Several European countries, especially Italy, hope that stabilizing the situation in Fezzan and reviving the economy will help slow migrant flows. Fezzan suffers from several problems, most of which are not of its own making.
Introduction
The Fezzan
Geography
4 Chadian authorities claimed they closed the border out of fear that terrorists fleeing the former Islamic State (ISIS) stronghold of Sirte could seek refuge in Chad's northern region. State and Statelessness in the Chad–Sudan–Libya Triangle”, Small Arms Survey, HSBA working paper 43, June 2017, p.
People
Triumph of the Illegal Economy
It is not a crime”, said a university lecturer.8 Libya's deep economic recession, which has caused cash shortages, severe inflation and a skyrocketing black market exchange rate, has encouraged illegal activity, including among the public sector employees who make up the majority of the formal workforce both in Fezzan and Libya as a whole.9 Trafficking in people, fuel and gold is widespread and highly visible, although drugs and weapons also pass through the region covertly.
People Smuggling
You do it once a week, and voila, in one month you make more than LYD which is more than four times the monthly salary of a policeman. But after a while you want to do the trade independently and not be just a driver anymore.
Fuel Smuggling
I fear we are at the point of no return for the youth of Tebu: many high school students take drugs such as tramadol [an opioid painkiller popular with militia members], which is cheap, and few go on to university. Because the trade generates such high profits and supports so many people, the tribes involved are unlikely to give it up even if they are offered alternative sources of employment.
Artisanal Gold Mining
According to a resident of Sebha: "They take truckloads of fuel from the storage tanks in Sebha, but instead of taking it to the gas station and distributing it to the people, they take it directly to smuggling routes".17 There is also some small-scale smuggling of fuel, via cars and trucks.18.
Vanishing Legal Economy
Agriculture
Some find the state farm model unattractive and support privatization.29 Private farms in the area, which have flourished in recent years, appear to be less affected by robbery than state-owned farms, perhaps because their owners, who live nearby, taking more interest in their defense. One thing is certain: Libyan authorities and international development agencies that want to help Fezzan must invest more attention and resources in the agricultural sector, which should not be left in its current state of collapse.
Oil industry
The oil fields employ few local residents; most of the workforce rotates in and out on special flights from the north organized by the operating oil companies.35 Communities living near the Sharara and Feel oil fields complain there is little interaction with local residents. There is no development in the town near the fields, no educational opportunities for us", said a Tuareg from Obari, noting that "even the person responsible for watering the plants in the Sharara oil field, from the be flown in north". 36 According to Libyan law, oil companies are supposed to invest in local social development projects, but they rarely comply with this provision either in the south or elsewhere.37 To help stabilize the local economy and calm local tensions, oil companies, in cooperation with the NOC, should do more to engage and employ local workers and to invest in local development. 37 When the head of the NOC, Mustafa Sanallah, visited the Sharara oil field in early July, many residents reportedly asked him when their villages would begin to see the benefit of the country's rising oil production.
Sanallah replied: "You have been very patient," before adding: "You should be patient a little more."
A Precarious Security Environment
Lingering Communal Conflicts
The conflict also had an economic dimension as members of the two tribes competed for control of smuggling routes into Niger.49. As of July 2017, there is no active conflict between these groups and some argue that "tensions are no longer at the fore and southern tribes no longer want war".50 Not everyone agrees;. 45 Qadhadhfa remained a supporter of the previous regime even after Gaddafi's death, reportedly aiding the efforts of former regime officials stationed in Niger.
During the 2011 war, the Awlad Suleiman eventually supported anti-Qadhafi forces, although they had previously been strong allies of the regime as well. 48 The forces of Misratan in the south denied their support for the Tuareg, insisting that they were a neutral force that intervened at the request of the government in Tripoli. Representatives of both sides met in Rome in March 2017 under the auspices of the Italian Ministry of the Interior and the Presidency Council (represented at the talks by Abdelsalam Kajman from the Brak al-Shati region).54 The Libyan participants assumed that Italy had a provide financial compensation for the victims of the Tebu-Awlad Suleiman conflict, as Qatar had promised to do during the Tebu-Tuareg negotiations, and as the government of former Prime Minister Ali Zeidan had done in 2014 after the first Tebu-Awlad Suleiman conflict in 2012.
A cornerstone of the agreement negotiated in Doha was that Qatar promised financial compensation for the families of the approximately 500 fighters killed on both sides.
East-West Battlefront in the South
In early 2017, Ben Nayel's men began attacking the Third Force in Tamanhindt with heavy artillery. The objective of the Greater Sirte Operations Room was to capture the strategic Jufra airbase, which was under the control of Misrata and other forces associated with the Tripoli-based government. A resident of Sebha said members of the Third Force colluded with local groups involved in smuggling, especially fuel smuggling.
Even locals who support Misrata's role as a deterrent in the south admit that the third force did not live up to expectations. Local supporters of the LNA claim that Ben Nayel's men turned against the Third Force after cooperating with them at the Brak al-Shati base in mid-2016 because the Misratans allegedly supported local figures with ties to al-Qaeda. The force withdrew entirely from the south.65 Since Misrata's withdrawal, there has been only one, quickly subdued episode of fighting in Sebha.66 Jamal Treiki, the leader of the third force, and others warned of a possible flare-up in the south or even ISIS -attack should Misrata be forced to leave.67.
I am not afraid of escalation of fighting between tribes because at the end of the day ayyan (tribal leaders) can stop it.
Fluid and Fragmented Loyalties
No GNA, Few Internationals in the South
No Central State
The International Community in the South
Policy Implications and Conclusion
Security
The Libyan authorities, EU and European governments can take steps to improve the situation in the region, which can eventually deter people smuggling, which is Europe's biggest concern. Paris is concerned about the strategic stability of the Sahel not only because it has troops stationed there, but also because it is an area of privileged French influence in Africa. Rome has energy interests in Libya (including natural gas pumped in the south) and is particularly concerned about the flow of migrants landing on its shores.
The two countries have provided political and, at times, military support to rival sides in the Libyan conflict (with France providing covert military support to LNA forces in 2016), although both nominally support the UN-led diplomatic process.106 Tensions between Rome and Paris respectively their respective roadmaps for Libya's stabilization could spill over to the south and undermine stabilization efforts. Europe as a whole is motivated by the migration issue and often seems to seek the kind of partnerships it has implemented with countries like Turkey, designed to prevent refugees and migrants from reaching the continent. In Libya, this is not possible: the internationally recognized government has little implementation capacity, especially in Fezzan, where forces opposed to the Tripoli government have taken over.
Instead, it would be wiser to put greater diplomatic pressure on Libya's meddling neighbors (especially Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, whose military action and aid in support of Haftar has been most disruptive), while avoiding the temptation to pick winners in local or national conflicts.
Economic Alternatives
At the same time, Europe should give greater support to UN efforts to resolve the Libyan conflict, stabilize the national economy and create a negotiating path for armed actors aimed at creating a more integrated security sector.107. Group observed in the south, privately owned and secured farms have continued to function, even amid the current disorder, because owners have a stake in protecting them. Further studies are needed to determine whether the better solution would be privatisation, cooperative ownership structures or another form of collective organisation.
In the meantime, the EU and others should encourage and, if necessary, help the UN-recognized government to improve its agricultural sector, which would also improve its standing among the Libyan people. In April 2017, promises by executives of Libya's NOC to invest in Murzuq persuaded local guards in al-Feel, an oil field operated by Italy's ENI, to lift their blockade on production. Maintaining good relations with civil society groups is all the more important in the current atmosphere of insecurity, where a single militia leader can block production in the hope of a payoff.
This would all be a humble beginning, but the international community still has a lot to make up for in southern Libya.
About the International Crisis Group
The Status of the Status Quo at Jerusalem's Holy Esplanade, Middle East Report N°159, 30 June 2015 (also available in Arabic and Hebrew). Tunisia's elections: Old wounds, new fears, Middle East and North Africa Briefing N°44 (only available in French). Reform and Security Strategy in Tunisia, Middle East/North Africa A Report N°161, 23 July 2015 (also available in French).
Algeria and its neighbours, Middle East/North Africa Report N°164, 12 October 2015 (also available in French and Arabic). The prize: Fighting for Libya's energy wealth, Middle East/North Africa Report N°165, 3 December 2015 (also available in Arabic). The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Repair, Middle East and North Africa Report N°170, 4 November 2016 (also available in Arabic).
Algeria's South: Troubles Bellwether, Middle East and North Africa Report No. 171, 21 November 2016 (also available in Arabic and French).
Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on TK since 2014
Crisis Group Board of Trustees
