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on more pragmatic achievements, such as surprise, resource depletion, target misleading, security, and learning [156,29]. In additional, aDeception storycan be designed to achieve other goals that are context dependent. In the military context, for example, save lives and resources, and show relative superiority can be goals of the deception operations [248]. In cyber space, the use of deception techniques may be used to detect previously unknown attacks that other defensive tools may miss [161].
Channels. Channelsrepresent specific ways to reach the target [142]. Different types of Channels can be used according to the type of conflict deception is applied. Typically, a channel used for deceiving brings together intelligence collection capabilities, such as human interaction, imagery, and open sources. Examples of deception channels include traditional media (e.g., newspapers, radio and TV) internet based media (e.g., social media sites and email), military communications (e.g., radio, orders and radars), and diplomacy (e.g., negotiations and official statements). The discrete piece of information carried by a channel is referred as a signal. Deception involves the manufacturing of false signals that can be fed into those Channels. The Target receives the signals and puts them together to form the intended (false) picture. The greater the reliance the target places on deceptive channels, the greater his vulnerability to deception.
Target feedback. The deceiver assesses the deception by receiving feedback on the effects of the deception. This feedback is typically analyzed by observing the actions performed by the target, delays on performing some action, or even the absence of action within a timeframe. If the signals are transmitted through the deception channels but the target does not receive them or does not interpret them as expected, then the deception fails.
To understand how deception affects the target, it is important for the Deceiver to un-derstand how decisions can be made by the Target. As previously presented in Section 2.2, decisions can be strongly influenced by different types of biases. Thus, two decision-makers may observe and analyze the same set of signals and reach different conclusions with different actions.
2.3.2 Deception, war and conflicts
The intuitive use of artifices in the military field has been fundamental for the analyti-cal study of deception as a discipline. Although narratives of military deception (a.k.a.
stratagem) date back to ancient times with seminal writings of Sun Tzu and Sextus Fron-tinus, its formal analysis did not occur until after World War II [30,144]. Many military documents describing war field experiences remained classified for years in order to pre-serve sensitive information of the strategies used. From 70s and on, these documents began to become public and the importance of the deception in military operations came to light. Examples can be found in texts likeThe Man who never was[249]),The Double Cross System [234], andFortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign [164]. Deception in
military operations constitutes the basis for the conceptual phase of strategic deception, where deception models and techniques were proposed. Also, during the mid 70’s, stud-ies correlating deception with other disciplines emerged, spotting perspectives of social science on deception, cognitive factors in deception and counterdeception, deception within communication theory, and deception as a theoretic game [165,166].
The advantage of surprising and confusing adversaries is evident, making deception a key strategy in warfare [108, 141, 152]. While the circumstances necessary to gain advantage over the enemy may vary, war strategies are created to increase asymmetry, in which advantageous situations are reached by effective actions on the battlefield. Military strategies are thought to create superiority over the enemy by making tactic and opera-tional contingent faster, stronger, better prepared, better supplied, well positioned, etc..
Deception adds the possibility of increasing asymmetry by manipulating the enemies’
perception to reduce their effectiveness [92]. Consequently, the enemy may be compelled to misallocate resources, attack on a time erroneously thought as favorable for themselves, and place or even avoid actions at all.
An example of the use of deception in contemporary warfare is observed during the Persian Gulf, where Iraqi’s commanders were successfully deceived [321].In 1990–1991, during the desert storm military mission, the use of operational security (OPSEC) and deception were applied to shape the beliefs of the adversary and achieve surprise. The OPSEC and deception efforts in combination were used to convince Saddam Hussein of an intent to conduct a main offensive using ground and amphibious resources into central Kuwait. The intention was to dismiss real indicators of the true coalition that aimed at swinging west of the Iraqi defenses in Kuwait while attacking the Iraqi itself. Deception measures included broadcasting tank noises over loudspeakers and deploying dummy tanks and artillery pieces as well as simulated HQ radio traffic to fake the electronic sig-natures of old unit locations. The operational deception plan succeeded mainly because it capitalized on Iraqi preconceptions while reducing the ambiguity in the mind of the Iraqis, i.e raising the belief of Iraqi’s commanders. Also, the ability to limit information flow into Iraq, proper sequencing to maintain the deception well into the campaign, and near perfect feedback on Iraqi reactions were key contributing reasons for success.
2.3.3 Principles and maxims of deception
Through the years a number of theories and models of deception have been discussed to construct the principles that govern deception in general (we discuss theories and models of deception in Section 2.4). A principle corresponds to a basic truth that explains or controls how something happens or works [284]. Bennett and Waltz suggest that these principles are related to how the target of deception acquires, registers, processes, and ultimately perceives data and information about the world [31]. They consider that de-ception is governed by four basic principles: truth, denial, deceit, misdirection. These principles are discussed next.
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Truth.The first principle, truth, considers that deception works within the context of honesty [243]. In essence, the truth principle is consistent with the idea that deception works because it is an exception within a world that is mostly non-deceptive. Framing this principle into the context of strategic deception, making accurate information timely available to the target is quite relevant for deception to succeed. Also, the more one has a reputation for honesty, the easier his lie would be believed.
Denial.The denial principle refers to block the target’s access to true data and accurate information. In strategic deception, the term denial is referred to using terms such as security, secrecy, cover, dissimulation, masking, and passive deception. Denial protects the deceiver’s real capabilities and intentions and creates the possibility to manipulate the target’s perceptions. As showed in Section2.2, cognitive vulnerabilities can be exploited by preventing the target to gain knowledge that is relevant and valuable to his needs and believes to be true. Denial is exemplified in several deception strategies in nature, magic stage, and military arena [31]. For example, during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, American intelligence was unaware that the Japanese naval doctrine had changed from cautious to aggressive when the Japanese employed up to a third of their carrier fleet in a single operation [297].
Deceit.The term deceit refers to the act of lying. Therefore, all deception requires simula-tion, i.e., a way of showing false characteristics (e.g., mimicking appearance) or behavior (e.g., sending disinformation). Note that this requirement is more restricted when com-pared to the concept in philosophy (Section2.1.1) that considers one can deceive without lying. Nevertheless, the deceit is expressed in the context of strategic deception, where it plays a key role [91].
Misdirection.Misdirection is the act of drawing the target’s attention to a course of ac-tion that can be exploited to his disadvantage. It is achieved by using techniques that clearly and unambiguously transmit a false signal to deflect the targets’ mind away from real assets and activities [137]. It is a fundamental principle used in several interplays, such as sports (e.g., eye fakes in football), entertainment (e.g., magic and poker), and, of course, military operations.
In additional to truth, denial, deceit and misdirection, Almeshekah [10] suggests that confusion is an equally important principle observed in many operations. The confusion principle is described as follows.
Confusion. Confusion seeks to degrade or paralyze the target’s perceptual capabilities through voluminous background noise, over-saturation, unpredictability, and the need for haste [137]. Confusing methods often interfere with both acquisition and identifica-tion of informaidentifica-tion by presenting the truth along with several plausible deceits. Dazzling
patterns are a representative example of confusing effect. These patterns are used, for example, to protect battleships by painting them with large-scale, high-contrast, and irregular patterns, causing adversaries confused to estimate range, speed, and heading of the vessels [208].
2.3.4 Maxims and rules for successful deception
In additional to the principles that govern deception operations, several hypotheses (max-ims) relevant to deception and surprise have been described [236]. These hypotheses summarize diverse information about deception, misperception, and cognitive biases into a unified body of knowledge containing ten maxims widely accepted by the research community. Although these maxims do not really represent a formal model of decep-tion, they illustrate a number of common deception concepts that appear in other models throughout the literature. The deception maxims are described as follows.
Magruder’s principles – the exploitation of perceptions.It is generally easier to induce an opponent to maintain a preexisting belief than to change it or create a new one.
Limitations of human information processing. Human information processing capabil-ities are limited and can be exploited in the design of deception mechanisms. Intuitive probabilistic judgments often show substantial biases. Equally, subjective standards for analyzing the adequacy of evidence are poor and sometimes ill-defined.
Multiple forms of surprise (cry-wolf syndrome). Surprise should be pursued in every possible and feasible dimension (e.g., location, strength, intention, style, timing, etc.). A particular variant of susceptibility to conditioning using the timing dimension (cry-wolf syndrome) is that after a seeming threat appears again and again, it tends to be ignored, opening opportunities to cover real threats.
Jones’ lemma. Deception becomes harder as the number of the information channels available to the target increases. On the other hand, within limits, the greater the number of controlled channels, the greater the chance of the deception being believed.
A choice among deception types. A-deception(or A-Type deception) aims at increasing the ambiguity in the target’s mind while decreasing the probability of a correct percep-tion. This is typically done by increasing the "noise" in information channels. M-deception (or M-Type deception) aims at misdirecting a target and increase his certainty that what they are looking for is his desired (deceptive) item. Whenever possible, the objective of deception should be to reduce the ambiguity in the target’s mind (A-Deception) to induce him to be more certain of a particular falsehood (M-Deception).
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Axelrod’s contribution – the husbanding of assets. There are circumstances where de-ception assets should be "husbanded", that is some dede-ception assets become useless once revealed through use or overuse. Despite the costs of maintenance and risk of waste, awaiting a more rewarding use is a good decision.
A sequencing rule. Deception activities should be sequenced so as portrayed as real for as long as possible. Also, riskier portions of a deception should be deferred so that they may be called offif the deception plan is compromised.
The importance of feedback. A scheme to ensure accurate feedback increases the chance of success in deception.
The Monkey’s Paw. Deceptions may create subtle and undesirable side effects (e.g., wrong actions taken by the adversary, retaliation, unmasking other deception plans, etc.).
Planners should be sensitive of such possibilities and, where prudent, take steps to miti-gate these effects.
Care in the designed and planned placement of deceptive material. Great care should be used in deceptions that spread fictional information to targets. Apparent windfalls are subjected to close scrutiny and often disbelieved. Genuine leaks often occur under circumstances thought improbable.
In additional to these maxims, Fowler and Nesbitt suggest a set of rules that, when applied, could maximize the success of the deception [121]:
Deception should reinforce enemy expectations. The deception plan must be straight-forward, sensible and essentially obvious to one’s opponent. It has been asserted that a successful deception must contain 95% truth. What a target expects to happen is strongly dependent on his background and culture, which can be exploited to reduce the confi-dence in his own battle performance.
Deception should have realistic timing and duration. Feedback on the target’s reaction to any deception activity is critically important to determine whether the expected ac-tions (inacac-tions) from the target have been conducted.
Deception should be integrated with operations. The deception plan should never be created independently from the operations plan. Operation and deception plans must complement and supplement each other. Overall, activities should provide believable indicators of the false operation and deny believable indicators of the real operations.
Deception should be coordinated with concealment of true intentions. Denial of in-formation on the true activities is an essential part of deception. This fundamentally
depends on stealth andcountermeasures activities to hide the real activity.
Deception realism should be tailored to needs of the setting. Effective deception de-pends on the quality of the realism produced. Reality is a function of the sensor and analysis capabilities available to the opponent and the time available to analyze the situ-ation, disseminate the data to the appropriate points and take appropriate actions. For example, in a low altitude attack, a pilot has very little time (a matter of seconds) to tell the difference between a decoy tank and a real tank.
Deception should be imaginative and creative. The most effective deception will be imaginative and creative. Deception is not a subject that lends itself to strict rules, de-tailed regulations or regimented procedures. It is best accomplished by bright, inventive (and tricky) planners who are given the necessary tools and the freedom to use them as they better fit the current environmental conditions.
While sharing some of the ideas presented by Fowler and Nesbitt, Haswell [156], De-war [102], and Latimer [217] share some additional principles that govern deception operations:
Preparation. Successful deception operations require careful preparation to develop detailed knowledge of the target and expected reactions from targets. Moreover, decep-tion operadecep-tions should be centralized and coordinated with regular security operadecep-tions to show both real and false information.
Multiple information channels. Information should be produced following a pattern of events in line with the target’s preconceptions and expectations using multiple informa-tion channels without raising suspicious.
Security. Access to the deception plan must be carefully restricted; information approved to be disclosed to the target should be carefully planned to not indirectly reveal any key point of the deception;
Flexibility. Exposes the need to deal with unforeseen situations even to the point of ceasing the deception plan if necessary.
2.3.5 Methods for deceiving
There are a number of resources, techniques, and tools that can be used to convey decep-tive information to a target. Depending on the context, decepdecep-tive methods are employed by using physical, technical, or administrative means [189]. In the military context, for example, physical means aim at conveying or denying information from an adversary;