2 water ballast tank Fig. 12 - Damage to the installation part of the Hyundai Discovery left side Fig. 13 - ACX Hibiscus table. A UK-registered Hyundai Discovery was bound for Singapore and a Panama-registered ACX Hibiscus was bound from Singapore. The Chief Officer of the ACX Hibiscus, unaware of the direction and position of the Hyundai Discovery, turned his vessel to the north to follow the planned course.
Despite several radio warnings from the Hyundai Discovery's chief officer, the commander of the ACX Hibiscus continued to turn his vessel into the path of the Hyundai Discovery. Simulations were conducted to consider what actions the Hyundai Discovery's senior officer might have taken when confronted by the ACX Hibiscus turning on him. Hyundai Discovery managers have provided training to share the lessons learned from this accident with the bridge officers in their fleet.
FACTUAL INFORMATION
BACkGROUND TO ThE INVESTIGATION
The ship's owners denied MAIB inspectors access to the Panamanian-registered vessel, ACX Hibiscus, which was outside MAIB's jurisdiction at the time. The PMA was unwilling to contradict the owner's instructions and did not require them to give the MAIB access to key sources of evidence. Consequently, this report has been prepared based on evidence gathered by MAIB inspectors, from the Hyundai Discovery, and a report from the PMA on the circumstances on board the ACX Hibiscus at the time of the accident.
Timings and navigation data were taken from Hyundai Discovery's VDR, which included a recording of Automatic Identification System (AIS) data for ACX Hibiscus.
NARRATIVE
- Events leading up to the collision
- Watchkeeping in restricted visibility
- Course alteration
- Action to avoid collision
- Collision
The cadet told the chief officer that he believed the ACX Hibiscus was going to pass down the port side of the Hyundai Discovery. At 0752, with a distance of about 2.2 nm between the ships, Hyundai Discovery's chief mate noticed that the radar track of ACX Hibiscus changed direction towards his vessel. At 0754:20 Hyundai Discovery's Chief Officer asked ACX Hibiscus's Third Officer to change course to starboard and make a minimum CPA of 3 cables.
At 0755:35 the master of the Hyundai Discovery arrived on the bridge and the chief reported to him the situation with the ACX Hibiscus. At 0756:10 the bow of the ACX Hibiscus collided with the port wing ballast tank of the Hyundai Discovery adjacent to No. Five containers fell from the deck of the Hyundai Discovery either into the sea or onto the forward berth deck of the ACX Hibiscus.
NAVIGATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS .1 Approaches to the Port of Singapore from the east
- Regional climate and weather
- Environmental conditions
ACX Hibiscus' master mustered his crew on the bridge and then instructed them to sound the tanks and bilges to check where the hull had been breached. ACX Hibiscus flooded in the forward peak tank and took a list to starboard. At 0830 the master notified the Malaysian Coast Guard of his ship's damaged status by VHF radio.
After this the Master turned the ACX Hibiscus to proceed westward at slow speed with the intention of beaching the vessel if necessary to prevent her sinking. At 0920, the master, satisfied that ACX Hibiscus's condition was stable enough to resume the passage, navigated his vessel back to Singapore's outer anchorage at low speed.
DAMAGE
- Damage to ACX Hibiscus
- Damage to Hyundai discovery
Hyundai Discovery's hull was in No.2 water ballast wing tank, both above and below the waterline (Figure 11). Five 40-foot long containers were lost overboard and several other 20- and 40-foot long containers and their securing arrangements were damaged. The port side of the vessel is along the length of the hull of no.
2 well, aft to the accommodation where the port accommodation ladder and surrounding structure were heavily deformed (Figure 12).
ACX HibisCus .1 key personnel
- Bridge operation
- Navigation
- Bridge radar
- Passage planning
- Supporting information
One 'S-band' (10 cm wavelength) radar equipped with an ARPA; The 'X band' (3 cm wavelength) radar did not have an ARPA. The AIS unit's screen was small and only displayed the range, bearing and names of nearby vessels, either in text form or in a radar format. A passage plan had been drawn up for the journey; however, this plan did not take into account the possibility of heavy rain, operating in limited visibility, or the need to cross the traffic entering the Singapore Strait when the course was changed to the north.
At the time of the investigation, MAIB had no information to indicate what command standing orders, company instructions or contingency plans were available to the crew of the ACX Hibiscus.
HyundAi disCovery .1 key personnel
- Bridge operation
- Navigation
- Radar operation
- AIS and ECS
- Manoeuvring data
- Master’s standing orders
- Actions to be taken by officers of the watch
- Instructions on the use of VhF and AIS equipment
- Passage and contingency plans
- Company audit
AIS data was displayed on a display located near the chart table on the front of the bridge (Figure 17). The ECS displayed the ship's Global Positioning System (GPS) position and AIS data for nearby vessels on the electronic navigation chart. ECS was not approved as a primary means of navigation and was provided to assist bridge watchkeepers in improving situational awareness.
The data predicted the ship's turning performance – with full rudder engaged – to both port and starboard. This information showed that the Hyundai Discovery, loaded and traveling at 18 knots, would advance approximately 4.5 cables3 and transfer approximately 2.5 cables4 during 90° turns to both port and starboard. 4 The displacement of a ship at a given course change is, of course, the distance the ship moves perpendicular to the direction of its original line of advance, measured from the point where the rudder is overturned.
The diagram showed that from full speed (100 rpm) the reverse drive would be started in 6 minutes and 38 seconds. The OOW should not hesitate to take immediate action for the safety of the ship. Sound the ship's whistle or use the signal light to alert the other ship to take action.
The Hyundai Discovery's passage plan from Hong Kong to Singapore included contingency plans, outlining actions to be taken in the event of limited visibility. The most recent navigation audit (Appendix F), carried out on board the Hyundai Discovery before the accident, was carried out by Zodiac in May 2011. This included an assessment of the bridge equipment, the management of the bridge team and the bridge keepers' understanding of the required actions. to avoid a collision.
The audit report did not address the AIS information that was available to bridge supervisors on the ECS display located adjacent to the bridge communications area.
REGULATIONS FOR COLLISION PREVENTION
HyundAi disCovery - SIMULATION OF POTENTIAL AVOIDING ACTIONS
The table below shows the likely outcomes of turning to starboard or port and making a roll stop. Time before collision Turn hard to starboard Turn hard to port Engine full astern.
MASTER’S OBLIGATIONS FOLLOWING A COLLISION
SIMILAR ACCIDENTS
ANALYSIS
- ThE COLLISION
- RESTRICTED VISIBILITY
- ACX HibisCus .1 Fatigue
- Watchkeeping
- Continuation of the turn to port
- Response to seeing Hyundai discovery
- Passage planning
- Actions following collision
- Summary
- HyundAi disCovery .1 Fatigue
- Actions of Hyundai discovery’s chief officer
- Actions available to the chief officer
- knowledge of emergency actions
- Use of VhF for collision avoidance
- AIS information and presentation
- Failure to stop to offer assistance
The PMA's investigation report said the chief officer had worked on ACX Hibiscus for 19 of the previous 24 hours. The chief officer was unaware of Hyundai Discovery's presence because the vessel's contact did not show on the radar screen and visibility was severely reduced. Consequently, it is also concluded that the chief officer either did not use the AIS information available to him, or misinterpreted it.
It is possible that the chief officer wanted the ship to be steady on its new course before handing over the watch to the third officer. The chief officer had insufficient situational awareness due to his inefficient use of the navigational aids available to him. The third officer arrived on ACX Hibiscus' bridge to take over the watch from the chief officer as the vessel began to turn.
It is considered likely that the third officer in this reply passed on information that the senior officer had passed on to him. When the Hyundai Discovery emerged from the torrential rain about two cables away, the chief ACX Hibiscus officer realized there was an imminent danger of collision. The chief officer's response to the situation was to use the VHF radio to alert the chief officer of ACX Hibiscus, question his actions, and ask him to reverse the turn to port and turn to starboard instead.
However, the chief officer was unable to warn the chief officer of ACX Hibiscus of the danger he was in or convince him to change his actions. After the final VHF radio transmission from Hyundai Discovery's chief officer to ACX Hibiscus, it took just over a minute for the collision to occur. The emergency actions available to the first officer were a hard turn to starboard, a hard turn to port, or initiate a crash stop.
The simulation estimated that if the boss had put the steering wheel hard to port at 40 minutes before the crash, the Hyundai Discovery would have passed 3.5 cables ahead of the ACX Hibiscus.
CONDUCT OF ThE INVESTIGATION
- AGREEMENT OF LEAD INVESTIGATING STATE
- FLAG STATE CO-OPERATION
- CONSEqUENCES TO ThE INVESTIGATION
- EFFECTIVENESS OF ThE IMO CASUALTY INVESTIGATION CODE The IMO Casualty Investigation Code (Annex A) requires that all substantially
In contrast, the MAIB showed the PMA's representative a replay of the AIS data taken by ACX Hibiscus' track from Hyundai Discovery. Unfortunately, it must be concluded that the decision to deny the MAIB access to evidence from ACX Hibiscus has limited the safety issues that can be learned from this investigation. The most important question to answer in this investigation was why ACX Hibiscus' chief officer chose to change course to port over a traffic route in such dangerous circumstances.
Although the PMA report provided many factual details, it did not fully answer this question. The conclusion that the chief officer's decision was due to fatigue was not substantiated beyond the mention of his most recent hours of work and rest. The reason why the chief officer continued to turn ACX Hibiscus despite calls on VHF radio and being warned of radar targets ahead of his vessel.
As a result, this report had to focus on measures to be taken to avoid rogue vessels rather than dealing with the root causes of the accident. This is contrary to the objectives of the MAIB and the IMO Accident Investigation Code. However, despite repeated requests, VDR data, interview transcripts and other evidence have not been provided to the investigating state.
The MAIB's inspectors provided only a partial account of the accident 3 months after it occurred. Evidence was withheld for this investigation due to pressure exerted by ACX Hibiscus' owners on the PMA. Marine safety investigation state(s) shall ensure that investigator(s) conducting a marine safety investigation are impartial and objective.
That ACX Hibiscus's owners were able to apply pressure to PMA, which resulted in very important evidence being withheld from the lead investigation state, highlighted a fundamental weakness in that administration's application of the IMO Accident Investigation Code.
CONCLUSIONS
SAFETY ISSUES DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO ThE ACCIDENT WhICh hAVE RESULTED IN RECOMMENDATIONS
OThER SAFETY ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING ThE INVESTIGATION ALSO LEADING TO RECOMMENDATIONS
SAFETY ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING ThE INVESTIGATION WhICh hAVE BEEN ADDRESSED OR hAVE NOT RESULTED IN
ACTION TAkEN
ACTIONS TAkEN BY OThER ORGANISATIONS Zodiac Maritime Agencies Limited has
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