Samskip Courier sustained relatively little damage and was able to proceed to anchorage in the Humber Estuary. Much of the information in this report comes from Samskip Courier's Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) and Humber Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) VHF radio and radar recordings.
Environmental conditions
Events leading to collision
Fifteen seconds after hearing Skagern's VTS communication, the pilot of the Samskip Courier requested a half forward speed reduction (12+ knots or 50% on power distribution setting (PDS)) to slow forward (approximately 9kts; 25% PDS ). The pilot of the Samskip Courier responded immediately and confirmed that they were also on the same side of the channel.
EVENTS AFTER THE COLLISION .1 Humber Estuary Services
Skagern
From the time the Samskip Courier cleared the King George dock at 22:41, to the point of collision, a period of approximately 17 minutes elapsed. Apart from the mobile phone conversation between Samskip Courier and Skagern's pilots at 22:47, all further verbal information about the ships' positions etc. At the same time Skagern became visible on Samskip Courier's radar at 2.25 miles range (Figure 12), approx. 6.5 minutes before impact.
Skagern's pilot requested that Samskip Courier's pilot switch radio channels and request that his own ship's speed be reduced. Skagern's captain went up the wing of the harbor bridge to try to visually see Samskip Courier. For about 20 seconds, the Samskip Courier pilot attempted to select channel 10 on the radio (Figure 18).
BRIDGE TEAM MANNING
Skagern bridge team
The master's routine allowed him adequate rest, which was no less than 10 hours a day, of which he spent at least 8.5 hours sleeping. The master's preferred sleep pattern was 6.5 hours of sleep at night and a few hours of sleep in the afternoon. The second officer came on the bridge about 2 minutes before the collision to take over the watch from the master; therefore, he was not fully involved with the bridge team at the time of the collision.
The Russian master held an STCW Unlimited Master's certificate issued by the Government of the Russian Federation. While sailing the Humber he monitored the ship's position on the ECS and supervised the ship's overall navigation. Although he was not fluent in English, he had sufficient knowledge of the language to perform his navigation duties.
ASSOCIATED BRITISH PORTS, HUMBER ESTUARY SERVICES .1 Pilotage
- Pilotage Exemption Certificate (PEC) training
- Vessel Traffic Services (VTS)
- Port and Vessel Information System (PAVIS)
- Dissemination of information
Although the Skagernan master traded in and out of the Humber for over 10 years, he did not have a PEC. In contrast, the master of the Samskip Courier was recorded to have "tripped" the PEC since the vessel first entered the Humber. The Humber VTS is part of the HES which monitors and controls shipping on the Humber, Ouse and Trent rivers.
Humber VTS provides radar surveillance only from the seaward approaches of the Humber Estuary as far upriver as the Humber Bridge. Humber VTS control tower is located on Spurn Head at the mouth of the Humber Estuary. The master of Samskip Courier was recorded as a "tripping" master from his first time in the river with the vessel.
PILOT TRAINING .1 General
Humber pilot training
Trainee pilots, who must hold an STCW 95 Certificate of Competency and relevant experience prior to commencing training, must complete a sufficient number of voyages (minimum 80 ships under control), inbound and outbound, to all berths within their pilotage area and to the satisfaction of authorized instructing pilots . In line with PMSC bridge resource management recommendations, HES is using the services of South Tyneside College to deliver pilot resource management training in a purpose-built ship's bridge simulator. The course syllabus (Appendix 3) includes Bridge Resource Management and an exercise in dense fog on the Humber.
A relatively new requirement of HES is that student pilots must complete a pilot resource management course before obtaining their formal authorization to pilot vessels on the river. The pilot on Skagern and Samskip Courier attended resource management courses in the 15 months before the accident. At the time of the accident, neither pilot was attending the course, although both were participating in blind navigation exercises as part of Pilot Resource Management training.
PILOT BACKGROUND .1 Pilot hours
The ship pilots
He was a master with the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service (RMAS) for 5 years before joining HES as an operator with Humber VTS in 2000. He was then employed as a municipal harbor officer, which involved piloting up to 20 vessels per week. During his time as a pilot at HES, he had performed 836 piloting actions, including many container ships, but he had never piloted the Samskip Courier or any of her sister ships.
Days preceding the accident
31 After finishing his work on the evening of Tuesday 6th June, he was absent until he took over the Samskip Courier on the evening of 7th June. He didn't go to sleep anywhere during the day, because he always had a hard time falling asleep during the day. The pilot arrived at ABP Port at 21:00 where he prepared a passage plan for the Samskip courier voyage before boarding the vessel at King George Dock at 21:45.
The pilot disembarked 'Ship E' (see table below) at the Spurn light raft on 6 June and then proceeded to the pilot's office at Port House to complete paperwork. During the afternoon of Wednesday 7th June he went to bed around 1600 for a nap – this was quite normal for him as he expected to work late. He arrived at Port House about 1930 to pick up his paperwork and transport it to Spurn Head, arriving at Spurn Head at 8.30pm.
PILOT/MASTER EXCHANGE .1 Samskip Courier
Skagern
After an exchange with the officer of the watch, the commander then showed the pilot the engine, autopilot and rudder controls. The commander did not recall the pilot showing him the passage plan, as he thought he had placed it on the bridge console. The official surrender of the fraud did not occur; the commander assumed that the pilot was delusional when he began giving instructions as they taxied up.
The captain was confident in the pilot's ability and was glad he took the trick.
Samskip Courier
Skagern
VOYAGE DATA RECORDER INFORMATION
Power setting (PDS) was calibrated from 0% to 100%; slow forward was listed as a 20% pitch in the ship's propulsion data; during the initial river transit the slow ride on the PDS was listed as 25% and gave a speed of 9 knots. The VDR also recorded rudder movements throughout, and the study showed that the rudder sensors for the VDR were connected in reverse order.
MANAGEMENT .1 Skagern
Samskip Courier
The ship's Bridge Procedures Manual was generic in nature and required the master to comply with regulatory requirements.
Humber Estuary Services (HES)
COLLISION PREVENTION REGULATIONS
MOBILE TELEPHONES
Managers employed the Marine Safety Engineering and Management Engineering Society Ltd (MARSIG) to carry out an internal audit of ISM 10 weeks after the accident. The low water depth at the King George Dock tide gauge was the datum point on the chart plus 1.7m; therefore, the depth on the river calculated on the map would be plus at least 1.7 m. After the collision, with the Samskip Courier lying motionless in the water to seaward of the Sand End light float, the VDR indicated her COG and SOG as 265˚, 0.3 kt.
POSITION OF COLLISION
ANALYSIS
- CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT
- FATIGUE
- VDR INFORMATION
- VTS HUMBER
- PAVIS
- HUMBER PILOTAGE
- PILOT/MASTER RELATIONSHIP
- BRIDGE MANNING LEVELS
- BRIDGE TEAM MANAGEMENT AND INTERACTION
- Samskip Courier
- COMMUNICATIONS
- RADIO CHANNEL SELECTION DIFFICULTIES
- MOBILE TELEPHONES
- COLREGS COMPLIANCE
- SPEED
- STEERING
- PASSAGE MONITORING
- Skagern
- Samskip Courier
- POSITION OF COLLISION
- DECISION MAKING AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING
- TIDAL INFLUENCE
- ACTIONS POST ACCIDENT
His role is to advise the team on the bridge, which will ensure the safe navigation of the ship. The master is fully responsible for the safe navigation of the ship and the well-being of the crew. Both ships appeared to use their pilot as part of the navigational watch, with the pilot considered a member of the bridge crew.
There was no formal handover of the zones to the pilot upon boarding, nor was there any question from the pilot to the commander as to who should take over the zones. A review of VDR playback data revealed inadequate procedures and levels of interaction by the bridge team. Focusing on the radio caused the pilot to lose consciousness of the vessel's relative position and speed at a crucial moment.
The Sand End light buoy was placed exactly 1 cable outside the 7 meter contour of Hull Middle Sands. Had the pilot or master of the Samskip Courier previously assessed the risk posed by the approaching Skagern, it would have been perfectly safe to place the vessel on the starboard side of the river and "slip" the Sand End light float to sail quite clear of the Skagern.
CONCLUSIONS
SAFETY ISSUES
Position information was not requested or passed on by the Samskip Courier captain to the pilot. Samskip Courier's radar had a mapping feature that, if used properly, would have helped maintain situational awareness and possibly prevent the accident. The Sand End light float was not best placed to indicate proximity to the fairway.
The masters did not verbally inquire about the actions of their pilots, thus disrupting the process of taking the pilot from the pilots. The pilot from Samskip Courier misjudged the effect of the tide and consequently stayed too far to the Skagernd's side of the channel.
ACTIONS TAKEN
Decided to introduce a requirement in January 2007 for all Class A&B PEC candidates to complete an approved bridging management course before attaining PEC status. Decided that from January 2007 PEC candidates will be required to attend Humber VTS for an introductory meeting before being given a “tripping number” and logbook. The PEC candidate will then be obliged to have this logbook signed each voyage by the pilot or the authorized PEC holder of that ship, so that the pilots are aware that they are sailing with a PEC candidate.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Marine Accident Investigation Branch April 2007
