Let's start with some general considerations regarding the involvement of the new member states in the EU's foreign policy. For similar reasons, the new member states support the EU's External Action Service.
Security considerations and Atlanticism
Second, perceptions of how to deal with Russia between the old EU member states and the Baltic states are often divergent, a topic that will be addressed in more detail in the next section. The strong Atlanticism in the Baltic countries and Poland compared to the other Central European counterparts can possibly also be explained by regional geopolitics.
Political elites and Atlanticism
As in the case of the Czech Republic, such differences exist not only between political parties, but also between parties. On the contrary, in the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Hungary, relations with the US (and foreign policy in general) play a very small role in general elections.
Public opinion and Atlanticism
Furthermore, when the answers to these survey questions were combined, a majority (over 50%) of the public considered Czech foreign policy to be following the right direction because there was no general decision to coordinate with the United States.21. A similar scenario would apply to the perception of the United States in the global fight against terrorism. While a majority of the public in the new member states view the role of the United States positively, in contrast, there is a negative view of the United States among a majority of the public in most of the EU-15 member states, with the exception of those belonging to traditional supporters of American politics , i.e.
The EU's role in promoting peace in the world and the fight against terrorism is most positively evaluated by Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which show the highest positive evaluations in the EU. It is one of the latest large-scale biennial surveys on various EU-related issues, carried out in the 25 EU member states and candidate countries. EU average, only Poland is quite skeptical about the positive role of the EU in these areas.
On the other hand, this Eurobarometer survey also suggests that the populations of the new member states are much more receptive to the idea of having a real CFSP. To summarize the discussed observations, the assumed Atlanticism of the new member states is likely to have two main consequences in the near future.
Geographical priorities in the activity of the new member states
Russia – will the Balts be able to prompt a common EU voice?
Not only is it by far the EU's largest neighbor, it is economically and perhaps strategically the EU's most important regional partner. At times it seems as if some of the EU's senior leaders were vying for Putin's attention. Looking at how to deal with Russia from the perspective of the new member states, there is no doubt that this is the number one issue for the Baltics and very important for Poland as well.
The cultural pressure stems mainly from a continuous raising of the issue of Russian minorities in the Baltic countries at various forums, including the OSCE or EU-Russia summits. But there is some frustration among Baltic leaders arising from the EU's inability to speak with one voice to Russia and address the Baltics' ongoing concerns about both internal developments in Russia as well as what can be seen as resurgent Russian imperialism. The latter spoke in favor of the Baltic states' position at the NATO summit in February 2005.
But it is also possible that we may witness the Baltic states pushing the EU to engage more closely in other parts of the former Soviet Union, namely in the Caucasus, Ukraine and Moldova. Firstly, it is due to the deep-rooted belief that the other former "brotherly nations".
Poland – paving the way for the Ukraine to join the EU?
The willingness of Poland to maintain "special" relations with Ukraine was self-evident even in the run-up to accession. However, it also shows an apparent lack of interest in Ukraine among the leaders of the EU heavyweights, a situation that contrasts sharply with how these leaders normally deal with Russia. The victory of the strongly pro-reform and pro-EU candidate in Ukraine has of course completely changed the European aspirations of this Eastern European country.
Yuschenko's visit to Brussels in February 2005 left no one in the EU in doubt that for the new Ukrainian president there are no alternatives to the aspiration of full membership. Not even the fact that the EU and Ukraine were able to quickly move forward with the European Neighborhood Action Plan. The Commission has so far kept a fairly low profile in the debate, but it clearly wants to move forward with Ukraine within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).
What will be the future of the Ukrainian card in the EU and how active Poland and possibly another new member will be in this process, we will see. However, the recognition of Ukraine's potential candidate status now depends on domestic policy.
The Central European countries – pulling South rather than East?
The region that attracts much more attention from the perspective of the Central European countries is Southeastern Europe or the Western Balkans. Despite the fact that there were some controversial issues, especially regarding Croatia, regarding the dispute over territorial waters in the Adriatic Sea, this is unlikely to pose major obstacles to supporting Croatia's bid for EU membership (an issue that will be explored later in this paper). Ensuring privileged treatment and the well-being of the Hungarian diaspora will be one of the focuses for Hungary's priorities in the CFSP.
As for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the connections with the Western Balkan region can also be explained mainly by historical and cultural motives. The Central European states' strong interest in the Western Balkans' relationship with the EU was clearly evident when the EU's Council of Foreign Ministers decided not to start accession negotiations with Croatia on 17 March 2005. The Central European states' position must, among other things, not be understood as a justification for the attitude of the Croatian authorities towards the Hague Tribunal, but within the wider context of the EU's policy towards the Western Balkans.
The leaders of the countries that support the start of accession negotiations with Croatia believe that it is necessary to give a positive signal to other candidates so that accession could become a reality. 45 Another explanation for Carla del Ponte's tough stance is that the court's mandate expires in 2010 and that the most wanted war criminals (Gotovina, Karadžić and Mladić) are still at large.
The supposed idealism in the foreign policy of the new member states stems from their own transformation experience. Many of the political elites in the new Member States are former dissidents persecuted under communism, and have deep empathy for those who continue to suffer under authoritarian or undemocratic regimes. Some of the leading proponents of idealism in foreign policy over the past fifteen years have come from Central Europe; examples include Václav Havel or Lech Walesa, who held top constitutional positions in the Czech Republic and Poland, respectively.
But it seems that the promotion of democratic change has indeed become one of the focal points of Czech foreign policy. However, it is quite striking that the new member states, especially the Balts and the Poles, did not oppose the lifting of the embargo due to strong opposition from Washington. It is therefore interesting to examine this question in relation to the Atlanticism of EU newcomers.
Such pragmatism is more likely to prevail the longer these countries remain EU members. Thus, predicting the degree to which the foreign policy of the new member states will remain connected to idealistic goals is difficult and complex.
Candidate countries and CFSP
Its strategic alliance with the United States is often considered one of the key elements of Turkish foreign policy.53 On the other hand, a certain shift in the attitude towards the United States can be traced recently. Therefore, there is no guarantee that Turkey will become another "Trojan" horse in the US in Europe. And this is also where one of the main problems lies, namely Turkey's complicated relationship with Armenia.
At the moment, relations are frozen and it seems clear that normalization of relations will be one of the litmus tests in the EU accession negotiations. On the other hand, as in the case of relations with the US, recent Turkish-Israeli relations have cooled, with Prime Minister Erdogan quite critical of the Sharon government. The impact of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on the CFSP is easier to predict as both countries will join the EU soon, probably in 2007.
Due to their close ties to the US, Bulgaria and Romania are considered to support US policy in many ways, including support for pro-reform movements in various parts of the region. Romania and Bulgaria could call for greater EU involvement in the region and use its soft power to turn the Black Sea region into a safe neighborhood for the wider EU, a strategy that is likely to be actively supported by the Balts and Poles.
Conclusion
In any case, Russia will remain an important actor in the region and the EU's cooperation will largely depend on the nature of the relationship between the EU and Russia. In the case of Bulgaria, it will probably connect with countries that are active in the Western Balkans. They are more likely to exert pressure in the EU to focus on the Western Balkans, where they have strong interests (albeit for different reasons).
Moreover, public opinion in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia is less Atlanticist than in the Baltic/Poland group, which gives governments in these four countries even more room to maneuver. Since their accession, these countries have kept a relatively low profile on most foreign policy issues discussed in the Council, with the notable exception of the Czech Republic on the Cuban issue. In the case of Poland and the Balts, these countries have been more active in their attempts to shape the EU's relationship with Russia.
It can be assumed that their push for a more inclusive EU-Russia policy is mainly driven by domestic considerations, and this is particularly true in the case of the Balts. Testimony of Bruce Pitcairn Jackson before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on European Affairs: "The Future of Democracy in the Black Sea Region."
