POLÍTICA FISCAL E EQUIDADE

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POLÍTICA FISCAL E EQUIDADE

CLAUDINEY PEREIRA

W.P. CAREY SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

NON-RESIDENT RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, COMMITMENT TO EQUITY

INSTITUTE AT TULANE UNIVERSITY

Fórum Internacional Tributário

São Paulo

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Roteiro

1. Introdução

2. Commitment to Equity Institute (CEQ) –

Compromisso com a Equidade

3. Metodologia

4. Fundamentos da Redistribuição Fiscal

5. Resultados para a América Latina

6. Considerações Finais

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1. Introdução

■

 

Alta desigualdade de renda e riqueza

■

 

Tributação e desigualdade: impostos diretos e

indiretos

■

 

Tributação e equidade

■

 

Efeitos da política fiscal na desigualdade e

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2 . COMMITMENT TO EQUITY (CEQ)

INSTITUTE – COMPROMISSO COM A

EQUIDADE

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2. Commitment to Equity (CEQ) Institute

Missão: Contribuir para a redução da desigualdade e

pobreza através de estudos rigorosos de incidência fiscal e

engagemento com os formuladores de política

Objetivo: Medir o impacto da política fiscal na desigualdade

e pobreza usando uma metodologia que nos permite fazer

comparações entre países

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2. Commitment to Equity (CEQ) Institute

■

 

Cobertura: 65 países – cerca de dois terços da população

mundial

–

 

Resultados disponiveis para 42 países

■

 

Mais de 100 pesquisadores

■

 

Parcerias: ADB, AfDB, CAF, IDB, IMF, ICEFI, OECD, Oxfam, Paris

School of Economics

,

UNDP, UNICEF, World Bank

■

 

Recursos da Fundação Bill & Melinda Gates: US$4.9 million for

5 years (2016 – 2020); National Science Foundation, US$240

mil para o Centro de Dados sobre Desigualdade e Pobreza

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http://www.commitmentoequity.org/

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3. Principais Perguntas

■

 

Quanto da redução em desigualdade e pobreza pode ser

atribuída a política fiscal de um país ?

■

 

Qual a contribuição de impostos e despesas específicas

para a equidade?

■

 

Quanto eficiente são os tributos e despesas pra reduzir a

desigualdade e a pobreza?

■

 

Qual o impacto de reformas que alteram a aliquota ou

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+ valor monetizado de serviços públicos de educação e saúde

Renda de Mercado

Renda Disponível

+ transferências diretas – impostos diretos

+ subsidios indiretos – impostos indiretos

Renda Consumível

Renda Final

3. Definições importantes

10

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4. Política Fiscal e Desigualdade

§

 

O sistema fiscal diminui ou aumenta a

desigualdade?

§

 

Quais impostos ou transferências são equitativos

(ou não) ?

§

 

Qual a contribuição específica de um imposto ou

transferência (ou uma combinação) para a

mudança na desigualdade?

§

 

Qual o impacto na desigualdade se aumentamos

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O que aprendemos

1. Analisar apenas o lado do imposto (ou da transferência) não é

suficiente (ou pouco útil)

Ø

 

Impostos podem não ter efeito equalizador, mas as

transferência podem mais que compensar o efeito dos impostos

[resultado conhecido]

Ø

 

Impostos podem ser regressivos, mas quando combinado com

transferências podem tornar o Sistema mais equitativo

[surpreso?]

Ø

  IVA no Chile

Ø

 

Transferências podem ser equalizadoras, mas quando

combinadas com impostos, pode haver um aumento no nivel

pobreza

[surpreso?]

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2. Analisar o impacto do sistema fiscal apenas na desigualdade pode

ser falacioso –

o nível de pobreza pode está aumentando

[surpreso?]

3. As medidas tradicionais de pobreza podem não está captando o

efeito do sitema fiscal corretamente

Ø

 

Pode haver uma redução do nivel de pobreza e mesmo assim uma

parte da população pode ter empobrecido como resultado do

sistema fiscal

[surpreso?]

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5.RESULTADOS PARA A

AMÉRICA LATINA

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17 países (2009-2014*): Argentina, Bolivia,

Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,

Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,

Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,

Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela

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Receitas do Governo (% PIB, 2009-2014*)

16

Source: Lustig (2018)

0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% Gu ate ma la (2 01 1 ) Do mi ni ca n R ep ub lic (2 01 3 ) H ond ur as (2 01 1 ) C olo mb ia (2 01 0 ) Pa ra gu ay ( 2 01 4 ) El S alv ad or (2 01 1 ) C hi le (2 01 3 ) C os ta R ic a ( 2 01 0 ) M ex ic o ( 2 01 0 ) N ic ar ag ua (2 0 0 9 ) Pe ru (2 0 0 9 ) Ec ua do r ( 2 01 1 ) Ve ne zu ela (2 01 3 ) U ru gu ay ( 2 0 0 9 ) B oli via (2 0 0 9 ) Ar ge nt ina (2 01 2 ) B ra zil ( 2 0 0 9 ) Av er ag e

(ranked by total government revenue/GDP; GNI right hand scale)

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Gasto Social (% PIB, 2009-2014*)

0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% G uate m al a (2 01 1) D om in ican Re pu blic (2 01 3) Par ag uay (2 01 4) Peru (2009) N icar ag ua (2 00 9) Ho nd ur as (2 01 1) El S al vad or (2 01 1) Ec uad or (2 01 1) Me xic o ( 20 10 ) Co lo m bia (2 01 0) Chile (2013) Ve ne zu ela (2 01 3) Bo liv ia (2 00 9) Co sta Ri ca (2 01 0) U ru gu ay (2 00 9) Br azi l (2 00 9) Ar ge nti na (2 01 2) Av erag e OECD (2011) (ranked by social spending plus contributory pensions / GDP; GNI right hand scale)

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Política Fiscal e Desigualdade

Aposentadorias não são consideradas transferências

Source: Lustig (2018)

0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60

Market income plus pensions Disposable income Consumable income Final income Argentina (2012) Bolivia (2009) Brazil (2009) Chile (2013) Colombia (2010) Costa Rica (2010) Dominican Republic (2013) Ecuador (2011) El Salvador (2011) Guatemala (2011) Honduras (2011) Mexico (2010) Nicaragua (2009) Paraguay (2014) Peru (2009) Uruguay (2009) Venezuela (2013)

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Política Fiscal e Desigualdade

Aposentadorias são consideradas transferências

0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60

Market income Disposable income Consumable income Final income Argentina (2012) Bolivia (2009) Brazil (2009) Chile (2013) Colombia (2010) Costa Rica (2010) Dominican Republic (2013) Ecuador (2011) El Salvador (2011) Guatemala (2011) Honduras (2011) Mexico (2010) Nicaragua (2009) Peru (2009) Uruguay (2009) Venezuela (2013)

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Efeito Redistributivo (%)

20

Source: Lustig (2018)

0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 -45% -40% -35% -30% -25% -20% -15% -10% -5% 0% Gu ate ma la (2 01 1 ) H ond ur as (2 01 1 ) Pe ru (2 0 0 9 ) Pa ra gu ay ( 2 01 4 ) N ic ar ag ua (2 0 0 9 ) El S alv ad or (2 01 1 ) Do mi ni ca n R ep ub lic (2 01 3 ) B oli via (2 0 0 9 ) C olo mb ia (2 01 0 ) Ve ne zu ela (2 01 3 ) C hi le (2 01 3 ) Ec ua do r ( 2 01 1 ) M ex ic o ( 2 01 0 ) U ru gu ay ( 2 0 0 9 ) C os ta R ic a ( 2 01 0 ) B ra zil ( 2 0 0 9 ) Ar ge nt ina (2 01 2 ) Av er ag e R ed is tr ib ut iv e e ff ec t-ma rk et inc ome to fi na l

(ranked by redistributive effect (left hand scale); Gini coefficients right hand scale)

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Contribuição dos Impostos e

Transferências na Renda Final

Aposentadorias não são consideradas transferências

-0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 B ra zil ( 2 0 0 9 ) C hi le (2 01 3 ) E cu ad or (2 01 1 P ar ag ua y ( 2 01

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Contribuição dos Impostos e

Transferências na Renda Final

Aposentadorias são consideradas transferências

Source: Lustig (2018)

-0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 B ra zil ( 2 0 0 9 ) C hi le (2 01 3 ) E cu ad or (2 01 1 )

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■

 

Politica fiscal equalizadora, mas o nivel de pobreza

pode está aumentando

Ø

 

1.25 dólares/dia: Guatemala e Nicarágua

Ø

 

2.50 dólares/dia: Bolívia, Guatemala, Honduras e

Nicarágua

Ø

 

4 dólares/dia: os países acima, Argentina, Brasil, Costa

Rica, República Dominicana, El Salvador, Peru e

Venezuela

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Renda de Mercado

Renda Disponível

+ transferências diretas – impostos diretos

+ subsídios indiretos – impostos indiretos

Renda Consumível

Definições

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Política Fiscal e Redução da Pobreza

$4 dolares 2005 PPP/dia; %; e pensões não são consideradas

transferências

1.0% -0.4% -0.4% _-1.7% _-2.1% -2.7% -2.7% -2.9% -5.6% -6.2% -8.5% -10.8% -13.0% -13.9% -41.0% -41.2% _-42.0% -11.4% 4.8% 2.0% 4.1% 4.9% -2.3% 3.8% 0.4% 1.9% 4.4% -3.5% 8.1% -10.2% -15.7% 2.8% _1.6% -24.2% -21.8% -2.3% -50.0% -40.0% -30.0% -20.0% -10.0% 0.0% 10.0% 20.0% -50% -40% -30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% N icar ag ua (2 00 9) Ve ne zu ela (2 01 3) G uate m al a (2 01 1) Ho nd ur as (2 01 1) Co lo m bia (2 01 0) El S al vad or (2 01 1) Peru (2009) D om in ican Re pu blic (2 01 3) Bo liv ia (2 00 9) Me xic o ( 20 10 ) Br azi l (2 00 9) Par ag uay (2 01 4) Ec uad or (2 01 1) Co sta Ri ca (2 01 0) Ar ge nti na (2 01 2) Chile (2013) U ru gu ay (2 00 9) Av erag e (ranked by poverty reduction in %; poverty line $4 dollars 2005PPP/day)

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Beneficiários e pagadores líquidos (decil)

Aposentadorias não são consideradas transferências

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Source: Lustig (2018)

Argentina (2012) Costa Rica (2010) El Salvador (2011) Guatemala (2011) Nicaragua (2009) Peru (2009) Brazil (2009) Bolivia (2009) Chile (2013) Dominican Republic (2013) Honduras (2011) Uruguay (2009) Paraguay (2014) Venezuela (2013) Mexico (2010) Colombia (2010) Ecuador (2011)

Net receivers

Net payers

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Nicaragua (2009) Guatemala (2011) Bolivia (2009) Honduras (2011) Dominican Republic El Salvador (2011) Peru (2009) Argentina (2012) Chile (2013) Colombia (2010) Costa Rica (2010) Mexico (2010) Uruguay (2009) Venezuela (2013) Brazil (2009) Ecuador (2011) Paraguay (2014)

Net receivers

Net payers

y<1.25 1.25<=y<2.5 2.5<=y<4 4<=y<10 10<=y<50 y>=50

Beneficiários e pagadores líquidos

(grupos de renda; doláres 2005 PPP/dia)

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28

Source: Higgins and Lustig (2016). Can a poverty reducing and progressive tax and transfer system hurt the poor? Journal of Development Economics 122, 63-75, 2016

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Empobrecimento Fiscal

Country (survey year)

Market

income plus

pensions

Poverty

headcount

(%)

Change in

poverty

headcount

(p.p.)

Market

income plus

pensions

inequality

( Gini)

Reynolds-Smolensky

Change in

inequality

(▲Gini)

Fiscally

impoverished

as % of

population

Fiscally

Impoverished as

%

of consumable

income poor

Panel A: Upper-middle income countries, using a poverty line of $2.5 dollars 2005 PPP per day

Brazil (2009)

16.8 -0.8

57.5

4.6 -3.5

5.6

34.9 Chile (2013)

2.8 -1.4

49.4

3.2 -3.0

0.3

19.2 Ecuador (2011)

10.8 -3.8

47.8

3.5 -3.3

0.2

3.2 Mexico (2012)

13.3 -1.2

54.4

3.8 -2.5

4.0

32.7 Peru (2011)

13.8 -0.2

45.9

0.9 -0.8

3.2

23.8

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6. Considerações Finais

1) Política fiscal é equalizadora, mas pode aumentar o nível de pobreza

Ø

 

Qualquer reforma deve levar em consideração esse efeito

2) Gastos em educação e saúde são quase sempre equalizadores

Ø

 

Mas, esse resultado ocorre porque a classe media e os ricos não estão

utilizando esses serviços?

3) Reforma tributária: impostos indiretos

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1. Argentina (2012-13; I): Rossignolo, Dario. 2018. “Taxes, Expenditures, Poverty, and Income Distribution in Argentina.” In Commitment to Equity Handbook.

Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty, edited by Nora Lustig (Brookings Institution Press and CEQ Institute, Tulane University)

Rossignolo, Dario. 2017. “CEQ Master Workbook: Argentina. Version: May 19, 2017." CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University) 2. Bolivia (2009; I): Paz Arauco, Veronica, George Gray-Molina, Wilson Jimenez and Ernesto Yañez. 2014a. “Explaining Low Redistributive Impact in Bolivia." In

The Redistributive Impact of Taxes and Social Spending in Latin America, edited by Nora Lustig, Carola Pessino and John Scott, Special Issue, Public Finance Review 42, no 3, pp. 326-345. DOI: 10.1177/1091142113496133

Paz Arauco, Veronica, George Gray-Molina, Wilson Jimenez and Ernesto Yañez. 2014b. “CEQ Master Workbook: Bolivia. Version: September 22, 2014." CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University)

3 . B r a z i l ( 2 0 0 8 - 0 9 ; I ) : H i g g i n s , S e a n a n d C l a u d i n e y P e r e i r a . 2 0 1 4 .

“The Effects of Brazil’s Taxation and Social Spending on the Distribution of Household Income." In The Redistributive Impact of Taxes and Social Spending in

Latin America, edited by Nora Lustig, Carola Pessino and John Scott, Special Issue, Public Finance Review 42, 3, pp. 346–67.

DOI: 10.1177/1091142113501714

Higgins, Sean and Claudiney Pereira. 2017. “CEQ Master Workbook: Brazil. Version: April 19, 2017." CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University)

4 . C h i l e ( 2 01 3 , I ) : M a r t i n e z - A g u i l a r, S a n d r a , A l a n Fu c h s , E d u a r d o O r t i z - J u a r e z a n d G i s e l l e d e l C a r m e n . 2 01 8 .

“The Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty in Chile.” In Commitment to Equity Handbook. Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and

Poverty, edited by Nora Lustig (Brookings Institution Press and CEQ Institute, Tulane University)

Martinez-Aguilar, Sandra and Eduardo Ortiz-Juarez. 2016. “CEQ Master Workbook: Chile. Version: October 7, 2016." CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University and the World Bank)

5. Colombia (2010, I): Melendez, Marcela and Valentina Martinez. 2015. “CEQ Master Workbook: Colombia. Version: December 17, 2015." CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University and Inter-American Development Bank)

6. Costa Rica (2010; I): Sauma, Pablo and Juan Diego Trejos. 2014a. “Gasto publico social, impuestos, redistribucion del ingreso y pobreza en Costa Rica.”

CEQ Working Paper 18 (Center for Inter-American Policy and Research and Department of Economics, Tulane University and Inter-American Dialogue), January

Teams and References by Country

(the year for which the analysis was conducted in parentheses);

C=consumption & I=income)

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7. Dominican Republic (2006-07, I): Aristy-Escuder, Jaime, Maynor Cabrera, Blanca Moreno-Dodson and Miguel E. Sanchez-Martin. 2018.

“Fiscal Policy and Redistribution in the Dominican Republic.” In Commitment to Equity Handbook. Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on

Inequality and Poverty, edited by Nora Lustig (Brookings Institution Press and CEQ Institute, Tulane University)

Aristy-Escuder, Jaime, Maynor Cabrera, Blanca Moreno-Dodson and Miguel Sanchez-Martin. 2016. “CEQ Master Workbook: Dominican Republic. Version: August 4, 2016." CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University and the World Bank)

8. Ecuador (2011-12, I): Llerena Pinto, Freddy Paul, Maria Cristhina Llerena Pinto, Roberto Carlos Saa Daza and Maria Andrea Llerena Pinto. 2015. “Social Spending, Taxes and Income Redistribution in Ecuador.” CEQ Working Paper 28 (Center for Inter-American Policy and Research and Department of Economics, Tulane University and Inter-American Dialogue), February

Llerena Pinto, Freddy Paul, Maria Cristhina Llerena Pinto, Roberto Carlos Saa Daza and Maria Andrea Llerena Pinto. 2017. “CEQ Master Workbook: Ecuador. Version: January 5, 2017." CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University)

9 . E l S a l v a d o r ( 2 0 1 1 ; I ) : B e n e k e , M a r g a r i t a , N o r a L u s t i g a n d J o s e A n d r e s O l i v a . 2 0 1 8 .

“The Impact of Taxes and Social Spending on Inequality and Poverty in El Salvador.” In Commitment to Equity Handbook. Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty, edited by Nora Lustig (Brookings Institution Press and CEQ Institute, Tulane University)

Beneke, Margarita, Nora Lustig and Jose Andres Oliva. 2014. “CEQ Master Workbook: El Salvador. Version: June 26, 2014." CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University and Inter-American Development Bank)

10. European Union (2011, I): EUROMOD statistics on Distribution and Decomposition of Disposable Income, accessed at http:// www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/statistics/ using EUROMOD version no. G2.0

11. Guatemala (2011; I): Icefi. 2017a. “Incidencia de la politica fiscal en la desigualdad y la pobreza en Guatemala." CEQ Working Paper 50 (CEQ Institute, Tulane University, IFAD and Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales), May

Cabrera, Maynor and Hilcias E. Moran. 2015a. “CEQ Master Workbook: Guatemala. Version: May 6, 2015." CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University, Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI) and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD))

34

Teams and References by Country

(the year for which the analysis was conducted in parentheses);

C=consumption & I=income)

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12. Honduras (2011; I): Icefi. 2017b. “Incidencia de la politica fiscal en la desigualdad y la pobreza en Honduras." CEQ Working Paper 51 (CEQ Institute, Tulane University, IFAD and Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales), April

Castaneda, Ricardo and Ilya Espino. 2015. “CEQ Master Workbook: Honduras. Version: August 18, 2015." CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University, Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales and International Fund for Agricultural Development)

13. Mexico (2010; C & I): Scott, John. 2014. “Redistributive Impact and Efficiency of Mexico’s Fiscal System." In The Redistributive Impact of

Taxes and Social Spending in Latin America, edited by Nora Lustig, Carola Pessino, John Scott, Special Issue, Public Finance Review 42, no.

3, pp. 368-390. DOI: 10.1177/1091142113497394

Scott, John. 2013. “CEQ Master Workbook: Mexico. Version: September 2, 2013." CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University)

14. Nicaragua (2009; I): Icefi. 2017c. “Incidencia de la politica fiscal en la desigualdad y la pobreza en Nicaragua." CEQ Working Paper 52 (CEQ Institute, Tulane University, IFAD and Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales), May

15. Paraguay (2014; I): Gimenez, Lea, Maria Ana Lugo, Sandra Martinez-Aguilar, Humberto Colman, Juan Jose Galeano and Gabriela Farfan. 2017. “CEQ Master Workbook: Paraguay. Version: February 12, 2017." CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University)

16. Peru (2009; I): Jaramillo, Miguel. 2014. “The Incidence of Social Spending and Taxes in Peru.” in The Redistributive Impact of Taxes and

Social Spending in Latin America, edited by Nora Lustig, Carola Pessino and John Scott, Special Issue, Public Finance Review 42, no. 3, pp.

391-412. DOI: 10.1177/1091142113496134

Jaramillo, Miguel. 2015. CEQ Master Workbook: Peru, August 7. CEQ Institute, Tulane University

Teams and References by Country

(the year for which the analysis was conducted in parentheses);

C=consumption & I=income)

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18. Uruguay (2009; I): Bucheli, Marisa, Nora Lustig, Maximo Rossi and Florencia Amabile. 2014.

“Social Spending, Taxes and Income Redistribution in Uruguay.” in The Redistributive Impact of Taxes and Social Spending in Latin

America, edited by Nora Lustig, Carola Pessino and John Scott, Special Issue, Public Finance Review 42, no. 3, pp. 413-433. DOI:

10.1177/1091142113493493

Bucheli, Marisa, Nora Lustig, Maximo Rossi and Florencia Amabile. 2014. “CEQ Master Workbook: Uruguay. Version: August 18, 2014." CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University)

19. Venezuela (2012; I): Molina, Emiro. 2016. “CEQ Master Workbook: Venezuela. Version: November 15, 2016." CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University)

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Teams and References by Country

(the year for which the analysis was conducted in parentheses);

C=consumption & I=income)

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References:

■  Enami, Ali. 2018. “Measuring the Effectiveness of Taxes and Transfers in Fighting Inequality and Poverty." In Commitment to

Equity Handbook. Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty, edited by Nora Lustig (Brookings Institution

Press and CEQ Institute, Tulane University).

■  E n a m i , A l i , N o r a L u s t i g a n d R o d r i g o A r a n d a . 2 0 1 8 .

“Analytical Foundations: Measuring the Redistributive Impact of Taxes and Transfers.” In Commitment to Equity Handbook.

Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty, edited by Nora Lustig (Brookings Institution Press and CEQ

Institute, Tulane University).

■  Higgins, Sean and Nora Lustig. 2018. “Can a Poverty-Reducing and Progressive Tax and Transfer System Hurt the Poor?” Journal

of Development Economics

■  Engel, Eduardo M., Alexander Galetovic and Claudio E. Raddatz. 1999. “Taxes and income distribution in Chile: some unpleasant

redistributive arithmetic." Journal of Development Economics, 59 (1), pp. 155-192

■  H i g g i n s , S e a n a n d N o r a L u s t i g . 2 0 1 8 . “

Allocating Taxes and Transfers, Constructing Income Concepts, and Completing Sections A, B, and C of CEQ Master Workbook.”

In Commitment to Equity Handbook. Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty, edited by Nora Lustig (Brookings Institution Press and CEQ Institute, Tulane University)

■  Lambert, Peter. 2001. The Distribution and Redistribution of Income, 3rd ed (Manchester University Press)

■  Lindert, Peter H. 2004. 2004. Growing Public. Social Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century. Volumes I

and II. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press

■  Lustig, Nora. 2015. “The Redistributive Impact of Government Spending on Education and Health: Evidence from 13 Developing

Countries in the Commitment to Equity Project.” Chapter 16 in Gupta, Sanjeev, Michael Keen, Benedict Clements and Ruud de Mooij, editors, Inequality and Fiscal Policy, Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2015

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•  ___________. 2017

. “El impacto del sistema tributario y el gasto social en la distribucion del ingreso y la pobreza en America Latina.” El

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•  ________. 2018. “Fiscal Policy, Income Redistribution and Poverty Reduction in Low and Middle Income Countries,” In

Commitment to Equity Handbook. Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty, edited by Nora

Lustig (Brookings Institution Press and CEQ Institute, Tulane University)

•  O'Higgins, Michael and Patricia Ruggles. 1981. “The Distribution of Public Expenditures and Taxes among Households

in the United Kingdom." Review of Income and Wealth 27, no. 3, pp. 298-326

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