrateb _71.49% _41.49% _32.96% _78.56%

Resolutionratec _110.78% _85.18% _72.04% _95.54%

Averagedurationofendedcasesd ₆_months ₈_months ₁₁_months

-2011

Newcases 1088 1741 2133 2507

Endedcases 1034 1181 1705 2643

Averagedurationofendedcasesd ₅_months ₁₂_months ₁₇_months _–

2012

Newcases 1329 1761 2242 2236

Endedcases 1192 1391 2129 2304

Averagedurationofendedcasesd ₅_months ₁₂_months ₁₇_months _–

2013

Newcases 1692 1849 2147 2400

Endedcases 1415 1642 2412 2359

Efficiencyrateb 61.60% 37.89% 42.97% 84.43%

Resolutionratec 83.63% 88.80% 112.34% 98.29%

Averagedurationofendedcasesd 5months 14months 15months –

2014

Newcases 1321 1820 2072 2844

Endedcases 1297 1319 2158 2817

Efficiencyrateb 58.87% 29.23% 40.94% 85.83%

Resolutionratec 98.18% 72.47% 104.20% 99.05%

Averagedurationofendedcasesd 7months 14months 18months –

Source:Ownworkusinghttp://www.dgpj.mj.pt/sections/estatisticas-da-justica,consultedon23February2016.

a_Alternative _Dispute _Resolution _includes _cases _from _Arbitration _Centres, _Courts _of _Peace _and _Mediation _{Directorate-General} _for _Justice _Policy

(http://www.dgpj.mj.pt/sections/estatisticas-da-justica,lastaccessedon3April,2016).

b _Efficiency_Rate₌_Nr._of_ended_cases/(Nr._pending_cases_at_the_start_of_the_period₊_Nr._of_new_cases)

×100.

c _Resolution_rate₌_(Nr._ended_cases/Nr._of_new_cases)

×100.

d _The_average_duration_of_ended_cases_corresponds_to_the_time_between_the_case’s_entry_date_and_the_date_of_the_final_decision_(judgement,_sentence_or_order)_at_its

jurisdiction,regardlessofresjudicata.

economicagentswhoopposedthemonopolyofpublicjustice

becauseitwaslong-windedandexpensive,anddidnotsafeguard theirlegalrights(Catarino&Filippo,2012).

Thus,a newnon-profit private jurisdiction was created in Portugalinlate2009– the AdministrativeArbitrationCentre (CAAD)–whichtheoreticallywouldenableswifterresolution of the issues that previously hadto be compulsorily submit-ted tothe Fiscal Courts.This jurisdiction operatesunder the aegisoftheHigherCouncilofAdministrativeandFiscalCourts

(CSTAF) and its founding partners are public, private and

third-sectororganizations.Thismodelenablesthe connection between the business world and the political, social and tax systems,inparticularwiththeGovernmentandPublic Admin-istration, Associative Summits, schools and universities, and

the financial and business community. The law allows any

public or privateentity toconclude association and

coopera-tionprotocolswiththe CAAD,becomingpart ofitsBoardof

Representatives.

Arbitrationisoptional,sothat taxpayerscanchoosewhich of defence channels (judicial, public, or arbitration, private) theywishtopursue.Itisaprivatejurisdictionwhereneutraland impartialthirdparties(judge-arbitrators),chosenbytheparties

or appointedby the CAAD, decide onthe issuesin dispute,

where decisions have the same legal value as court rulings.

The engagement of citizens in the process of selecting the

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Table2

NumberofcasessubmittedtoArbitrationCourtsinPortugal.

Year Numberofcases

2011 26(monthsofSeptember, October,December)

2012 150

2013 311

2014 850

Total 1494

AverageDurationofEndedCases 4monthsand20days

Source:AdministrativeArbitrationCentrehttps://issuu.com/caad.arbitragem/ docs/newslettercaadn12015?e=7377553/11811779, consulted on 22 February,2016).

Arbitrationtheoreticallyhastheadvantageofswiftly obtain-ingadecisionbindingonthetaxauthoritiesandonthetaxpayer, similartodecisionshandeddownbyafiscalcourtoflaw,aswell asensuring,insomecases,thepossibilityofappeal.Sincethe implementationofarbitrationasanalternativemeansfor resolv-ingtaxdisputes,itappearsthatthenumberofcasessubmitted hasbeenincreasing,ascanbeconfirmedinTable2.

Conceptually,thepoliticaldispositionforthecreationof arbi-trationinPortugalis connectedtotheattempttoimprovethe provisionofpublicservicesbothintermsofspeedandof

qual-ity(Eijk&Steen,2014;Joshi&Moore,2004),workingfrom

theassumptionthatserviceusershaveaccesstothenecessary resourcesandthewilltoachievedthis(Bovaird&Löffler,2013). Onthisassumption,andtaking intoaccount structuraland operationalprocesses,theCAADischaracterizedbythe

follow-ing(seeFigueiras,2011):thehumanresourcescentreincludes

arangeof specializedtechnicians whoare responsiblefor all administrativeproceduresregardingthecases.Therefore,allthe stepstakenarecarriedoutbyadministrativehumanresources whobelongtothecentre.Asstatedabove,thejudges-arbitrators arechosenfromasetofpersonalitiesthatarelistedonthe cen-tre’swebsite.Itshouldbenotedthatthesejudges-arbitratorsare notemployeesofthecentre;theyonlyassistinfulfillingthe pur-posesthatthecentresetsouttoachieve.Shouldthepartieswho usethisservicedecidetochooseajudge-arbitrator,experts,etc., otherthanthoselistedbythecentre,itiscertainthatthecosts arising from this will be borne by the parties. Despite these increases,“in theoretical terms one actually see adownward trendinarbitrationcostsinrelationtoordinaryCourts,atleast whenthepartiesdonotappointanarbitratorwhoisnotpartof theCentre’slist”(Figueiras,2011,pp.127–128).

Given these theoretical advantages, the number of cases

resolvedinthatcentrehasbeenincreasing.Thisislargelydueto thespeedatwhichtheyareconcluded,whichisfastercompared toothercourtsthatareconsideredtraditional–seeTables1and2. Sothetimetakentoresolvebothadministrativeandtaxconflicts isonaveragefourmonthsandtwentydays,whileinothercourts thataverageishigher–seeTable1.Thesefiguresprovethatthe co-productionismoreefficientandeffectivethanthetraditional provisionofpublicservices,asstatedinstudiesonco-production

(Eijk&Steen,2014;Bovaird&Löffler,2013;Joshi&Moore,

2004). However, one cannot overlook the assessment of

CCAD’sservices,madebyitsusers(seeDirectorate-General,

2013). Referring now solely to the opinions of the CAAD’s

users(n=337),itisclearthat theyaremostsatisfiedwiththe performanceofthejudge-arbitratorresponsiblefortheircases (anaverageof8.54).However,theyseemlesspleasedaboutthe swiftnessofconflictresolution(anaverageof7.77),thecostof access(anaverageof7.97),thetimebetweentherequestand thefirstsessioninwhichtheywereheard(anaverageof7.79),

and the punctuality when starting the sessions (an average

of7.87).

According tothe judges-arbitrators,theCAAD has

advan-tagesover the traditionalmodel of conflictresolution.Ofthe 16 interviews,allrespondents mentionthespeed of decision-makingasthemainadvantageofthismodel:

“Wemustnotforgetthat‘goodjusticeisalwaysswiftjustice” (respondent2);

“Under current circumstances, I consider that the main

advantage offered by the Centre is the gain in decision

time–comparedtothesaturationandtheconsequentslowness ofadministrativeandfiscaljustice”(respondent16).

Accordingtorespondents,thisswiftnessisduetothe sim-plificationoftheprocess(respondents7and9),whichdoesnot requiretheproceduralstepsthattakeplaceintraditionalcourts andthatgeneratetheslownessshowninthetraditionalmodel.

On theotherhand,beyondthe questionsof speedand

proce-duralsimplicity,thechoiceofexpertstosettledisputesbetween partiesisalsoagreatadvantage(respondents3,5,7,9,11,12 and14).Thisisoneaspectwheretheuseoftheco-production modelintheCAADproducedgreatbenefits.Sincethe judges-arbitratorsarerecruitedamongrenownedexpertsbymeansof engagingtheparties,theaveragequalityof decisionstendsto increasebecausetheyarelegallybased(respondent12). More-over,inadditiontotechnicalquality,integrityandimpartiality indecisionmakingareothercriteriathatarementioned (respon-dents4and12).Theengagementofthepartiesinthearbitration processbychoosingthejudgesisanimportantcontributionto theentireprocess,asissuggestedintheliterature(Eijk&Steen,

2014;Joshi&Moore,2004)andthiscanbeseenhere,i.e.,on

averagedecisionsreallyarefaster.Nonetheless,giventhecosts involvedandassociatedexpectations,theCAAD’susersdonot givesuchpositivescorestothespeedofprocesses.

Even so, these data corroborate one of the main reasons

for the creationof the CAAD,whichwas toswiftlyobtaina

decisionthat wouldbebindingonthepartiesinthecase. We would point out that co-production aims tocreate apossible alternativeinordertoimprovetheprovisionofpublicservices

(Joshi&Moore,2004).Thus,andaccordingtoJoshiandMoore

(2004),usersshouldparticipateinthedesign,implementation

andevaluationoftheactionsandpoliciesadopted.

Although severaladvantages are enumerated, some

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Another of the respondents concerns is the possible lack of impartiality, independence and integrity of judges-arbitrators (respondents3, 4, 11and12).In addition,despitethe recog-nizedtechnicalqualityofdecisions,thejudges-arbitratorsmay alsodeliverpoor-qualitytechnicaldecisionsbecauseitcan hap-pen(respondent4).Thisdisadvantageisassociatedwithanother

concern – once the CAAD’s mediation is accepted by users

thedecisionmustbeacceptedbythepartiesandthis compro-misessomeindividualguaranteesregardingappealsagainstthe decision,whichareprovidedforinfiscalcourts(respondents7 and15).Butifthepartiesare involvedinthearbitration pro-cessbyappointingjudges,thiswillfostergreateracceptanceof thedecisionshandeddown.Finally,costsarehigherfor users (respondents5,12and13),whichpartiallycontradictstheuse ofco-production.AccordingtoBovairdandLöffler(2013) co-productionaimstoincreasetheimpactofpoliciesoncitizens’ lives,particularlybyloweringcostsintheprovisionofpublic services.Wefound inthiscasethat the swiftnessis real and thatthisimpactsthependingissuesofserviceusers;however, itfallsshort regardingthe reductionof costs,whichprevents many usersfrom resorting tothis method.This is consistent

withwhatisFigueiras(2001)’sclaimthatthecostsofarbitration

shouldtheoreticallybelowerwhencomparedtothetraditional model.Thisstudyshowsthatthemainreasonfordissatisfaction amongtheservice’susersisessentiallythecostsinvolved(see

Directorate-General,2013).

Despitethefactthatsomedisadvantages wereidentified in comparisontothetraditionalmodelofconflictresolution,most

respondents assert that the CAAD is a model that provides

swifter results (except for respondents 7 and 11, for whom,

respectively,it isprematuretomake areal andreliable com-parison,andthetechnicaldecisionsdonotseemtobehigherin quality).Fortheremainingrespondentsthisarbitrationmodel providesgreateradvantagesthanthetraditionalmodelbecause there is greater agility in hiring judges (respondent 1). This agilityresultsfromtheengagementofthepartiesprovidedforby theco-productionmodel(Hilton&Hughes,2013).Thesejudges areindependent,andaccordingtotherespondent7,demonstrate higher productivity than the career judges of administrative courts.

Thelastadvantagepointedoutinthisarbitrationmodelisthe citizen’sabilitytobepresentatalltheproceduresofthe case (respondents1 and8). ThisreasonisconsistentwithBovaird

andLöffler’s (2013)assertion:co-productionenablesusersto

employtheir assetsand resources;in thisparticular case the userscanvoluntarilyadddatatotheprocess,therebyinvolving theminit, whichaidsdecision-makingandtheswiftnessand qualityofthedecision.

User participationis therefore the biggest asset and inno-vation inthe creation of thisarbitration centre. Thisasset is provided by co-production,as it fosters closeness amongall partiesregardingthecaseprocedures(respondent7):

“The biggest advantage is the proximity to citizens and

the possibility they have of directly following the case

throughthejudges-arbitratorstheyappointorthearbitrators appointedbythecentre”(respondent13).

Anotherinnovationistheselectionofjudges-arbitratorsby thoseengagedinthedispute(respondent1),andthatusers com-mittoacceptingandfollowingthedecisionthatishandeddown (respondent11):

“Userparticipationisviathejudges-arbitratorscontainedin alistthatispre-approvedandmadepublic.Thesearepeople ofrecognizedmeritinjudgingontheissuessubmittedtothe arbitrationcourt,sowhenusersresorttoarbitrationtosettle disputes,theyalreadyaccepttheparticipationofanyofthese judges-arbitratorsinthearbitrationproceedings,relyingon

them toconsider the issue andto make judgement on it”

(respondent12).

Itshouldbenoted,however,thatamongthenewcasesonly infourteenofthemdidthepartiesrequesttheappointmentof thearbitrator,whileinthreehundredandfivecasestherewas norequestforthearbitrator,whowaschosenfromamongthe independentexperts.

Userparticipationisnotlimitedtomonitoringtheprocess. Thecreationofthisarbitrationcentrewasbasedonthevisibility andreputationofdecisions(respondent9),andthesedecisions

are highly dependent on what is offered by the users

them-selves.Indesigningthemodel,thepartiesinvolvedcansubmit proposalsforimprovingservicestothecentre’sEthicsCouncil (respondent6).Besides:

“(...) Ithink that the participationof users– or, I would

say,oftheorganizationsthatrepresentthem,ratherthanof individualusers–couldbeplacedpreciselyatthe‘design’ and‘implementation’,andthenatthe‘monitoring’ stages.

The existence of something like afollow-upcouncil

con-sistingofrepresentativesfromtheorganizationsofpersons andentities that most often requestthe Centre’s interven-tion, as well as the administration sectors who accede to it, could be a ‘monitoring’ structure capable of assessing the operation of theCentre and, dependingon their

expe-rience, suggest and propose the appropriate adjustments”

(respondent16).

SuchaprovisionisconsistentwithwhatisarguedbyEijkand

Steen(2014),forwhomco-productionreferstoactionswhere

citizensassistpublicagenciesasvolunteersinordertoimprove thequalityoftheservicesprovided–whichactuallyhappensin thiscasebecauseusersparticipateintheco-production(notin anarrowsense)oftheservicesthattheywilluse(Pestoffetal.,

2006).

Somerespondents(4,11and12)maintainthat,inorderfor service userstogoonbenefittingfromthisservice,it is nec-essary toensure thereis alegalandmaterial frameworkthat is perfectly clear and appropriate. With the existence of this framework,theyalsoarguethatitisimportanttoseparateand controlfunctions(respondent3),andthateachprocesscanbe adaptedtothecasebeingtried(respondent5).Thiswould guar-anteethecentre’sintegrity,reputation,credibility,efficiencyand effectiveness(respondents9and13).Inconclusion,the admin-istrativearbitrationcentreemergesasaninnovativemodel,not

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of the procedural and administrative participation of service users. Thischaracteristicsets it apartfrom arbitrationcourts, sothat:

“(...)thequalityofthe servicesprovided–the speedand

correctnessof thedecisions–isanessentialfactorthatthe

CAAD has practised,in contrast to the very poor service

providedbythefiscalcourts”(respondent15).

Conclusions

Giventhe scarcer resources thatStates havetheir disposal toprovideservicesthatarefast,efficient,high-quality,andthat meetthenecessaryrequirementsofitsusers,co-productionhas emerged as analternative meansof catering tothe collective needsthatareindividuallyexperiencedbypopulations.The

co-production is understood as comprising all actions in which

citizens(individuallyor collectively considered)assist public agenciesonavoluntarybasisinordertoimprovethequalityof publicservices(Eijk&Steen,2014).

Inadditiontothelimitationsoftraditionalmodelsofservice provision, due to citizens’ needs and to favourable political andinstitutionalconditions, thiswayof providingpublic ser-vicesinspired,inPortugal,the creationof the Administrative Arbitration Centre in 2009, so as to settle disputes between theadministrativeandfiscalpublicauthorityanditsusers.The CAADisprivateinnatureand,byengagingthevariousparties, hasincreasinglygainedprominenceinconflictresolution–the numberofcasessubmittedtoitrosebyoveronethousand per-centbetween2011and2014.Thisisexplainedbyitsswiftnessin decision-making,whichwouldnotbepossibleotherwise(Hilton

&Hughes,2013).Inadditiontothespeedofdecisions,thereare

otheradvantagessuchastheongoingengagementoftheservice userthroughtheappointmentofthejudges-arbitrators,the pro-cedural monitoring andalso the abilityto improve the entire servicebyconsultingusers’.

However, thereare two factorsthat shouldbe considered. The firstrefers tothe issueof cost,i.e., thecost for usersof theadministrative centreshouldbe lower.Thisisreflected in notverypositiveevaluationsbyusers.Asborneoutby judges-arbitrators,costisabarrierforindividualsororganizationswho would like to resort to this means of resolving existing dis-putes.Thisisbecausetheamountschargedtousersarehigher thanthoseof traditionalmeans ofconflictresolution.Inspite ofthegreaterefficiencyandeffectivenessoftheirservice provi-sion,arbitrationcentresdonotreceiveentirelypositivefeedback

from users, as demonstrated by the study conducted by the

Directorate-General (2013). Therefore one of the challenges

thatshouldbetakenintoaccountisareductionintheoperating costsof thismodel,toenablecitizenstouseitsservicesmore often.

ThiscaseshowsthattheStatehasnomonopolyinthe provi-sionofpublicservicesandthatitispossibletofindmoreagile waysofprovidingthembyusingco-production.Instead,citizens andsocietyingeneralcanthemselvesprovidesuchservices,thus benefitingfrom goodsand servicestheyreally need andthat helpthemtoresolveeverydayissuestheymayface.Itshouldbe

notedthatthisisapreliminaryandexploratorystudy,so ongo-ingattentionshouldbepaidtothisparticularphenomenon.This attentionisduebecausewecannotyetclearlyassertJoshiand

Moore(2004)’sargumentthatco-production‘isthebestofall

possible alternatives’ to improve the provision of public ser-vicesthroughusers’participationinthedesign,implementation andevaluationof publicpolicies.Moreover,it isimportantto proceed withthisanalysisbutthistimefocussingonthe

the-ory of services proposedby Osborne(2013),thus cementing

theoreticalknowledgeinthisfield.Thisknowledgeshouldalso beexpandedtootherindustriesandothersocial,politicaland economicrealities.

Funding

Thisworkwassupportedbynationalfundsthrough FCT–

Fundac¸ãoparaaCiênciaeaTecnologia,underproject “PEST-OE/CJP/UI0713/2013”.

Conflictsofinterest

Theauthorsdeclarenoconflictsofinterest.

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