Bureaucratic Capacity in Brazil and Argentina: Does Politics Matter?
Celina Souza INCT-PPED and IESP-UERJ Sienna, May 6, 2014
Objectives
Analyze the process of bureaucratization and the construction of bureaucratic capacity in Brazil and Argentina
Measure the quality of the Brazilian bureaucracy in agencies in charge of four developmental
policies (environment, infrastructure, industrial and innovation)
Creation of an index of bureaucratic capacity in Brazil (Index of Bureaucratic Capacity - IBC)
Capture and analyze the perceptions of
bureaucratic and social actors in Argentina about
the quality of their bureaucracy
Why study bureaucratic capacity and why compare Brazil and Argentina?
The capacity of the bureaucracy is a predictor of what is likely to happen to public policies
Brazil and Argentina began their
bureaucratization process at the same time (1930s), their systems were quite similar but they followed a completely different path
regarding the selection of their civil servants after redemocratization.
Literature: State capacity and Evans and
Rauch (1999; 2000).
The argument
The difference between Brazil and Argentina after the end of the military dictatorships is explained by different political agendas
Brazilians decided to write a new Constitution in 1988 to inaugurate the new democratic regime. The main goal was to rebuild democratic institutions. Access to public
employment through competition and meritocratic criteria was part of the redemocratization agenda to distance the new regime from the previous one, based mainly on
patronage. Furthermore, meritocratic criteria was seen as a requirement of advanced democracies
In Argentina no new Constitution was written and in 1994 a constitutional amendment was approved with no major
institutional change, except the constitutionalization of several international treaties for the protection of human rights, heavily violated during the military regime.
Structure of the presentation
State formation and bureaucratization in Brazil and Argentina and its relation to state capacity
Data and analysis:
• Index of bureaucratic capacity in Brazil (IBC)
• Perceptions of bureaucratic and social
actors in Argentina about the quality of their bureaucracy
Discussion
State formation, bureaucratization and their relation to state capacity
Tilly x Silberman
And what about Latin America?
Questions:
• What were the differences and similarities in the bureaucratization processes?
• Do different trajectories explain subsequent decisions about the rules for civil servants recruitment?
• Both countries adopted a politico-technocratic criteria for recruitment, but why Brazil has opted for changing it and not Argentina?
• Do similar trajectories alone explain why they distance themselves from each other?
Hypotheses:
• Similar trajectories in the early 1930s but institutions created in Brazil survived but not in Argentina
• Politics matter: rational actors (politicians) addressing issues of different agendas
IBC
Objectives
• To capture the quality of the federal bureaucracy in four policy areas:
environment, industrial, infrastructure and innovation
• To capture differences among agencies
Dimensions of bureaucratic capacity and sources
Dimensions:
Recruitment I: proportion of the higher officials in the agencies who entered the civil service via formal examination and
competition
Recruitment II – proportion of higher officials with temporary contracts
Types of professionalization:
• Generalist (English-speaking model)
• Specialist (French model)
Internal promotion: rules for the promotion of civil servants
Accountability: civil servants fired for wrongdoing Sources:
Federal government of Brazil: several sites – 18 agencies and 28.578 higher level civil servants
Survey in Argentina: 18 interviews
IBC : Contributions
Disaggregation of the index by policy areas – innovation, environment, infrastructure, industrial
Disaggregation of the index by dimensions of bureaucratic capacity
Take advantage of the availability of online data
Little knowledge about who is and where is the “new” bureaucracy recruited by competitive exams
Analyze the bureaucracy in charge of policy formulation and implementation and not the entire bureaucracy
Proposition of a methodology applicable to other policies
Identify outliers and explain why and what policymakers can do
Different from other studies, we added state companies and appointed officials to high positions
Different from other studies, we searched for a connection between bureaucratic capacity and developmental policies and not economic growth
IBC - Results
Policy IBC
Industrial 0,68
Innovation 0,66
Environment 0,62
Infrastructure 0,59
IBC by Dimension
Dimension Indicator Weight Environment Industrial Infrastructure Innovation
Recruitment I IR1 0,2 0,504 0,007 0,226 0,039
Recruitment II IR2 0,2 0,010 0,012 0,039 0,014
Generalist IF1 0,2 0,011 0,018 0,007 0,005
Specialist IF2 0,2 0,826 0,591 0,279 0,647
Internal Promotion IP1 0,1 1,220 1,196 1,588 0,973
Accountability IA1 0,1 0,018 0,010 0,004 0,000
IBC 0,624 0,677 0,590 0,66
Bureaucratic Capacity - Argentina
No data online or systematic information available
Different from Brazil, it is not possible to construct an index or to analyze specific policy areas
Survey (questionnaire) to capture perception
Ex-post evaluation - answers were
consistent: bureaucrats, politicians,
scholars, members of think tanks.
Recruitment: % of civil servants selected by competitive examination
82.00%
18.00%
Less than 30% Between 30-60%
Civil Servants with university degree
46.00%
18.00%
36.00%
Between 30-60% Between 60-90% More than 90%
Generalists x Specialists
27.00%
46.00%
18.00%
9.00%
Dependent on the agency Between 30-60%
Between 60-90% Don´t know
Internal Promotion
36.00%
37.00%
9.00%
18.00%
Don´t know 2 levels 3-4 levels Several
Temporary workers
64.00%
36.00%
Between 30-60% Between 50-90%
Accountability: civil servants fired for wrongdoing
9.00%
91.00%
Don´t know Seldom
Analysis: Brazil and Argentina in comparative perspective
1. Two main distinct political decisions with consequences for the political and bureaucratic systems:
1. The writing up of a new Constitution in Brazil based on broad societal participation and on several instruments to legitimize the new
democracy. Argentina´s political elites mainly addressed the issue of human rights
2. Starting in 1994, the federal government in Brazil created thousands of new jobs in the civil service and officials became to be selected by competition
2. By any dimension analyzed (recruitment, types of
professionalization, internal promotion and accountability) Brazil scores better than Argentina, although in Brazil
there are differences between and among agencies and policy areas.
3. Brazilian policymakers have large information advantage over Argentinean.
Discussion
The research confirms the literature in bureaucratic capacity: its distribution is not uniform
The concept of path dependency explains only partially why Brazil followed one path and Argentina another after redemocratization.
To depend only on path dependence arguments without specifying different political environments and political agendas does not
explain why rational actors took different decisions at the same critical juncture
Because civil servants in Argentina, in particular higher officials, are not selected through competition, it does not mean that patronage alone prevails and that the government is unable to provide public policies. Its capability is selective, to policies high on the President
´s agenda.
Brazil now fulfills all the requisites of a Weberian bureaucracy whereas in Argentina public officials still face uncertainty and are subjected to electoral cycles.
