Factor 3: Government agenda

At first glance, Brazil and Canada have distinct political systems; Brazil’s system is presidential while Canada’s is parliamentarian. However, these differences should not be taken at face value. Scholars have described the Brazilian presidential system as having been largely based on the constitution of majorities in Parliament, which has been termed “coalition presidentialism” (ABRANCHES, 1988). The Canadian parliamentary system has been commonly described as executive- centered, which highlights differences in Canada compared to other Westminster systems in which representatives have more power in initiating legislation and are less dependent on the prime minister and the Cabinet. In other words, the powers of the Brazilian president are constrained by the necessity of building governing

45 It was not possible to determine the state of origin of three ACOs; as a result, n = 113 for map figure nº7.

coalitions in Congress. The Canadian parliamentary system also focuses on forming a small group of decision-makers that share little of their powers with low profile representatives.

Neither of these governments are pure types of Westminster or presidential systems (FIGUEIREDO, 2004). To be sure, the Brazilian president has at his or her disposal important devices to circumvent Parliament, such as the enactment of provisional measure (Medida Provisória)⁴⁶. However, as demonstrated in the topic dedicated to discussing the constitutional design in both countries, the Brazilian Constitution is a hybrid of the presidential and parliamentary forms of government (CHEIBUB; ELKINS, 2009). On the other hand, the consensus of the last few decades that parliaments have played a marginal role in policymaking process has been substituted by the understanding that “legislatures are institutions of far greater significance for policy outcomes than scholars have generally appreciated” (MARTIN;

VANBERG, 2011 p. 5). This idea means that in both cases, it is more important to understand the substantive agenda of the majority (or, for that matter, the government agenda) rather than discuss minor differences in the formal functions of the two systems (LIMONGI; FIGUEIREDO, 2009).

In other words, it is not only the agenda-setting powers that each governing system may have in formal terms what attracts the curiosity of the researcher, but also the variation of the content of such agenda pursued by the national governments at the time of the policy proposals made by the Native groups participating in both policy review processes considered in this dissertation.

First, it is important to emphasize from the outset that the federal governments of Brazil and Canada have had historical roles concerning Native issues. Chapters three and five explain the origins of this fact in both cases. The present section examines the relative importance of Indigenous issues in government agendas by measuring two indicators: 1) the federal budget allocated to the top federal agency concerned with Native public policies and 2) the development strategy executed by national governments and the roles these governments assign to Indigenous groups.

The concrete descriptions of these indicators in each case are considered in the following section.

46 Medidas Provisórias (MPs) are legislative measures taken by the Brazilian president for a certain period and which have an immediate effect. After its enactment, Congress must vote the continuation or dismissal of an MP within a tight timeframe. The indiscriminate use of these measures, often circumventing political conflicts in Parliament, have led some analysts describe them a “imperial power” attributed to the president.

Sub-variable 5: political centrality

Politically central issues lie at the heart of governments and can range from policy proposals to budget allocation decisions and set the agenda disputed by politicians and policy-makers. Those issues tend to attract government attention and its agents carry out efforts to make this agenda pass in Parliament. Once debated and approved, policy proposals require proper funding to be implemented.

Underfunded agencies and policies are often understaffed and have a difficult time accomplishing even basic functions. In this sense, one could hardly argue against the conclusion that, in general terms, the more money a certain policy or agency has, the more importance it has to the government of the day.

In terms of the size of the budget assigned to a ministry or public policy, a given issue can be central – when the total amount of money increases over time and its importance relative to the whole federal budget also increases – or marginal – when either the specific budget decreases or increases over time but decreases in relation to the whole budget – to a government’s political agenda. In the Brazilian case, it is important to consider that federal concern for Indigenous peoples has been historically marginal, and the budget assigned to the top federal agency to design and implement the Indigenous policy in Brazil – the FUNAI – is equally low.

Figure 8 below presents the FUNAI’s authorized budget between 2013 and 2018. FUNAI’s budget increased 11% on average per year during the period considered, which could be seen as a sign of the counter-balance of a historical trend of underfunding.

Figure 8: The FUNAI’s authorized budget between 2013 and 2018 Source: SIGA Brasil (https://www12.senado.leg.br/orcamento/sigabrasil).

*adjusted for inflation

However, the authorized budget is not the best indicator of the actual money spent on agency activities. When the money effectively spent over the course of the FUNAI’s mandate was tracked, a decreasing pattern of investment was clearly identifiable.

The situation is strikingly different in Canada. Mark Milke (2013) compiled the available data related to federal spending on Indigenous policy through the Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Ministry in Canada between 1946 and 2012 and found that spending rose from $79 million to $7.9 billion, a 99-fold increase. Figure 9 illustrates the evolution of this spending in 2013 adjusted-inflation Canadian dollars.

Figure 9: Growth of federal spending on Indigenous policy in Canada between 1946 and 2012 Source: MILKE, 2013.

Milke (2013) also found that in addition to increasing significantly over time, federal spending on Indigenous policy grew at a much higher rate than the average federal spending on other programs during the period. Average spending for other programs increased only 9-fold. The comparison between both spending rates can be better observed in Figure 10 below.

Figure 10: Growth in federal spending on Indigenous policy compared to total federal program spending in Canada between 1946 and 2012 Source: MILKE, 2013.

It is important to highlight that Indigenous policies are marginal in Brazil and Canada, and the differences in policy funding can only be described in relative terms.

Policies designed to support Indigenous peoples are not a priority for either nation- states when compared to issues such as healthcare, education, and housing, all of which are usually at the center of any government agenda. The only conclusion that can be drawn from the presented data is that if increased spending on a certain policy is taken as a sign of the importance of these policies to a government, it can be affirmed that Indigenous policy is more central to the federal government in Canada than Brazil.

Sub-variable 6: Economic strategy

Every political party or governmental coalition comes to power with clear guidelines for economic policy or, more broadly, a political project for strategic development. Economic choices and strategic priorities lie at the heart of the

governmental function and have repercussions for virtually every area of society. The current dissertation understands that such strategies can be inclusive by trying to involve all relevant political and economic actors and respecting protocols to consult Indigenous peoples. These strategies can also be exclusionary, keeping Native groups away from the economic decisions or even dismissing their claims to dialogue over economic issues. In terms of the main actor driving development, a distinction can b made between a (neo)developmentalist economy – in which the state plays a prominent role in pushing economic activity – and a (neo)liberal order – in which private actors are either the main drivers or the most prominent beneficiaries of national economic activity.

The role of economic expansion in the extermination of Indigenous peoples in Brazil is a well-known theme. As Oliveira (2016, p. 17, translated by the author) has recently affirmed,

the subalternization of the, in the past, free and autonomous autochtone population, was a violent and arbitrary process that responded to dominant economic interests such as the land grabbing and the recruitment of workers, articulated with the consolidation of a ruling elite and the governmental structure.⁴⁷

Dilma Rousseff came to power in 2011 and is known as the “mother of the PAC” (the Portuguese acronym for Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento), a governmental plan for massive investment in heavy infrastructure such as hydro dams, urban housing, steel factories, lines of energy transmission, harbor expansions, airport renovations and expansions, subways, and roads in the wake of the country’s most recent “economic boom” and the immense popularity of her predecessor. Considered a hardline technocrat and not particularly fit for political talks, Rousseff began her first term with the greatest number of acts of protest carried out by Brazilian Indigenous peoples between 2009 and 2015;⁴⁸ she further developed the economic matrix of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s (CIMI, 2011).

47 From the original in Portuguese: “A transformação da população autóctone, antes livre e autônoma, em subalterna, processo indissociavelmente violento e arbitrário, respondeu aos interesses econômicos dominantes, como a apropriação da terra e a obtenção de mão de obra, articulada com a consolidação da classe dirigente e de uma estrutura de governo.”

48 This data is presented later in this chapter.

After years of neoliberal order and fiscal austerity under President Cardoso, the Workers Party came into power in 2003 with the challenge of maintaining fiscal responsibility, a pillar of liberal rhetoric, while simultaneously investing in infrastructure and social policies. As Sallum Jr. and Goulart (2016, p. 130, translated by the author) explain, the challenge was to build a government “politically democratic and moderately liberal in the economic level.” Observers of Indigenous peoples and advocacy groups quickly characterized Rousseff’s economic matrix as

“neo” developmentalist, a renewed version of the economic developmentalism applied during military rule (CIMI, 2011).

Following Morais and Saad-Filho (2011), four theses underpins the neo- developmentalist strategy: 1) no strong market can exist without a strong state; 2) no growth can occur without putting in place the adequate macroeconomic policies; 3) the national project should harmonize economic growth and social equity; and 4) it is impossible to reduce poverty without continued and sustained high rates of economic growth. Even though Lula da Silva and Rousseff’s governments were not fully coherent with all neo-developmentalist propositions, the presidents achieved impressive economic performance during their terms and managed to reduce poverty and increase spending on infrastructure (BRESSER-PEREIRA, 2013)

In the Canadian case, it is important remember that all Canadian prime ministers elected after World War II – Mackenzie King, John Diefenbaker, Lester Pearson, and Pierre Trudeau – were full-fledged Keynesians who considered the state to be the main driver of the economic growth. As a result, they ran governments with increasing deficits as percentage of GDP and high levels of federal spending, a trend abruptly reversed by the liberal government of Jean Chretien in 1993 (HENDERSON, 2010). The “big government agenda” established by Trudeau over his almost uninterrupted 14 years⁴⁹ serving as prime minister shaped Canadian society in search of social justice and economic fairness (CAMERON, 2011).

After Trudeau’s resignation in 1984, conservative leader Brian Mulroney was elected with a platform focused on a free-trade agreement with the United States, cutting federal spending, privatization, control of the budget deficit and boosting the

49 Pierre Elliott Trudeau was prime minister of Canada from April 20, 1968 to June 30, 1984, except for nine months between June 4, 1979 and March 3, 1980, when Joe Clark of the Progressive Conservative Party was prime minister (HENDERSON, 2010). Trudeau’s first campaign was run under the motto “a just society,”

indicating his ambition to expand the social economy and “rescue an unjust society through better social policy”

(CAMERON, 2011, p.1).

private sector. As Cameron (2011, p. 3) puts it, “the Progressive Conservative Party professed a sort of business liberalism that was inimical to social liberalism.”

Eventually, Mulroney was unable to accomplish the majority of his fiscal austerity agenda and performed poorly in almost every economic indicator (UNIFOR, 2015).

However, it is important to consider that in the era of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, Mulroney was more prone to maintaining the overall viability of the Canadian welfare state by making “cuts in the margin” of the budget and not trying to push a hardline neoliberal agenda similar to that of his British and North American counterparts⁵⁰ (PATERSON, 1996).

It can be affirmed that while the Mulroney government was committed to

“economic renewal in which economic growth and expansion were clearly favored over the traditional goals of equitable redistribution of wealth and income”

(PATERSON, 1996, p. 19), the Workers Party governments relied strongly on the capacity of the state to boost economy and, at the same time, carry out distributive policies designed to reduce poverty and increase the consumption. The key drivers of economic growth are distinct in both cases, as are the rhetoric and goals of economic activity. However, both paths are strongly tied to market-driven demands and exploitation of natural resources, often harming the environment and communities that may stand in the way of projects and “development.” For the purposes of the current investigation, it is considered that both strategies exclude Indigenous peoples from the design of sustainable economic activities and are likely to predispose governments and economic actors against Indigenous rights.