FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS
CENTRO DE PESQUISA E DOCUMENTAÇÃO DE HISTÓRIA CONTEMPORÂNEA DO BRASIL – CPDOC
PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM HISTÓRIA, POLÍTICA E BENS CULTURAIS
MESTRADO ACADÊMICO EM HISTÓRIA, POLÍTICA E BENS CULTURAIS
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE “UNWRITTEN ALLIANCE”: THE POLICY OF A PERSUASIVE APPROXIMATION BETWEEN BRAZIL AND THE
UNITED STATES (1889-1906)
BY
OLIVIER NICOLAS RONALD FRANÇOIS BODART
ACADEMIC ADVISOR: PROF. MATIAS SPEKTOR Rio de Janeiro, November 2018
FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS
CENTRO DE PESQUISA E DOCUMENTAÇÃO DE HISTÓRIA CONTEMPORÂNEA DO BRASIL – CPDOC
PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM HISTÓRIA, POLÍTICA E BENS CULTURAIS
MESTRADO ACADÊMICO EM HISTÓRIA, POLÍTICA E BENS CULTURAIS
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE “UNWRITTEN ALLIANCE”: THE POLICY OF A PERSUASIVE APPROXIMATION BETWEEN BRAZIL AND THE
UNITED STATES (1889-1906)
BY
OLIVIER NICOLAS RONALD FRANÇOIS BODART
Master dissertation in History, Politics and Cultural Assets presented to Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil – CPDOC
as partially required to obtain a Master degree in History.
Ficha catalográfica elaborada pela Biblioteca Mario Henrique Simonsen/FGV
Bodart, Olivier Nicolas Ronald François
An alternative to the "unwritten alliance" : the policy of a persuasive approximation between Brazil and the United States (1889-1906) / Olivier Nicolas Ronald François. – 2018.
145 f.
Dissertação (mestrado) – Escola de Ciências Sociais da Fundação Getulio Vargas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em História, Política e Bens Culturais.
Orientador: Matias Spektor. Inclui bibliografia.
1. Diplomacia. 2. Rio Branco, José Maria da Silva Paranhos, Barão do, 1845-1912. 3. Brasil - Relações exteriores - Estados Unidos. 4. Estados Unidos - Relações exteriores - Brasil. I. Spektor, Matias. II. Escola de Ciências Sociais da Fundação Getulio Vargas. Programa de Pós-Graduação em História, Política e Bens Culturais. III.Título.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Although the act of academic writing is often a solitary moment, the research part definitely represents a collaborative work with a tremendous amount of people involved and innumerous gratifying experiences en route.
First of all, I would like to give a special thank you to my advisor, Prof. Matias Spektor, for always giving me pertinent comments and precious guidance along each step of my research, and my academic career.
I also would like to stress the generosity of Profs. Alexandre Luís Moreli Rocha, Maurício Santoro, João Daniel Lima de Almeida, Rodrigo Goyena Soares, Oliver Stuenkel, and Guilherme Casarões for their availability and their enthusiasm in listening and reading about my project; always providing me some useful feedback. I am also thankful for the great influence, in many ways, that this dissertation received thanks to the entire staff from the Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC) from Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), in Rio de Janeiro.
I am very grateful to the Boards of Directors from Fundação Getulio Vargas for allowing me to do this research with the help of a grant.
The dedicated employees, trainees and volunteers from the National Archives (NARA I and II) at College Park, Maryland, United States of America and from the Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil who support me in my historical archives research deserved all my admiration for their professionalism.
Last but certainly not least, thank you for the support of my family in Brazil and in Belgium. Much gratitude, admiration and love are dedicated to my spouse, Joselita, for her precious understanding, generous advice and kind patience during my endless moments of studies and writing. I cannot miss to give a very special gros bisous to my son, Basílio, who was born during the course of this dissertation and gave me more strength and maturity to achieve my goals.
I am sure you all feel as proud and victorious as I am after having accomplished this intellectual challenge.
“Nations move more for interests than feelings”1 “The persuasive means are, in my opinion, the single ones to be made use of, in order to succeed in delicate negotiations like these, by a nation like Brazil that does not enjoy sufficient power to impose its willon an important military power”2
1 Translation from the author: “As nações se movem mais por interesses que por sentimentos”. Minister
Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to J. M. da Silva Paranhos do Rio-Branco, State Minister of foreign Relations, March, 30th, 1906, n°2, p. 4. File: 405-5-17, reservado.
Buenos Aires Oficios, 1906-1908, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro.
2 Translation from the author: ALSINA, João Paulo Soares. Rio-Branco, Grande Estratégia e o Poder
ABSTRACT
This work aims at presenting an alternative version to the unwritten alliance that commonly describes the U.S. and Brazil relations at the beginning of the 20th century when they became closer and more intense. By unpacking the foreign policy strategies of each party and the perception of power towards each other, it appeared that Washington and Rio de Janeiro shared a perception of international changes as far as hemispherical matters. This converged into a persuasive approximation that mainly served Brazilian interests to contain the Argentine republic’s ambitions and divergent influences; without nonetheless the need to officialize the specific relation.
Keywords: U.S.-Brazil relationship, Argentina, Approximation, Perception, Rio Branco.
RESUMO
Este trabalho busca apresentar uma versão alternativa à aliança não-escrita que comumente descreve as relações entre os Estados Unidos e o Brasil no início do século XX quando elas ficaram mais próximas e intensas. Ao desfazer as políticas externas de cada ator e a percepção perante cada um, concluímos que Washington e Rio de Janeiro compartilhavam uma percepção das mudanças internacionais no âmbito hemisférico. Isto convergiu em uma aproximação persuasiva para o Brasil poder conter as ambições de poder e de influência divergentes da República Argentina; sem contudo a necessidade de oficializar esta específica relação.
Palavras-Chave: E.U.-Brasil relações, Argentina, Aproximação, Percepção, Rio Branco.
RÉSUMÉ
Cette étude a pour objectif de présenter une version alternative de l’alliance non-écrite qui généralement décrit les relations entre les États-Unis et le Brésil au début du XXe siècle lorsque celles-ci sont devenues plus proches et plus intenses. En dénouant les politiques étrangères de chaque protagoniste mais aussi en analysant la perception de chacun de l’autre, il apparaît que Washington et Rio de Janeiro partageaient une perception des changements internationaux en rapport au continent américain. Cela a convergé vers un rapprochement persuasif au service du Brésil afin de principalement contenir les ambitions de pouvoir et d’influence divergentes de la République d’Argentine; sans toutefois la nécessité de rendre officielle cette spécifique relation.
Mots-Clés: Relations U.S.-Brésil, Argentine, Rapprochement, Perception, Rio Branco.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 1
CHAPTER 1 | U.S. and Brazil Domestic Asymmetry - 1889-1901 //////////////////////// 24 1.1. U.S. Domestic Politics For International Ambitions ////////////////////////////////////// 24 1.2. Settling U.S. Foreign Policy: Between Legacy And Progressive Principles ////// 26 1.3. Washington “Offensive” Foreign Policy Toolbox ///////////////////////////////////////// 28
1.3.1. 20th Century’s Monroe Doctrine: Universal Projection //////////////////////// 29
1.3.2. Pan-American Conferences And Pan-Americanism Ideals //////////////////// 32 1.4. T. Roosevelt’s Ambitious International Project ///////////////////////////////////////////// 35 1.5. Hemispherical Reactions To U.S. Vision Of International Order //////////////////// 36 1.6. Brazilian Domestic Level: Instability In Changes ////////////////////////////////////////// 39 1.7. Brazilian Foreign Policy Reorientation //////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 43
1.7.1. U.S.-Brazil: First Pragmatic Approximation Attempt /////////////////////////// 45 1.7.2. Brazilian’s Perception Regarding The U.S. ///////////////////////////////////////// 46 1.8. Perception of Power Distribution In South America ////////////////////////////////////// 49 1.8.1. Argentina As A “Special” Neighbor /////////////////////////////////////////////////// 50 1.8.2. Tariffs War Between The U.S. And Argentina ////////////////////////////////////// 51 1.8.3. Brazilian Concerns About Argentina’s Naval Power //////////////////////////// 53 1.9. Conclusions /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 54
CHAPTER 2 | New Perceptions of Power in the Americas - 1902-1904 //////////////// 57 2.1. U.S. Moral Foreign Policy ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 58 2.1.1. The White House’s Perception About The South Of The Americas ///////// 59 2.1.2 The U.S. Department Of State’s Views Towards South America ///////////// 61 2.2. South American Perception Of Power ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 63 2.2.1. Brazilian Gains vs. Argentine Losses ////////////////////////////////////////////////// 63 2.2.2. Double “B”: Bolivia And Bolivian Syndicate ////////////////////////////////////// 64 2.2.3. Brazilian Military Power Situation ///////////////////////////////////////////////////// 66 2.2.4. Argentine Search For Regional Influence: Isolate Brazil ////////////////////// 68 2.3. Switch In The Americas ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 71 2.3.1. Reorganizing The Balance of Power in South America: Venezuela Case 71 2.3.2. Three U.S. Steps Towards South America //////////////////////////////////////////// 72 2.4. Argentina Takes the Lead /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 75
2.4.1. U.S.-Argentine Attempts at Forming an Alliance ////////////////////////////////// 75 2.4.2. Drago’s Doctrine Attempt ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 77 2.4.3. South American Solidarity Attempt ///////////////////////////////////////////////////// 79 2.5. Brazilian Reaction To The Venezuelan Case //////////////////////////////////////////////// 80 2.5.1. Rio Branco’s International Views ////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 81 2.5.2 Tightening Relations Between Argentina And Brazil ///////////////////////////// 85 2.6. Revolutions In South America: U.S. Views ////////////////////////////////////////////////// 87 2.7. Conclusions /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 89
CHAPTER 3 | The Illusive Alliances - 1905-1906 /////////////////////////////////////////////// 91 3.1. Confidently Assuring U.S. Influence: Roosevelt Corollary //////////////////////////// 92
3.1.1. Consequences in Brazil ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 93 3.2. Decisive action, symbolic gesture: elevation to Embassies ///////////////////////////// 96 3.2.1. U.S. Legation Perceptions Of Rio Branco’s Policy ///////////////////////////// 100 3.3. Rio Branco’s Multilateralist Approach To International Relations //////////////// 101 3.4. Two Perceptions For One Cause //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 102
3.4.1. Rio Branco’s Perception Of The U.S. - For Argentine Purposes ////////// 102 3.4.2. Illusive Alliance – A-B-C ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 103 3.4.3. Rio Branco’s Perception Of Argentina - For U.S. Purposes //////////////// 106 3.4.4. Illusive Alliance – U.S. Embassy ////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 106 3.5. U.S. Foreign Policy towards South America /////////////////////////////////////////////// 108 3.6. Two Statesmen To Catalyze The Illusive Brazil-U.S. Alliance ///////////////////// 110 3.6.1. An Idealist - Elihu Root /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 111 3.6.2. A Convinced Monroeist - Joaquim Nabuco //////////////////////////////////////// 113 3.7. 3rd Pan-American Conference In Rio De Janeiro ///////////////////////////////////////// 115 3.7.1. Argentina’s Opposition //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 115 3.7.2. Rio Branco’s Instructions to Nabuco Prior To The 3rd Pan-American Conference ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 116 3.7.3. Rio Branco’s Explicit Message To U.S. ///////////////////////////////////////////// 119 3.8. Conclusions ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 120
CONCLUSION ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 122 BIBLIOGRAPHY ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 129
INTRODUCTION
On the 9th of August 1906, the President and the Secretary General of the 3rd Pan-American Conference firmly criticized the misbehaviors of the press corps during the official sessions hosted in the Monroe Palace in Rio de Janeiro. Among their main complaints was the fact that official documents and papers were stolen, journalists were sitting in the designated seats of delegations, and some were playing hide and seek behind curtains during private meetings. Highly irritated with these attitudes, both Brazilian officials at the head of the organization, Joaquim Nabuco and Assis Brazil, announced that, consequently, the press would be excluded from the room every time a crucial political or a diplomatic debate was to occur.3
According to the Herald of New York, that decision followed a polemic interview of the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rio Branco by the well-known Argentinian journalist Ignacio Orzali. In the piece published fourteen days earlier by the Buenos Aires newspaper “La Nacion”, Orzali credited Rio Branco for these following words regarding Latin America: “Countries which cannot govern themselves and which do not possess sufficient strength to suppress continual revolution have no right to exist and should give place to stronger nations”. A couple of days later, a telegram was also “mistakenly” sent to Bogotá wrongly attributing these words to Rio Branco’s Pan-American Conference opening speech and was published in Spanish-American newspapers.4
In response, Rio Branco called the Argentinian journalist “a liar” and published, in the Brazilian press, a semi-official denial article commenting the whole incident: “The dispatch to Bogota gives an idea of the intrigues that some press
3 Translation by the author. Silvino Gurgel do Amaral, Trade Representative, United States of Brazil Embassy in Washington to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron of Rio Branco, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, September 14th 1906, dispatch n° 40: Single Attachment: The New York
Herald, September 10th 1906, “Press boycotts Rio conference”. Arquivo Particular do Barão Do Rio Branco, Lata: 854, Maço: 02, Relações exteriores, Pasta: 14. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro.
4 Translation by the author. Silvino Gurgel do Amaral, Trade Representative, United States of Brazil Embassy in Washington to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron of Rio Branco, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, August 11th 1906, dispatch n° 38: Attachment n°1: The New York Herald, August 8th 1906, “Baron Rio Branco’s Denial”. Arquivo Particular do Barão Do Rio Branco, Lata: 854, Maço: 02, Relações exteriores, Pasta: 14. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro.
correspondents are indulging in in order to create in certain Spanish-American countries feelings of distrust and ill will against Brazil”5.
The 3rd Pan-American Conference organized in 1906 in Rio de Janeiro, and principally the U.S. Secretary of State’s official visit, as a special guest is often represented in existing literature as the zenith of a new foreign policy orientation between Rio de Janeiro and Washington that had started a few years earlier, at the turn of the century. Between 1902 and 1906, the two sides had worked to actively shape a new, closer diplomatic relationship. The process had relied on the leadership of a handful of key officials, and was now reaching its apex.
As this dissertation will show, on the American side, Elihu Root, respectively Secretary of War and Secretary of State under T. Roosevelt’s administration, designed and implemented the new policy towards Brazil. From Rio de Janeiro, the policy was ran by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Maria da Silva Paranhos Junior, known as Baron of Rio Branco, with the support, in a second phase, of his Ambassador in Washington, Joaquim Nabuco. Both nations worked in a collaborative effort - at different level - to pursue their political interests and achieve a historical approximation that is commonly characterized by the expert literature as the most intense and the closest in terms of relations between the United States and Brazil up to these days.6
This dissertation focuses on the construction of that specific relationship between both hemispherical nations between 1902 and 1906, based on previous relations that began at the Brazilian Republic Proclamation in 1889. My goal is to
5 Ibidem.
6 BUENO, Clodoaldo; CERVO Amado Luiz. História da Política Exterior do Brasil. UNB, 5a Ediçao,
2014; BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política Externa da Primeira República. Os Anos de Apogeu – de 1902 a 1918. Paz e Terra. 2003; HIRST, Monica. Brasil-Estados Unidos: desencontros e afinidades. Rio de Janeiro, FGV Editora, 2009; PEREIRA, Paulo José dos Reis. A política Externa da Primeira República e os Estados Unidos: A Atuação de Joaquim Nabuco em Washington (1905-1910). São Paulo:
Hucitec/FAPESP, 2006; RICUPERO, Rubens. Rio Branco: O Brasil no Mundo. Editoria Contraponto, Rio de Janeiro, 2000; RICUPERO, Rubens. A Diplomacia Na Construção do Brasil: 1750-2016. Versal Editores, 2017; SMITH, Joseph. Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil, 1889-1930. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991; TEIXEIRA, Carlos Gustavo Poggio. Brazil, the United States, and the South American Subsystem: Regional Politics and the Absent Empire. Lexington Books, 2012; VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. O Dia que Adiaram o Carnaval: Política Externa e a Construção do Brasil. UNESP, 2010; VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. O Evangelho do Barão: Rio Branco e a Identidade Brasileira. UNESP, 2012.
better understand the logic of that approximation between the United States of America and Brazil in the beginning of the 20th century. For this, I will unpack the motivations of each of the parties, and analyze the politics behind that phenomenon. More specifically, I seek to answer the following question: How best can we characterize the U.S.-Brazil relationship at the turn of the twentieth century? Answering this question matters because existing literature describes the enterprise as an unwritten alliance, but here I offer an alternative explanation of what took place on the ground. Instead of framing this relationship as an informal or semi-formal alliance, I believe we can more productively understand what happened at the time by thinking in terms of a persuasive approximation.
By leading a persuasive approximation policy, I mean that the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Rio Branco, made full benefit of a tradition of cordial relations but mainly a shared perception with Washington about shifts in the international balance of power at the turn of the 20th century to get closer to the U.S. government.
By maneuvering so, his main goal was to deter expensive and aggressive behaviors of a third agent involved in the equation: the Argentine republic. Because the Argentinian-Brazilian diplomatic relations were particularly tense, the communication between both governments troubled and misled, and no signals of cooperation from the Argentine capital given at this time, the intention in Rio de Janeiro was to signal to its direct border neighbor – via the U.S. channel - that Brazilian authorities were nonetheless precisely aware of its geopolitically suspicious intentions in South America. Thanks to close relations with the U.S. – perceived in South America as the hemispherical emerging power -, Rio Branco could restrain any hypothetical offensive actions from Argentina.
This specific approximation - at the service of the persuasive policy - provided many other advantages: low-cost, autonomy, and did not require institutionalization. By consequence, this type of behavior cannot be characterized as an alliance – written or unwritten. Brazil-U.S relations were after all loose rather than tight, with levels of mutual commitment minimal. There were no provisions of budgets on either side to build up a special relationship with the other, nor were there new institutions set up to formalize mutual commitment. Administrations in Washington and Rio de Janeiro did not set up new bodies to manage relations with the other side, nor were there any provisions introduced to establish a division of labor between the two countries in their relations with the rest of the hemisphere. As the dissertation will show, the trove
of evidence that is now available suggests that the density of the bilateral relationship between Brazil and the United States at the time of Rio Branco was thinner than it is normally taken to be. Our task is to properly specify the terms under which the two sides set out to cooperate.
The process of diplomatic approximation between Brazil and the United States of America in the beginning of the twentieth century is, as seen above, normally described as an unwritten alliance7, an expression consecrated by the American historian E. Bradford Burns8. Published in 1966, two years after the beginning of the last military dictatorship in Brazil, the book9 continues to be the major work of reference regarding the topic, having mainly influenced various generations of scholars in Brazil10 and across the world11.
Burns defines the relation between the U.S. and Brazil as an unwritten alliance to mutually support one another within the regional fora of the time. This arrangement is presented by the author as part and parcel of the broader approximation between the two countries that started in 188912. This process would include U.S. government
7 BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations.
Columbia University Press, 1966. This is the first published book by the author.
8 Edward Bradford Burns (1932-1995) was an assistant professor of history at UCLA (1964-67) and
professor, UCLA (1969-93). He was born in Muscatine, Iowa. He specialized in Latin American history.
9 In 2003, the book was published in Portuguese by FUNAG, under the title: A aliança não escrita: O Barão do Rio-Branco e as relações do Brasil com os EUA. The reader should be aware that FUNAG is
a Brazilian government agency and the official publisher of the Ministery of Foreign Relations. More info: http://www.funag.gov.br/index.php/en/. Another important fact is that this study was translated from English to Portuguese by Sérgio Bath, a Brazilian retired diplomat.
10 PECEQUILO, Cristina. As Relações Brasil Estados Unidos. Fino Traço, 2012. BANDEIRA Moniz,
Luiz Alberto. Capítulo I. In: Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Revan, 2003, p. 43-69. CERVO Amado, Luiz; BUENO, Clodoaldo. História da
política exterior do Brasil. UNB, 2008. BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política externa da Primeira República. Os anos de apogeu – de 1902 a 1918. Paz e Terra. 2003. TEIXEIRA, Carlos Gustavo Poggio. Brazil,
the United States, and the South American Subsystem: Regional Politics and the Absent Empire. Lexington Books, 2012. GARCIA, Eugenio Vargas. Cronologia das Relações Internacionais do Brasil. 2a Edição, Editora Sairava, 2000.
11 CRANDALL, Britta H. Hemispheric Giants: The Misunderstood History of U.S.-Brazilian Relations.
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011. HIRST, Monica. Brasil-Estados Unidos: desencontros e
afinidades. Rio de Janeiro, FGV Editora, 2009. LANGLEY, Lester D. America and the Americas: The
United States in the Western Hemisphere, University of Georgia Press; 2nd edition, 2010. ROETT, Riordan. Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society, Praeger Special Studies, 5th Edition, 1999. SELCHER, Wayne A. Brazil in the international system: the rise of a middle power. Boulder: Westview Press, 1981. SMITH, Joseph. Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil, 1889-1930. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991. TOPIK, Steven. Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the Age of Empire. Standford University Press, 1997. TULCHIN, Joseph S. Latin America in International Politics: Challenging US Hegemony, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2016.
12 “Although the past provided several historical arguments in favor of the theory of traditional
friendship, a close scrutiny reveals that 1889, only thirteen years before Rio-Branco’s ministry, marked the real beginning of a continuously close relations between Brazil and the United States”. BURNS, E.
support to the military who exiled the Brazilian emperor and founded a Republic (1889)13, the recognition of the new regime (1890)14, political and military support during the military “Brazilian Naval Revolts” (1893-94)15 in Rio de Janeiro’s harbor, and bilateral economic and trade missions for mutual benefit16. These ties, along the years, were established with much support in Brazil from leading politicians and intellectuals such as Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil17, Salvador de Mendonça18, and Joaquim Nabuco19. The U.S. captured the imagination of a generation of Brazilian leaders to the extent that the Brazilian military that took office went as far as renaming their country: the United States of Brazil in 189120.
Burns describes the alliance as unwritten or informal because it was based on and informed by traditional, historical or necessary friendship. For the author, a trustful and intimate relationship was built between the two countries that led to uniform harmony based on tacit agreement or special agreement.21 As a consequence,
no written documents, signed treaties were consequently necessary.
For him, the approximation was a necessity for Brazil22 to achieve its national
interests and foreign policy: international prestige, Southern American leadership and settlement of Brazilian borders23. However, for the North American government, the Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 165.
13 BANDEIRA Moniz, Luiz Alberto. Capítulo I. In: Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Revan, 2003, p. 43-69.
14 SMITH, Joseph. The United States and the Americas-Brazil and the US: Convergence and
divergence. The University of Georgia Press, Athens & London, Kindle file, 2010.
15 NABUCO, Joaquim. A Intervenção Estrangeira Durante a Revolta de 1893. Edições do Senado
Federal, Vol. 21, Brasília, 2003, pp. 55, 66, 98-100.
16 TOPIK, Steven. Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the Age of Empire. Standford
University Press, 1997.
17 Centro de História e Documentação Diplomática. Assis Brasil: Um Diplomata Da República. 1a Ed.,
Vol. I e II. FUNAG, Rio de Janeiro, 2006.
18 MENDONÇA, Carlos Sussekind de. Salvador de Mendonça: democrata do Império e da República.
Rio de Janeiro, INL/MEC, 1960.
19 ALONSO, Angela Maria. Joaquim Nabuco. Companhia das Letras, 2007 - CHDD - Centro de
História e Documentação Diplomática. Joaquim Nabuco: Embaixador Vol. I e II. Brasília, FUNAG, 2011.
20 “Since the inconfidência in 1789, Brazilians had admired and hoped to emulate the North American
form of government”. “The rapid economic growth of the United States, its expanding industrialization, and its increasing manufacturing efficiency excited the admiration of Brazil”. BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 167.
21 BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations.
Columbia University Press, 1966.
22 “In studying the solidification of that friendship it becomes clear that the approximation was more
important to Brazil than the United States and that Brazil took the initiative in effecting it”. Ibidem, p. 203.
approximation was “simply a part of a larger concern with world diplomacy”24. On Burn’s views, Washington agreed to this because Rio de Janeiro behaved according to the American will and was thus seen as sufficiently trustworthy to become a close associate in the Western Hemisphere25. Burns argues that an alliance between the United States of America and Brazil took shape because of mutual positive reinforcement between the two countries.
The supportive role of Washington in the arbitration of Brazilian border disputes and other diplomatic events helped to create a trustful relationship26. The two countries also shared geopolitical concerns such as Spanish-American Republic instability. Each one of the protagonists controlled its own geopolitical influential zone wherein the American government was taking care of Central America, Brazil would take care of South America, and would help to create a bridge between the United States of America and Latin America.27 The explicit recognition by the
Brazilian government of the American Monroe Doctrine and its keen participation in the U.S. concept of Pan-Americanism - as opposed to Argentina’s pushback against American designs - also favored that privileged relationship28.
Above all, Burns points out the commercial rationale behind approximation. He argues that Brazil’s structural economic change at the turn of the 20th century, from sugar cane to coffee agriculture was a key factor behind approximation with the United States29. This switch in crop originated in an impressive “Coffee Boom” that led Brazil between 1889 and 1930 to undergo major economic growth30.
This phenomenon began in the middle of the 19th century, with a significant
24 Ibidem. p. 204
25 “The good will of Root and Roosevelt complemented and facilitated the efforts of the Brazilian
foreign minister and ambassador”. BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 203.
26 Respectively, the author cites: the Acre dispute (1902-03), the recognition of Panama (1903),
settlement of Peruvian-Brazilian controversy (1903-09), the elevation of the legations to embassies (1905), the Panther affair (1905), the visit of Root in Rio de Janeiro (1906).
27 “Brazil recognized the sphere of influence of the United States in the Caribbean, while the United
States did not interfere in Brazil’s sphere of influence, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia. There seems to have been a tacit accord whereby Brazil acknowledged the hegemony of the United States in North America and the United States respected Brazilian pretensions to the hegemony of South America”. Ibidem, p. 207.
28 “In addition to their allegiance to Pan-Americanism and without in any way intending to contradict
it, both supported the Monroe Doctrine”. Ibidem, p. 207.
29 “Cheap suitable land, high profits, large numbers of immigrant workers, and a rising world demand
made coffee a popular and lucrative crop”. BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 2.
30 “Of the many changes brought by the overthrow of the empire, perhaps the most fundamental was
mark in 1870-1880, when the Brazilian production began to show signs of fast expansion31. Between 1822 and 1889, the Brazilian coffee export grew 75 times. Simultaneously, the worldwide coffee consumption rose 15 times along the same period. In 1850, Brazilian coffee planters were producing more than half of worldwide production that led the southern American country to produce 5 times the production of all other countries together by 1906.32
For example, in ten years, from 1880-81 to 1890-91, coffee production rose from 3,7 million sacks (60kg) to 5,5 million sacks whereas, in 1901-02, production reached an extraordinary amount of 16,3 million sacks33. The first years of 1900 represented a peak in production that allowed Brazil to come close to dominating the global market for coffee, an economic transformation that underwrote Washington’s decision to privilege Rio de Janeiro as its major partner in South America34.
During the first decade of the 20th century, under Rio Branco’s administration,
the Brazilian coffee exporters maintained their steady ascension witnessing a high international demand and solidly establishing its privileged situation, especially in relation to Washington. Despite an asymmetric relation regarding trade balance, between 1902 and 1912, the coffee exports heading the U.S. market skyrocketed from 79 millions to 124 millions U.S. dollars.35
In fact, the American market was the largest in the world for Brazilian exports and Brazil appeared to be the main U.S. commercial partner, just after European countries36. Great Britain continued to occupy the first place as the main trade partner along with Germany and France37.
31 Translated by the author. TOPIK, Steven. Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the
Age of Empire. Standford University Press, 1997, p. 112.
32 Translated by the author. TOPIK, Steven. As relações entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos na época de
Rio Branco. Sessão IV in: Rio Branco, a América do Sul e a modernização do Brasil. ALMINO, João; CARDIM, Carlos Henrique (org.), Rio de Janeiro, EMC, 2002, p. 411.
33 Transled by the author. FURTADO, Celso. Formação Económica do Brasil. Editora Cia das Letras,
Rio de Janeiro, 1959, p. 251.
34 “Perhaps even stronger than the political and the diplomatic bonds drawing together the two
countries were the commercial ties”. Ibidem, p. 202.
35 Translated by the author. TOPIK, Steven. As relações entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos na época de
Rio Branco. Sessão IV in: Rio Branco, a América do Sul e a modernização do Brasil. ALMINO, João; CARDIM, Carlos Henrique (org.), Rio de Janeiro, EMC, 2002, p. 412.
36 Translated by the author. TOPIK, Steven. Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the
Age of Empire. Standford University Press, 1997, p. 14.
37 Translated by the author. “(...) during the two first decades of the Republic, Brazil kept close trade
relations with main European great-powers: Britain and France but also with Germany. Great-Britain continued being the main trade partner of Brazil, although its participation on the Brazilian market had dropped from 40% to 25-30%, due to German competition (...)”. BETHELL, Leslie.
According to Burns, the paramount change in commodity initiated in 1889 led to a crucial political switch. During the “Coffee Boom” years, the Brazilian government under Rodrigues Alves (1902-06), Afonso Pena (1906-09) and, Nilo Peçanha (1909-10) and Hermes da Fonseca (1910-14), managed to deal with market and production fluctuation and economic world depression by manipulating prices, contracting foreign loans, and stimulating government interventions with the purpose of keeping its competitiveness on the international coffee market38. From the highly lucrative coffee industry emerged an influential group of coffee planters that managed to create intimate relations with the federal government and “(…) political control by the coffee interests characterized the First Republic”39.
For Burns, the “Coffee Boom” was a source of peace, progress and prosperity for Brazil. This favorable economic situation helped to understand the new Brazilian experience and prosperity: the reshaping of Brazilian politics and economy. Coupled with unprecedented changes in demography, immigration, politics, urbanism, infrastructure and nationalism, Brazil became a natural magnet for the United States in South America. However, this Brazilian “miracle” was highly dependent on the coffee industry and its export network40.
Burns argues that Salvador de Mendonça, the Brazilian commercial attaché in New York (1876-1890) and then consul in Washington (1890-1898), understood the potential for growth in U.S. demand for Brazilian coffee41. After all, since 1870, the North American market absorbed more than half of the Brazilian coffee production dedicated to foreign exportation; being the principal buyer of the commodity42. From 1890 to 1898, the Brazilian diplomat worked hard on building a bilateral relationship between both nations in order to sign a commercial treaty43. In 1891, a reciprocity agreement was signed allowing most of the Brazilian commodities to cross the Joaquim Nabuco No Mundo: abolicionista, jornalista e diplomata. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Bem-Te-Vi, 2016, p. 186.
38 Ibidem, pp. 5-10. 39 Ibidem, p. 5.
40 “The sale of several natural products, particularly coffee, in the world market ensured Brazilian
prosperity”. “(…) Brazil had successfully made the change from a monarchy dependent on the support of the sugar barons to a republic dependent for its order and progress on the coffee industry”. Ibidem, pp. 62, 199.
41 “For many years, North Americans had been the principal purchasers of Brazil’s three major exports:
coffee, rubber, and cocoa. Since 1865, the United States had taken the single largest share of Brazils coffee; (…)”. BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 63.
42 Ibidem.
43 “Understanding the importance of the North American market for Brazilian products, he tried to
American borders almost free of taxes44. American goods received the same treatment. Nonetheless, despite Salvador de Mendonça’s enthusiasm, the reciprocity agreement was cancelled in 189445 by the Brazilian authorities and a new form of bilateral commercial relations was established under the Dingley Tariff in 1897. The latter more advantageous for Brazil, and unfavorable for the United States allowed commodities to enter on the American market totally free of taxes46. Despite the numerous attempts of the U.S. administration to reduce Brazilian tariffs in favor of North American products, this commercial imbalance continued during Rio Branco’s tenure as foreign minister. From 1902 to 1912, the Brazil-U.S. complementary47 trade helped Brazil to sell four times more products to the United States than the opposite48. As pointed out above, Bradford Burns set the mold for scholarship on U.S.-Brazilian relations in the first decade of the twentieth century. But his work presents several problems and has received several criticisms, which I seek to lay out below.
Perhaps the first limitation in Burn’s work is the narrow focus on the role of the foreign ministers behind the unwritten alliance. For all the emphasis on the commercial dimensions of diplomatic approximation, he tells us little about the interconnection between economics and politics at the time. Second, Burns does not take into consideration external factors such as the balance of power and power perception as a catalyst of foreign policy creation. This dimension, as I will show in this dissertation, is a crucial factor in shaping U.S. and Brazilian behavior at the time. Third, Burns centrally focuses on the Brazilian state characteristics and its actors, without giving due weight to the role of the United States. Ironically, what should be a narrative dominated by the interaction between two sides – because of that alliance - ends up being an account which privileges one side at the expenses of the other, and presents the outcomes as direct results of the preferences of one side.
44 “ (…) Brazil’s principal exports, rubber, coffee, sugar, and hides, entered the expanding American
market either duty-free or nearly so”. Ibidem.
45 Translation by the author. “From 1890 to 1892, the United States bought 218 million US dollars in
Brazilian products, 95% without customs taxes. Brazil imported 38 million US dollars from the United States, 87% under heavy taxes”. ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de; BARBOSA, Rubens Antônio.
Relações Brasil - Estados Unidos: Assimetrias e Convergências. Ed. Saraiva, 2002, p. 116.
46 “The Brazilian tariff policy was unfavorable to North American imports and in no way reciprocated
North American generosity. A cursory glance at the trade statistics during the period graphically shows the trade imbalance in favor of Brazil, which sold in the American Market and purchased in the English Market”. Ibidem, p. 63.
47 “Brazil sold tropical and semitropical products on the world market. The United States sold
manufactured goods and raw produce from temperate zones.” Ibidem, p. 166.
48 “In fact, by 1902, the United States admitted duty-free 94.5 percent of the Brazilian imports and
collected an average duty on total Brazilian imports of 4.8 percent. On the other hand, Brazil admitted no imports from the United States duty-free, the average duty amounting to 45 percent”. Ibidem.
Even though, after the proclamation of the Republic in 1889, Brazil faced clear and severe signs of disturbance, fragility, and instability49, in Burns’ optimistic views, positive politics and economic structural changes in Brazil, due to the “coffee boom”, influenced the local authorities to feel confident enough to start a proactive foreign policy without considering Brazilian domestic challenges as a valid reason for an approximation with the U.S. 50
As seen earlier, the historian based his main argument on stating that Brazilian foreign policy was strictly grounded on commerce because Rio Branco considered trade as a tool to achieve his foreign policy51. The Brazilian foreign minister could bring closer political relations with Washington by focusing all his efforts on keeping, by all means, favored tariffs policy as a unique and special relationship between the two countries52. This analysis depicts a high level of dependence on American commerce to formulate Brazilian foreign policy and does not take into consideration other essential Brazilian domestic economic factors.
After the Republic proclamation, despite Brazil’s efforts to improve its insertion in the international economy, the “First decade of the Republic regime was one of the most difficult for the economic policy”53. International commerce was still relative in Brazilian domestic economic balance and the country was still showing some signs of a closed economy until the first decade of the 20th century considering that “the exports value per capita, although, it grew from US$ 11,7 in 1872 to US$ 12,9 in 1913, does not define Brazil as a notably open economy, because these values are close to Latin America tropical average, this is, without including Argentina,
49 Military coup (1889), “Armada” Revolts (1891-94), “Canudos” War (1896-97), Vaccine Revolt
(1904), Panther Case (1905), “Chibata” Revolt (1910), “Contestado” War (1912-16). During these national events, civilians and military losses were counted.
50 “Prosperous and peaceful at home, Brazil could turn its full attention to international relations and
could concentrate its energy on the formation and execution of a constructive foreign policy for the first time in several decade”. BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 20.
51 “The pragmatic Rio-Branco understood that relationship between commerce and diplomacy”.
BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 62.
52 “The sale of several natural products, particularly coffee, in the world market ensured Brazilian
prosperity. Prosperity brought progress and together they strengthened the Baron’s chances of successfully carrying out his foreign policy”. Ibidem, p. 63.
53 Transled by the author. FRANCO H. B., Gustavo. A Primeira década Republicana, chapter 1, p. 11.
In PAIVA ABREAU DE, Marcelo (org.). A Ordem Do Progresso: cem anos de política econômica republicana (1889-1989), Elsevier Editora, Rio de Janeiro, 1990.
Uruguay and Chile”54.
Besides, if Rio de Janeiro switched its diplomatic axis from London to Washington at the beginning of the 20th century, Brazilian authorities were still entangled with a series of important loans55 contracted, among others, in London. Between 1902 and 1913, “the federal foreign debt value, for example, expanded from £30,9 million in 1890 to £44,2 million in 1900, but in 1913 reached the number of £144,3 million”.
As far as foreign investments, “(…) from 1860 to 1902, capital of foreign companies established in the country reached £105 million, whereas the total for foreign companies established during 1903-1913 is around £190 million”.56 This equation of foreign capital, foreign debts and export would be the roots of the Brazilian politics of international economy during the “First Republic” and often considered as the cause of instability within its macro-economy.57
By focusing on a Brazilian-centered argument, Burns also gives extensive emphasis to Rio Branco58 as the source and catalyst of this approximation. In this
respect, Burns argues that Rio Branco’s considered the United States of America as a model and a guide59. This semi-biographical approach definitely provides the reader insights about the Brazilian foreign minister’s private life and his political profile. Rio
54 Transled by the author. FRANCO H. B., Gustavo. A Primeira década Republicana, chapter 1, p. 12.
In PAIVA ABREAU DE, Marcelo (org.). A Ordem Do Progresso: cem anos de política econômica republicana (1889-1989), Elsevier Editora, Rio de Janeiro, 1990.
55 “The Brazilian dependence on the London financial markets continued without any major alteration”.
Translation by the author. RICUPERO, Rubens. Rio Branco: o Brasil no mundo. Editoria Contraponto, 2000, pp. 35-6. “The agreement was negotiated as a moratorium and named “funding loan” (…). “ The government would receive 10 million pounds, and provide the national customs benefits as a
guarantee”. “The new loan interests would only begin to be charged after three years and the
amortization after thirteen years, the rest should be paid within a diluated 63 years delay”. Translation by the author. SEVCENKO, Nicolau. A Revolta da Vacina: Mentes insanas em corpos rebeldes Cosac Naify, 2010, p. 57. “The important international finantial group under the Rothschild House closely followed the Brazilian financial economy, particularly after the funding loan in 1898”. Translation by the author. FURTADO, Celso. Formação Económica do Brasil. Editora Cia das Letras, Rio de Janeiro, 1959, p. 254.
56 Transled by the author. FRANCO H. B., Gustavo. A Primeira década Republicana, chapter 1, p. 12.
In PAIVA ABREAU DE, Marcelo (org.). A Ordem Do Progresso: cem anos de política econômica republicana (1889-1989), Elsevier Editora, Rio de Janeiro, 1990.
57 Ibidem, p. 13.
58 The title of the book gives us a glimpse of this central role from Rio Branco according to Burns:
“The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations.”
59 “His goal was for Brazil to imitate the success of the United States and at its side to exercise
considerable influence in the world.” BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 86. The reader should be aware that the author based his argument on a correspondence from Rio Branco to Nabuco from the archive - the personal Nabuco’s archive. More important is to take into consideration that the date is unknown: Rio
Branco perceived his neighbor in the North as a growing power within the western hemisphere and the shift of international power from London to Washington at the beginning of the 20th century. As a result, the Brazilian diplomat planned to switch Brazilian diplomatic axis from London to Washington.
Nonetheless, Burns does not mention anything about Brazil’s own power perception and ambitions (defensive or offensive) within the international system, and only states that strengthening relations between Brazil and the United States was one of the foreign minister goals. Besides, he does not even mention the extensive regional tensions occurring in neighboring South American countries at that time either.
In order to sustain his focus on the Brazilian government and authorities as the source of this approximation, Burns mainly concentrated his efforts researching in Brazilian official and non-official archives. The reader will note that he is a little too close to the official Brazilian position on Rio Branco and the relationship with the United States that was prevalent at the time of writing. Burns does not spend much time in American diplomatic archives or in the private archives of the U.S. protagonists such as Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root. There is little attention given to the U.S. side to explain the approximation between Washington and Rio de Janeiro.
In his work, E. Bradford Burns mainly drew on documents from the Historical Archive of Itamaraty (HAI) and, to a lesser extent, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Overall, the use of primary sources is very limited. No official correspondence between American diplomats in Washington and Brazilian diplomats in Rio de Janeiro, for instance, made it in the book. He mainly focused his study on the primary sources from the Historical Archive of Itamaraty (HAI), drawing most of his attention to the correspondence between the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) and its embassy in Washington and, to the official communication between Rio Branco and the American Secretary of State: Elihu Root.
The book’s organization also seems to serve perfectly Burns’ Brazilian-centered analysis. Instead of using a chronological narrative explaining the successive causes of the approximation among respective governments, the author mainly built his arguments by depicting Brazilian internal factors as the reasons to shift towards the United States.
In addition, it is worth considering Burn’s terminology when he describes the highest level of Brazil-U.S. relations as an unwritten alliance60. This term was borrowed from Winston Churchill’s speech at the English-Speaking Union in honor of General Gruenther, the North Atlantic treaty Organization’s Supreme Allied Commander in 1954:
"We are entitled to fix our thoughts on the mind, and I think I may say Majesty, of the unwritten alliance which binds the British Commonwealth and Empire to the great Republic of the United States. It is an alliance far closer in fact than many which exist in writing. It is a treaty with more enduring elements than clauses and protocols. We have history, law, philosophy and literature; we have sentiment and common interest; we have language. We are often in agreement on current events and we stand on the same foundation of the supreme realities of the modern world". 61
This speech is one among many post-war speeches given by Churchill between 1953 and 1959 about the necessity of an Anglo-American “special relationship” and “friendship”.
Based on the ideological conception of Churchill’s unwritten alliance, the application of this concept to Brazil-U.S relations seems not to fill any of the Churchill requirements: no common language, no common sentiment, no common history, law, philosophy or literature.
Despite that, over the 305 pages in the book, the nouns and adverbs friend(s)62, friendship63 and friendly64 extensively appear for a total of 129 times to justify the nature of the relationship between Brazil and the United States of America. Reading Burns it is impossible not to remember Martin Wight’s reflections on friendship between states in international relations:
“Alliances are not friendships within International Politics – unless, as Aristotle observed, one uses the word friendship to describe relations based on utility. Alliances cannot be uninterested. The field of friendship extends itself to the point that a man gives his life for his friends; but self-sacrifice
60 Several academic reviews about Burn’s book release in the 60’s already mentioned the terminology
issue. Cf.: Dexter Perkins. Review: The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American
Relations by E. Bradford Burns. The Journal of American History Vol. 54, No. 1 (Jun., 1967), Oxford
University Press. pp. 176-177. Alan K. Manchester. Review: The Unwritten Alliance. Rio Branco and
Brazilian-American Relations by E. Bradford Burns. The Hispanic American Historical Review Vol.
47, No. 1 (Feb., 1967), Duke University Press. pp. 128-129.
61 CHURCHILL, Winston. Post-war Speeches: The Unwritten Alliance: Rosetta Books, kindle file,
2014.
62 The noun “friend(s)” appears 10 times: pp. 65, 111, 140, 142, 156, 170, 183, 207 and 209.
63 “Friendship” is present 85 times during the scholar argumentation: pp. 61, 62, 65, 66, 70, 76, 84, 87,
90, 95, 96, 98, 100, 101, 102, 107, 108, 111, 113, 114, 120, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 139, 140, 141, 143, 157, 160, 165, 171, 176, 177, 178, 179, 187, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 209.
64 The adverb “friendly” is used 34 times: pp. 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 76, 85, 87, 89, 95, 101, 115, 128, 130,
is not permitted to governments whose right is to protect the interests of the people”. 65
What is thus lacking in Burn’s evaluation of the relationship is a reasoned argument as to why and how friendship might have evolved between Brazil and the United States, and the degree to which such friendship might have translated or not into actual diplomatic cooperation in tough areas where friction or disagreement might be expected.
In sum, Burns Brazil-centered analysis provides a particularly narrow interpretation of the so-called unwritten alliance, and presents various challenges to scholarly exploit in order to enhance the debate over the Brazil-U.S. approximation in beginning of the 20th century.
Burn’s book greatly influenced the Brazilian scholarly debate regarding the Brazil-U.S. relationship during the First Republic. It is nonetheless astonishing to notice that, since 1966, the qualified unwritten alliance has not been refuted or complemented by additional accounts. On the contrary, Burns’s argument was received positively among scholars as testified in Brazilian studies, as mentioned earlier, with respect to Brazilian foreign policy during this period. Although some recent semi-biographies or studies gently criticize the concept of the unwritten alliance, very few nonetheless offer a detailed analysis and/or an alternative narrative nor a new concept.
In his brief but dense book, the experienced Brazilian Diplomat, Rubens Ricupero, provides a more incisive analysis regarding Rio Branco’s myth as a national hero and softens Rio Branco’s actions and achievements by intelligently contextualizing the man and his circumstances. For Ricupero, the U.S.-Brazil approximation is due to the establishment of the Republic, a domestic political shift that resulted in Brazil losing its privileged relationship with Great-Britain. Brazil was isolated and weak; also in an asymmetric position in front of international, hemisphere-wide and regional threats. Pragmatically, Rio Branco perceived the U.S. as a growing power. The minister benefited from the bilateral commercial relations as
65 Translation by the author. WIGHT, Martin. A Política do Poder. Trad. C. Sérgio Duarte, 2a edição,
Editora Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais; São Paulo, 2002. Capitulo XII: Alianças. p. 117.
a way of approximating. His aim was to use the prestige of Washington in order to neutralize hypothetical threats.66
Likewise, the two recent works from Luís Cláudio Villafañe provide a somewhat critical view with respect to Rio Branco’s myth and his legacy as the minister of Foreign Affairs. In his latest book, the diplomat describes Rio Branco as a great manipulator, calculating, articulator, and a very influential and distrustful person. This leaves the concept of unwritten alliance pretty fragile. Villafañe’s main argument to explain this special relation is grounded on the necessity for Brazil, thanks to the Monroe Doctrine, to protect itself from European imperialism, and by extension from neighboring countries intrigues67. In his next-to-last book, he organizes his arguments around the myth of a nation construction.
The author highlights how Rio Branco succeeded in using manipulation in order to create a certain definition of the Brazilian identity abroad. According to Villafañe, Rio Branco had a certain vision about Brazil and its international insertion. The Brazilian diplomat thought pragmatically about his foreign policy, including the approximation with the U.S., with the objective of serving the national interests and the building of a national identity68.
In the same direction as pointed by Burns, Clodoaldo Bueno identified two reasons that pushed Rio Branco to approach the U.S. For him, economic and political interests nourished this new trend in Brazilian foreign policy. On the one side, the complementary economies and the advantageous commerce for Brazil represented a tremendous opportunity for the viability of the agribusiness economy. On the other side, politically, Rio Branco acknowledged and fully supported the U.S. foreign policy towards the Western Hemisphere: the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary. The Brazilian minister envisioned them as a defensive tool for Brazil. This pragmatic alignment to Washington, qualified by Bueno as an entente cordial, permitted Rio Branco to channel and neutralize hypothetical intrigues from neighboring countries, rivals or competitors, such as Argentina. At the same time, Brazil could benefit from a prestigious position in the hemisphere, mainly in South America. In his book, Bueno discards the term unwritten alliance based on the Joseph
66 RICUPERO, Rubens. Rio Branco: o Brasil no mundo. Editoria Contraponto, 2000, pp. 34-9. 67 VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. O Evangelho do Barão: Rio Branco e a Identidade Brasileira.
UNESP, 2012.
68 VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. O Dia que Adiaram o Carnaval : Política Externa e a Construção
Smith’s argument that the relationship between Rio de Janeiro and Washington was more unilateral, for Brazil, than reciprocal.69
Smith states that Brazil had an interest in the concept of alliance but such policy never really materialized and remained purely aspirational instead. For him, the coffee economy definitely influenced the approximation but only unilaterally. As a matter of fact, thanks to its privileged trade position, the United States tried to bargain more tariff concessions on more American products. However, the Brazilian government, mainly Congress, kept being reluctant to concede tariff advantages to Washington. Rio Branco’s approximation was also to influence his desire to play a leading role in South America. However, the book also mentioned some doubts about the honesty of a truly Brazilian friendship to U.S. considering various misunderstandings and disagreements, and a better communication with European delegations. For the American officials, Brazil was still perceived as a remote region and the zone of influence of U.S. foreign policy only extended to Central America. In addition, some U.S. officials considered the nation as sensitively lacking economic and military power. Despite the fact that American diplomats were more interested in improving commercial tariff conditions than tightening political relations with Rio de Janeiro, Brazilian authorities never attended their requests.70
Steven Topik argues in the same way stating that national and international competitive economics were the reasons why Brazil and the U.S. started to try tightening their relations, under the Blaine-Mendonça reciprocity agreement, at the end of the 19th century. The American professor underlines that Brazilian and U.S. commercial development and early close relations in the hemisphere were not part of an organized government strategy but originated more from internal political conflicts of interests among politicians and private individuals and groups. The European economic imperialism was also seen as a threat to economic development for both sides.
However, Topik warns that, despite an agreement and accord between both nations, there is no evidence of a total alignment from Brazil. On the contrary, Brazilian pragmatic nationalism muted American economic imperialist needs because U.S. efforts were not rewarded, and the reciprocal trade agreement failed to
69 BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política Externa da Primeira República. Os Anos de Apogeu – de 1902 a 1918.
Paz e Terra. 2003, pp. 21, 145-67.
70 SMITH, Joseph. Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil,
materialize. For Brazil, a reciprocal trade agreement was already meaning close relations with Washington to use as a tool to maintain political survival and support frontier disputes with Argentina, besides dealing with British influence in South America.71
In his turn, Brazilian political scientist and historian, Moniz Bandeira argues that the nature of the bilateral economy between the U.S. and Brazil, and between Argentina and Great Britain played a significant role in Brazilian approximation. Washington and Buenos Aires had a competitive commerce. This situation consequently put the Argentinian economy under pressure because the latter could only count on the European market for its survival. Besides, U.S. foreign policy towards the hemisphere was to increase influence and exclude the British from it. Without many options, Argentina attempted to aggressivelypressure Rio de Janeiro to enter the market. Pressured and perceived as isolated in South America, Brazil naturally strengthened relations with Washington.72
Commercialrelations with the U.S. were vital for Brazil to develop its national interests. Rio Branco wanted his nation to be recognized as the leader in South America. This is the reason why Brazilian officials, and especially Joaquim Nabuco, worked on a “Diplomatic approximation” with Washington. According to Carlos Gustavo Poggio Teixeira, the renewed foreign policy was simple: align as much as possible to U.S. foreign policy’s interests. However, an alliance never really materialized, nor discussed in private. The author adds that South America was definitely not a strategic region for the U.S. They didn’t want to be involved in South American affairs. The only relative objective for gravitating toward Brazil was to obtain tariff concessions and improve its “public relations” among Southern Spanish republics.73
More recently, João Paulo Soares Alsina Junior drew special attention to his peculiar interpretation of the U.S.-Brazil “informal entente”, and especially for his focus on Argentina. To him, the approximation is not to be justified by friendship or ideology. The search for prestige, by aligning to an emergent power such as the U.S., was one of the reasons to this enterprise. By doing so, Brazil could be perceived as a
71 TOPIK, Steven. Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the Age of Empire. Standford
University Press, 1997.
72 BANDEIRA Moniz, Luiz Alberto. Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: da Tríplice Aliança ao
Mercosul. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Revan, 2003, p. 136.
73 TEIXEIRA, Carlos Gustavo Poggio. Brazil, the United States, and the South American Subsystem:
stable and different nation from the others in South American, and especially in a context where Argentina was the main economic and military power. The ongoing balance of power stimulated by Argentina, and principally related to an unsolved frontier issue in the southern region, was also taken into consideration by Rio Branco’s pragmatism. U.S.-Brazil close relations could neutralize intrigues in Washington from undesired rivalry against Brazil and reduce American involvement to the detriment of Rio de Janeiro. The support from Washington could also be used as a defensive tool against European imperialism in South America.74
Although Alsina’s and Bandeira’s arguments do not claim to offer an in-depth analysis of the origins of U.S.-Brazil foreign relations, perceptions and dynamic, they represent nonetheless a valuable starting point for this research, especially as far as Argentina is concerned.
Buenos Aires’s assertive diplomacy towards the Southern American region appeared to be a common challenge to Washington and Rio de Janeiro, and could be a factor to explain the necessity to create a Brazil-U.S. counter-power. Brazilian authorities not only quickly recognized the asymmetry towards the United States, and the formation of a new great power but also perceived the slight threat of a foreign policy strategy tending to create a unipolar Western Hemisphere system under Washington’s watch. Besides, Rio de Janeiro considered the Argentine Republic as a direct threat because of its proximity, economic and military power coupled with Buenos Aires “natural” ambitions to dominate the southern regional subsystem; excluding any Northern or Central American influence.
In the field of world politics, one can seek a better understanding of the interstate relations and connections in many different ways. For William C. Wohlforth, power is a central element but it is definitely not an easily measurable notion that one can only base on static criteria such as: army, territory, economy, population, material resources, diplomacy and, influence75. This implies that the rational or material power of one state is definitely taken into consideration but nonetheless appeared to have less impact than the perception of power when considering the original impulse of changes in the international landscape. The author
74 ALSINA JUNIOR, João Paulo Soares. Rio-Branco, Grande Estratégia e o Poder Naval. Editora
FGV, 2015, pp. 182-85.
75 “Many authors assume that the balance of power is a real distribution of capabilities, to which states
adjust or fail to adjust”. WOHLFORTH, William Curti. The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War. Cornell University Press, 1993, p.6.
