In the wake of the violence that engulfed East Timor in 1999 and was the final bloody chapter of Indonesia's brutal 24-year occupation, the United Nations and the international community committed themselves to the principle that the perpetrators of these atrocities should not go unpunished can't stay Despite the energy and resources invested, both trial processes established after the 1999 atrocities – the UN-established Special Panels in East Timor and the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Indonesia – have fundamentally failed to bring to justice those most responsible for the atrocities in East Timor. The UN will withdraw from the legal system in East Timor in May 2005.
Since the Ad Hoc Courts for Human Rights were established and the East Timor trials began in Jakarta in 2002, there have been some improvements in the judicial system. However, without the political will to prosecute high-level perpetrators, these developments will not benefit victims in East Timor. The looming deadlines for justice efforts in East Timor and Indonesia have put the UN's reputation and commitment to accountability for international crimes on the line.
Without serious renewed commitment and reforms, the efforts for justice in East Timor undertaken over the past five years are likely to result in impunity for most of the guilty and represent a major blow to the credibility of the UN and international community's commitment to punish and punish. to combat crimes against humanity. 3 These organizations included the International Center for Transitional Justice, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Federation for East Timor. Many other NGOs have also written separate letters demanding accountability for the crimes in East Timor.
EAST TIMOR’S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
In 1975, the leaders of the right-wing East Timorese party UDT (Uniao Democratica Timorense/Timor Democratic Union), which had declined significantly in popularity compared to the left-wing FRETILIN, left the pro-independence coalition and instead supported unification with Indonesia. . The Chinese population in particular became victims; on the first day of the invasion alone, approximately 500 people were killed in Dili. Through this strategy, Indonesia gradually consolidated its control over the country, although pockets of resistance would remain throughout the occupation.
The appalling brutality of the Indonesian occupation was not limited to the first few years. The occupation eventually led to the killing or starvation of about a third of the East Timorese population and left virtually no family untouched. FRETILIN, which continued to control large parts of the island's mountainous interior, also committed its own serious human rights abuses during the occupation.
36 According to John Taylor, during the first invasion, about 90 percent of the military equipment used was supplied by the United States.
THE INDONESIAN AD HOC HUMAN RIGHTS COURT Background
Many of the innovative policy reforms implemented at the Human Rights Court had their origins in the Commercial Court – for example the use of ad hoc judges. Of the 33 individual perpetrators named in the original Komnas HAM report, many of the most senior officers were not charged. While the problems in the ad hoc lawsuit have been numerous, most local and international observers place most of the blame for its failure on the attorney general's office.
First, the content of the charges and the evidence adduced at trial revealed that the prosecutors were almost completely unfamiliar with—or else willful. A second problem was a lack of trial skills and preparation on the part of the lawyers, including those who argued the cases at trial. Identified by most observers as the biggest problem plaguing the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court, the lack of political will to prosecute the perpetrators appears to start with the President and permeate the entire office of the Attorney General.
The view of the conflict put forward in the Jakarta trials conflicts with that of outside observers, yet it is the prevailing view of the East Timor conflict within the country. 64 Letter from Secretary General to Juan Mendez, ICTJ, July 22, 2004, one of the signatories of the letter to the Secretary General urged him to appoint a commission to remedy the crimes committed in East Timor. Because prosecutors presented such poor cases, it is difficult to assess the judges' capacity and performance.
Lack of transparency in the courts, including the practice of unpublished opinions, is not only an obstacle to the assessment of the judicial process, but it can also hinder the fairness and effectiveness of the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court. Second, a number of the judges on the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court have now participated in training programs in international human rights law. The Attorney General sits in the Cabinet with the head of the military, and the Ministry of Justice is historically closely linked to the military.
A human rights lawyer told us that despite the advent of direct elections, there have been very few changes in the composition of the main government institutions, from Another aspect of the problem of political will is cultural—generally, within the Attorney General's office and in Indonesian society as a whole. The prosecutor's office is one of the few branches of the Indonesian civilian government that observes these rituals.
And, as one judge of the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court pleaded, “I and the other judges who support justice need support from the international community.
THE SERIOUS CRIMES UNIT AND SPECIAL PANELS Background
Unlike SCU and Special Colleges, its focus is on the entire period of Indonesian occupation. The jurisdictional mandate of the SCU is not limited to 1999, but extends to all serious crimes committed in East Timor throughout the duration of the Indonesian occupation. Furthermore, the broad focus of the SCU has undermined the credibility of the process and the public perception that justice is being achieved.
That approach would have dramatically drawn international attention to the fact that the most culpable perpetrators were beyond the reach of the serious crimes process and forced the international community to confront its failure. Despite the criticism, it must be emphasized that many members of the SCU and Special Panels have sacrificed and worked heroically to overcome obstacles and bring justice to the people of East Timor. This problem cannot be largely blamed on the staff of the SCU or the Special Panels.
As was clear from the early days of the establishment of the SCU, the chance of extradition of perpetrators from Indonesia was minimal without significant international pressure and, barring a significant or long-term change in the Indonesian government, will remain so. In relation to many of the highest level commanders, the East Timor government has blocked the submission of those warrants to Interpol. The increasingly strange events in the Wiranto case indicate a lack of political will on the part of the Timorese government to pursue prosecutions, as discussed below.
News cameras captured the image of the two men laughing and hugging, and Xanana referred to it. They found that the villagers have not been kept informed and have only a very simple understanding of the trial process. 111. Therefore, extending the mandate of the SCU and the Special Panels may not suffice as an effective justice mechanism for East Timor, but it can ensure that the SCU is allowed to close in a rational and accountable manner.
Despite the failures of the process, the SCU has done considerable useful work, including fairly thorough investigations of the 1999 cases. It is essential that before the SCU and CAVR complete their work, all the evidence they have gathered transferred to UN authorities outside the East.
A ROAD MAP FOR RENEWING JUSTICE EFFORTS FOR EAST TIMOR Objectives, Obstacles, and Obligations
Many argue that Indonesia has used this issue, as well as military maneuvers close to the borders, to remind East Timor of it. Although an invasion appears unlikely, security concerns have been cited as justification for continuing to expand the UN's overall mandate in East Timor. Furthermore, it should be expected that the East Timor government will resist any subsequent justice efforts.
As Lucas da Costa, Rector of the Universidad de Paz, has pointed out, the acts committed are "crimes against humanity, not only against East Timor".121. Such a commission would analyze the failures of justice in East Timor and Indonesia and make recommendations to the Secretary-General and the international community to correct these failures and keep the promises made to the people of East Timor. 124. Moreover, its closure with hundreds of outstanding indictments would deeply diminish the credibility and commitment of the UN to ensure accountability for crimes against humanity committed in East Timor.
But with a very specific, focused mandate – and a change in the current lines of authority from the unit as a body of the East Timor legal system to that of a stand-alone UN institution – a short . extension may be justified. Victims groups and their advocates in Timor-Leste have spoken out, saying that compensation is not a substitute for criminal justice; those who committed terrible crimes deserve to be put behind bars. The government of East Timor has already expressed its willingness to pay compensation for this last category of crimes.
In the event that new and additional processes are not undertaken in the East Timor cases within Indonesia, it is nevertheless essential that the international community, including the United Nations, devotes significantly more resources and attention to supporting the Indonesian legal process. Another option that should remain on the table is the establishment of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal for the crimes committed in East Timor. It is essential that this option is considered, especially as it is overwhelmingly preferred by victims. groups and civil society in general in East Timor.
The tribunal could be based in The Hague, or ideally in a willing country in the region, such as New Zealand, which in August 2004 again called for the establishment of an international tribunal to redress the crimes committed in East Timor. The United Nations and the international community have failed the people of East Timor too often. The credibility of the international commitment to end impunity for the most serious international crimes is at stake, as is the development of respect for the rule of law in Indonesia and East Timor.
As deadlines for the completion of the legal process approach, while justice and reconciliation remain elusive for East Timor, the international community should not miss this opportunity for action.
