Presidentialist decision making in Latin American foreign policy: examples from regional integration processes

321

DotA,|Y'

1ft515

P,lll,j.ir"; l I

í'u\

ROUTLEDGE

HANDBOOK

OF

LATINAMERICA

IN

THEWORLD

Edited

by

_lorge

L Domínguez

and

Ana Covarrubias

Êl

Routledqe

$\

ra¡orarranciióroup

First publishcd 2015

by lloutlctlgc

711 Third Avcnuc, Ncw Vxk, NY 10017 arrcl by lìoutlcdgc

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l:nnds ()ronp, an inJonna busincss

(r) 2015 Tayl<¡r & Friurcis

Thc right ol thc cditors tr> bc itlcntificd îs thc lutlì()r of thc cditorial ntttcrill, antl of

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All rights rcscrvcd. N<l pirrt of this book nuy bc rcprintctÌ or rcproducctl or utiliscd

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lrc¡'caftcr invcntcd, inclutling _{¡lhotoco¡ryirrg} lutl rc.^ortling, <>r irr rrry irrfbrrnati<>n st()r¡rgc ()r rctricvll systcrrr, without pcrrrrissi<lr in rvriting lro¡¡r rl¡c putrlishcrs.

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rvithot¡t intcrrt to inlringc.

Library oJ Congress Ctt ologitrg-itr- Pultlkation Dna

lLoudctlgc h¿ntlbook ofl-atin Anrcricir in thc worltl

/

cditctl by _Jorgc I. l)orrrin¡4ucz

r¡¡tl A¡r¡t (Ì¡v¡rrubias. pngcs cnl

l.

L¡rtin Anlcrica-Forcigrr rclations-l9tl0-

l.

l)orrringucz, Jorgc 1., 1945- ctlitor of conrpilation.

ll.

(ìovarrr¡bias Vchsc<>, Ana, ctlitor of cornpilirti<>n.

Ill.

Titlc:

l-ltndllook r¡f Latin An¡crici¡ in thc w<¡rld.

JZ15t9.t\68 20t4

327.11-tlc23

2014016tt26

To

Robert

Pastor

Scholar,

teacher,

s t ates m

an,

colleagu

e,

and

fr

íend

1947-2014

ISIIN : 97tì-0-4 1 5-fì423t1-9 (hbk)

lSllN: 97tl-I-315-7536t|-3 (cbk)

Typcsct irr lìcnrbo

by Apcx C)oVrntugc, LLC

CONTENTS

Líst of Fígurcs and Titl¡lcs ¡f,

Introduction:

Latin Anrcrica

in llorlc'l

Politics

Ana

Covarrubias and _Joryc

L

Douinguez

1

PART I

LatinAmerica in

the

World

23

25

1

A tansfornrecl

Latirt Anterica

in

a

lìapiclly

Cltanging

ìØolld

Abroham F. Lotuenlhal attd

Hattttah

lvL Baron

PART

II

Theoretical

Approaches

43

45

58

74

2

Realisnr

in

the

Pcriphcry

Carlos Esudé

3

Grand Strategy

I?oberttt /lusse// _{and Juan} Gabrial Tökatlian

4

Autononry

arrcl

Latin Americau ltttcrttatioual

Rclations

Thinking

Arlane B.Tickner

5

The

l)ynarrrics

of

Asynurrctrical

l)evelop¡r¡e¡lt:

Latin Atlterica

in

the Cìlobal

Econonry

Nicola Phillips

vll

Contents Contenls

ó

Liberalisnt, Constructivisnr

ancl

Latin Autcrtca¡r

Politics since

the

1990s

Arturo

Sattta-Cruz 97 112

t25

127 1,39 153 1,69 180 197 199 21,1, 223 235 PARTV

Integration

and

Multilateralism

247

17

Tr¡clc

atlcl

Ecouonric Irltegration

Attlotti

Eslcuadcordal, Paolo Ciorclatrc attd Barbam /ìarrros

249

7

Presiclentialist

ì)ecision

Making in

Latin Antericau

Foreign Policy: Examples

from

Regional Integration

Proccsses

Andrés Malamud

18

Nolth

Alucrica

llobcrt

A.

Postor

265

PART

III

Latin American

Foreign Policies

19

T¡trning

Iuwarcl:

Rtrling

Coalitions autl

Mcrcosttr's

lìetl:rtchrlteut

Joshua Nlalníght and Etcl So/irr.gcrr

20

lìegional

Mt¡ltilatcralisrrr

in Latin

Arnclica:

UNASUR,

ALIIA

urcl

CELAC

N at

alia

Salt ala uacch i a Zíccard

i

281,

8

Argentina's

Foreigl

Policy

Robcrto l?ussell _{and Juan Cabriel} Ti¡þatlian

298

9

lìethinking

Global

ancl

l)o¡¡testic

Clullenges

in

llrazilia¡r

Foreigl

Policy

lvlonica Hirst. and

Maria

l?cgina Soares de Líma

21

llcyoncl

lìcach?

The

c)r.ganization

of

Anrcrican

Statcs artcl

Effcctive Mtrltila tcr¡lisru

Thomas

bgler

311

10

Venezuelat

Foreigr

Policy, 1920s-2010s

Javíar Corrales ancl Carlos

A,

Ilonrero,Tianslatiort lry Michael Ordowcr

₂₂

-]\.rc

_{Inrer-Aruerican corlr-t of}

_Htrr]ran

lìights: Its l)ecisivc

Iurpact

on Latirt Atlrcricart

lìights

Dicgo Garcío-Sayán

329

11

ì)ecision Making in

Mexican

Forcigl

Policy

l?afaal Fcrnández dc Castro

12

Cuba's

External Projcction:

The

Interplay

between

I¡lternational

lìclations

Theory

ancl

Forcigl

Policy

Analysis

Carlos Alzugaray

PARTVI

Issues

in Latin

America's

International

Relations

347

23

L¡titr

Ar]rer:ica ancl

thc

Iclca

of

InterDatiorlal Hutnan

lìights

Kathr¡,¡ Sifrl¡írrk

349

PARTIV

Extra-Regional Actors

362

13

The

Unitecl

States and Lati¡r

America

Marþ

Eríc Williams

24

The

l)ynar.nics

of

Nt¡clcar

Politics: Lcssolts ñ't>rll

Latiu Atltcrica

Jaeqrcs

E.C.

Flymans

25

The Intcrnational Politics

of l)rtlgs

ancl

Illicit

Traclc

irl

the

Arltcltcas

Pcter Attdreas ancl Augcliea Durau lvlarlincz

376

14

Shaping

Chinese Engagcnrent

in

Latin Amertca

lvlargaral Myers

2ó

Latin

Amcrica in (ìlobal

Etrviroturtcr¡tal

Cìovcrtlancc

Katl tr _¡, t

¡

Hoehst c t ler

391

15

Latin

,{rnerica's Relations

with

Europe:

A

Stable

but Limitecl

ancl Fragurcutecl Partrtership

Susanne Cratius

27

Migrltion

in

thc

Atrrcrtcas

Alcxatúra

Dílano

404

1ó

_Japan's Rclations

with

Lati¡r

Ar¡rerica

an<l

the

Caribbean

llroad

Changes uncler

Globalization

Kanaþo Yamaoka

2tì

hìterstatc

Secttrity

Issttes

irl

Latin Arncrit:a

Dauid

IL. Nlarcs

vlil lx

Contents

29

llusiness beyond lJor¡nclaries

in

Lati¡r

Anrcrica: The

Power

of

Multilatinas

ancl

Innovative

Practices

to

AclcL'ess

Growth

a¡rcl

Social Aclvancenrent Cuslavo Herrero 434

FIGURESAND

TABLES

Con\ríbutors Index 455 461 '17.1 17.2

Figures

t¿rcle ancl Integr:ttiou Agreettrcrlts

in

the Aurcricas

L¡tin

Anterica ¡nd

thc

C)¡ribbean (LAC) and E¿rst Asi¿ Shares

of

Ìlorld

Export s, 19 62-201 0

Shate of Intraregional Tr¿tlc over Totrtl Foreign Tr¿¡de, 1981

¡nd

2011

Intrarcgionitl Trade : Mclcostlr ancl Fotrntling Mctlrbers Founding Mercosur Mcnlber Total Tr¡de

Mcrcosur Foreigu

l)irect

Investnrent (FDI) Stocks

Inward Foreign

l)ircct

Irlvcstnrent (FDl) ils it Percentagc

of Gross l)ontcstic Protltrct (CDP) Argenti ne-llrazilian Tradc l.)isputes

253 255 255 282 283 284 284 292 17.3 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 11.1 1 5.1 1ó.1 16.2 1 8.1 18.2 19.1 26.1 28.1 29.1

Tables

Modcls of Prcsidenti¿¡l Man:tgcmcnt irnd the Inlpitct of Burc¿ucracics, 1 988-201 2

Political l)ialogtrc Forutrrs EU-LAC)

R¿rtios of Lati¡r Anrerica ¿nd the C¿rribbe¿ln and Asi¿ irr

Jrpan'.s Tot¿¡l Tracle (pcrcentagc)

The Sh:rre of Latin Attrerica and thc Caribbcar.r arld Asia

in

Japan\ Foreign

l)ircct

Invcstnrerlt (pcrcerlt¿ìgc)

Inclic¡tors

fol

the' Arncricas, 1980 ¿rucl 2010

Exports of Western Henrispherc Tlading Gtoups, 201 1

_þy

perccntage) Mercosur Agreeurcnt Typc by L)¡¡c and Parttrer

Latin Anreric¿ttr Govertttrrcttts in Globi¡l Euvirourlreutll Cìovernance-Four lllt¡strative Exartrples

Militarizec'l Itrtcrstate Disptrtes, 2005-201 I

M¿tin Econolnic Indicators for 20

Lltin

Aurericatr Cotl¡rtries

t77 228 239 240 268 270 286 400 426 435 x xl

7

PRESIDENITIALIST

DECI

SION

MAKING

INT

LATINT

AMERICANT

FOREIGNT

POLICY

Examples

from

Regional

Integration

Processes

Andrés

Malamud

Prcsidcnti¡lisnr h¡s bccn long defincd as a regiurc typc birserl on thc principlc ofseparirtion of powcr. Ilowevcr, nrost tilncs acnral prcsidcr-rtill systcnrs have pcrfornrcd on a differe¡rt basis, closel to con-centration

r¡thcr th¡n

separltion

of

powcr.

Tlús

is espccially the c¿sc

in

urost L¿tin Aulericarr countries. Ever since Sinrón llolívar assertcd, as e:rrly as 1826, that "the new states of Arnerica . . .

rrcccl kirrgs

with

thc

titlc

of President" (Sondrol 1990,426), the region h¿s bccn iclcntifictl by its

propensity towarcl the accunrulation of powel

in

thc top executive o{tìce. Hyper-prcsídatilialistn,as

this phenonrerlorì c¿ìuìe to be cllled (l',lino 1992), is at oclds

with

the original, U.S. corìcept of

pres-idcntialisnr, which !Øoodrow

'lfilson

(1885) defined as "congrcssion:rl governurerl¡"-r5 hc arguecl

that Congrcss was "fast bccoming thc governing body of the r¡ation."Such an unexpectc'cl evolution w¡s a conbination of two factors, one institution¡l and the other culttrral.

Institr.rtionrrlly, the urctluorphosis

of

plesiclcntialisur was due

to

the aclaptarion

of

thc

U.S.

co¡ìstitutiorì

of

1789 to tlìc Latirì Aurerican colìtext, first exccr¡ted by the Chile:rrì constitution

of

1833 ancl tllen followccl by thc Argentinc onc

of

1853. Most South Arneric¡n constiËutiorl:ìlists, lcd by Diego Portales ancl _Jr.ran ll¿u¡tistr¡ Alberdi, consiclcrerl that thc m:rjor thre¿t cheir rìew

coun-tries f¿rced was anarchy rather tha¡r ryran¡Ìy, bccausc thc tlifficulties

of

governin¡¡ an t¡neduca¡ed population dispcrsccl over a v:ìst ¿rca far exccedccl the d:rngers of a nronarchical restoratiorr.

Con-sequently, their proposccl constitutional dcsign strengtherred exccutive powers at the expense

of

congrcss lncl of st¡bn¿tion:rl (st:rtc or provincc) ¡utlìoriry.

Ctrlturally, thc tradition

of

mudillisnto-or, nlân on horseback-pervadecl a region

chrr¿cter-izecl by low dcnrogrlphic dcnsity autl a rnostly rur¿rl environment.

TIìc

urbanizatio¡r ancl

indr¡s-trializ¡tio¡r

of

the

twcntierh

centuly

allegedìy chirnged

thc

fornrs

of

caudíllisnrc

but not

its subst:rncc, ¡row rclabclcd populisru. Govcrn¡rrent of men ratlìcr than govcrnnrerìt of laws l:rrgely prcvailcd, ancl che cornbiuation

of

cllarisnratic pcrsonal rule

with

strong exccutive institr"rtions procltrccd a conccntr¿rtionist rathcr th¿n balancecl typc of presidelìtialisnt.

lleyond

thcse features,

wllich

are distinc:tive

of

Latin

Arneric¿r, presidents gcnerally enjoy greâtcr roour for nìiìrìeuver frorn both i¡rstitution¿l and political constraints

in

the foreign policy

arc¡. As Schlcsingcr (1974,279) pointed out, eve¡ì

in

seplrationist presidentialisnr such as

in

the

United Statcs,

"it

was frorn foreign policy that the inrperial Presiclency drew its

initial

nronren-tunr." Hcnce,

in

this chlpter,

first

the r¡rain fc¿turcs

of

Latin Anleric¿rn presic'lcntial systcnrs is

tt2

Presidentiulist Dcciskxt fulaking

claborirtecl, irncl

¡

fcrv crucial c¡scs of lorcign policy clcc:ision urrrkiug arc scrttritlizcd. Thc goal is

to pinpoint chc intcrn¿rtional exprcssion of conccntratirtnist prcsitlcnti¡lisrlr, nrtntcly, prcsidcntill

diplorrrircy, aud to analyzc its lel¿rtion¿tl outconc, n:tnrcly, intcrpr:sidcnriitlisnt.

Latin American Presidentialism:

Institutional

Features

Prcsidcnrialisr¡r h¿rs bccn

chlrgcd

u,ith ¡n

allcgcd

poor

rccorcl

leglrdin¡¡

clcntocr¿ttic stlbility. According to Linz (1990),

it

lrrought about ttrrrl tlcnrocr¿rtic legitirn:rcy, sulfèrccì frortt tcrttportl rigiclity, f<¡sterccl r,vinncr-takc-all politics, ¿rntl lostercd pcrsortalisrtr ¿rnd clccisiollisttt. I-lt>rvcvct',

thcsc charactcristics irrc not alr,vays rcckonccl as lìcllrtivc;

i[

c¡n cvcn bc argued th:tt they shotrltl bc considcrcd advantrgcs instc¡cl of pitfìrlls.

Prcsidcntialisnl, bcc:¡usc

ol

its practice

ol

poprrlur clcctions

for thc

hc:¡cl

of

govel'rìlttclìt, has

bccn s¡icl to provitle :ldcìition¿¡l clc'uroclatic lcgitiuracy for thc systcrrt aurl, ltcttr:c,

lor

thc ovcr'¡ll rlccisiorr-nrrrkiug pxrccss.

It

otïcrs a lìrort: clilcc! rncchrnisnr of ucrli¿al aeavntability,tolìctlìer u'ith

it

grc¿lrcr

idcnrifilbility of

its

t<>p olfici:rl,

th¡n in

pirlliarncntary regirucs. I-lorvcvct',

thc

othcr'

irclvautirgcs adv¡nccd by Shrrgirrc irntì Oirrcy

(1992)-thc

plcscrìcc of c:llecks antl b¡latlccs ¿trttl thc r-olc

of arbitcr-rrc rrtlìcr

wciìk

iu

urauy plcsidcntiirl rcgiutcs:

in

fact, scvcr¿tl

Latitl

Atlreric¿trl

clenrocr¿rcics

fìll

rathcr short in pl'¿ìctice, cvclì tlìouglì chccks arxl bal¿tnccs irrc ltrrrrrally irlscrilrc"d

inro tlrcir

corìstitutions.

In

O'l)onncll's

(1999) tcrnìs, lhey l:rck

/ro¡i:oll,rl

ucoruúabilit¡,. Wh¿rt c'lcfìncs prcsidcncialisru, rcgardlcss of its subtypcs, is thc fìxcd tcrr¡t for oftrcc th:rc r¡llorvs soci¿tl

¡ntl

ccononric ¿rc[ors to pllrn thcir activitics iurd invcstlìrcrìts ovcr a known cirllctlrble.

L¿uin Anrcric¿rn new political instabilicy (Pórcz-Liirírn 2007), whiclt sc't foot in thc latc I 980s ¿r¡rcl

cnclurcd ft¡r

littlc

lììorc tlìau a decade, sornchow (¡rcstiorìc(l thc prcviotrs âsscrtiorì. Thc stlcccsslt¡l

iurpcachureut or carly rcsignutiou of ne¿¡r a rlozcn pn:sitlcnts sholve cl thut inscittttiorrrrl instability rvas

fìrr lronr ovcr'. Howcvcr, its rcturn rvas cluc to policy firilrrrc r¿tther tltan to policy dcadkrck, ¿s the traclicion¡l iìrgulììclìt cliriurcd.

Thc

conscc¡ucncc is that dentocntcy survivcd, as pr.*sidcntial

stlcccs-sir>ns rvcrc nrauagccl by cougresses through colìs[itutionâl proccclutcs. Yct, excctttivc ofÏìccs did Ilot

losc courpcreuccs, so it coulcl bc saitl that, in concclìtr¿rtiorìist prt'sidcnti:rlistn, corìcclttr'rtior-r olporvcr

stirys cvcu rvhcn prcsiclcnts go. Since the eirrly 2000s, though, fì¡vor¿¡blc irttcrna[i<¡t¡¿tl contlitiorts

contriburctl to rcstorc political strrbility ¡¡rcl evcn pronrotcd rttorc fi'ctlucttt prcsitlcntial n:clcc¡iorts.

(louccntration of poucr ancl stirbilicy in porvel thus rcbtrilt thcir clcctivc aflìnity.

Prcsidcntial

powcr c:ìlì

bc

<lividcd int<¡ constitutioual :rnd prrtisrrrì polvcrs (Shugalt and

M:tiur,virring 1997). The forurcr is the rcsulc of thrcc lcgislative powcrs, th¿tt is, lcgisl:rtivc initiativc, tlccrcc powcr, and vcto porvcr, pltrs ir ratlìcr politicrrlly loarlctl:tgcndit-settinf¡ capacity.

IIt

tttltr,

p¿rrris¡rì powcrs clcpcnd orì thc

p¡rty

systcur an<l the dcgrcc of party disciplinc (r-clativc noc only to pirrty stnlctrlrc urtrl orgitnization but ¿¡lso to institutionirl rtrlcs).

(ìonccnrracir>nist prcsidcntialisru ir¡volvcs thc rcclrrction of vcto points irt scvcr¡l or all

of

thcsc

clinrcnsions, tlrtrs potcntially incrcasiug thc crrpircity

lor

prcsitlcntial iniciacivc, rapid rcsportsc, itntl cxccr¡tivc-(lrivcn rlccisiou

naking.

Thcse ch¿rrlctcristics arc rnorc

likcly

to bc cffcctira

ilt

ccrtrtirl policy arcas

tll¡n

in othcrs, clcpcnclin¡¡ on ¿¡ sct oldivcrsc vari¿¡blcs. lììon<lcl ¿rntl Clott¡ (199ó)

undcr-linc

tlnrc

clscs in

"vhich thc govcr¡ìlnclìt lrctluircs gl!'atcr ¡.rtorxlrry

wirlt

lcspcct to thc strpporting pitrtics: cnrcrgcncics, tecllnic:rl cascs, irnd inrplcnrcntirtion. As nrcntionctl, plcsidcnts tcnd to crrjoy ÍÌrcatcr r<)olìì for nrirnct¡ve r fi'onr bt>th instittrtioll:rl and politicirl constraints as forcii¡n policy rcg:trds. For instirncc, lìogorvski (1999) clainrs th¡t nlorc sccurc tcnrìs of offìcc cnhatlcc f<lcign policy

cr-cd-ibiliq,. Although hc rrcknowlcclgcs that the prcserrce

of

fcrver vcto p<>iuts tttrty urttìct'tttitlc sttch

crcclibiliry, this rvor¡ld l;c conrpcnsatcd try iruplovccl stabilicy rrnd policy cohcrctrce.

llcyond rhcir dilfercntiltcd pcr:fornriu¡cc ircross issuc :rrc:ts, corìcclìttirtiorr ¡rld difhrsion of porvcr

¿¡lso h¡vc a tlivcrsc inrp:rct on gcncr':rl govcrnurcrttal caplcitics. As'lVcavcr ittttl Rockrllltu (1993,454)

Andrés Mahmud

st:ltccl, "those ârrangcnÌcnts th¿tt concentrate powcr . . . tcnd to perfornr l¡ctcer at thc stecling tasks

of governttrcnc than thosc tllat difftrse power." Conccntration of powcr is scc¡r as luorc ¡blc to tlc¿l

'lvith activc policy rnaking, whereas its cliffusion is

utrrc

closely relatccl

to

rnainte¡rancc--rtick to

cotrrtrritnrelrts-artd

political-wide

representation ¡ncl sociirl pe:rce-capacirics (lìockman 1997).

The application of tl¡esc propositions to Latin Anrcric¡ nriry wcll be ¿r

fruitful

endeavor:whcn rhe

rcgiott was strffcring fronr politicirl instability, preenú¡rent or conecnlrali<>ttist presiducies wcre unablc to solve social cortflicts and evctr to persist. Oncc tr¿rclitiou¡l causes of conflict had rcccdcd

¡ntl

ncw challengcs for govcrnauce ltad to lre f2rccd, stecritry rapncity (elncctive decision nrirking) clcvelopecl an irrcrc:tsirrg itttportaucc, sorÌrctinìes even ¡uore signifìcirnt tbirn politkal eapadty (lcgitinrare rcprcselìtlr-tion). Only rccently did soruc schol¡rs begirl to pây gre¡ter attcntiorì to the link berwec'n

prrsiden-ti¡lisrn iurcl public policy _{(Hrgganl and McCubbins 2001),:rlthough thcy do nor foct¡s on} foreign policy btrc on btrdgetary and regulatory policies. This chapter nroves ¿ì step forward and analyzcs how

external st¿tc bchr¡vior has h:rd an irnpact olì tlìe type ofpresidcntialisnt rhar prevails in L¡tin Aurerica.

It

cloes so by irpproaching a critical foreign policy arca: regionirl incegriìrion, the only one in which

thc vcry naturc of thc st¿tc is ch¡llengcd as parr:cls of sovcn:ignry are volnntarily rclinquished.

lVhat

are thc institution:rl caplbilities that foster higher effectivcncss

in

rhc

fiekl

of

regional integration? Tlrrce clomains ¿rc involved: forcign affairs, tradc policy, ancl nl¿inrena¡rce of inrcrna-tiotral ct>t¡rtnitrltents. Alrhotrgh the fornrer nray bc considerecl as cncourpassi¡ìg tlìc otlìer two, by foreign ¿rffairs I rcfer to thc over¿ll capaciry of targcting priorities ¡¡rc.l selecting nlr¡cro-oricnrarions

in

world

politics.

lìy

contrast, nutinten¡nce

of

iutcrnational conruritrnelìts rìleiìns corìtirìu¿rtiou r':¡tltcr than targetirìg, whereas tradc policy is

within

rhe rt¿hn

of

so-called

low

politics, that is,

ttìattcrs

th¡t

¿¡n: not vital to tlìc survival of thc state, antl inrplies nlicro or uteso-orient¡tions th¿t

are subst¡¡rtivcly ancl analyticllly diffcrcnr fì'onr granrì srraregy.

Itr

o¡rc

of

the few iuvestigations

linking

excctrtive

fornr¡t

with

intern¡tional

perforurance,

Milner

has arguecl

tlut

"diffcring

political institrrtions

in

Great lJritai¡r, France, ¡ncl rhc Unirccl

States have lìot lcd to rnajor cliffercnccs

in

their rrbiliry to nrake and nraiutain intcrn¡tional conr-trritrrrenrs

in

thc tratle scctor" (1993,347). The firct thar rhe Unitc'dStates does nor outperforru

pltrliartrentary clenlocracies is not surprisi¡ìg, becâuse prcsidcntialism is not better eqtrippecl th¿n parlixttìentarisrtr is reganling nraintcrunce capabilities. However, rcgionirl integration is lnuch

lnorc courplcx arld dauntirlg âlì entcrprise than

just

sticking to corlrrlritments rrlrcady att¡i¡rcd. M<>rcover,only one c:rsc

of

presiclcntiâlisln was analyzcd by

Milncr,and

it

was thc archctype

of

tlte

seplrationist type.

Thc

question

is how

concentrationist prcsidenrialisnr woulcl have per-fornrcd, whether regarding uuriuteu¿rnce or stcering c:rplcitics.

Thc argr.rrtrcnt adv¡nccd in this chapte r is th¿t the dcfinitiorul charactcrisric

ofpresiclenrialisn.r-thc fixctl tenn of thc prcsident (lìiggs

199a)-working

togcther

wirh

rhc dcfinirional charac[er-istic

of

thc corlccntr¿¡tiorlist subtypc,

wllich

is cxccutivc corìccntration of powcr, has allowccl for

:r highcr probability that decisions regarding forcign issucs would be macle rvithor¡r Êrcing insti-ttltiortrtl block¿rtlcs. Sinlt¡lt¡ncot¡sly, conccrìtr¿ìtionist prcsidcnti¡lisrn has proviclccl rclevaut actors

witll

clircct acccss to top decision nrakcrs and ll¿s perurit[ecl a

rlpitl

rcsponsc

froln

thc latter. I¡r trtost

of

Latilt

Arltcricl,

artd especillly the Southcrn C)onc, concentrate(l ràtlÌer tlìan scparated

powcr has proved wcll suitcd to deal

with

integration, at least in its first stages, becirr.rse it managed

to ovcrcotììe obsttcles presented by legislaturcs, cabinets, and regional iustitrrtions.

Latin

American Presidentialism: Cultural

Roots

TIre

exect¡tive concentr¿ìtion

of

power

is historicllly

rooted. Sondrol (1990, 417) has

distin-guished the uniquc tradicion of La¡in Anrcrica as nracle r.rp of threc kcy aspecrs: raarli//lsrrr, person-alisrrr, antl clitisnr, whose outcorue woulcl be

tn

cjceutiulsllo allegeclly

inrrinsic

to

rlìe

rcgion.

It4

Presidentialist Decision Mukittg

According to tlìis tpprorch,

duling

thc ni¡tion-building pcliod, " ciae utivisttttt

ill

Latin Artrt:rica has

bccn ¿r devicc

to

guidc irnd

coutrol

the extrcr¡list antl ccntrifugul forces clt¿¡r¿tctclistic

of

the

rcgion,:rntl to forgc unifyingsynrbols csserìtiill to lìrtiorì¡lisrìì

ill

l¡nds rifc

with

scpàratist

tcrltlcn-t:ies ancl

politicll

fitctions" (Sortdlol 1990,419).

Caudillisilt

c¡n bc

tlefìncd as :r typc

of

charisnr¿rtic lcrdcrship cxcrtcd

by it

lantlowncr

or

åì

likcwise granrl nran ovcr his srrt'¡ordinatcs

or

ncighbors, basctl ou clc f,rcto power attcl pct'sottal

wolslrip. I>e rsotmlísm consists

in

thc idcntifìcrtiorì of llìc uttdillistic lc¡dcr rvith tlìc stiìtc itsclf, thtrs cr:rsing any diffi:rcrrce Lrctwccn thc pcrsou ¡nd thc institution, paving thc lviry

fol

clicncclisrn as

l

social stnrcturc fountlcd

on

u pcrsonirl irnd irsynrnrctric cxchange rclationship. Elitisttt,

on

thc orhcr Il¡nd,rcfcrs to the intellectu:rl oricntution of nlost foturding fìrthcrs of

tllc

L¿rti¡t Arlrcric¡rt

strrtcs;

in

thcir vicrv, chc only conccivablc rulc rvas thc rule of rcitson, an idc¿r

tlt¡t

rlist¡r¡cccl thcr¡l fi'onr a ptrrcly tlcnrocratic corìception ancl drirggcd thenr closcr to

I

nrorc aristocratic ollc.

TIrc concept

of

populisttr,rvith its long history aud uriruy llloca¡ccl urc:tnittgs, crpturcs tnost

of

the ¡bove. Sonrctinrcs

it

is untlcrstood ¿rs

¡

social structurc th¿rt corubincs certaitt political,

cco-nonric,:rud ct¡lttrrrrl cll¿r¡acccristics

(O'Donncll

1973; Gcruurni 1978;

(lotrniff

1982),

whilc

at

orlìcr tilncs

it

is dcfìncd

in

telnrs of socioccononrir: policy (Srrchs 1989; L)ornbt¡sch rrncl Edrv¡rtls 1991).

llorh

intcrprct:rtions h:tve lately lost nnrch of thcir conccptull grip. lVcyland\ dcfìnitiorr

of populisru as ir politicitl

stlltcgy

scenrs rìrorc suit¡blc, provitlctl that

:r pcrsonll lerrdcr appcals to n hetclogcncous lìì¿rss of lollorvcrs

who

fccl lcft out ancl at:

¡vaihblc for

rlrobiliz¡tiolì;

thc

le¡cler rc¿¡cllcs

thc

fòllor'r,ers

i¡l

¿t dircct, tluitsi-pcr:sonal

lìulìrìcr

rh:rt bypasscs cstlblishcd intclurcrliirry organizations, cspcciirlly p¿rrtics;

iI

tlìc lc¡clcl btrilds â lrew or rcvivcs an old populist p:rrty,

it

rcrutius a pcrsotritl vehiclc

with

¡

lorv lcvcl of institutionirlizirtiorr.

(199e,

J8r)

In

turn,Albclti

calls for rhe rthabilitation of thc pr>liticul crrlturc applo:tch ¡s thc lteccssiu'y olìc to ¿tccor.rrì! for nnníniuilisllo in L:rtiu

Anrclic¡.

FIc argucs

tll¡c

"ntovcntcnt ¡nrl irlscittrtiotl ¿ttc trvo

tliftbrcnt, contratlictr>ry and nu.rtrritlly cxclusivc principìcs

of

soci¿rl lif-c'''

(Albcrti

1996, 261).

Movirrricntisrno is tlrus defìned iìs

"r

piìrticul:rr rvay of phying politics

in

rvhich irll nrirjor intct'csts

in socicty lre expressccl and loosely orgrrnizctl in rlroverncnts lcd by charisnl¿ttic lc¡tìers,which cl¡irlr to rcprrscrìt chc'truc'interests of thc nation . . . rurd itlentify pcrsonal lcirtlcrship

lvitll

Stitte institu-rions" (Albcrri 1,996,254). McGrrirc sinrilarly tlcfines politic:rl move nrcrìts as "¿t sct of pcoplc who

sharc a cournron political idcuticy and whose lcadcrs aspire

to full

antl perttrâncnt corltrol

of

thc

srnrc rlìrouglì the nrost rcacìily availablc urcaus,clcctoral or rÌoc"

(1997,7).lt

is sirnple to cottcltttlc that ull tllc prececlilìg phcnonrcn:r ¿uc tightly rcl¿rtcd to cach othcr, all thcrn stctttttúttg fi'otrr a

cotll-r¡ron dcn<.¡núu¿ìtor: ptrticul¿risur, thc h¿utl corc of Lrrtin Anlcriciul politics. As llolívar wotrld h¿rvc

lvishcd, nìos[

Lttilì

Anrcricau cxccutivcs havc bccol¡tc "kings r,r,ith thc titlc

of

prcsidcrtt." Unlikc

kiug;, hotvcvcr, they have to

wiu

pcriodic clcctions, and thcir nrancl¿¡tcs ¿rlc lirlútctl in tirtrc.

Morcovcr, thcy arc strpposed to bc chcckctl by institutions sucl¡ ¿rs corìgrcsscs, citbinct

nrirlis-tcls, rrud, iu sorììc cascs, govetuol's.

llut

thcsc institurious cndccl up bcing diffcre nt fror¡r thcir U.S.

prcclcccssors, rs tlìcy ¡llowcd presitlclts l:rr:¡¡cr rcour for r¡t¿tr¡cuvcr.

\lith

lcw

cxccptiolts sttch as

Chilc and Urugu:ry, historical pr¿rcticc did not tiurìc cxccr.ltivc iruton()nry irl L¡ti¡r Arllcrica.

Aficr

thc T'hird Wavc of t'lcrlrocratic tr¿ì¡lsitiolìs, tlìc pclsistcncc of cxccutivc suprcnìacy leil

O'Donncll

to spcak of ir

"ucw

¡niur¿rl":dclcgirtive clcnrocncy,unclcrstoocl:ts u t'cgitrtc typc irt which

whocvcl wir¡s election to rlte presidcncy is thcrcby cntitlccl to govcnì ¡s hc or sltc sccs

fìt, conscnrinecl orrly by thc hard facts of existing powcr rclations :rncl by a colìstitr.rtiottally l15

Andrés Malamud

lintitccl tcrr¡r

of officc

. .

. In

this vicw, othcr

instittrtions-cot¡rts

ancl le¡¡islaturcs, for inst¿r¡cc-are nuis¿nces . . . a nlcrc irupcdinrent to thc full iìuthoriry thac the prcsident

hirs bccn tlclcgatcd to cxclr:isc.

(1999,164)

l)ourestic

institution:rl constr¡i¡rts were evc¡1

we¡kcr

regarding foreign affairs. Frrrtherlììore, krnger pcriods

in officc-fi¡cilitatecl

by dcrnocr:rtic stability and,

in

sonre cases, by corìstitutional aurencùnents that allowed for consccr¡tive

rcelcction-allowed

incr,rrubent presiclents to becollre nrore knowleclgcable and lssertive, as well as to crcate personal boncls and policicll solidarity

with

their fcllow presiclcnts

in

thc rcgion. This sort

of

"presitlcnts'club" constituted à ncwly grow¡ì,

particul¡ristic trase olsupport that contributccl to further untie th<: presidencs'hanc-ls fi'onr niìtiolìâl and rcgional institt¡tio¡rs.

Latin American Presidentialism

and

Foreign Policy

Thc

pr<>nrirtcnt role

tlut L¡tin

Aurerican presiclents have playccl

in

crafting ancl implernenting

lorcign policy is wcll cstablishcd. Fol ex:trnple, Keller (2012) shows how prcsiclcnts Atlolfo López Matcos (1958-64)

¡txl

Gt¡st¡vo Dí¡z Old¿¡z (1964-70) personally shapcd Mexic¿rr¡ foreign policy to st¡pport Fidcl Clastro:rftcr the Cub¿¡n Rcvolution regardlcss of systcuric or iclcological fì¡ctors.

Likcwisc, Escudé (1997) cxplains

how

Prcsidcnt Carlos Menern (1989-99) proclucecl dranr¡tic changcs in Argcntina's forcign policy

with

disrcgard for political tr¡ditions and institutiorral cor.r-strai¡-tts. Menelu rencged on clecadcs of confiontutio¡r

with

thc'West by undertaking a course

ol

r¡nilatcral disarnraurent, leaving thc nonalignecl moveurent, reestablishirìg

frientlly

rclations

with

lì'it:rin,

¿rnd r.¡ncontlitionally aliguing

with

thc U.S.

in

tlle

Gulf

ì7ar by executive clecrcc. More

crucial inst¡nces to tcst thc significance ofprcsitiential influence over forcign policy arc providecl by thc cre:ttion ancl opcration ofregional organizations: rvhen internation¡l creaties const¡'ain state

¡ction, presidents should c'loclge not only clonrestic bt¡t ¡lso inter¡ration¿l insti[trtior¡s

in

onlcr to prcvail. Therefore, thc bcst cascs to assess how effectively prcsidentialism and foreign ¡ff¿irs

inter-act ¿rre institr.ltionalizcd cases of rcgional integrirtion. A bricf conrnrent

olì

the Central Ar¡rerican Cot¡rmon M¿rrkct (CACM) artrl the Ancle¡n Comurunity (CAN) follows, and the n more

enrphn-sis is given to

thc

(lorìrnron Markct

of

the Sotrth (MERCOSUIì), oncc thought

of

as the nrost successful regional or¡¡lnization i¡r the \)fcstcrn Henrisphere.

The C,{CM

was fotrnclcd

in

19ó0 ancl pcrforrnccl renr:rrkably well during its first ycars.

Pro-g¡ess w¡s cluc to

tcchnical-that

is, non-politicized-managcrÌrcrìt, âs well as to the low political and ecotrotuic costs of

intcgrâtion-si¡rce

it

clid not thr-ca[e¡r any powerful irìtercsts and

ac]l-rún-istration cxpenscs wcre paicl by forcigu sourccs

(Wynil

1970;Mattli 1999). Howcvcç the fragility

of

the ¡chieverìrcnts bccaure âppârcnt as

thc

task <lf holcling the integrative stnlcturc togctlìcr'

turncd out to be the principal corlccrn of rcgion:rl leaders after the boonr of the first years. Thc

result was an expansion

in

thc scope of the tasks perfornred by an increasing numbcr of regionirl institutions,

without

a co¡rconritant increasc

in

the authority of such ir-rstinltions. The stagnation

of

the proccss would last two dccades, during which both interstate and

civil

wars sruashetl any

illusion

ol intcgrltion.

In the early 1990s,pacificltion rnd democnrtization led to a revival of che bloc (Grugel 200ó;

Mattli

1999).

Thc

nrcchanisnl thât linked denrocratiz¿rtion

to

intcglirtion

had an instirutional foundation:presidenti¿rlism. The relaunch of thc organiz¿ìtiorì ste urnìed froln the

insticr.¡¡ionaliza-tion of prcsidcrìtial rncctirìgs, which was propelled by the pe rsonal conrprornise of the prcsidcnts.

Tlris innovatiorl wâs "a keyJaelor in the rencwcd dynanúsn of Cennal Anrcrícan cooperation and

inte-gralion proccsscs,and it has alloutcdJì>r nrcanínglirl pro.gress in rcgional deuelopmuú" (Conúsión Econónúca

ll6

Presidet t t iul ist [)ecision Muki ng

par:r Arrróricu Latin¿r anrl lluno Intcr¿urrcric¿uro dc l)csarrollo

_{KIEPAL-llll)l}

1997,35,crttph:tsis rrdderl). Thc hirnd of thc chicf cxcclrtivcs ovcr tlìc rcgionirl ¡rchirccture is notice¿rblc'in thc insti-tu[iolìâl proviso thirt cstablishcs that prcsidcnts bcconrc rnenrtrcrs

of thc

(ìcntrul Antcri<:¡ll Pitr-lianrcnt as soorì as thcy cnd

their tcrnl in

oflìcc, thus

offcling

thcil

expcricncc

to tlìc

regional

org:ruizatiou-and gr:unting thcnrsclvcs clrc pcrks of thc ncrv position, incltrcling excrììption

ftolìì

prosecutiolì.

Thc CAN

w¿rs cst¿¡blishctl

in

1969 and,jrrst like thc CIACM, pcrfornred quitc sltisÊrctolily in

ics early ycars. Howcvcr', chc cnlargcnìcrìt to Vcnczucl¡

in

1.973 ¿tncl thc rvithtlri¡wirl

ol

Clhilc irl

197(> gcncrirtcd

¡

succcssion of nurjor criscs. Aplrrt frour thc

rigidity

of thc tlr,'rttics, tllc fìtilurc rvas

cluc to thc uncqual tlistribution of costs and bencfits, thc politicizatiorì of irìtegr'rtion issucs. grcitt politicrrl instability, arrd thc lack of rcgional leadcrship

(Mrttli

1999). In spite of thc cst:¡blishurcnt of ¿r court ofjusticc :rnd u rcgional p:rrlianrcnt, the l¡loc staguittccl trutil

.l

987, wlìclì it trc¿ìty rcfortll

rcndercd its

working

urcclunisuls nlorc flcxible. Still,

it

was

llot until

:rll the prcsidclìts lìrct irì 1989 chrt thc region enrbarkccl orì

r

proccss of tlccpening and opcning. The Andcan Presidenti¿rl

Cotrncil, creatcd

in

1990, wrs to (:orìsolitl¿rtc such ¡r bid.

It

is corrrprised

of

thc prcsidcnts of thc nrenlbcr statcs

¡nd

constitlrtes the bloc's highcst-lcvcl body. Hor,raver,

in

1992

thc (louncil

w¡s

tuu¿rtrlc t<¡ prcvcnt chc crisis prodtrced

wllcn

Presidcnt

Albcrto

Fujin-rori stagctl it sclÊcoup ;tnd

rctircd Perlr fi'onl

thc

rcgional ins¡itutions. As

it

happens, prcsidcntialisc dccision

utlking

utity have ncgltivc ¿rs nluch as positivc cftccts on rcgional intcgration. Itr rtny cusc, oncc Fujirnori lc'fi

offìcc his coturtry rvas prourptly rc:rcccptccl

into

CIAN institntious.

MEIìCOSUR was foundcd

in

1991 and, ur¡likc thc prcviorrs clses, rìot evcn its fìrst stcps

fit

thc rnirinstrcanÌ tlìcorics of rcgional iutcgration. The t'"vo uri{or coutcrtìpori¡ry currclìts, uantcly,

libcral intcr¡¡overnnrcntalisnr (Mor:rvcsik 1998) and supran¿rtiolìâl govclrì¿ìncc (Stonc Swcct

¡ntl

S¿ndholtz 1998), rcg.ud socicry irs the point of clcprrltrrre for intcgrirtion, bccituse tr¿uìsrì¡tiolìitl

trans¿ìctors incrcasc thcir cxchangcs irucl subsctlucrìtly

crll

on lìirtion¿ìl or tr:ìlìslìatiolìal ¡trthorities

to :rtljtrst rcguhtions and policics

[o tlìc

ucw sirtr¡tion. Thcse :rpproachcs clralv on cvidcncc

col-lccrccl frorn the European expcrienccs. MEIìCOSUR., howcvcr, arosc

front thc

politicirl

will of

n:¡tioniìl govcrrìnìcrìts, iurd only thcrc¡ftcr

did

it

gcncratc public dcnland

for

furrher intcgration (Malanrud 2003).

Liberal .intelgovcrnrlrent¿rlisnt sces ccorìonric intcrdcpcnclcrtcc as

I

stroltg precorttlitiort for

intcgration. As tratle libclalization ¿ruglììcl.rts cxport tlcpeucle ncc itnd intrit-indtrstry tradc, sttortge t'

prcssr¡rc for intcgr:rtion ariscs.

Iìcgionll

instittrtions ¿rrc tlìus conccivctl us nrccll¡trisnls to lock

ill

¡ncl c¡rforce agreelìrcnts r¿ìtlìcr th¿lì :rs politicirl ¿rrcrìas or ¿rutonorìtolls actr>rs. lu spirc

olthc

crucial

wcight this approach ¡ccords

rìrtiolìîl

st:rtcs, thc dccision to

citllcl

pool

or

dclcgatc sovereignty

to thc region¿ll level is rc¡¡arded as urìirvoid¡blc to allow for higher lcvcls

olcornplcx

interitctiotl. The hisrory of MEIìCIOSUR, howeve r, runs ag:rinst thesc argurncrìts: firsr,

it

did not crnergc fi'our

cichel incrc¿rsctl cconouric interdependencc

or

soci¿rl dcnrirncls; secortd, ic h¡s

¡lot

clc¿¡ted ar)y

:rurorìorìrous institr.rtional struclurc. Instc¿d,it is lulcd by a t:ouncil cortrp<>sccl of thc forcign and

ccolìonìy nriuistcrs, lvho by trcaty proviso shor,rld nrcct

rt

lclst o¡rcc pcr

ycll

undcl thc :rcgis

of

thc prcsitlcnts.

In [urn,supraniìtion¡l gover¡lance thc<>ry s[r'csscs thc signifìcitncc of fcltrr ttti¡itt ¿tctors in ptrsh-ing lorward European intcgllrtiorr: lìirtiorì stltcs, trirrìslìatiollitl !r:ìns:tctors, thc Eut'opeart

Corllrllis-siou, ancl thc Europciru Court

of

_Justicc. Thc latte r two

lrc

supriuìacion¡l instittrtions that clo uot

e xisc in MEIìCOSUIì, a f;rct that, ¡ddctl to thc wcukncss of tr'¿rnsn¿rtional tnrusrtctors, llas lcfc

cxclu-sivcly rltc

lìttiolì

stittcs irs suprerìre ¡ctors. ID consiclcring thc Errropcln Union, Stonc Swcct ¡ncl

Slndholrz (199S, 19) callctl irttcution

to

"thc

rulc-ccutcrctl logic of insritution¿tliz¿ttion"tlt¡t lcd

rr'¿ìns¿tccors to clenrand clcarer aud nrolc prtdictable rt¡lcs as intcrdepcndetrce iucrc¿tsctl. Irl

MEIì-COSUIì, increasing interdepcndcuce h¿rs crciìtcd the ncctl

[o

lnrn¿rl4c it rising uuntbcr o[criscs

Attdrés Mnkvnud

aud coonliuation probleurs,

btrt

trausnational transactors lìavc <leuranclecl particular decisions ratlter tlìalì gcncral rulcs. For st¡ch decisions, the national prcsidents have bcen perceived ¿ìs rìlorc

¿ble-nrore

acccssible, utore responsive , more effe ctive, r¡rd

faster-than

arìy other' ¿ctors.

It

is cor¡lnonplace to ¿lsscrt tlìat thc

operltion

of MEIìCOSUR h¡s frrndanrcntally rcstecl on presiclcntial diplornacy (Núrñcz 1997; Danese 1999). This nrech¿rnisrn is understoocl âs tlìe cus-torÌrâry rcsort to clirect negotiations bctwcen rìâtionâl presidents evcry tinrc a crucial decision h¿¡s

to be m¡cle or a critical conflict ¡leeds to bc solvecl. In spite

of

the "presidential"adjcctive, rlìis

l¡bel referenccs any

folnr

of political sunurút diplom:rcy-as opposecl to br¡reaucr¿rtic process or

professional dipbnrrrcy. Thcrcforc,

it

is not concepttrally differcnt frorn the prâctice dcvelopccl by

priurc ministcrs in parliaruentary deurocracics. In MEIìCOSUIì, succcssive chicf exccr¡tivcs have

lllegedly

c¡rricd

out presidcnti:rl diplonracy

with

a lree hand to ¿cconunodate the issr¡es at stakc

in

the way thcy s:rw

fit.

M¿¡lanu.rd (2005) has reconsiderecl this argunrent orì the grouncls that, althotrgh not incorlcct,

it

does not provic'le ir

tnrly

accurate cxphnation

of

the proceeclings ancl

results

of

MERCOSUR.

Hc

arguecl

th¡t

instittrtio¡ral incenrives ancl consrraints, shapetì

lry

thc presidential fornrat of nrenìbcr st:ìte institr.rtions, luvc supported thc process of regional intcgr:r-tion, thus providing an iustitutional b¡sis to :rpplrently discretional dccisions.

The rapprochcrìrent betwccn Argcntina and

llrrzil

beg:rn

in

1979 turcler

syuluetric

nr.ilitary rule, although coopcratiorì was institutio¡ulizcd

only

in

1985 whcn denrocracy was rcstored irr

both corrntrics. Although bilatcr¡l collaboration hacl becn attenrptcd onc decade bcfore, nrilitary

presideuts

A.lcjlntlro

L¡nusse and

Emílio

Gnrrastazú Méclici failcd

to

overconrc bure¡ucraric intcrcsts

itr

the ¿¡rrncd forccs ¡rtcl forcign nrinistries

of

both statcs.

Darnton

(2012, 120) argucs

that organizational politics,

not

presiclcntill cliplomatic crrors, cxplains

thc

persistcncc

of

the

Argcntinc-llrazilian conflict

in

the early 1970s. 1"1ìc interpresidcnti¿rl ¿ìrgunrent, which assunrcs

de ntocracy ls politicirl rcgirne, shccls light orr why two ochcr prcsidcnts strccceded in thc following

decaclc, cvc¡r though cltcy had to face the sar¡re vestcd intcrests embcddccl i¡r the st¿rtc ¿ìpparatus

that rcnraincd reltrct¿nt to cng¿¡gc

in

iDterstl¡te coopcrltion.

Threc events that have r¡ralkecl MEIìCOSUR's history restify

to

rhe releva¡rce

of

interprcsi-dentialism. Two were tlte co¡rtrovcrsies over thc only special rcgin'res established at thc beginning

ofthe

process, naurely, for thc ¿utonrobiles and sugàr sectors. The thircl concer¡rs the tenrporary sttspension

of

Paragu:ry's mcnrbcrship

in

2012, followir.rg a presidential iurpeirchurent. The

ana-lyticirl

nitrrative

tlìat

follows clr:rws

partly

on

tlìe

sr¡pranational govcrn¿ìrìce irpproach, as

it

is

cspccially setrsicive to diffcrent policy areas and ro tlay-to-day politics.

At

the sanrc tintc,

it

clra'¡'s

on tlÌc irltergovernrnental approach to prcference fonlration, ficr thc hypothcsis tested here chal-lcngcs the libcral irssuurptiorì that stâtes âct as agcnts ofdonrcstic soci¿l actors.

lletween 1990 ancl 1996, there was a shnrp increase

in

intnregional trade

in

cars as ¿ì

conse-quc¡rce

of tariff

reductions

lnd

agreenrents to b¿la¡rcc iurports aud exports. However, by núcl-1995

llrazil

atrd Argcntina wcrc sr.rflering fronr econo¡¡úc distrcss bccause

of

the 1994 Mcxican

fì¡r¿rncial crisis.

Autonlobilc

prodtrction rernaincd statrlc

in

Argentina esscrÌti¿rlly becuusc

of

its

exports

to

llrazil, which

gencntcd a growing bilateral tracle inrb¡la¡rcc a¡rd rlisecl corrrplaints iunotìll

llr¡zili¡n

produccrs. Thc l¿¡ttcr askcd thc llrazili¿¡rì govcuuìrclìt for procective tr¡de barriers, brrt these were rìot sr,rpposccl to apply within MEIì.COSUIì. The crisis cânrc to a hcacl whcn llrazil

¿ttrtrourtced that

it

would

li¡rrit

automol¡ilc irrrports

with

no exceptions uracle for

MËIìCOSUIì

pârtncrs, angering the Argcntine autlìorities.

Thc

l3razilian cabir¡er

wls

dividecl about rhc deci-sion, as the financc tniuistcr opposed trade rcstrictions where¿s the planning urinister supported thel¡r.

lloth

wcre close aidcs to thc llrazili:¡n president Fcrn¡ndo Henrique Cardoso so he usually nrediatecl between thcur, but this tiure the harcl-liners c¡rriecl the day.

In responsc, Argcntine president Me ncur threatenecl to boycott the prcsiclenti¡l summit

schcd-trlcd

for

the

forthcouling

MEIìCOSUIì

Econonúc Forunr. Facecl

with

this stance, Carcloso

118

-I

P resi den t iuli st Decision Mnking

postponccl thc cnlorccnrcnt of thc dccrcc for thirry clays.

'lhc

prcsitlcnts thcnlsclvcs c:tn'icrl out tlìe ncgotiatiolìs, excluding their c¿binct núnistcrs. Thc Argcncinc.forcign tllittistcr u,as

in

lì<>tltc, and

his dcprrty tlid not tirkc part

in

thc proccss cithcr. The presitlcnts helcl din:r:c colìvcrsittior.ts to r,vot'k

ouc a solution. Fcllorv

MEIìCOSUIì

pr,csitlcnts, Paraguay's _{Jtrirn Cllk>s lf:tsurosy} ancl Ulugtrayi

Julio Sirnguiuccti, offcrcd lhcnlsclvcs as pclsorìitl urcdiators in the disputc betwccu thcir l:rlgel

palt-rìers. II wrs :rgrced thac all four prcsiclcnts woulcl urcct ¿¡ud th¿tt Mcttcnr ¿rncl (ì¡rdoso r,vor"rld holtl a

bil¿rrcrll suulnrit thereaftcr. Nobocly rncntionctl

thc

possibility

of

rcst>rting

to

thc

Protocol

of

tlr¡síli¿r, thc ins¡itutional instrunrenü by rvhich rncultrcrs lverc supposccl

to

t'csolvc thcir disptrtcs.

C¡rdoso ¡skcd Mcuelll to :rct "politicarlly, in ordcr to rcstorc ¿r bal¡ucc lrct'uvcctr thc pitl'ts. TIlc tllost

inrportanc ching hcre is politic;rl

rvill"

(Mrlanrud 2005, 145).

Thc

two _¡rrcsidcnts finally:tgrccd to sign a dcclirnrtion st;rting thlrt ne¡¡otiatiolìs werr to corìtinuc.

A

tcntpoltry

solution

ltltl

conrc ttp,

u,ith ncithcr rcgional institutions uor c¡binct nrinisters h:rving hacl any signifìcirnr plrticipariorl.

MEIìCOSUIì'.s atrconmbile

conllict

¿rncl its resolutiou c¡ucstiou thc validity

ol ¡n

¡ltcrn¡tivc

cxplanation: burclucr¿¡tic policics. In

Allison\

faurous dcscliption, "T'he 'lc:rdcrs'rvho sit on top

of organizltions arc

lìotir

rlronolithic

group..

. _{lbtrt playcrsl} in a

ccntrll,conÌpctitivc

glrrtc.

Tltc

ll¿rnrc of tllc glrurc is politics: brrrgaining alon¡¡ rcgulalizctl circuits iìlììolìg playcrs positiolrctl hicr'-:rtchically

within

thc

govcrnrìrcnt" (1971,144).

In

tlle

casc ¿tc st¡kc, Itolvcvcr, b:rli¡irinini¡ took

pl:rcc bctlveerì govcrrÌlì)cl)ts ritclìcr tharl

rvitllin.

Couccr¡tr¿ttionist prcsitlcrtts trcccl

tlot

pìay thc powcr g¿uìrc donrcscicrlly, bccausc thcy ovcrritlc iìl.ry potcnti¿rl corìrpeti[ors.

The sugal rcgirnc is _{unotller ¡rriurc} casc

for

g:ru¡¡in¡¡ prcsitlentiirl intcrveutiou,

for

thc intcr'-prcsidcntirrl ârgunÌcrìt fìrccs ¿r clirect challengc.

Thc

rc¿rson is that this rcgintc hirs

oftcn

bccrr

sclcctcd to untlc'r'line thc iurpoltaucc of nation¡l plrli:rurcnts, thc

joint

palli:turcntrrry cotttntissiott,

or clonrcstic social ¡ctors (Mustlpic and Cìcncyro 2000; Vigevani cc

ll.

2001).

Sugar hirs bccn a hot issue sincc the bc¡¡irrnin¡¡

of

MEIìCOSUR. Argcntin:r

ud

llrazil

h;rcl

opposing intcrcsts lcsultiug fr'our rr high productivity difti'rential,

which

is ¿ttr otttcotrrc

of

thc l-]r¡zilian Prograur:r Proírlcool. This prograrn subsitlizcs thc plotluctiotr olsug:tr caltc it.t orclcr to

usc carìe alt:ohol ¿rs :¡ blencl proportiorì in gasoline. As a consequcrtcc,

llr¡zil's

prctluctiort olstt¡¡ar'

w¿ìs iìrtifìcially incrcascd rrntl bccanrc :r by-product tr:rd¡blc ut nritrgin:tl pliccs. Argcntinit, on tltc

othe

r

h:rnd, Êrccd ¿r

diffìcult

situ¡rion bec¡usc

oÍ

¡hc dourcstic conrlitions

for

thc protltrctiort

of

strgar'. Sugirr crops

rlc

sprcrd ovcr fìvc provinccs locatctl

in

thc poor northwestcrrì rcgion. (ìivcrt

thc fedcr¡l

¿ìrrlìrìgclììclìts est;rblishcd

by

the Ar¡¡cntine constitutiorutl rcgintc

lhc

sctt¿tols ¿ttttl

deputics l'cplcselìtirìg

tllc

uorthwcstcrn plovinccs colìstitr"rtc a solid bloc

irt

()ongr-css _{to dcfcrld}

thcir

"sug:rr co¡)stituc¡ìts."

hr

7997,chc Argcntinc Congress prssecl a lrnv irnposing the s¿rr¡rc

t¿riflort

irttports of l-ìrazili¡rl

sug¿ìr as thrrt rrpplicd to

non-MElìCOSUIì

countrics. Although thc llrazili¿n ruthoritics (lcrìied h:rving cxerlecl irny pn:sstrn: orì

tlìe

Argcr-rtine govenìrìrelìt, Prcsitlcr¡c Mcncnr vctoccl thc litur Shockingly, thc Senatc unauiurously tcjcctcd the vcto. 'I-hc clcccoral cautpitign for nlicltclrlt

elcc-tiolìs w¿rs trnclcr rvay, irncl no l¿¡wnrakcr wirntctl

to

lrc c'xposcd to r:ricicistu

for

having pitvctl art

opcu rorrd

fol

l]r¡zilian

sugirr iurports.

Thc

argtrnrcnt cscalacctl itftcr

tllc

ovcrr:itling oft tlle vcto.

In thc lJrazili¿rn Congrcss, there werc rctali¿rtion tlucats.

'fltc

cxcctrtive atloptcd a prtttlctrt strttcc,

hor,vever. Prcsidcnt (ìarcloso w¿rs awiìr'c that thc Argcntinc legislirtors rvcrc actiltg ttttrlcr pt'cssttrc

of

thc clcc¡oral clurpaign, so he optcd

to

trust thc cf^forts that

tllc

Mcucnl

adtltitristratiotr rvas

nr:rkinp¡ co

liurit

thc clrunirge. Thc" Argcntinc cxccutivc corttlcnulcr'l thc congrcssional posicion artcì

rcr¡ucstccì to its lJr¡zilian courìtcrpi¡rt lììorc tirìrc to fix thc prolrìcnt. Sor¡rc offìciirls on tlte l]razilian

side-notably

thc forcign

nriuister-rvcre

not conviuced

o[thc

sinccrity

olthc

Argentirte posi-tion, but C¡rtloso gavc Mcncnt thc bcncfìt of thc dotrbt.

As thc situation approachc<ì ¿ul unbcrr¡¡blc point, it presidcnrirl lìtcctirtf{ lvas agrcctl ttpotr.

ltt

Novcrnber 1997, aftcr clcctions wele held, Mcncnr trrvclccl

to

llrrrsíli¿r.

This

trip

rcvcrsccl

tllc

Andrés

Mokntwl

tìcgrtivc attttosphct'c, arltl tltc

Algcntinc

prcsitlcut cvcntullly atloptctl :r

lorr¡tull

th¿tt tl¡tccl b¿rck

to

thc

Viccroyllty of

La

l)lat¡:

":tcíttcsc, pcr() rìo sc cr.rrn¡rlu" (lcknorvlcdgc thc

nrlc

brrc

tlo

not otrcy iQ.

ltt

:ttlcie Itt tirncs, this pr¿r(:ticc wrlrkccl wcll ft>r nrliugs i:r>nriug fìorrr Sltain; norv, it u,orkccl against tlrc hrvs originrtting

in

thc,{r¡4cutirrc Cìouglcss.'l'llc ttrifi'"v:rs ncvcr applicd.

Sr,rcccssfttl prcsitlcrrcial circunlvcntion

ol

both

rìatiorìal congrcsscs and

MEIìCOSUIìt

_Joinr Plrliitnrcntary Cloltntission is bcst unclcrscorccl by a sccond strgar c¡riso<lc.

Iu

Atrgust 2000, thc

Argcntinc Oongrcss cn¿rctc(l rlì()tlìcr larv ¿riurccl to protcct Argcntinc c¡nc t'our lJr:rzilian

colìtpc-tition.

lìr¿rzili¿rn olfìcials issucd con<lcnìlìatory l'csp()rìscs, _'"vhcrcits

tllc

llr¿rzililrn Oongrcss

tltrc:rt-crtccl to lirtric iutports

olfòotl

contairtirtg sugur fì'onr

Argcntinl.

Argcntinc prcsidcrrt Fcrnantlo rìc

l¿r Iìíra r,vls ttpsct abr'ruc thc Algcntirrc lcgislltivc dccision. Flc rv¿rs cxpcctcd

in

llrrrsília, whcrc a

Sottth Atncricalt sunlnlit wrs sct t() tirkc pl:rcc, ¡nrl was not plcasccl to l-¡c rcccivcd in :rn unfì'icndly clitlt¿tc.

AlÌcr

ir bittcr cubinct rììccting, hc scnt his f<>rcign nlinistcr to rìcgoti¿ìtc

with

rhc dcputics

lìrlll

tlle lìorthwcstcnì provirtccs to avoicl u war bctwccn thc llr¡zili¿rn ln<l Ar¡¡cntiuc c()lìgrcsscs.

Althotrgh Prcsiclcnt

Mcncrn\

visit

of

Novcnrbcr

i997

ll:rd allorvctl thc softcning

of

rcnsions

bctrvcctr tlte nvo asscrrrl;lics, providing

r

tcrììpor:ìry rcsolution for thc fìrst str¡¡lr cpisodc, this rirrrc resolutiotr appcarcd to bc utorc diflìcult. Thc lisk

ol¡n

outbiddin¡¡ conflict thirt cotrlil jcoplrclizc

thc

intcgrltion

proccss krokcd grcatcr. MEIìC)OSUlì

llltl

not yct ovclcorìrc rhc cflccts of thc 1999

llrazili¡rr

fìn¡ncial crisis antl (ìurrcrìcy clcvaluation that h¿rl affcctctl tlrc b¡lancc

oftrlclc

rvithiu

tllc

bloc, urttl lcgisl:rtors fronr both (ìor¡ntl'ics wcrc now thrcutcning

rctlli¡tion

though

lvllcn

no

clcctor¡l citrnltaigrt rv¿s unclcr u'ity. Mcrnlrcrs of

tllc

Joint l)lrliarncrrt:rry Oornurission itttcrrrptcd

to rììc(lilìtc to no :rvl¡il.

Jtrst rvlrcn it sccrttccl that things could gct no worsc, l)rcsitlcut dc

l¡

lìú¿r strrprisingly vctocd thc

lrrw, ortly to sigrÌ

I

rcsolutit>rl rvith thc sArììc contclìts.

'l'hc

goirl rv¿rs trv<>hrkl.

()n

onc hlrrd, this tlccisiorl prcvcrìtc(l att opcrt-cutlcd csc¡lltion bctrvccn tlrc con¡¡r'csscs, cxpcdiently rcnroving thc

issttc fì'otlt thc lcgislltivc arcua. Ort thc <;tllcr,a rlccrcc

in

placc of'a l¡rw irnproved thc cxccrrtivc'.s

ltcgotiatiorÌ powcr, âs

it

cnablcd tltc Argcr"rtinc prcsi(lcrìt to crìsurc his

lìr¡zili¡n

courìtcrptrt tltar thc tlccrcc woukl lrc liftcrl ¿ls soorì ¿ìs an agrcenìclìt rvas rclrchctl, rvitlx>ut lì¿ving to go tlìrouglì ârì

tunccrtain lcgislutivc proccss.

'I'llis

cvcltt

sltolvs lt<>w

thc

prcsitlcnts

ll¡vc

chosclì

to

tlìkc

ull

rcsp<;nsibility _'uvhcncvcr

MEIì(l()SUlì

fitccs

¡

sct'ious conflir:t. Thcy lurvc <lonc sr> cvcrì at thc cxpcnsc of rclinquishing thc

likcly Ì;cncfìts th:rt cot¡Ìd lrc cxtr¿tctcd tì'orrt a two-lcvel gitnrc (Putnani l9tìtì).

Wltcn

ncgorittiltg

with

ftrrcign p¿rrtncls, thc prcsitlcnts ci¡rì rìo lougcr argr.rc tll¿t dc>nrcstic institutions kr:cp thcir

lla¡ltls ticd, as thcy lluvc ttt¡clc

it

clcar tlìat lì() actor stu¡lcls abovc prcsiclcntial corììpctcnccs.

f'hc

tllos¡ rccctrt tnatlilcstrtiolì olirìtcrprcsidcntial suprclììrcy \\,¿rs clìc proccss

thlt

lcd to tllc

sttspctrsiotr of Paragu:ty'.s rttenrbcrship ¿tltcl thc congrcssionul oustin!a oll)rcsiclent Fclnanclo Lrrgo

irr _Jtrrrc

2(\12.'fhc

cottl¡tcssioual proccctlings h¡ci bccn hastily carriccì our

in

forcy-cighr hours,

rvllicll

r¿riscd rvidcsprcacl criticisr¡l th¿t cluc proccss h:rtl nr>t bccrl rcspcctcrl. Howcvcr, thc (lhanlbcr

t>f I)cptrtics irtrpcirchctl thc prcsiclcnt by au <>vcnvhclnring rrurjority olscvcnty-six vorcs ro onc, '"vhilc che Scn;ttc t'ctltovcd

Ili¡ll

fr<¡¡n

olficc

by

thirty-rrinc

votcs

to

four. Lugo hinlsclf publicly

acccptccl

tlrc irlpclclrnrclìt

arì(l its cvcutr¡¿l rcsult,

llthough

hc

lltcr

callcd

it

a

"parliarrrcntlry

t:otrp."1'hcSttprcrttc

(lourt

cnrlorsccl thc rlccision rs (:olrstiturionllly v:rlirl and thc vicc-prcsitlcut,

rvho h;tcl bccrl clcctcrl

olr tlìc

sânrc tickct as Lrrgt>, rcplacctl his prcdcccssor as corìstitr.rtionally

tlitttclatctl. I-lorvcvcr, thc rcrnairring

MEIìCOSUIì

prcsiclcnts

did

not agrcc

wirh

rhc lcg;rlity

of

tltc

proccss.

Aftcr

scnding

thcir

fì>reign nrinisccrs irr arr uttcnrpt to prcvcnt tltc inrpcîclrrncrì[ or rcversc its otltcotìtc, tltcy

rlct

a lvcck

l¡tcr

in Mcnrìozir, Argcntina, ancl suspcncled l)arlguly,:rllcg-irrg that ¿r cotrp d'ótrrt hatl

tlkcn

placc uncì thus MEIì(lOSUlì'.s clcnrocr¿rric cl¿rusc shoulcl bc

¡c:tivrtc(|. T'hc provision allowcd thc organizati<>n

to

strspcncl

lny

of

its rucrubcrs

il

a¡r clcctctl

lcaclcr ."v¿ts _{ovcrtlìrowrì. In ¡}

_trilatcrll

_{rìrcctirìll at rvhich thc l)ar:rguayurì rcpresclìtâtivc rvas stoppcd}

r20

P residat t t it t I i st I )cc i si ott ìvl ukù _ry

lut

tllc

tkx>r', tlr'¡zil'.s

l)ilnlrr

lìousscf l', Algcntin:r'.s

(lristin¡

ltcrníurtlcz dc

I(ilcllllcr,:rrrtl

Urtr¡1tl:r1".s

Josí'Mr¡icir

outr'<>tcrl

thc

[):rnrguuyurì (]orì!ìrcss, its Suplcnrc O<ltrrt,

urltl thc

c<>rtstittrtiortrtlly

clcctcrl

vicc-prcsirlcrrt-l)()w

irr cllrrgc

of

tlrc prcsi<lcnti¡l

oliìt:c-l)),tllrcc

v()tcs t() zcr'o.

Ilt>tli-crrlly, this <ìccisiorr u,as lll:rrlc

rvitll

tllc sunrc lllstc irrrptrtctl to tl)c ilììpcxcltrttcttt proccss, irlthotrgh

u'itll

lcss irtttclìrucrìt t<> lci¡al plot:ctlrrrcs. O<lnsultations

rvitll

tlrtt tiìrl4ct st¿ttc \\/crc lì()t ct>tltlttctctl,

:rs tllc tlcutics rn¿ntllrtc<ì,:rntl thc.juli<licll instrunrcnt oÍ'tlrc strspcttsi<>tl rv¿ts not rr lc¡¡:tl ittstrtttllctlt

l)ut a pta.ss rclclrsc. S<¡¡llc lcg:rl nicctics \\/crc ¿!tcurptcd

htcr,but

tllc firct rcrtt:tins tll¿rt tllc rlcr:isiorl

Ir:rs uo cotlc rrt¡nrbcr rvithin

MEIìO()SUll

body

t>fllu'

¡nrì that thc thlcc siurt:ttoly strtcs rljcctc(l

rlr¡r

it

corrltl

bc

rcvicrvctl virr :r

jrrtlicial

ploccss--fìrr cxiìnrplc,

thc MEIì(l()SUlììs

l)clrlrtrlc¡lt

lìcvicu, Ooult.

In silnì, tl)r'cc lìlrcigrr prcsi(lcnts ovc¡rulcrl

tltc

tlo¡lrcstic cllccks:uld brtlltrtt:cs

tll

tllc

lì>rrrtll

llcllrbcr

st:rtc ¿rntl succcsslirlly circurìrvcrìtc(l :rll rcgi<>nirl institutiorls.

M[ìlì(]()SUlì

has bccn :r t:lsc of'sr.rpply-sitlc intcgrltion (l)crllcs 2{X)3). 't'hc clcc:isiorr to cstiìl)lislì

thc

org:rrrizltiolì w:ìs

not

nurtìc

irr

rcspr>rrsc

to

prcvious cc()rx)lìri(ì irttcltlcpcttclcrtco ()r s()cictitl

rlclrr¿rntls btrt by thc k>nc tlct:isi<>ll of its nlcrubcl st¿rtcs'prcsidcrìts, in solììc ctscs a!Ìlrilrst thc rvill

of

rhcir'¿i<lcs and diplotrrrtts.

M:¡llntlrl

(2(X)5) sh<>rl's llorv thc prcsirlcuts ll:tvc t:otltril'¡tttcd to shapc thc

illtcgi'rtiolt pt'occss antl to nl:rkc it u,ork by rnlking trsc of tllcir institution¿rl :rrrrl _{¡roliticitl r:itplcitics.}

Whclcus

MEIì(l()SUIì

s,:rs intcntir>rrully crc:rtctl rrurl kc¡'rt :rs un irrtcr'¡¡ovc¡'ltntcntul <>rguttizutiott,

thc s<>r'kirrg proccsscs <>ltllc bloc: lrrrvc rlcvclopctl :rs ¿rn cxtrcntc ty¡rc olintclgovct'tttttctttltlistlr

tlnt

hirs bccn callctl intclprcsirlcntirrlisrlr (MaLrrrnrrl 2(X)3).

It

rcsults fì'ont tllc courbirlrttit>rl of it tlorllcstit: itrstitution, tlrlrt is, corrccntrâtior)ist plcsi(iclrtillislìr, rvith :ul intclnittionrtl strrtclly, thirt is, prusirlcrttill

rlipklnlcl,.

Urrlikc

lillcr¡l

iutclg<x,clrrrrrcntulisru, iutcrprcsitlcnti:rlisrlr is supportctl tlorrrcsticlrlly by

politic:rl i¡rstitutit>ns riìtlìcl tlìarì try socictirl tlcrrnncls,:rntl it is propcllcd by politic:rl ¡rtcfòrcttccs nttltcr

tlllrn socill prcfi'rcrrccs. llcsirlcs,

it

is prrr:rctivc irntl tllus rut()rìolììotìs lrortt plcviotts lcvcls

olirltcrrl:t-tiorrul intcrclcpcntlcncc. And, unlikc burc¿ruclrrtic politit:s, it rlocs rtot involvc birlgainin¡¡ lttllt>tlg scvct.tl

pl:tycls trccltrsc <>nc r>f tllcnr ovcrrulcs all othcrs, bc thcy cabinct rttirtistcrs, p:rlli:rtttctttut'y rttrjolrtics, thc tliplorrrlrti<ì (ìorps ol'cvcn supru)lìtion¡l lurtlloritics. l)ur:rpltrrrsirtg Allixln, politics is still tllc Illrtrrc

ol'tlrc girnrc, onl¡' i¡ is pluyc.l _{irrrrorrg ¡rccr prcsidcnts} ¡iìtlìcr tlìlìrì l¡ctrr,ccn tkrntcstic :tgctrt ics.

Conclusion

Sullrnrit

diplortltcy

is n<>t

l

fì'irtrrrc cxclusivc t<¡ L;rtin Arucric¿. T'hc

originirlity

t>f'tltis rcuiorr

rcsi<lcs

in

its bcing thc lrrrgcst lrrc:r s,llosc clricf cxccutivcs

lrc:rll

prcsitlcrtts

iultl

s,ll<lsc rcgiortal institr.rtions c<>llrc itr ¿rll lì>rrlrs

¡ntl

colt>rs. l)r'ovirlctì tlr:rt clorttcstit: rcgitttcs ll:rvc:ttt irttp:tt't tt¡r<trt

intcrnlttion¡l

rcl;rtit>ns,

it

is conccit,itblc

tllat

not r>rrly thc rlcrrtocr':rcy-ltut()(ìr'rt(:)/ rlit:ltotorrry lttrt

rulso

tllc

_{¡rrcsirlcntiirl parli:rrrrcnt:rry clistinction} is likcly tr¡ ttt:tkc :r rlifli'rcncc.

l)rcsitlcnti¿l rcginrcs irr L:rtin

Anlclic¿

irrc ct>rrrnrorrly dcsclitrctl its:tsy,ttttttctric, utlbalrt¡lcctl, h¡,pcr'-plcsitlclìtilì1, ()r (:or.ìccntrittioltist rvllcn r:orttpurctl to tlìc U.S. c¿sc. 'f'lris <:lltptcr Il¿s sllou'tl

tltat L¿rtill Arucriclrr <lcnr<>r:r'¡tic plcsitlcnts c()lr(:cntrltc crt<>rtglt powcr to citlrcr prcvail ovcì'()l'

t:ilcurrrvcllt vct<> pllycrs such irs

tllc

c:rbinct lrntl t:<>n¡4r'css,

otlìcr

p()tcrìtiltl vctt>:tctt>rs stlclt ¿s

natiorìiìl [.¡t¡rc:rucr:t:ics,:rnd

rcgiorrll

institutions,

ilì

iì

\\'ry

trutlliuk:r[rlc f<>r'citllcr pltrliltrttcrttrrly cxccutivcs <>r btilutrt'l prcsìrlcnti:rl systc¡ìrs. In this ch:rptcr, tlìc pcrft)rrrìiìlìcc

of

prcsitlcrtts ls ltotlr

pr>lic), r'rirltcrs irrrtl rlisputc scttlcrs lrrs bccn cx:rruincd,un<l tlrc rolc ¡rllycrl b¡, clricf'cxcctrtivcs irt key policy:ucas ll:rs bccn usscssccl. T'lrc institutir>uul fc'l¡turcs thrrt shlpc plcsiclcrrti:rl itttcrvcllti<lll

u,clc irlcnrifrctl,l.>ct'lusc intcrplcsidcrrti:rlisnl is b¡scrl ll<>t <>rtly r>tt irltlivicltr¿l tlist:rcti<¡tl ltttt:rlst> otì (ìolìstitutionîl lrntl piu't)/ r'c\our'('c\.

l)rcsitlclltial intcrvclìti()lìs rvclc succcssfìrl lrccut¡sc tltcy s,crc ll:rckctl by irrstittrtiorrll c:rpabili-tics srrcll iìs vct() antl tìct'r'cc p()wc¡'s, l.lcr':rr¡sc tlrc prcsidcrtts'su¡'r,ivltl wiìs rì()t tlcpctttlcttt ort tltc lcgislattrrc,

¡ntl

bccar¡sc c:rbirrct nlinistc¡'s unrl

tllcir

brrrclrr¡t:r'ltcics u,crc subt>rtlitl:ìtc(l t() tìlc clricf'