Talks between the government and the opposition have been on-and-off, always marked by a legacy of deep mutual suspicion following last year's brutal crackdown on street protests. Since then, the government has released nearly all of the remaining prisoners – a move welcomed by the opposition – and passed an amnesty law to drop charges against them. These should build on past agreements between the government and the OAS and include reform of the Supreme Electoral Court.
Introduction
It was not possible to speak to any government official despite numerous requests, so the report is based on official statements and pro-government media articles and conversations with the government-appointed Truth, Justice and Peace Commission.5. The appointment of its five components was not preceded by prior consultations with civil society or victims' representatives, according to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which submitted several recommendations to the government to guarantee its legitimacy. Graves violaciones a los derechos humanos en el marco de las protestas sociales en Nicaragua”, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, June 21, 2018, p.
Returning to the Negotiating Table
But preventing an economic free fall will largely depend on resolving the crisis in a way that meets some of the wishes of the opposition, civil society and the private sector. 13. 15 In July 2018, under the global Magnitsky Act, sanctions were imposed on Francisco Díaz, head of the National Police; Fidel Antonio Moreno Briones, Secretary of the Office of the Mayor of Managua;. 16 Article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter provides that "in the event of an unconstitutional change to the constitutional regime that seriously harms the democratic order in a member state, any member state or the Secretary General may request an immediate convening of the Permanent Council to conduct a joint assessment of the situation and make such decisions , as they see fit.
Dialogue Amid Distrust
However, the Alliance negotiating team has so far remained steadfast on core opposition demands, including the release of political prisoners, early elections and the need for international institutions to oversee the implementation of the agreements. For example, the nuncio participated in the first dialogue efforts last year and, at the height of hostilities, intervened with Nicaraguan bishops to secure the release of prisoners and prevent a potential massacre when student protesters cornered a Managua church is. 29 Rosadilla, a former Uruguayan guerrilla, was a member of the OAS delegation that approached the government in February and also worked with the government on an electoral reform plan in 2017.30 His. His announcement of a return to dialogue was preceded by a meeting between him and some prominent businessmen – though not members of the Civil Alliance – on February 16, with the participation of papal nuncio Waldemar Sommertag and Cardinal Brenes.
It also included a tailored electoral reform that benefited the FSLN by allowing a candidate to win the presidential election if he came out first with 35 percent or more of the vote in the first round and a 5 percent lead over the second round. placed candidate. 28 Crisis Group interviews, Civic Alliance member, Managua, April 5, 2019, and another Civic Alliance member, Managua, January 31, 2019. The Civic Alliance's relations with the broad opposition front, the Blue and White National Unity, are marred by mistrust.34.
The presence of leaders of older political forces in its ranks has raised concerns among the grassroots sectors, such as the so-called Articulation of Social Movements, that it will be used as an electoral tool that harnesses the energy of the civil movement to serve personally. or party ambitions.35 Organizations representing victims of last year's repression feel particularly underrepresented.36 Furthermore, Unity members across the country complain that they do not know who is coordinating actions at the national level and often receive no response from Managua .37. Crisis Group interview, member of the Blue and White National Unity Political Council, Managua, 2 April 2019. 37 Crisis Group interview, member of the Blue and White National Unity, León, 3 April 2019. which advocates overthrowing the government through street protests and creation of a transitional administration) are over-represented.
38 Crisis Group interviews, member of the political council of the Blue and White National Unity, Managua, April 2, 2019 and member of the Civic Alliance, Managua, April 5, 2019.
Progress and Pending Issues
48 On May 22, members of the Civic Alliance claimed that at least 42 people were detained in 2019 in connection with last year's uprising, and that they should be treated as political prisoners. Crisis Group interview, members of the Committee for the Liberation of Political Prisoners, Managua, April 1, 2019. 50 Crisis Group telephone interview, member of the Union of Political Prisoners, May 6, 2019; Official of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Managua, 2 April 2019; member of the Blue and White National Unity, León, April 3, 2019.
The OAS focuses on electoral issues and, together with the nuncio, already guarantees the agreement on political prisoners. At a minimum, it should contact and cooperate with the UN in the run-up to the High Commissioner's report due in September.59. According to the Civic Alliance, after reaching a deal, the government backtracked and drafted its acceptance of the proposal.
Kinondenar ti aliansa daytoy ken dadduma pay a panaglabsing iti katulagan dagiti escort iti maysa a dialogo idi Abril 23. Idi pinaruarna ti mision ti Nangato a Komisionado ti UN para kadagiti Karbengan ti Tao idi Agosto 30, inladawan ni Ortega ti UN a kas "maysa nga instrumento ti politika ti panagbuteng, kinaulbod ken bain". 58 Sapulen ti singasing ti gobierno iti punto e) “Dagiti press release manipud iti delegasion ti gobierno ti Nicaragua iti lamisaan ti negosasion,” VivaNicaragua, Mayo 6.
60 The proposals included the continued release of political prisoners in May under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross; cancellation of all legal charges against them; and the appointment of international guarantors of the civil rights agreement.
Steps Forward
Ensuring Compliance
Outside powers should also make it clear that they will lift punitive measures if the government honors its agreements. If the government completes the release of political prisoners, drops the charges against them and demonstrates its willingness to comply with the agreement on citizens' rights by June 18, they should stand ready to support the third round of negotiations and offer political and financial support to enable both sides to reach a lasting solution. International actors should also make it clear that they expect tangible results from the next round of negotiations within a reasonable time frame, but without setting tight deadlines.
A Third Round of Talks
Conclusion
After months of state efforts to silence dissent, President Ortega's decision to resume talks, likely motivated by mounting international pressure and a steep economic downturn, surprised many Nicaraguans, opposition and government supporters, and international observers. The results of the second dialogue also exceeded those of the first, especially with the agreed release of hundreds of political prisoners. However, gaps in the agreement still remain, above all the lack of international oversight for one of them, some uncertainty as to whether the government has fully complied and doubts about what will come next.
The main challenge so far has been on the side of the government, with President Ortega seemingly more interested in buying time and averting further sanctions than actually extricating his country – and his government – from the predicament. However, the release of most of the political prisoners before the June 18 deadline suggests that he is determined to negotiate a negotiated way out of the crisis. Opposition movements, for their part, need to refine their demands for the next round of talks to ensure they are realistic, draw on input from the entire opposition coalition, and seek as much public support for the dialogue as possible.
They should be prepared to impose additional sanctions if the government fails to fulfill its commitments and progress in negotiations lapses, as long as the measures taken are targeted, enjoy broad international support and are lifted when the government fulfills its promises. President Ortega may be ruthless, but he remains one of Latin America's greatest political survivors and a pragmatist who is fully aware that the campaign to oust President Maduro in Venezuela bodes ill for his own rule. His anti-imperialist rhetoric serves to close Sandinista ranks, but he has demonstrated the ability and willingness to make concessions.
He may not be interested in sweeping institutional changes, but he is aware that his resilience and Nicaragua's economy depend on maintaining domestic support and international confidence.
A Timeline of Nicaragua’s Year-long Political Crisis
The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, Latin America Report N°56, January 29, 2016 (also available in Spanish). Easy Prey: Criminal Violence and Central American Migration, Latin America Report N°57, July 28, 2016 (also available in Spanish). Colombia's Final Steps to End the War, Latin America Report No. 58, September 7, 2016 (also available in Spanish).
In the shadow of "No": Peace after Colombia's referendum, Latin America Report No. 60, 31 January 2017 (also available in Spanish). Mafia of the Poor: Gang Violence and Extortion in Central America, Latin America Report No. 62, April 6, 2017 (also available in Spanish). Colombia's armed groups fight for the spoils of peace, Latin America Report No. 63, 19 October 2017 (also available in Spanish).
Mexico's Southern Border: Security, Violence and Migration in the Trump Era, Latin America Report N°66, May 9, 2018 (also available in Spanish). Risky Business: The Duque Government's Approach to Peace in Colombia, Latin America Report N°67, June 21, 2018 (also available in Spanish). Building Peace in Mexico: Dilemmas Facing the López Obrador Government, Latin America Report N°69, October 11, 2018 (also available in Spanish).
A Road to Dialogue After Nicaragua's Crushed Uprising, Latin America Report N°72, December 19, 2018 (also available in Spanish).
Frequency and Phases of Mass Public Protests in Nicaragua, 2018-2019
About the International Crisis Group
The Crisis Group is chaired by former UN Deputy Secretary-General and Administrator of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown. Power without the People: Avoiding Venezuela's Deterioration, Latin American Conference N°36, June 19, 2017 (also available in Spanish). The Missing Peace: Colombia's New Government and the Last Guerrillas, Latin America Report N°68, July 12, 2018 (also available in Spanish).
Gold and Grief in Venezuela's Violent South Lat- in America Report N°73, 28 February 2019 (also available in Spanish). A way out of Latin America's impasse over Venezuela, Latin America Briefing N°38, 14 May 2019 (also available in Spanish). Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown Former UN Deputy Secretary-General and Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme.
Former Foreign Minister of Italy and European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid Cheryl Carolus Former South African High Commissioner to the UK and Secretary General of the African National Congress (ANC) Maria Livanos Cattaui Former Secretary General of the International Chamber of Commerce Ahmed Charai. Chairman of the Center for Liberal Strategies (Sofia); Member of the founding board of the European Council on Foreign Relations. Leader of the Labor Party and Labor Parliamentary Group; former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Jake Sullivan.
Member, Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; President, Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Peking University.
Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Latin America since 2015
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