According to Gelson Fonseca Jr. (2008), though the United States have real powerand are able to unilaterally promote any military action due to their strategic advantage, they have been experiencing defeat, especially because they were never open to work with partners to whom they would offer reciprocity to the support given. In this sense, the perception derived from analyzing American foreignpolicy in the last decades is that the country has increasingly lost its ability to project the so-called softpower, to use Joseph Nye's designation when referring to the types of power the United States may enforce. Therefore, there seems to be a gap between the ideals and the ability to implement them.
Thus, what you see is a convergence of the foreignpolicy priorities linked to domestic pol- icies that will result in milk bank initiatives. Through technical cooperation in health the country exports a public policy, in addition to its technology, which delivers internal results and attracts developing countries due to the ef- fectiveness and low cost of its solutions. At the same time that cooperation contributes to health goals, it also brings an increase of power. Regard- ing the former, this is seen in the consolidation of domestic policies, the exchange of knowledge (even if still asymmetrical), stronger institutions, and expanded intersectoral dialog, among others. Regarding the latter, as the supplier of technolo- gy to develop or adapt structures in the receiv- ing nation, it uses an approach that is unlike the traditional North-South approach, capturing softpowerand increasing nation’s prestige, the credibility and leadership ability. This modus operandi demonstrates that the governments in this period understood the situation was favor- able for softpower measures. In short, by helping partner countries implement these projects, Bra- zil exports its model and legitimizes its practices, creating new rules and institutions ruled by these values, and enhances dialog and makes room for intersectoral cooperation.
Only in part. Power is the ability to alter the behavior of others to get what you want, and there are basically three ways to do that: coercion (sticks), payments (carrots) and attraction (softpower). Niall Ferguson, a distinguished historian, described softpower as “non-traditional forces such as cultural and commercial goods,” and then dismissed it on the grounds that “it’s, well, soft.” (ForeignPolicy January 2003) Of course drinking coke or wearing a Michael Jackson shirt does not necessarily convey power. But this view confuses the resources that may produce behavior with the behavior itself – what the political philosopher Steven Lukes calls the “vehicle fallacy.” Whether the possession of power resources actually produces favorable outcomes depends upon the context. This is not unique to softpower resources. Having a larger tank army may produce military victory if a battle is fought in the desert, but not if it is fought in a swamp.
are intended to build ‘softpower’. As Nye observes, “the military can sometimes play an important role in the generation of softpower” (NYE, 2008, p. 106). However, the AFRICOM military programs don’t seem to generate softpower, since suspicions and skepticism has been raised regarding its main motives, making it harder to find partners for the implementation of the program. 75 The diminished credibility of American policy as a result of the Iraq war, as well as the incapacity of the Department of Defense in adequately explaining how the command will help African countries, aroused a fear that the U.S. was militarizing its foreignpolicy in Africa. 76 As Michelle Ruiters, a senior researcher at the Institute for Global Dialogue puts it “AFRICOM would destabilize an already fragile continent and region, which would be forced to engage with U.S. interests on military matters”. 77 China, on the other hand, at the moment does not use military pressure to achieve agreements with African countries; it uses a “softpower” policy based on flexibility, consistency and pragmatism, which in turn provides transparency, legitimacy, accountability, visibility and recognition among African countries.
Paradiplomacy practised on a permanent and structured basis by sub-national governments of the most advanced knowledge regions, or on sporadic and non- structured basis by other regions, is mainly focused on low politics areas, ranging from trade and investment, to science and technology, education, culture issues and involves the use of both formal instruments, such as international agreements or trade offices, and informal instruments. Far from being marginal areas, these are on the contrary crucial issues for the building of knowledge society and for strengthening the softpower of states. One of the key arguments put forward is that paradiplomacy is a strategic channel for the creation and consolidation of softpower, the capacity to influence others and shape their behaviour by persuasion and attraction rather than coercion. The knowledge society and the logic of knowledge networks have important consequences in terms of changes in foreignpolicyand the way in which states interact with each other and with non-state actors. In this respect it is argued paradiplomacy is an important source of innovation and somehow anticipates some of the inevitable changes to come in central governments’ external action, namely the abolition of boundaries between the domestic and the international levels, requiring an integrated approach and greater coherence and coordination between domestic policies andforeignpolicy; the implementation of a multi-actor process highly participated both in terms of formulation and implementation which is the effective way to respond to the increasing complexity of both the issues-areas and the international community; the increasing relevance of informal channels and the role of Soft Law and transnational networks in international regulation.
Brazil – as it depicts benevolent rather than suspicious Argentinians – and more inconvenient, as it suggests that ‘soft’ politics, or public diplomacy, would be ineffective as foreignpolicy instruments. Mesquita and Medeiros analyse media discourse rather than public opinion. They show a gap between Brazil’s official discourse and the media, and within the media itself. Their empirical investigation leads them to claim that, while Brazil reformed its international identity after Lula’s inauguration, national andforeign media continued to judge this in terms of their previous editorial ideology. Rather than questioning the inability of Brazilian foreignpolicy to change biases in the media, they focus on ‘the refusal [of some newspapers] to validate Brazil’s new identity’. In their narrative, the reason is not that these media outlets are more powerful than the emerging Latin American power, but that they incarnate class or national interests which clash with Brazil’s.
Entre 1950 e 1990, a foreign image policy alemã foi uma política notavelmente estável, tanto no que diz respeito aos seus objectivos, como aos instrumentos utilizados (Hülsse 2009, 293-302). Até meados da década de 1990, a Alemanha preocupa-se com a sua imagem internacional, principalmente, por razões de segurança. O objectivo central era a construção de laços de confiança com os outros atores internacionais (trustbuilding), importantes para a reabilitação da Alemanha e para assegurar relações externas pacíficas. Com essa finalidade, foram privilegiados os instrumentos clássicos de política externa cultural. Tais instrumentos incluíam o diálogo intercultural e programas linguísticos e de intercâmbio que procuravam transmitir uma visão abrangente sobre a vida política, social e cultural alemã, cujo principal embaixador é o Goethe Institut e as suas instituições espalhadas um pouco por todo o mundo.
Over the past decade, Brazil has suffered from strong competition in both Latin America and Africa, especially from China, so it is important to understand the context behind the BNDES' move to support and finance "Brazilian multinationals" (COUTINHO, 2013; FIOCCA, 2006), such as Embraer, Vale do Rio Doce, Odebrecht and Gerdau, which have the size and capabilities to become competitive on a global scale. In a 2001 report on its strategic plan for the 5-year period beginning in 2000, the bank declared these goals very candidly: it was to "[support] Brazilian firms with international competitive potential, in order to turn them into global players, whilst pursuing the on-going process of trade liberalisation" (BNDES, 2001). In a recent interview, BNDES president, Luciano Coutinho, briefly discussed this policy, arguing further that the bank was preparing to shift focus towards the pharmaceutical and information technology sectors, which he thought had most potential going forward (COUTINHO, 2013).
Thus, we can conclude that, for most countries, mark-ups present a counter-cyclical behaviour following a government spending shock. This is observed at least for seven countries in our sample in either the impact period and also considering the cummulated effects after two, five, and ten periods. Australia, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden are the exceptions in the short run. We can only find evidence of consistent pro- cyclical behaviour of mark-ups for the Netherlands and Norway. Germany also presents a similar pattern from period two onwards. Canada, Japan, and the UK also present occasionally less expected combinations. Again, the results obtained are consistent with existing theoretical endogenous mark-up models: a government spending shock, or a similar aggregate demand shock, implies a shift to the right in the demand curve and a rightward movement along the marginal-cost curve when output increases, with a smaller increase in prices than the one observed in marginal costs. 7
Both societal goals and social policy as instrument to pursue societal goals are in trouble. Concerning societal goals, values and norms, Ferge (2001; 125) notes that “the respect for basic “western” values like social integration, solidarity or distributive jus- tice is absent from home public policy. Not even lip service is paid to them. This makes it difficult to put them on the agenda of public discourse”. Societal values listed above have been de-legitimised, and not been reformulated. Policy formulation has not been driven by negotiated social or societal principles, but instead took place in a pragmatic, often rushed and ad-hoc manner. The lack of public discourse on fundamental societal principles leads to the instrumentalisation of social policy. In the Hungarian example, it could be argued that in the first waves of reforms, the conservative government (1990- 1994) instrumentalised social policy for the sake of political legitimation. That meant a status-quo-oriented approach with delayed reforms. The second, socialist-liberal coali- tion government (1994-98) instrumentalised social policy for the needs of economic policyand launched a strong neo-liberal ideological attack – in the form of a forceful moral agenda - on the welfare state and paternalism. The shock therapy in 1995 involved the most radical cutbacks, which was partly reversed by the Constitutional Court. The third, conservative government (1998-2002) was the first to distribute more wins than losses. However, social policy was mainly used by political motivation: to build up a middle-class that would then become the stable base for a united conservative party.
The interaction between imperfect competition and fiscal-policy effectiveness has deserved a fair share of attention in economic theory – see Costa and Dixon (2009) for a survey. Most theoretical models tend to associate larger mark-ups with higher fiscal policy effectiveness due to either a (short-run) pure profits multiplier mechanism or to a (long-run) entry effect that increases factor efficiency – increasing returns to entry or endogenous mark- ups. Nonetheless, there is no consensus on the topic, as preferences, technologies, heterogeneity of firms, and types of taxation are crucial for the theoretical outcomes obtained. Thus, taking the theory to the test of data is an important step in order to derive some useful policy implications, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. However, the empirical analysis of the connection between market powerand the effects of fiscal shocks is scant.
perimoderno conseguem captar a atenção pública quase toda. As expectativas implícitas e as promessas de salvação ligadas à libertação do colonialismo foram goradas. As incorporações de um futuro melhor, tanto na forma do “Partido” como do “Estado”, desestruturam-se e frustraram todas as tentativas de desenvolvimento das sociedades que conquistaram. Estas instituições trans-étnicas modernas, cozidas à pressa. Não raras vezes, produtos de guerras demoradas e destruidoras, e sem profundidade histórica, são parcialmente baseadas numa mimikry da administração colonial. As condições macropolíticas e macroeconómicas, orquestradas historicamente pela organizações de Bretton Woods, impostas por uma panóplia de “atores”, armadas com hard power e softpower e, em parte, criadas no local pelo “complexo da cooperação para o desenvolvimento,” que surge como vanguarda da expansão do modelo industrial mundial, levaram a processos de autodestruição assistida de muitas sociedades agrárias africanas que viram desaparecer uma parte substancial da sua produtividade e, não menos importante, assistiram a uma redução significativa da capacidade de socialização das suas futuras gerações. A desacreditação da cooperação internacional parece quase total. A estratégia de desenvolvimento, embora ainda mantida ao nível do discurso e na propaganda (“objetivos do milénio”, etc.), mudou. Foi substituída na realidade, a nível internacional, por
According to Aynne Kokas (2017), there has been a remarkable increase in Chinese censors’ ability to shape co-productions with Hollywood. In “Iron Man 3” (2013), two versions of the movie were produced, one for Asia with pro-China elements (for example, beverages from the Yili brand and acupuncture), which are removed in the North-American version, in order to avoid viewers’ estrangement. In the movie “Transformers: Age of Extinction” (2014), produced by Paramount with the help from Jiaflix Enterprises and China Movie Channel (owned by CCTV), the script was tempered in order to respect Chinese censors. In the movie “Pixels” (2015), there were scenes where aliens exploded the Great Wall of China, which were preemptively deleted by Sony (Thussu 2018). For Kokas (2017), Hollywood has learned not to cast Chinese individuals as villains, nor call too much attention to sensitive issues, such as Tibet. Robert Daly, director of the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States at the Wilson Center in Washington DC, also mentioned the fact that “there have been no films in recent years that depict the Chinese Communist Party or mainland Chinese characters in a critical light. […] Instead, China has saved the world in ‘2012’ and ‘The Martian’.” 2 Kokas has highlighted that granting control of
A trend that has deserved much attention in international relations since 1990, globalization manifests itself in two ways: access to markets and expansion of internal businesses abroad and of external businesses into the internal domain. Europe and the United States have benefited from globalization and thereby increased their systemic competitiveness since the end of the Cold War. Brazil’s objective in this regard is to have strong corporations to compete on a global scale, with the State’s logistic support and the financial support of national institutions, such as the National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) and the Bank of Brazil. If Cardoso privatized [enterprises], Lula conglomerated [them]. The President’s finger is behind the formation of the great national conglomerates. Despite this earlier achievement, Brazil has a long way to go before attaining the density of developed countries, whose multinationals co-opt their own governments, which then form coalitions and use pressure to influence decisions at multilateral organizations, such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank, and for the signing of bilateral treaties, and ultimately to obtain internal and intergovernmental rules in their own favor.
China. Some argued for an international order determined chiefly by cooperation between the two governments, what is called a “G-2” world order for the 21 st century. 3 In practice, however, Sino-American relations remain more complicated and conflicted than recent official discourse and arguments by commentators in favor of a Sino- American international condominium would lead us to expect. A review of the many decades on Sino-American relations shows enormous changes over time, with patterns of confrontation, conflict, and suspicion much more prevalent than patterns of accommodation and cooperation. The past four decades have featured sometimes remarkable improvements in relations as leaders on both sides have pursued practical benefits through pragmatic means. That the base of cooperation is often incomplete, thin, and dependent on changeable circumstances at home and abroad shows as the societies and governments more often than not demonstrate salient differences over a variety of critical issues involving security, values, and economics. If one gets below the surface of recent positive official discussion, a review of developments and trends shows officials, elites, and public opinion on both sides demonstrating suspicion and wariness of the other country and its possible negative intentions or implications affecting Sino-American relations. 4
held in 2007, proposed to confer on Brazil the status of a “strategic partner”, a proposal that was endorsed by the European Parliament. In the European view, Brazil, as a key country in the region, is an indispensable ally in meeting global challenges related to climate change, human rights, intellectual property, industrial policy, and other economic and social issues. The European decision was based on specific data and on expectations: Brazil accounts for approximately 80 percent of Mercosur’s GDP; while the European Union accounts for 22 percent of the Brazilian foreign trade, it directs only 1.8 percent of its foreign trade to Brazil. European investments in Brazil are significant, but business would increase should there be a better regulatory framework and lower customs duties – if adopted, these measures would facilitate European Union’s relations with South America. This concession to Brazil signals a change in the European bloc’s international strategy; since its formation, the bloc had assigned priority to inter-bloc relations, assuming that it would export its model of integration that yielded recognized benefits. Brazil became European Union’s eighth strategic partner, after the United States, Japan, Canada, India, Russia, China, and South Africa. The programming of the joint cooperation plan began promptly and has continued at ministerial meetings and at a series of Brazil-European Union summits held since then.
Limitations to the maximum resonant frequency achievable in the real circuit by several factors include device switching characteristics, thermal constraints, and availability of the passive components . To modulate the inverter for the prototype resonant DC link inverter, a synchronized PWM scheme is used. In this scheme the PWM signals are sampled at the resonant frequency and then synchronized to the zero crossing of the bus voltage. For example, hysteresis bang-bang control is used in PWM inverters for current control within the inverter; however RDCLI uses zero hysteresis bang-bang control; if switches are switched only when the voltage/current is zero and not necessarily when bang-bang controller acts. In order to preserve the well-defined switching pattern of the PWM signals, simulations show that a resonant frequency of about 5 times of the PWM switching frequency is adequate. A resonant frequency of 25-40 kHz is chosen for the design of the link components, considering a maximum PWM switching frequency of 5-8 kHz. If the resonant impedance is known, considering the resonant frequency, the values of the resonant components can be determined.
In contrast, however, another study in the Netherlands questions the discourse that associates the need to increase investment in high competition sports to the growth of national pride and sense of national identification. Based on a public consultation conducted in the country in the summer of 2008, the effects on the Dutch people's national pride were measured from the sports results in sporting events and major events of that year: Euro 2008 (football), the Beijing Olympic Games, Tour de France (cycling) and Wimbledon (tennis). There were 300 respondents for each measurement (12 in total) in the period between May and October 2008. The authors concluded that there is no empirical evidence to demonstrate the existence of an intrinsic relationship between sporting success and the importance played by sport in a country when it comes to national pride, thus refuting the argument of those who advocate an increase in public investment in sport in order to win medals, as a mechanism of elevation of the national pride (van Hilvoorde, Elling, & Stokvis, 2010).
The Brazilian community is also a group present in Suriname and Guyana, as well as Brazilian miners. In Suriname, the association made by Surinamese to Brazilians is directly connected to gold mining, criminality in the mining areas and sex. This perception has fu- eled a threatening speech in relation to Brazilians and recently generated violent clashes. In Guyana, in turn, the presence of the Brazilian community is also significant and linked mainly to mining. With little attachment for seasonal migration, there is a low in- tegration of Brazilians in the country. However, unlike what is found in French Guiana and Suriname, there is no evidence of politicization of Brazilians in Guyana.
A significant factor that stands-in with the external factors is the internal division of power between political elite and oligarchs in Ukraine. Goals of the business elite directly influence the decision-making process in the government. Simultaneously, the political elite receives incentives from the oligarchic lobbyists to maintain power. The application of the Machiavellian statecraft brings us to the prime sources of power, “the men you’ve armed will be under an obligation to you” (Machiavelli, Chapter 20). We have delimited themes of power from the traditional military to the intangible forms of power. Therefore, we can consider oligarchs that “arm” Ukrainian political leaders with financial support and promotion seize the opportunity to settle certain vectors of internal and external policies to be beneficial for their personal benefits. “You cannot in good faith give the nobles what they want without doing harm to other; but you can with the people”, assured Machiavelli (Chapter 9) proving that a limited round of people, who accumulate benefits, would act in egoistic purposes only. The power that comes with “the support of the wealthy nobles” leads to weak state with the fate of collapse.