Borderline cases

evidence is. Apparently, there is more than one plausible way of responding to high-order evidence, and the adequate way might vary according to the situation’s specifics.

This renders Pilot a somewhat exotic case of akrasia, because when we think of practical akrasia, there isn’t more than one plausible way of responding to whatever it is that is causing the disruption of coherence in action. Think of classical cases of practical akrasia, such as the cases of people giving in to temptation, like Austin’s (1979) example of the person who couldn’t help picking one more piece of chocolate cake, in spite of knowing that she was not supposed to. The remarkable difference between this and Pilot is that it looks as though Pilot could be purposefully compromising, whereas the person in the chocolate cake example is simply losing control. She can’t help it. The desire for the extra piece of cake overtakes her.

requires and deserves respect and cooperation while the woman is to be belittled, avoided (Rorty 1983: 178).

Here we have a person who sees himself as committed to a general non-sexist principle. He has a resolution, or a general understanding of things (say, a judgment), according to which women are not inferior to men and should not be treated as inferior. Apparently, this commitment is strong enough for him to avoid calling women

“broads” or “chicks”, but not strong enough for him to avoid describing a woman’s imaginative conduct as “manipulative”. So the mismatch here is between the meaning of the things he says and the meaning of his resolution, or his overall understanding (as opposed to a mismatch between beliefs and judgment, like in the previous cases). There is a clear epistemic dimension to this mismatch, which lies in the fact that it brings epistemic injustice about, hence it being deemed a case of epistemic akrasia (as opposed to one of practical akrasia).

From all alleged cases of epistemic akrasia presented so far, this is the one I find the most difficult to make sense of, even though the attitude it depicts is remarkably unexceptional. I find it difficult to make sense of this as a case that belongs to the same general category as the previous ones, or that is more similar to them than dissimilar.

For one thing, differently from the other cases, it doesn’t look as though the person here knows that he is doing something he shouldn’t be doing. He might as well not be aware of the abovementioned mismatch at all. This sometimes happens to us – we do things whose consequences we didn’t fully understand in the moment of action. A person who is currently on a diet, trying to lose weight, might chose to have a big bowl of caesar salad for lunch instead of a sandwich, not knowing that the former has three times more calories than the latter. This person is not aware of the inadequacy of her current action to her resolution. It’s not clear that the closeted sexist from Rorty’s example is not one of those. He might simply not know that by describing a particular women’s creative conduct as manipulative he is wounding his own non-sexist principle.

What’s more, there seems to be plausible alternative explanations for what is going on in the closeted sexist case, that need not involve the concept of akrasia at all. One of them is that it is a simple and plain case of ignorance, like I’ve just suggested by means of the caesar salad analogy. Another one is: maybe the case

could be accounted for in terms of implicit cognitive bias. People under implicit cognitive bias haphazardly say things they didn’t mean; words simply escape their mouth in a non-reflexive way. And they might not know that their words mean what they in fact mean, that is, they might not be aware that they are coming out as prejudiced, for instance. If so, then they could hardly be said to know that they’re doing something they shouldn’t be doing. But in all the other cases presented so far, it is easier, or at least less strange, to accept that the person knows that something is odd in the way she is reasoning, and this is what their akrasia is all about: the person knows about the mismatch, but knowing doesn’t suffice to elicit change.

Also, it is not strictly speaking correct to say that people under implicit cognitive bias do what they do, or say what they say, deliberately. It is not as if they deliberately chose to act in a way that goes against their general commitments, or their better judgment, like typical akratic agents (practical akrasia) and agents in the other examples do. A typical akratic agent does a in circumstances under which it was completely possible for him to have done b instead. But it’s not clear that the same could be said of the agent in Closeted Sexist.

Another alternative explanation for what is going wrong with Closeted Sexist that doesn’t involve the idea of akrasia could be that this is a case of self-deception.

According to Mele (2001) when we are self-deceived, we believe something because we want it to be true, even though it is false. So maybe the person in Closeted Sexist wants to preserve his self-image as a non-sexist person. That is, he wants it to be true that he is not a sexist, and that’s why he believes that he is committed to gender-equality principles, whereas in fact he is not. While I acknowledge that there might be substantial overlap between self-deception and akrasia¹¹, it looks as though we can make sense of Closeted Sexist as a simple and plain instance of self-deception instead of akrasia, which leaves us to wonder where the line should be drawn between these, as well as other, neighbouring concepts.

Be that as it may, one of the reasons Rorty might have had to term Closeted Sexist an example of epistemic akrasia is the fact that in this case there is a mismatch between the way the person thinks that he should think, that is, his

non-11 Mele (1986: 221-222) attempts at qualifying this difference by saying that, for self-deception, one’s belief that p must be false; and non-epistemic considerations in favour of holding or not holding p must be irrelevant to the charge of self-deception. In contrast, one may akratically endorse a proposition p that is true, and non-epistemic considerations (such as preferences and habits) might be quite relevant to a charge of akrasia.

sexist resolution; and the way he (apparently, based on what he says) actually thinks;

even though this might be a momentary mismatch, only. Maybe this person is in the middle of the process of becoming non-sexist. If so, then it is likely that he already knows what to do, or what would be right for him to do, but still isn’t capable of doing it thoroughly. That’s because the process of becoming a non-sexist person takes time. From the moment he formed the resolution to honour the principles of gender equality to the moment he is a person that conducts himself in full accordance with those principles there is a time gap. It’s the gap of education, or self-improvement, so to speak. Meanwhile, he is prone to fall into old patterns, sometimes. At those times, the mismatch comes to surface. It’s a mismatch between his better judgment and his actual conduct.

Another alleged case of epistemic akrasia that could be termed borderline is Heil’s psychoanalytic patient, which is similar to Closeted Sexist to some extent.

PSYCHOANALYTIC PATIENT

The incontinent believer is typified by the psychoanalytic patient who has acquired what might be termed an intellectual grasp of his plight, but whose outlook evidently remains unaffected. Such a person has failed somehow to integrate his appreciation of certain facts into his overall psychological state. He continues to harbour beliefs, desires and fears that he recognizes to be at odds with his better epistemic judgment (Heil 1984: 69).

Here we don’t know exactly what plight the agent is involved with (but provided that he is a psychoanalytic patient, I’m guessing it could be something of the sorts of

“do I actually resent my mom?”, “am I actually bisexual?” or “what happenings from my childhood shaped me into who I am?”). Be that as it may, we have the following situation: some information has just been disclosed for the patient that is of relevance for the prospects of him making sense of his plight. However, the process by means of which this new information is incorporated into his “chart” of everything that is relevant for that specific end does not self-complete immediately. Rather, like in Closeted Sexist, it takes time. This is the process by means of which the newly acquired information would result in some “amendments” within that chart (for instance, the dissolution of certain fears, the intensification of certain desires, the dismantling of certain beliefs, etc). Whilst this process is not completed, some things in the patient’s life remain as if that information hasn’t ever been assessed, hence the

mismatch between his current understanding of things and the newly acquired information.

This example I find difficult to make sense of too, because, like in Closeted Sexist, I’m under the impression that, in real life cases that resemble this tale, we might be talking about information that is not held consciously; and also that the patient does not have control over the process by means of which the newly acquired information would be incorporated. So it is not as though the patient is deliberately refraining to incorporate, or deliberately harbouring her old beliefs, desires, fears, etc.

In other words: he might not be aware of the mismatch and, therefore, not be able to undo it.

Setting this issue aside, it is interesting to take notice of the fact that timing plays an important role in the case having been described by Heil as a case of akrasia. If the process of incorporation (of the new information to the person’s inner

“chart” of everything that is relevant for her quest) had begun and ended quickly, or immediately, there would be no “space”, so to speak, for the information to be held against the agent’s overall judgment. The same holds true of Closeted Sexist: if self-improvement was a process that began and ended quickly, or instantly, it wouldn’t be possible for her to fall into the lapses of speech discussed.