This paper attempts to establish the relation between neighbor’s decision of breaking-up on own municipality’s valuation, taking into consideration economic conditions that influence the median voter’s decision regarding fiscal decentralization with homogeneous individuals. The benefits of decentralization come from the increase in the per-capita intergovernmental transfers after the division while the cost is the scale loss of the capital in the publicgoodsprovision. The final effect determines whether there is an efficiency gain or loss in the production function of the public good. Assuming that the median voter is not fully informed about the amount of resources received by the transfers, he uses the decision taken by his counterpart’s neighbor municipalities to account for his voting.
Our main results are as follows: when local governments only use a head tax we are in the presence of a pure negative externality, leading to a situation of overcommuting of agents, but being the best decentralized alternative if the transportation cost or the productivity asymmetry are high. The introduction of a toll distorts the number of interjurisdic- tional commuters, resulting in undercommuting of agents since the local government of the high productivity jurisdiction uses it both for reduc- ing congestion and collecting revenue. Nevertheless, the toll is the ﬁscal mechanism that presents higher overall utility in a decentralized equilib- rium if the transportation cost is low and the productivity asymmetry is mild. Furthermore, we show that it is possible to replicate the ﬁrst best by allocating the decision of the toll amount to a benevolent cen- tral government while leaving the decision regarding the publicgoodsprovision to the local governments. Finally, the introduction of wage taxes, which can be used by both local governments, may lead to under or overcommuting, being the best decentralized equilibrium if both the transportation cost and the productivity asymmetry are low.
The second aspect is the awareness that a solution that gives more powers to the supranational tier entails a political and economic incongruity. Economically speaking, centralisation clashes against the principle of assigning publicgoods’ provision to the lowest government tier, especially when it is easy to find out the territorial delimitation of benefits. More importantly, centralisation runs against subsidiarity, one building block of European integration. To envisage the EU budget increasingly funding publicgoods goes against the belief that supranational bureaucrats are far away from places where problems are tangible and affect peoples’ daily life. Supranational bureaucrats’ increasing interference paves the way for unreasonable solutions, since some decisions regarding the provision of publicgoods might involve a myopic assessment of local populations’ needs.
However, accountability systems take many forms. One promising model is that of bottom-up monitoring, in which citizens receive information about the shortcomings of a given project so they can evaluate and pressure underperforming public officials (Kosack and Fung 2014; Molina et al. 2016; Raffler et al. 2018). Proponents argue that bottom-up accountability is effective because: 1) constituents have first-hand information about the outcomes of local policies; 2) citizens have incentives to attack corruption that directly affects themselves; 3) policy-makers are sensitive to social punishment from their own communities (Serra 2011, 570). In this regard, bottom-up accountability offers a potential solution to the principal-agent dilemma in public service by aligning the interests of state officials with those of the constituency they serve (Barro 1973; Raffler et al. 2018, 2).
In order to obtain some preliminary idea of what situa- tions people may spontaneously associate with the pub- lic goods game, we conducted a classroom survey to an introductory discrete mathematics class at a Swedish uni- versity. The survey presented the publicgoods game in abstract terms and asked respondents to state any real-life situation they thought the game reminded them of. The response format was free. Common responses included collaborative situations such as teamwork and also vari- ous transactions such as investments, gambling, and pay- ing taxes. We therefore judged this game to be a good can- didate for exhibiting between-individual effects on behav- ior of spontaneous frame selection, thus allowing compar- ison with label framing effects. To enable distinct labels we chose a single collaborative situation (teamwork) and a single transaction (paying taxes) from the list of common reponses in the pilot survey. Thus, the specific aim was to study the effects of spontaneous associations to team- work and paying taxes and compare them with the effects of labels ("The Teamwork Game" and "The Paying Taxes Game", respectively).
From table 7, the researcher wants to know if there is existence of politics in provision of public services in arusha city council. And the researcher found out that there is politics in delivering of public services according to the respondents which is 107(83.6%), while 21(16.4%) said it does not exist completely. And those who responded yes said the impact of politics can be proved through the distribution of public services where the best services are established where the leader of the leading party comes from. Data from the interviewed respondents shows that 13(59.1%) responded that there is no any political influence but is equally distributed for the benefit of the public citizens and country in general while 9(40.9%) of the respondents responded that there is political influence in the provision of public services that is why many parts of the city from where the leaders such as councilors are from opposition the services are very limited compared to the place where there is a ruling party.
An implicit assumption underpins basic models of the evolution of cooperation, mutualism and altruism: The benefits (or pay- offs) of cooperation and defection are defined by the current frequency or distribution of cooperators. In social dilemmas involving durable publicgoods (group resources that can persist in the environment–ubiquitous from microbes to humans) this assumption is violated. Here, we examine the consequences of relaxing this assumption, allowing pay-offs to depend on both current and past numbers of cooperators. We explicitly trace the dynamic of a public good created by cooperators, and define pay-offs in terms of the current public good. By raising the importance of cooperative history in determining the current fate of cooperators, durable publicgoods cause novel dynamics (e.g., transient increases in cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemmas, oscillations in Snowdrift Games, or shifts in invasion thresholds in Stag-hunt Games), while changes in durability can transform one game into another, by moving invasion thresholds for cooperation or conditions for coexistence with defectors. This enlarged view challenges our understanding of social cheats. For instance, groups of cooperators can do worse than groups of defectors, if they inherit fewer publicgoods, while a rise in defectors no longer entails a loss of social benefits, at least not in the present moment (as highlighted by concerns over environmental lags). Wherever durable publicgoods have yet to reach a steady state (for instance due to external perturbations), the history of cooperation will define the ongoing dynamics of cooperators.
China—the world’s largest agricultural producer—offers a stark contrast in government policy to that implemented by New Zealand described in Box 2. The country’s economy is heavily controlled by centralised government and relatively free from the political influence wielded by farmers lobbies. Government can therefore act largely in its own self-interest, which may align more often with the public good. This has allowed the Chi- nese government to implement environmental policies on scales that would be virtually impossible elsewhere in the world. The Grain to Green Project is one example, having converted nearly 9.1 million hectares of cropland into forest whilst incentivising farmers to participate with grain and cash subsidies . This permanent land retirement scheme has reduced soil erosion and increased carbon sequestration at landscape scales . China is also adopting a stricter approach to large industrial agriculture. In 2014, the country’s top legislature revised the national environmental protection law for the first time in 25 years. The revisions included harsher penalties to deter companies from accepting fines rather than investing in pollution control . Whether enforcement fol- low suits remains to be seen.
We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant justiﬁcation bias, that is, respondents bias their answers to the attitudinal questions when attempting to justify a “Not Pay” response to the CV question. It may be the case that a non protester does not wish to look guilty in the eyes of other people for not aﬀording to pay or not valuing the environment highly enough, and, subsequently, tries to justify his negative CV response by looking like a protestor when answering the attitudinal questions. If this justiﬁcation bias is ignored in the model, some non protester respondents are wrongly classiﬁed as protesters, and vice versa, severely bias ing both the estimate of the social cost and the economic value of the public good with implications for policy purposes. Therefore, we may conclude that psychological factors should not be ignored in CV estimation.
The paper deals with the legal rules for the provision of health services by third parties, explaining the forms of contract by the government through contracts or arrangements, distinguishing the contracting work plan, and analyzing the impact of federal law 13,019 / 14 that deals with the regulatory framework of civil society organizations. The analysis of assumptions include the possibility of provision of health services by third parties, the social nature of realizing the right to health and the participation of society in the control and organization of the Unified Health System - SUS. The research problem is what kind of impact that federal law 13,019 / 14 will have on the role of society in its relation to the SUS. Responding to this issue, despite the positive aspects of the law on increasing social SUS controls, society will not be starring in the effectiveness of the right to health as a direct provider of health services by civil society organizations, on the contrary, the provision of health services will have a more business character.
In a third approach, natural resources could be considered as a source of fiscal revenue windfalls to local communities. These windfalls could translate into more and better local infrastructure and provision of publicgoods, depending on the levels of political responsiveness -which requires good institutions and political competition- and local technical capacities. Empirical studies in this line find some support for this logic. Caselli and Michaels (2013) found, from data of Brazilian municipalities, that the increment of fiscal oil-based revenues generated spending increases, but the improvements in public-service provision appear small compared to them, which suggest that incumbents diverted funds. Monteiro and Ferraz (2010) also used data of Brazilian municipalities, and found that oil windfalls generated no significant effects on education or health supply, but increased public employment; the authors also showed that elections, media presence and constraints on executive were mechanisms that restrained the misuse of oil rents.
he historical process of managing and preventing communicable diseases, particularly those that are prone to cause epidemics and pandemics, has shown that they do not respect political and geographical borders of municipalities, states and countries. In this context, it is unlikely that any sole country can take isolated measures that can be considered fully protective, as contemporary dynamics involves the constant low of goods and persons, leading to the natural rupture of protection bubbles. hus, the global trend indicates cooperation among people as a solution and the need for evidence- based consensus and respect for the principles of ethical social coexistence.
Local and regional conferences are an essen- tial component of bottom-up planning because they are held across the entire country, paving the way for the National Health Conference. Howev- er, we cannot deny that their executive format does not always capture regional needs to inform the formulation of national guidelines. National health conferences should strengthen the articu- lation of locally resolvable regional health needs into the national arena, but in a more compre- hensive manner, as standards, since national pol- icy makers do have a clear understanding local policy issues. Public participation is imperative for an effective SUS and health conferences and health councils are important mechanisms for facilitating public participation in health policy formulation and implementation.
Our second major contribution was applying an explanation of individual decision making to publicgoods dilemmas based on current research in collective rationality or team-based rea- soning, which is reasoning about group preferences in addition to individual preferences. We implemented this theoretical perspective in terms of Van Lange’s integrative model where indi- viduals attend to and are motivated by a combination of self-interest, interest for others, and equality for all. Van Lange has shown that this model appropriately represents the behaviors and expectations of prosocial individuals  and is a sufficient explanation for collective ra- tionality . Applying this model to publicgoods dilemmas of different sizes, we find that the inclusion of an equality term leads to novel predictions as well as dynamic decision making. Not only are predictions based on this model consistent with our results, but the agent-based simulation further confirms that the outcomes and processes from the model to the data are coherent. Using agent based modeling rooted in a theoretical basis and with an empirical benchmark can enhance our understanding of an issue , in this case connecting people’s motivations with their individual and collective action, and interactions, within publicgoods dilemmas.
In fourth place, we must highlight the tendency to a growing State intervention in the economy within very long time horizons, which is besides intimately connected with the civilizing dynamics expressed in the very processes of economic growth. This one, as it has been often said but seldom remarked, produces multiple needs that only the very process is in conditions to satisfy, if only incompletely. That fact tends to imply the systematic redefinition of what is private and public matter. Universal health is something that doesn’t affect me negatively, at the most positively, but the fact is that an increasingly intrusive State (imposing universal vaccination programs, for instance) understandably tends to be more and more demanding in fiscal terms. This is admittedly a somewhat extreme case, but also an unavoidable one, of systematic redefinition of limits of public and private spheres.
This paper discusses issues of public space, citizenship, gender, and race in the light of public relocation of responsibility for social services and care to private com- munities due to the elimination, privatization or devolve- ment of such services by state restructuring and welfare reform. The presented case studies are taken from a larger study of community gardens in Buffalo, NY. This mixed methods study found connections between com- munity organizations’ commitment to community gar- dening and their involvement in the provision of social, youth, and emergency services, including after school programs, tutoring, refugee services, and winter coat drives. The paper concludes that the everyday lives of Buffalo’s residents within the social, political and eco- nomic conditions cannot be separated from the effects of larger structural processes, such as deindustrialization, privatization, and state restructuring.
ﬂexible. The main channel is an expectational one, which justiﬁes the announcements made by ﬁscal policy authorities. More speciﬁcally, depending on the realization of fundamentals, a producer may under-invest in equilibrium, afraid that others might not invest much (which would imply a low demand and thus a low price for her variety). Owing to a technology to produce publicgoods that are substitute to private sector goods, government can improve agents expectations about their relative price by implementing an expansionary ﬁscal policy. Such a policy tells ﬁrms the demand for their goods will increase. Moreover, ﬁrms also expect that other ﬁrms will expect more demand. Furthermore, ﬁrms have expectations about other ﬁrms’ expectations about their increase in demand and so on. We dub this higher-order expectational demand channel (expectations about others’ actions and expectations about others’ expectations about others’ actions and so on ) the “conﬁdence channel”.
The emergence of cooperation among selfish individuals is an intensively studied problem [1,2]. Traditionally, the problem of cooperation is investigated by means of the game theoretical models of the prisoner’s dilemma for pairwise interactions, and more generally publicgoods game for groups of interacting individuals. In particular, the publicgoods game is abundant in human society, e.g., protecting the global climate and avoiding overfishing of the oceans [3–6]. In the classical publicgoods game (PGG), individuals engage in multiplayer interactions and decide simultaneously whether to contribute (cooperate) or not (defect) to a common pool. Then the accumulated contributions by cooperators are multiplied by a factor large than one, i.e., the so-called multiplication factor, and finally the resulting assets are shared equally among all group members irrespective of their initial decision. From the perspective of each individual, defection is clearly the rational decision to make as it yields the highest income compared to other members. Thus, selfish individuals should decline to contribute and attempt to free ride on the other players’ contributions. However, if nobody decides to invest, the group fails to harvest the benefits of a collective investment, which