Is a pluralistic security community developing in
Northeast Asia?
A case study on peaceful behavioral change between
China, South Korea and Japan:
From 1990 to 2005.
Makiko Yamauchi
Doctoral Candidate
Post-Graduate Research Programme
Global Challenges – Transnational and Transcultural Approaches University of Tuebingen, Germany
makikohamag2@web.de
Presented at the International Studies Association Convention March 2008, San Francisco
For the Panel: “Northeast Asia as a Regional Security Complex: Conflict Formation or Security Regime?” 26. March, 3:45-5:30 pm.
Introduction
In recent decades, the region of East Asia has become increasingly more important, both economically and politically. However, politically, the region is often looked upon with pessimism; many observers see that relations between the East Asian states have not become any more peaceful since the end of the Cold War. This is in notable contrast to Europe, where relations between states changed tremendously with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.
At first glance, this view of the situation in Northeast Asia is understandable, if one looks at the nuclear weapons development of North Korea or recurring disputes over history between Japan and its neighbors. Uneven levels of economic development and the different political systems of the states in the region are named as reasons why conflict is likely. Closer cooperation between states hasn’t appeared to develop and it looks like tensions are likely to prevail. Considering this negative outlook, it is surprising that the question of the stability of peace in this region with such an economic weight does not get more attention.
However, at the same time, it is also possible to observe other developments in the region, namely increasing economic and social exchange between states in Northeast Asia. These exchanges have been mutual in most cases. Also, if one excludes the problems between North Korea and South Korea and between China and Taiwan, there have been no serious tensions in the 15 years since the end of the Cold War. How the relations can be analyzed in the region since 1990 presents a scientific puzzle. That the relative peacefulness and the developing collaboration between the three countries have not yet been analyzed more thoroughly is a gap in research which I hope to fill with my doctoral thesis.
The context and the purpose of the work
In my thesis project, I examine the stability of the peace between three East Asian states: the People's Republic of China; Japan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). The time frame I use is from 1990 to 2005. This time frame has often been addressed in international relations research to make predictions on the way the relations will develop between these states, however most predictions do not seem to have come true.
In Northeast Asia, these three states have the largest populations and the largest economies. They also present themselves most uniformly as a region and are characterized by the strongest economic exchanges. To understand why I will examine only these three countries,
it is also essential to think of Northeast Asia as a region not only determined by geographical factors, but also as a social construction.
In the 1990s, several multilateral "dialogs" were founded in Eastern Asia (Capie and Evans 2002), such as CSCAP1, ARF2 and ASEAN+33, in which the three states of the case study
took (and continue to take) part and also play a major role. During conferences of these organizations and dialogs, the heads of state of the three countries met on several occasions for three party talks and thus a "Northeast-Asian"4 framework developed covering various
issue areas. The relationships between the states began to change, not only in terms of multilateral, but also bilateral relations. Although the high level of media coverage about anti-Japanese demonstrations in China suggested otherwise, throughout the 1990s and up until 2005 Japanese development aid remained an important part of development aid flowing into China and remained on the same level as it was in the 1980s. During the same period Japanese development aid to most other states was reduced.5 Although the disputes between
South Korea and Japan over historical events are often discussed, in the studied period, both countries have developed a number of channels in different bodies to address various issues (Cha 1999). These developments have been less visible than those in Europe, so I will take on the task here of trying to identify and analyze this change.
I will examine more precisely whether the three case study states changed their behaviors in the period from 1990 to 2005 and put it in perspective by applying the concept of the Pluralistic Security Community, originally from Karl W. Deutsch (Deutsch 1957). This concept has already been used often as a model of a stable peace. Michael Zielinski even called it the concept of "peace community" in his work about Germany’s post-war relations (Zielinski 1995).
The concept was developed further by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Adler/Barnett 1998), according to the constructivist theory, and this serves as the theoretical basis of my work. Their work especially made the evolutionary process of the development of a security
1 The CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asian Pacific) was founded in 1993 and has 20
members.
2 The ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) was founded in 1994 and has 23 member states.
3 ASEAN Plus Three was founded in 1997 and consists of the ASEAN member countries as well as Japan, the
P.R. China and South Korea. There are also other international institutions in the region, for example APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) or ASEAN-PMC (ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference).
4 Meaning only Northeast-Asian countries, without the Southeast Asian ASEAN or other countries of the greater
region of the Asia-Pacific.
community clearer. When referring to this evolutionary process, I will use the term "security community building"6.
The research project consists of two parts: in the first part, the term “pluralistic security community”, as developed and used by Adler and Barnett in relation to security community building, will be conceptualized and operationalized for application to the case of Northeast Asia. (Adler/Barnett 1998, Acharya 2001); in the second part, the applied model is used to describe and analyze the developments in Northeast Asia. In this paper, prepared for the ISA Convention, I will introduce only the first theoretical part of the research project.
Taking the observations described above as a starting point, the main purpose of the research project is to answer two questions:
1) How stable is the peace between China, Japan and South Korea?
2) Which factors support the process of security community building between the three countries?
In order to gain a better understanding of what the process of security community building entails in the case of China, Japan and South Korea, I have posed several more concrete sub-questions:
1) How does change in the relations between China, Japan and South Korea in the process of security community building present itself during the period from 1990 to 2005?
2) Which transactions, institutions and norms between these three countries promote stable peace in the form of a security community?
3) Which variables (transactions, institutions and norms) for security community building are the most pronounced for the different dyads of states: Japan - South Korea, South Korea - China and China - Japan?
4) How does the emergence of a security community present itself in detail on a multilateral level?
6 This thesis was originally written in German and used the term “Sicherheitsvergemeinschaftung”. This word
The choice of theory and current state of research
The research project is based on the concept of the security community, as developed by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. This concept is recognized as being a constructivist approach. In their reasoning, Adler and Barnett often refer to the constructivist school of thought: "Constructivist scholarship is well-suited to consider how social processes and an international community might transform security politics" (Adler/Barnett 1998, p. 12).
As many researchers have noticed, the constructivist approach is not fully incompatible with the other approaches in the discipline of international relations, such as neorealism and neoliberalism. From a constructivist viewpoint, both neorealism and neoliberalism describe a possible structure of the international system which can be constructed by actors and in fact often is. This inclusion of different approaches is widespread in international relations research concerned with East Asia and has also seemed to have gained popularity elsewhere (Fearson/Wendt 2002). Although I will take a basically constructivist approach, I will consider findings found in literature using other approaches with reference to Eastern Asia. If the necessity arises, I will also refer to the literature of other theories to address specific issues in the case studies. Adler likewise refers to neoliberal contributions and positions himself and his research between rationalist and strong constructivist approaches (Adler 2005).
Most of the neorealist and neoliberalist literature dealing with East Asia in the past have had a very narrow focus on single conflicts or on certain dyads of states (Kim 2004). The predictions made in these works for the region after the end of the Cold War have not come true. For example, different researchers of the neorealist school of thought (Friedberg 1993, Betts 1993) predicted an increase in rivalry and the probability of military conflicts, but this has not eventuated.
As already mentioned, neoliberalism has produced some contributions to which I can also refer; nevertheless, these approaches do not seem to adequately explain the change in relations that can be observed. Most neoliberal institutionalists concerned with the relations in East Asia offer comparisons between European integration and regionalism in Eastern Asia, especially ASEAN. They try to explain from historical research with the examples of SEATO or EAEC7, why regionalism or institutionalization failed in Asia. The conclusion according to 7 SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) was founded in 1954 on the initiative of the USA with the
Manila contract to force back communism in Southeast Asia. However, differences in the interests between the countries were too great and thus the organization dissolved from 1970 on and was officially dissolved in 1977. The EAEC (East Asia Economic Caucus) was suggested by the former prime minister of Malaysia Mahathir in 1990 to strengthen the economic relations between the ASEAN countries and China, Japan and South Korea. In the end, because of strong objections from USA Japan did not join and thus EAEC failed. In a more loose form
rationalists is that the institutions which exist are too weak to be effective. (Wallraf 1996, Hemmer 2000).
Although the number of constructivist works has increased since end of the 1990s (Finnegan 1999, Acharya 2001, Johnston 2003, Katsumata 2007) they are still few in number in comparison to the other schools of thought. Thus, relations between China, Japan and South Korea have seldom been examined with constructivist approaches and in particular not yet at all by means of applying the concept of the security community. Working with a constructivist approach opens new insights that will be more likely to provide answers to my research questions.
If one looks at peace not as a fixed state, but as a process, then constructivism is best suited to examine this process in Northeast Asia (Zielinski 1995). The process of social learning is an important aspect in constructivism, especially the social learning related to peace. Neorealism can not recognize structural change in events like the end of the Cold War or in the peace between democratic states, as Wendt wrote, “Neorealists do not consider such changes "structural" because they do change the distribution of power or transcend anarchy “ (Wendt 1999, p. 17).
Constructivist thinking in international relations emphasizes ideas, norms and the identities of the actors. As constructivism ties the reproduction of the international system to the ideas and identities of actors, it can more thoroughly explain behavioral change.
The focus of my research, as mentioned at the beginning of this paper, is directed at the investigation of the existing peace between three countries. Therefore, I use the concept of the security community to make clear that the stability of peace between China, Japan and South Korea is not due to material and structural factors as would be the case in a peace based on a "Balance of Power" or "Bandwagoning". Rather, based on the observations, I assume that a fundamental behavioral change has taken place between the three countries since the end of the Cold War. In constructivist literature, the essential elements which determine the behavior of states are their identity and interests. For constructivists a stable peace is based on common identity and shared interests. Questions then arise as to which factors are responsible for a change of identity and interests and how these changes come about.
The fact that constructivist theories and factors relating to interests and identity have received very little attention thus far makes it especially interesting for application to Northeast Asia.
Therefore, of interest to me are not the structural factors that stabilize peace in Northeast Asia, but factors stemming from identity and ideas.
Choice of method und case
The model of a security community does not describe a static state of affairs, but rather a dynamic ongoing process (Zielinski 1995). The new security community model developed by Adler and Barnett describes a development from a nascent to a mature security community. Because of the process character of the model, it should be possible to apply it to study changes in the region after the end of the Cold War. Based on this model, I will examine the change of behavior that should be reflected in the relations between China, Japan and South Korea.
The stable peace which serves as the research object is redefined into a stricter terminology as a “security community”. From constructivist theory, the Adler and Barnett model and Amitav Acharyas work (Adler/Barnett 1998, Acharya 2001), I derive three independent variables: transactions; norms and institutions. These variables are used to assess change in the relations between China, Japan and South Korea to determine, if the changes observed can in fact be described as approaching the building of a security community.
Therefore, “security community building” is the dependent variable and the relations between China, Japan and South Korea during the period from 1990 to 2005 make up the case study which is to be explained.
I will describe my subject of study in depth and in necessary detail, but also to move beyond a mere thick description. My aim is not only “verstehen” (understanding) by means of describing the history of relations of the countries, but analysis of the subject in view of the research questions. The relations between the three countries from 1990 to 20058 will be
analyzed by means of a longitudinal study based on constructivist theory and the concept of security community.
The case is also split into smaller case studies to gain a more accurate picture of the relations between the states. The observed units are the relations between states so the analysis is limited to the system level. To be able to analyze the case in more detail, the whole case is split into four sub-cases of three dyads and one triad. So I will examine both bilateral and multilateral relations. The examined dyads are: China-South Korea; Japan-South Korea and
China-Japan. This way I hope to check for distorting effects in a single dyad. In addition the triad is examined, in a smaller area to check the results of the other sub-case studies and to attain a better understanding of the processes.
To be able to evaluate the hypotheses, I use congruence testing on the variables for my dyad case studies, allowing me to examine the independent and dependent variables for covariance to either confirm or refute the hypotheses on the development of relations. As it is not a quantitative study, I will not use a set scale for the variables. However I will examine the triad of multilateral relations to confirm or to disprove the results from the dyad case studies. On the basis of the obtained data, I will then analyze the complete case and answers the research questions.9
The triad case will be a multilateral case study on the issue of maritime concerns. This is an issue area where some activity has already developed making it especially promising for research. This is most certainly related to the high importance of the sea territory for all three states, as well as the fact that the waters are the only direct borders they have with each other. If change can be observed in multilateral relations, then it will probably show there first.
What is the pluralistic security community?
Here I will briefly present the conceptual and theoretical background of the security community.
A group of two or more states is described as a security community, if their relations are in a stable state of peace.10 Karl Deutsch, who first developed the concept, described the essence
of the security community as a community which is stable in its “dependable expectations of peaceful change” carried over a long period of time, meaning that within the population the expectation of a peaceful solution to conflicts is stable.11 Relations are not simply static; they
9 Due to time and resource restrains, I will not examine single decision-making processes with the method of
"Process Tracing", and just summarize initiatives and results.
10 The use of the word “security” in the concept of the security community sometimes leads to
misunderstandings. Here I would like to point out that the term should be understood not only as security in the military sense, but also covers a larger field of non-military security issues.
Also security community is often associated with existing international organizations. Acharya for example defines the concept of the security community as different from other forms of security cooperation, but there is a danger of mixing up these terms. (Acharya 2001) The situation is complicated by the fact that security cooperation may occur within a security community. However, the security community is to be separated from the term security cooperation as they actually have no shared characteristics. The concept of the security community is a lot more elementary than that of the security cooperation which is a concrete form of security policy.
11 The term was developed by Karl W. Deutsch in the 1950s. At that time he studied the North-Atlantic region.
He also considered cases in which states unite with other states at the end of the process, to form a new state, as for example the USA, this he called an amalgamated security community. The other type of security community Deutsch studied was states that form a group, e.g., the Norwegian-Swedish relations at the beginning of the 20th
also permit changes, without thereby endangering the basic expectation that violence or the threat of violence is ruled out from the resolution of conflicts (Deutsch 1957). While Deutsch has mainly stressed transactions as a basis of the development of a security community, Adler and Barnett have remodeled the concept on a constructivist basis. According to their understanding, the essential mechanism is social learning, on the peaceful resolution of conflict. This is what I will call the process of “security community building”. Hence, they stress the development of trust and a common identity which is supported by factors like transactions, norms and institutions. In that sense, it should be possible to use this concept, which has only been used so far for the North-Atlantic area to analyze other regions.
The concept of the security community, since becoming more popular again in the late 1990s, has often been connected with the liberal and democratic constitution of the concerned states (Acharya in Adler/Barnett 1998) and in particular with the theory of the democratic peace. So it seemed that security communities are only conceivable if they consist of democracies. However, Deutsch did not name democracy as an essential or even as a helpful factor for the development of a security community and lists many historical examples of security communities between non-democratic states (Deutsch 1957).
Some literature does exist which takes security communities between democracies as an inevitable matter of course, thereby combining the concepts of the security community and the democratic peace. However, there are also some studies on communities of states which are regarded as a security community in which not all states are democracies. One must make a distinction between the “liberal security community” between democracies and the “security community” whose members are not all democracies (William 2001). Non-democratic states can also build up a security community or take part in it. Still it is possible, that in the course of “security community building” democratic values are spread. In that case, democratic states and liberal international institutions socialize non-democratic states to take over at least some liberal practices.
Non-liberal ideologies, for example a common development model, can also serve as a basis for a security community (Adler 1997). In my study, it is important to differentiate between the approach to the security community and other approaches of liberal peace because here a
century or today's EU. He called these cases pluralistic security communities. The difference is whether the integration leads at the end to the establishment of a new state or whether every state keeps its sovereignty, but the states form a zone in which war is unthinkable. In this paper I only refer to the pluralistic security
security community between two democracies (South Korea, Japan) and a non-democratic state (China) is examined.
The model of the security community by Adler and Barnett describes several phases.12 The
first phase of a security community is the nascent phase. In this phase community building has only just begun, - the states do not consider themselves "enemies" anymore - but also have not developed enough common identity to understand themselves exclusively as "friends" (Wendt 1999). The ascendant phase has been introduced by Adler and Barnett as an intermittent phase which underlines the process character of the security community model. The mechanisms of social learning and an increasing density of transaction networks mark this phase (Adler/Barnett 1998). The mature phase of the security community marks a temporary end of the process. The peace between the involved states has become very stable in this phase. Indeed, while this state of affairs may not necessarily last forever, the process of the peaceful behavior has entered into a more lasting and stable state.
In the case examined here I presuppose that the relations between South Korea, China and Japan in the time frame from 1990 to 2005 have moved from the absence of security community into the process of security community building. This would be the nascent phase or perhaps already the ascendant security community. The change of one phase to another phase is a continuous process of security community building. Hence, fluctuation of the dependent variable is also possible and also an occasional decline is not ruled out. This is quite natural, because something as complicated as stable peace does not appear from one day to the other, but rather is a constant approximation to an ideal state of affairs (Zielinski 1995). The differentiation of the process into phases helps in making the direction of development of the security community clearer, it is however not an absolute scale. This differentiation is not used any further in my work, as in the studied case the process of security community building is in its very early stages, and therefore I need to examine much smaller changes. The variables I use and their indicators have therefore been, in part, derived from other constructivist literature, mainly from Acharyas.
The triggers
12 However, Adler and Barnett call this division into phases a “heuristic device“, to illustrate the process
Adler and Barnett describe a set of possible triggers which can start the development of a security community, “…"trigger" mechanisms that initiate this initial search and the desire to create institutions or organizations to order and foster their relations” (Adler/Barnett 1998, p. 51). These triggers are events that occur before the process of security community building has begun but had an effect on getting the process started. Therefore they are not variables, but rather events that provide the pretext for the security community process. In the literature on the security communities it is assumed that there are many possible triggers. Adler and Barnett mention that all triggers have as a basic quality that they are national, trans-national or international processes leading to a change of perception and allow common interests to develop. Therefore, it can either be a common threat or the development of interdependence between the states; or it can be rapid changes in the distribution of military power at the global or regional level, or the development of new ideas concerning relations with other states. These are developments which make a common future more likely and desirable. Perceptions change and this leads to the fact that governments "seek" deeper exchanges with other governments and start looking for new coordination possibilities.
In more concrete terms, the basis of this thesis is precisely these changes after the end of the Cold War and the economic development of China and South Korea. For a better understanding of the differences between the condition during the Cold War and afterwards, I will also briefly summarize the history after the Second World War.
“Security community building” as dependent variable
Thus far, I have laid out the research interest, the research question and the theoretical and methodical basis of my work. Now, I will describe the operationalization of the variables and how I define them. They form the basis from which I will collect the empirical data. All this is, of course, based on the theoretical considerations.
I will begin with the dependent variable “security community building” and will then address the three independent variables - transactions, norms and institutions.
As I have already mentioned, although I use the term “security community building” to mean an ongoing development process. I do not use the differentiation of the phases from nascent to mature as developed by Adler and Barnett. Rather I will use my own indicators to structure the development process. The relations between three countries do not entail a mature security community and therefore I need the indicators which primarily help to identify the beginning
of the development of a security community; or, using the model of Adler and Barnett, indicators for the beginning of the nascent phase.
Based on Adler and Barnett’s concrete model, as well as in Acharya’s work, I have identified different indicators for “security community building” (Acharya 2001). The indicators are derived from reflecting on how to recognize the trend towards “security community building” in the respective behavior of states. Here I apply a dichotomous scale which is able to mark a direction of the change, whether the movement of the process strengthens or weakens.
The first indicator taken is the use of force / threat of force.
This determines whether force was used or was threatened in international conflicts or in connection with other international matters. This also encompasses military confrontations which would make the use of force seem possible, even if violence was not threatened directly. In the nascent phase of “security community building” a possible rivalry has not yet completely disappeared. However, there are no more (large scale) military confrontations or open war and state A does not consider state B an enemy. According to Deutsch, it is important for a security community that states have reached a point where they do not plan the use of force any more, even if: “a war between two states might quietly be considered possible by some of their leaders, even though no significant preparations for it were being made by either side; and routine preparations for defense of a border might continue even though conflict across it might already appear unthinkable” (Deutsch 1957, p. 32-33).
In addition, not only the use of force or confrontations between the case study states will be examined, but also the military planning of the states, particularly, if a violent conflict is anticipated, or if there are other preparations for a conflict. Furthermore, I will examine how defense spending has developed, because a security community should not contain an arms race directed against the other states of the same community.
“Security community building” is to be considered more advanced, if there were no more (large) border disputes in the respective observation period. Smaller border disputes, for example over small islands or exploration rights on the high sea, are to be assessed according to the specifics of each respective case such as whether the situation culminated in a confrontation and what the consequences were. Until the ascendant phase of the “security community building” such border disputes are still conceivable. Only in the mature security community can these matters be expected to be completely resolved. With a change in the military, unsupervised borders, a common definition of threat or by the creation of a collective security system or joint military units the possibility of military conflict becomes
unthinkable. For the nascent security community up to ascendant security community decline in the number, and the strength, of confrontations and defense spending, is enough of an indicator that “security community building” is assumed to be developing. This indicator is particularly important to distinguish the step from the complete lack of a security community to the “security community building” process.
The second indicator taken is the mutual perception of the respective governments.
A change in thinking towards anticipating more peace in the future, no more border disputes and considering war to be “unattractive” is an important indicator. When politicians and elites start to include such thinking in their planning and make an effort to realize peace, a (nascent) security community begins to emerge. This perception need not be comprehensive, and it is important to keep in mind that the security community building must be understood as a process which is a striving towards an ideal condition, which will probably never be completely achieved.
The perception on behalf of governments that trust has to be built up over time is another step which is linked to this process. A change in perception between nations regarding their relationship takes place when country A begins to consider country B as a possible partner, and as a result security problems are understood as common problems. This can also mean that, for example, country A starts to think in such a way that the security of the neighboring country B is also important for itself and that security is a collective task which both countries can only master together.
A change of perception consists of states increasingly considering each other as strategic partners. In this process states do not see themselves as enemies any more even if certain rivalries may not yet have ended completely. However, if state A considers state B to be a partner, it is a first step in a process of “security community building”. Such a perception should show in the white papers of the ministries of defense or also from secondary analyses undertaken in institutes concerned with security issues that are close to the governments. The basic question here is that of a certain level of trust coexisting between the countries. Via changes in perception, trust will start to be important, above all, trust in security behavior, i.e. trust in the fact there will be no armed conflict and that there is no military planning in this direction. It is based on the mutual recognition of the states regarding themselves as (possible) partners, a change in the definition of threats, and the establishment of confidence-building measures. These indications for the development of a level of trust are indispensable for the security community, because without trust no security community can develop. It is the core
of the idea of "dependable expectations of peaceful change" whether one could expect a basis of mutual trust, which mandates that future problems will not be solved by violence. Once a level of trust has been established a common identity also develops, which is also decisive for the “security community building”. Trust itself is difficult to operationalize, so I do not use it as an indicator. Instead trust is used to make a connection between the single indicators. Trust is therefore an important umbrella term for all of the indicators of the dependent variable.
The third indicator taken is perception of a common identity.
It is still difficult to discern a common identity between three countries in the current stage of the security community building process. However, it is possible to determine indicators and use them to measure how far the development of a common identity has already progressed. The identification of measurable indicators of a common identity is known to be a challenge facing constructivist scholars.
Identity is understood by constructivists as coming from the self-image of the states, but also dependent on the fact that this identity is recognized by other states. So identity originates from interaction and ideas (Finnemore/Sikkink 2001, Wendt 1999). Identity in the region Northeast Asia refers to a community generating an identity which is distinguished cognitively from "others". Such a common identity can only develop within the process “security community building” slowly, and it only appears completely in the mature security community. In the nascent and ascendant security community it exists only as an "expectation" and "future image". That means that if there are discourses in the three countries on an identity for Northeast Asia, this is a hint for a common identity.13
Common identity is difficult to measure, but as an indicator for “security community building” identity is important in the early phase, especially when watching for the potential forming of a community. A sign for a common identity can even be that the responsibility for peace in the region is seen as being that of the countries themselves and not that of other countries beyond the region. In the end, the relations in a mature security community are identified as showing a "we feeling" and "sense of community".
13 According to the here much quoted literature by Adler/Barnett or Wendt and the case studies on European
integration or the OSCE process, a common identity is defined as follows: In a community where there is a common identity 1) political identity is shared 2) common identity is represented officially 3) the own values are named as common values 4) the process of community building is referred to as common history 5) the
community is represented together on the global level 6) there are transnational political movements, 7) the citizens of the community are asked for their identification with the community 8) it is expected that on the level of the élites nationalism is disappearing (Anderson 1983, Waever in Adler/Barnett 1998).
„The kind of sense of community that is relevant for integration, and therefore for and loyalties; of study, turned out to be rather a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of “we-feeling,” trust, and mutual consideration; mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and of cooperative action in accordance with it-in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making. “Peaceful change” could not be assured without this kind of relationship.” (Deutsch 1957, p. 36)
Operationalization of the independent variables
Transactions
In Deutsch’s original concept of the security community, transactions were already given an important role. Because of this his concept has also been called Transactionalism. In their reworking of Deutsch’s concept Adler and Barnett keep an important place for transactions for the development of a security community. Transactions have a key function, especially in the nascent phase, to let a social network develop between the countries (Väyrynen 2000, p. 114).
Several different types of exchanges are named as “transactions” including the economic and political, but also science/technology, tourism and culture, and migration.
To get to a differentiated evaluation of the variable transactions, and to structure the study, the different transactions will be divided into three areas which I record individually: politics /
economy / society.
Political exchange
Political exchange encompasses all diplomatic contacts recorded, such as all visits by government delegations and official contacts by provincial- and regional representatives. Reciprocal visits will be assessed as more valuable than unidirectional visits. Also recorded is the number of consulates in the examined countries. The opening of new consulates is also recorded as an increase in the variable. Information exchanges are very important in the political area and this is what distinguishes the nascent and the ascendant security community. They accelerate the building up of mutual trust. Contacts between the militaries are also assessed as positive for a strengthening of the security community building process. Joint military exercises will also be included in this indicator.
Here all exchanges of goods and capital will be recorded quantitatively. That means all imported and exported goods, as well as the investments in the corresponding countries. Transactions in this area also include development assistance given as bilateral ODA. In addition the number of companies having branches in each other countries is also recorded as well. The collection of the named indicators will be done, as far as it is possible based on official statistics of national and international organizations. If no official material is available, I will use newspaper reports.
Societal exchanges
As societal exchanges I will record academic exchanges, in the context of university partnerships and academic visits, as well as the number of student exchanges. Exchange between research institutions, in particular in the domain of political science is also important, as it will help to build “epistemic communities” among researchers, which help to bring about social learning. The number of tourists and the number of sister city arrangements will also be recorded. Migration between the countries and the respective minorities living in the countries will be assessed to see if they have increased or decreased. Another important aspect is the spreading of media from the other countries.
Judging from the first empirical observations the increase in transactions in the area of the economy and partly in the area of society, over the last 15 years seems to be notably strong. Increased transactions in the area of the economy seem to have preceded an increased level of transactions in the societal area. The transactions in the economy seem to have provided an impetus for increased transactions on the societal level. Transactions in the political sphere then seem to have followed the other two. The areas economy and society encouraged the changes in the political area and the linkages created through transactions in the different areas have a positive effect on the development of the security community. When transactions in the political area become more formalized, there is a shift from the variable transaction to the variable institutions. These two indicators need to be strictly differentiated.
Norms
Kratochwil defines norms as: “standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations”. Norms spread common values between states and create common patterns of behavior among them. All forms of community are based on norms. Norms reduce
uncertainties, as they bring together expectations on the behavior of the actors (Acharya 2001). Besides their regulating effect they are also constitutive. Norms play an important part in the examination of security communities, as they may define the identity of an actor. Norms specify common values and through their reduction of uncertainty they help build trust. “Compatibility of major values” is a basic factor for a security community according to Deutsch (Deutsch 1957, p. 124). Shared norms also define common interests of the involved states.
First of all the extent to which there are common norms between the states will be examined, including whether levels of commonality differ between the dyads. The specificity of the norms also has to be examined to evaluate the effect of a norm on the development of a security community. The properties of all norms are to be included as an indicator for the expression of the variable and the strength of the respective property will be included in the assessment of the variable.
Source for norms are international treaties and agreements between the countries, or conventions including more countries from the region. Also to be considered are legal acts by international organizations when they included the countries of the region and final declarations of international conferences in which where the countries participated (Boekle/Rittberger/Wagner 1999). Joint declarations, recommendations and reports of joint commissions will also be used as sources for norms. Important is that the commonality of a norm makes it relevant for the security community. National norms will therefore not be examined.
For the indicators of the variable norms certain contents of norms are more important than others. For the development of a security community some norms are to be given a higher value. A shared norm has to have some properties that are beneficial for the formation of shared interests or a common identity. Especially norms related to the following issues will be regarded as a stronger indicator of the variable (Acharya 2001):
Norms that restrict armament, such as the abdication of nuclear, chemical or biological
Norms that are helpful for a peaceful conflict resolution, such as all norms that are
concerned with acceptable behavior in the case of a dispute. Included are also norms that support consultations between governments, steps towards de-escalation and confidence building measures, including norms that ban certain acts that can be seen as provocation. Examples for such norms are agreements on information about military exercises as well as conventions for early consultations of heads of state in the case of conflicts.
Norms, that call for joint actions, such as all norms that in special matters or specific areas
of problems speak in favor of joint action before unilateral action, as well as norms that call for mutuality in actions. Examples are common fishing quotas or joint agreements on environmental protection
Norms, that express a common identity, such as norms that distinguish the region from
other regions and define certain kinds of behavior or properties that make a country “Northeast Asian”. Examples for such norms are those that oppose interference by other states from outside the (defined) region or a norm that defines a common cultural heritage and calls for its preservation.
Norms that might work against the security community will also have to be considered. Norms that are shared in a dyad but reject the third country must also be considered problematic. Such a norm would not be productive for the security community.
Institutions
Deutsch already viewed the role of international organizations as very important for a security community. The effect of international institutions is also portrayed as important throughout constructivist scholarship. They have a special role, as they can influence the identities of their members (Wendt 1994). While states do possess identities, independent of the institutions in which they take part, identities can be changed over time through their membership. International institutions have different functions, they are important to build trust and a common identity on the one hand; on the other hand they also have an effect on the other variables: transactions and norms. Institutions can encourage transactions and set norms, as well as strengthen the effect of norms by supervising compliance (Barnett/Finnemore 1999).
Considering the empirical part of my work, it is important to analyze Northeast Asia in view of the following aspects: 1) What kinds of institutions are there? 2) Is there an increase in institutions on the regional level, as well as a trend of co-membership on the global and regional level? 3) With which issue areas are the institutions concerned? 4) What are their actor properties? Finally 5) who represents the member states in the institutions?
The points 3), 4) and 5) have to be analyzed after point 1) has already been analyzed for the respective international institution.
First it has to be examined how the institutions, where the three countries are members can be categorized. According research on international organizations, I distinguish between the following kinds of institutions (Rittberger/Zangl 2003, Zangl/Zürn 2003). The categories are adjusted for the case of Northeast Asia:
1. Global International Organizations 2. Regional International Organizations 3. International Networks
4. Track 2 Institutions
International Organizations (Global/Regional)
An international organization between two or more countries is particularly important for the effect of social learning. They are the strongest form of international institution and often have actor properties. This means that they have the ability to set norms which has special importance for the development of the security community. International Organizations may have their own means of supervising norm compliance (monitoring) as well as their own means for sanctioning non-compliance. Weak organizations without their own means for monitoring and sanctions still have an important function as forum for the governments and can help to develop trust and a common identity.
A greater number of international organizations in which the case study states are members is an indicator for a stronger value of the variable “institutions”. The characteristics of an organization also play a role, so that not only the number of organizations is important but also their mission and their (own) ability to act. Organizations will be assessed as to whether they are mandated to work within a specific issue-area or address multiple issue areas. An organization concerned with different issue areas is an indicator for a stronger value of the variable, as they can build trust in different areas (spill over) and present a broader forum.
Especially important are organizations that work in the area of security as this generally demands a high level of trust.
International Networks
International networks are functional in character and therefore carry less weight as an indicator. Still the development of an international network among the governments has to be considered as indicating some increase in the level of institutionalization. For international networks the same properties have to be examined, as for the international organizations; such as if they are directed towards just one issue area and if meetings are conducted on a regular, or an ad hoc basis.
Track 2 Institutions
Within the Asia-Pacific area, research into institutions regularly uses the classification of Track 1 and Track 2 institutions, based on the function the representatives of the states have in the institution. Now and again these concepts are also used for other regions, but they are known, above all, in Asia and the Pacific and the concept is seldom used elsewhere. However, they are important if one deals with the region of Northeast Asia (Capie and Evans 2002, p. 213-215).
Track 1 institutions are official interstate, political and security dialogs. This includes international organizations or international networks where the participants act as official representatives of their states. Track 1 institutions will be categorized in this case as an international organization or as international networks.
Track 2 institutions are unofficial dialogs led by societal actors, where researchers, journalists, and also non-government organizations take part. Politicians, diplomats or military officers sometimes also take part in these committees, but not in their official capacity. The meetings or sessions on the Track 2 level do not correspond to the level of international organizations or international networks. However, Track 2 dialogs do take place regularly and are partially institutionalized, as in the case of the CSCAP. In this respect they are also institutions. Often research institutions which work on a particular issue area might organize Track 2 conferences. These actors thus form an "epistemic community". Although these research institutions are not official government institutions, they nevertheless often have connections with the governments of their states.
For global as well as regional institutions, co-membership will be recorded, as common participation in global (or inter-regional) international organizations is also an indicator for the development of the variable institutions. It is also examined whether there have been common initiatives in these organizations which could lead to strengthened cooperation.
Conclusion
In this paper I have presented the research questions and the theoretical bases of my work. Here I would like to summarize them once again briefly.
The aim of the research project is to answer the questions: How stable is the peace between China, Japan and South Korea? Which factors support the process of security community building between the three countries?
The model of the security community serves as a precise description of the change towards more peaceful behavior that can be applied as a variable. If I can prove in my work that the relations between the three states show change in the sense of “security community building”, then one can also assume a greater stability of peace in the region. By assessing the individual variables, it is possible to gain a more precise insight into the development of a process of security community building because through them the factors which contribute to a stable peace can be described. I hope to analyze and answer the main research questions by the examination of the variables: i.e. the examination of the changes of the dependent variable, “security community building” and the three independent variables, transaction, norms and institutions, for co-variance in the given time frame between 1990 and 2005. It is also of interests which of the three independent variables: transactions, norms or institutions, is the most pronounced and how these affect the dependent variable in each case. My initial observations allow me to conclude that there is change in the behavior of the three countries, although it is not particularly pronounced. Therefore my research design is adjusted to also examine smaller changes in the different indicators for the variables.
The dependent variable is determined by three indicators: use of force/threat of force, mutual perception of the respective governments and the perception of a common identity. Through it I will assess whether “security community building” has been strengthened or weakened in each of the four sub-cases.
It is not the purpose of my work to test the constructivist theory or the model of the security community. However, by the application of the model of the security community I hope to contribute to its further development. I wish to deliver a detailed description of the change in
the relations of three countries. Also, I hope to complement the already extensive literature on Northeast Asia with the special perspective on three countries.
References
Acharya, Amitav 1991, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: „Security Community” or “Defence Community”?, Pacific Afffairs 62,2: 159-177.
Acharya, Amitav 2001, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, London: Routledge.
Adler, Emanual and Crawford, Beverly 1991, Progress in Postwar International Relations, New York: Columbia University Pres.
Adler, Emanuel 1997, “Imagined (Security) Communities. Cognitive Regions in International Relations”, Millenium 26, 2: 249-277.
Adler, Emanuel and Barnett, Michael 1998, Security Community, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Adler, Emanuel 2002, “Constructivism and International Relations”, in Carsnaes, et. al. 2002, 95-118.
Adler, Emanuel 2005, Communitarian International Relations, The epitemic foundations of
International Relations, London: Routledge.
Anderson, Benedict 1983, Imagined communities; reflections on the origin and spread of
nationalism, London: Verso.
Barnett, Michael N. and Finnemore Martha 1999, “The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations”, International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 4: 699-732
Betts, Richard K. 1993, “Wealth, Power and Instability”, International Security 18, 3: 34-77. Bellamy, Alex J. 2004, Security Communities and their Neighbours, Regional Fortresses or
Global Integrations?, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Boekle, Henning, Rittberger, Volker und Wagner, Wolfgang 1999, Normen und Außenpolitik:
Konstruktivistische Außenpolitiktheorie, Tübingen: Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur
Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung Nr. 34.
Caballero-Anthony, Mely 2007, “Nontraditional Security and Multilateralism in Asia: Reshaping the Contours of Regional Security Architecture?”, policy analysis brief (The
Stanley Foundation), June.
Capie, David and Evans Paul 2002, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, Singapore: Seng Lee Press.
Carsnaes, Walter et. al. 2002, Handbook of International Relations, London: SAGE Publications.
Cha, Victor D. 1999, Alignment despite antagonism: the United States-Korea-Japan Security
Choi, Young Jong and Caparaso, James A. 2002, “Comparative Regional Integration”, in Carsnaes, et. al. 2002, 480-499.
Christensen, Thomas J. 2003, “China, the U.S-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia”, in Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003, 25-56.
Cossa, Ralph A. (ed.) 1999, USA-Korea-Japan relations: building toward a “virtual alliance”, Washington, DC: CSIS Press.
Cossa, Ralph A. 2007, “East Asia Community-Building: Time for the United States to Get on Board”, policy analysis brief (The Stanley Foundation), September.
Cronin, Bruce 1999, Commnity under anarchy: transnational identity and the evolution of
cooperation, New York: Clumbia University Press.
Czempiel, Ernst-Otto 1998, Friedensstrategien, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Deutsch, Karl W. 1957, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Deutsch, Karl W. 1995, “Frieden und die Problematik politischer Gemeinschaftsbildung auf internationaler Ebene“, in Senghaas 1995, 363-382.
Dosch, Jörn 1995, „Die Relevanz des integrationstheoretischen Ansatzes von Karl W. Deutsch für die Assoziation südostasiatischer Nationen (ASEAN)“, Welt Trends 7: 66-85. Dosch, Jörn und Mols, Manfred (Eds.) 2000, Internatinal Relations in the Asia-Pacific, New York: St.Martin's Press.
Eilenberger, Guido and Mols, Mandred and Rüland Jürgen (Hrsg.) 1996, Kooperation,
Regionalismus und Integration im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum (Mittelungen des Instituts für
Asienkunde Hamburg Nr. 266), Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde.
Fearon, James and Wendt, Alexander 2002, „Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View, in Carsnaes, et. al. 2002, 52-73.
Finnegan, Michael J. 1999, „Constructing cooperation: Toward Multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia“, Asian Perspective, Vol. 23, No. 1: 81-109.
Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn 2001, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, Annual Review of Political
Science, 4: 391-416.
Friedberg, Aaron L 1993, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia”,
International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3: 5-33.
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2004, „Regional Reneissance? Security in a Globalized World“,
FES-Themenschwerpunkt, FES Briefing Paper, March 2004.
Goldsmith, Benjamin E. 2007, “A Liberal Peace in Asia?”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44 No. 1:5-27.
Harding, Harry 1994, “Prospects for Cooperative Security Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific Region”, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies Fall: 31-41.
Hasenclever, Andreas, Mayer, Peter and Rittberger, Volker 2000, “Integrating theories of international regimes”, Review of International Studies 26: 3-33.
Hemmer, Christopher and Katzenstein, Peter J. 2000, “Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism”, International
Organization 56, 3: 575-607.
Hook, Glenn D. (ed.) 2001, Japan’s International Relations Politics, economics and security, 2. ed., London: Routledge.
Hummel, Hartwig 2003, Ostasiens Wege in die Weltpolitik: Intra-regional Konflikte und kompetitiver Nationalismus, in Rittberger, Volker 2003b: 123-143.
Ikenberry, John G. and Mastanduno, Michael ed. 2003, International Relations Theory and
the Asia-Pacific, NY: Columbia University Press.
Johnston, Alastair Iain 2003, „Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory”, in Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003: 107-162.
Kacowicz, Arie M. 1998, Zones of Peace in the third world, Albany: State University of New York Press.
Katsumata, Hiro 2007, “Constructivist-Rationalist Partnership and Policy Contribution”, Paper presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention, “Politics, Policy and Responsible Scholarship”, Chicago, 2 March 2007.
Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996a, “Regionalism in Comparative Perspective”, Cooperation and
Conflict 31, 2: 123-159.
Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996b, Cultural Norms and National Security, New York: Cornell University Press.
Kim, Samuel S. 2004, The International Relations of Northeast Asia, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc..
King, Gary and Keohane, Robert O. and Verba, Sidney 1994, Designing Social Inquiry.
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kratochiwill, Friedrich V. 1990, Rules, norms and decisions: on the consitions of practical
and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Krell, Gert (hrsg.) 1994, Frieden und Konflikt in den internationalen Beziehungen:
Maull, Hanns W. 1996, “Von Europa lernen? Konfliktpotentiale und die neue Sicherheitsstruktur im ostasiatisch-pazifischen Raum.“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 51, 12. April.
Maull, Hanns W. und Nabers, Dirk 2001, Multilateralismus in Ostasien – Pazifik, Probleme
und Perspektiven im neuen Jahrhundert, Hamburg: Instituts für Asienkunde.
Möller, Kay 1996, “East Asian Security: Lessons from Europe?”, Contemporary Southeast
Asia, Vol. 17 No. 4: 353-370.
Möller, Kay 2002a, Pacific sunset Vom vorzeitigen Ende des ostasiatischen Jahrhunderts,
SWP-Studie, (April), Berlin: SWP.
Möller, Kay 2002b, „Nordostasien: kein „Liberaler“ Frieden Wechselwirkungen zwischen binnenstaatlichen und regionalen Strukturen und Dynamiken“, Diskussionspapier der FG 7, 2002 / 3. Dezember 2002, SWP Berlin.
Müller, Harald 2002b, “Security Cooperation”, in Carsnaes, et. al. 2002, 369-391.
Okawara, Nobuo and Katzenstein, Peter J. 2001, “Japan and Asian-Pacific security: regionalization, entrenched bilateralism and incipient multilateralism“, The Pacific Review 14, 2: 165-194.
Ohhata, Hideki und Moon, Chung-In (ed.) 2005, „Nikkan Kokusaiseiji no Shinchihei“, Tokyo: Keio Gijyuku Daigaku Shuppankai (Keio University Press).
Pei, Minxin and Swaine, Michael 2005, „Simmering Fire in Asia: Averting Sino-Japanese Strategic Conflict“, Policy Brief, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 44 November 2005.
Risse-Kappen, Thomas 1994a, “Demokratischer Frieden? Unfriedliche Demokratien? Überlegungen zu einem theoretischen Puzzle“, in Krell 1994: 159-189.
Risse-Kappen, Thomas 1994b, “Wie weiter mit dem »demokratischen Frieden«?“, Zeitschrift
für Internationale Beziehungen, Heft 2: 367-379.
Risse-Kappen, Thomas 1995, “Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretations of the Liberal Argument”, European Journal of International
Relations, Vol. 1(4): 491-517.
Research Institute for Peace and Security Tokyo 1991-1992, 1994-2004, “Ajia no Anzenhoshô (Asian Security)”, Tokyô: Asagumo Shinbunsha.
Rittberger, Volker (ed.) 2002, Global Governance and the United Nations System, Tokyo: United Nations Publishing
Rittberger, Volker und Zangl, Bernhard 2003a, Internationale Organisationen – Politik und
Geschichte, 3. ed. Opladen: Leske + Budrich,.
Rittberger, Volker 2003b, Weltpolitik heute: Grundlagen und Perspektiven, Baden-Baden: NOMOS.
Rozman, Gilbert 2004, Northeast Asia’s stunted regionalism: bilateral distrust in the shadow
of globalization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schubert, Gunter 2006, „(Un)Sicherheit in Ostasien“, Die Friedens –Warte, Band 81, Heft 3-4: 11-20.
Senghaas Dieter (hrsg.) 1995, Den Frieden denken, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Smith, Richard 2007, “Regional Security: Is “Architecture” All We Need?”, policy analysis
brief (The Stanley Foundation), December.
Sprinz, Detlef F. and Wolinsky-Nahmias, Yael (ed.) 2004, Models, Numbers & Cases,
Methods for Studying International Relations, Ann Arbor, Mich: University of Michigan
Press.
Suh, J. J. , Katzenstein, Peter J. and Carlson, Allen ed. 2004, Rethinking Security in East Asia,
Identity, Power, and Efficiency, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
The Stanley Foundation 2006, “Building an Open and Inclusive Regional Architecture for Asia”, Policy Dialogue Brief (The Stanley Foundation), November.
Van Evera, Stephen 1997, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, New York: Cornell University Press.
Väyrynen, Raimo 2000, „Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps towards Theory Building”, in Kacowicz, Arie M. and Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov et.al. ed. 2000, 108-129.
Wallraf, Wolfram 1996, “Keine Chance der Theorie? Zur Leistungsfähigkeit integrationstheoretischer Ansäzte bei der Untersuchung asiatisch-pazifischer Realität“, in Eilenberger, Mols und Rüland Hrsg. 1996: 37-72.
Wendt, Alexander 1994, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”,
American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2: 384-396.
Wendt, Alexander 1999, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, Michael C. 2001, “The Discipline of the Democratic Peace: Kant, Liberalism and the Social Construction of Security Communities”, European Journal of International
Relations, Vol. 7 (4): 525-553.
Young, Jong Chi 1995, “An Exploration into the Institutional Underdevelopment in the Asia Pacific Region: National Attributes, Transaction Costs, and Regime Preferences, Pacific
Focus, Vol. 10, No. 2: 29-54.
Zangel, Bernhard und Zürn, Michael 2003, Frieden und Krieg, Frankfurt am Main: suhrkamp. Zielinski, Michael 1995, Friedensursachen, Baden-Baden: Nomos.
