Mobilising finance

4.1

The European Report on Development 2011/2012 discussed the fact that subsidies for natural resources such as fossil fuels are often poorly applied and affect those living in poverty most severely, are economically inefficient and are bad for the environment. Through public subsidy reform, public resources can be mobilised and spent more effectively (see also World Bank, 2013). Global subsidies on fossil fuels are twice the level of investment in renewable energy and six times the level of subsidies on renewable energy.

If governments removed fossil-fuel subsidies and spent the same money on renewable energy, they could broadly meet the finance required to keep the increase in global temperature below 2ºC (see Figure 4.1). Chapter 6 discusses these issues in more detail.

Tax administrators face a range of further challenges such as transfer-pricing abuse, reported value of production, debt payments and hedging. For example, when TNCs calculate taxable income for their operations in each country, they need to put a price on goods and services traded among units of the same company. But what is the right price? Many TNCs use a transfer-pricing mechanism to transfer value to low-tax jurisdictions. Some studies suggest the price differentials are often more than 10%

(Bernard et al., 2006). A model simulation of an increase of export prices rising by 10% shows that national incomes in SSA would rise by some $3.5 bn annually (commissioned modelling paper; Fic, 2015). Thus, better global tax policies that lead to fairer pricing strategies could significantly boost the GDP of countries in SSA (by around a quarter of a percentage point of GDP).

The abuse of transfer prices can also significantly reduce tax revenues. Each country should have detailed requirements for how companies should deal with transfer pricing, but monitoring is problematic. Global discussions could help with designing and implementing transfer-pricing principles. For example, with external support, transfer-pricing adjustments made as a result of

that addressing international tax issues such as transfer pricing might divert scarce capacities from dealing with domestic tax issues. Hence this Report emphasises the need for increased domestic tax efforts as well as global action, both of which can be supported by international public finance as argued in Chapter 6.

4.1.2 Mobilising international public finance

The determinants of ODA and OOF include poverty and per capita income, vulnerability, policy factors (targets), cultural factors (e.g. the relationship between countries and the former colonial powers) and other characteristics of specific donors and recipients. A range of studies (e.g. Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2006;

Dollar and Levin, 2005; Cohen and Katseli, 2006) has examined whether aid is allocated on the basis of needs in the recipient country, as measured by GDP per capita. Most find that ODA, especially bilateral aid, is only weakly based on such needs, but that there is great variety among donors.

Cadot et al. (ERD commissioned paper, 2015) suggest that what determines the allocation of ODA is poorly understood. They highlight that previous studies often relied on cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of ODA receipts at the country level (e.g. Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Dowling and Heimenz, 1985; Mosley, 1985;

Gillis et al., 1992; Wall, 1992). Trumbull and Wall (1994) pointed out that heterogeneity across countries was likely to confound their results and revisited the issue using a panel with recipient fixed effects. They found that ODA allocation seemed to react to variations in infant mortality and civil rights in recipient countries. This means that domestic conditions, including policies in developing countries, also make a difference in attracting ODA.

There seems to be a difference between allocations made by multilateral and bilateral agencies. The former appear to provide more

general programme assistance (including budget support) and commodity aid, and thus actively support efforts to align ODA to the priorities of the recipient country and to smooth income variability arising from commodity price fluctuations. According to Cohen and Katseli (2006), they also seem to specialise in basic infrastructure, in particular transport, water supply and sanitation, and productive sectors, most notably agriculture and financial services.

By contrast, bilateral donors are more

‘politicised’ than multilateral agencies in their sectoral allocations, and seem to cater to the preferences of their domestic constituency, including NGO support, emergency assistance and debt cancellation (Cohen and Katseli, 2006).

Ultimately, the allocation of ODA is a policy choice, and is also highly political. Some donors have long-standing commitments to concentrate on the poorest countries (e.g. DFID’s target of 90% to LICs). The OECD Development Co- operation Report (2014) suggests that 50% of ODA should be allocated to LDCs. While the allocation of ODA across country groups is ultimately a political decision it could be argued that poorer and more fragile countries need aid more as they lack sufficient income to use and distribute it.

A further finding is that aid allocations based on the adoption of specific policies have not become stronger, although Alesina and Weder (2002) suggest that Nordic donors tend to give less support to countries in which corruption runs high. Some donors do not seem to base their ODA primarily on the poverty of the recipient country. Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) examine 18 donors and find that infant mortality is a better explanatory predictor than income. Berthélemy (2006) examines trade as an explanatory variable for ODA, and Alesina and Dollar (2000) suggest the importance of single factors in influencing ODA allocations, e.g. Israel/Egypt for the USA, former colonies for France and the UK, and UN voting records in the case of Japan.

Sources: IEA (2012); FS-UNEP (2014) 800

700 600 500 400 300

0

USD (billions)

200 100

Additional finance needed to keep

temperature rises below 2 degrees by 2050

(max)

Fossil fuel subsidies

Investment (Renewable Energy)

Subsidies (Renewable

energy)

Figure 4.1 | Subsidies on fossil fuels, green finance needs, and subsidies and investment in renewable energy

audits on TNCs have increased tax revenues in Colombia by 76%, from $3.3 mn in 2011 to $5.83 mn in 2012. Donors also provide assistance, such as through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), to improve transparency regarding taxes paid by EI-registered companies.

Tax evasion and tax avoidance are global issues governed by laws that date back to the 1920s.

OECD countries do not always tax TNCs where production takes place, enabling them to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions and legally avoid taxes. Some companies also evade taxes by hiding large sums in offshore locations (which is illegal). The OECD is currently discussing reforms in the global tax systems (namely Base Erosion and Profit Sharing); although it is unclear how quickly new systems would be adopted. Developing countries need to be involved in such discussions as reforms could affect them in a major way. The modelling and case-study evidence on transfer pricing suggests that it is not difficult to change such regimes. At the same time, there is a risk

Gamberoni and Newfarmer (2011) assess whether aid for trade (AFT) goes to the countries most in need of it, using gravity-based indicators of needs and comparing the observed allocation with a simple allocation rule. They find substantial dispersion of flows around estimated needs, although the correlation between the two is positive across the countries examined.

In addition, as discussed in Chapter 2, international targets such as the MDGs have contributed to raising ODA levels especially for the social sectors (such as education and certain aspects of health).

It can be anticipated that future specific global actions could contribute to increasing the amount of ODA still further.

Uneze (ERD commissioned paper, 2015) provides insights into how SSC is allocated. The past decade has witnessed the emergence of Southern donors, which do not refer financial assistance to other developing countries as aid, but rather an expression of solidarity (UNCTAD, 2010). All countries in the Global South are considered equals and partners, and therefore national sovereignty and mutual respect are key to their relationships. This partly explains the absence of policy conditionality on Southern aid, although there is some non-policy conditionality.

There is also a difference in the sectoral allocation between Northern and Southern donors.

Development cooperation from Southern donors shows that while allocations from Brazil, Saudi Arabia and South Africa are concentrated in social infrastructure, similar to traditional donors, China, India and UAE prioritise economic infrastructure.

China and India also assist the productive sector, suggesting that they deploy aid to facilitate trade and investment in other developing countries.

The aid from Arab countries and Brazil tends to go to countries facing humanitarian crises.

4.1.3 Mobilising domestic private finance

Private finance is available in different quantities at

different terms in different countries and sectors.

It is available in abundance in some countries whilst bypassing others. There are many reasons for this but the most important for this review is the crucial role of policies in mobilising and steering private finance.

There are many factors behind the level and depth of financial-sector development (see Beck (2013) for a recent review of the literature). Low-income countries tend to have little financial sector depth, which may be hampered by low population density (in SSA), weak savings institutions, the absence of pension systems, inefficient (development) banks, small stock markets with low liquidity, and financial illiteracy. All such (non-financial) issues, many of which are associated with market failures, affect financing for development.

Loayza et al. (2000) review a number of determinants of private savings (and hence domestic private finance), which include:

persistence, income, growth, demographics and uncertainty. There are two major views on savings: the permanent-income hypothesis that private savings react only to permanent changes in income; and the life-cycle hypothesis that consumption and savings are spread over an individual’s lifetime. Whichever is the correct hypothesis, private savings tend to react to changes in determinants only after a time lag (persistence). Moreover, evidence across a range of countries suggests that higher income per capita (and higher growth) raises savings. In developing countries, other things being equal, a doubling of income per capita is estimated to raise the long- run private saving rate by 10 percentage points of disposable income. Further, Loayza et al. (2000) argue that microeconomic and macroeconomic evidence, both at the international and country level, confirms that a rise in dependency ratios (i.e. young or old dependants) tends to lower private saving rates.

Policy can influence these aspects and hence could affect the mobilisation of domestic private

finance. The broad development of a financial infrastructure is important, such as developing a good regulatory framework for pension funds, insurance funds, and stock markets, all of which have the potential to grow fast in LICs. Better policies for developing collateral, such as land- titling and credit bureaux, will also develop domestic finance. Loayza et al. (2000) find that fiscal policy and public savings affect private savings. The effects of tax incentives on savings are found to be more ambiguous. Pension reform, on the other hand, can have major effects on private savings especially through mandatory saving requirements. Liberalisation of interest rates, elimination of credit ceilings, easing of entry for foreign financial institutions, development of capital markets, and enhanced prudential regulation and supervision are also important.

Barajas et al. (2012) discuss a number of policies that would increase the availability and stability of domestic private finance: (a) market- developing policies; (b) market-enabling policies; and (c) market-harnessing policies.

Market-developing policies include legal changes and substantial upgrading of macroeconomic performance and stability. These policies help to overcome constraints posed by a small financial sector and can help to expand the frontier of the financial sector (on the demand side). For example, small and undiversified economies can benefit from access to international capital markets and attract private finance by using them as risk- pooling and diversification mechanisms. Such integration requires appropriate macro-prudential policies to dampen the potentially negative effect of volatile capital flows. Informational and contractual frameworks can also help to attract finance, especially in the long term.

Market-enabling policies address weaknesses in regulatory barriers or lack of competition. They help a financial system move towards the frontier.

They include more short- to medium-term policy and regulatory reforms, e.g. policies aimed at

fostering greater competition in micro- and consumer lending. Such policies can also include removing regulatory impediments and reforming tax policies, which can raise market contestability, as well opening up new payment systems and credit registries. Such policies could help to expand financial markets.

Market-harnessing or market-stabilising policies help to prevent a financial system from moving beyond the frontier. Such policies include the regulatory framework, macroeconomic and macro-prudential management, including the mitigation of risks associated with non-bank providers of financial services and consumer- protection schemes.

In conclusion, a range of policies influences the financial market and hence the availability and stability of private finance. Barajas et al. (2012) measure the development of the financial market by the ratio of private-sector credit to GDP according to the policy factor and suggest there is a level of financial deepening that is neither too low nor too high but just right. Too much credit can lead to ‘boom–bust’ cycles in the financial sector, and too little leads to drying up of private finance and lack of investment opportunities. There is a crucial role for policy to obtain an appropriate level of financial deepening.

4.1.4 Mobilising international private finance

FDI

As discussed in Chapter 3, the distribution of private capital flows is uneven across countries.

There are often straightforward reasons for this.

Several factors can help to attract FDI: (a) general policy factors (e.g. political stability, governance, investment climate); (b) specific FDI policies (incentives packaged in a strategy, investment promotion to address imperfect information, international trade and investment treaties, or home-country measures); (c) macroeconomic factors (human resources, infrastructure, market

size and growth); and (d) firm-specific factors (e.g. technology) and one-off factors such as the availability of natural resources or large-scale privatisation (Dunning, 1993; UNCTAD, 1999; te Velde, 2006).

There are also various specific national and international policies to mobilise international private finance. There are too many to discuss in detail, but we identify four as relevant to the post- 2015 debate: (a) FDI incentives; (b) trade and investment global and regional policies; (c) global financial rules that can help to reduce the incidence of crises; and (d) global environmental rules.

The literature suggests that specific FDI incentives are less effective in attracting FDI than so-called general economic fundamentals, such as good quality and appropriate education and infrastructure. Incentives do tend to have an effect on the choice of location at the margin (examples include Ireland and Singapore over the 1970–1990 period) (te Velde, 2002), and tax lawyers take tax treaties into consideration when advising their clients. Incentives are most effective in determining in which of a number of similar locations footloose export-oriented investment will focus. Morrisset (2003) also argues that time-series analysis and surveys indicate that tax incentives are a poor means to compensate for negative factors in a country’s investment climate, but that incentives do affect the decisions of some investors some of the time. Since incentives are costly in terms of forgone revenues, the question is how to minimise wasteful tax incentives and avoid a ‘race to the bottom’ for tax incentives (and tax levels generally, as expressed in the OECD’s work on base erosion and profit-sharing).

Global and regional trade and bilateral investment agreements may help to mobilise FDI.

Although causalities are difficult to disentangle, multilateral trade liberalisation in the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) has probably contributed to the massive increase

in vertical FDI over the last 20 years. While the impact of bilateral investment agreements on FDI flows remains controversial (Sauvant and Sachs, 2009; UNCTAD, 2009; Berger et al., 2011), empirical studies on the impact of regional trade agreements (RTAs) on FDI tend to suggest that they encourage extra-regional FDI flows and for some regions intra-regional FDI (te Velde and Bezemer, 2004; Büthe and Milner, 2008; Büge, 2012). Other studies also show that different countries within a region experience different effects with respect to attracting FDI. This difference reflects variations in the relative size of the industrial sector, but also the degree to which economic integration, directly or indirectly, increases the geographical advantage of a country relative to others in the region.

In addition to trade-related provisions of RTAs the strength of investment provisions also matters for promoting FDI. The examination by Dee and Gali (2003) of older RTAs suggests that FDI responds significantly to their non-trade provisions. Te Velde and Bezemer (2006) find that membership of a region (including ACP and non-ACP regions) as such is not significantly related to inward FDI, but that if a country belongs to a region with a sufficient number and level of provisions on trade and investment (e.g. describing treatment of foreign firms, large trade preferences), this helps to attract more inward FDI to the region.

More recently concluded RTAs usually include comprehensive investment chapters, although their contents vary considerably (Kotschwar, 2009).

Opening up the ‘black box’ of RTAs’ investment chapters – accounting for variations with regard to their commitments – recent studies find that the significant positive effects of RTAs on FDI flows can be attributed to the extensiveness of the provisions (Lesher and Miroudot, 2007; Miroudot, 2009) and in particular on the inclusion of clauses on market access in the form of pre-establishment national treatment (Berger et al., 2013).

Box 4.1 gives an example of the role of global policies (international mitigation agreements)

that could help to mobilise climate finance. The presence of a strict global emission-reduction target would mobilise around $100 bn from a bunkers’ fuel tax, reducing the need to mobilise climate-related finance from other sources.

Portfolio flows

A range of national and international factors drives short-term capital inflows, including economic growth potential, commodity exports and prices, inflation and exchange rates, deficits on current account and government balances, capital account convertibility, financial-market development, marketing drive, appropriate pricing and size of (sovereign) bond transaction, and global monetary conditions (see Hou et al., 2014).

Global economic policies are crucial for the prospects of portfolio flows to developing countries. The global financial crisis of 2007–

2008 and its severe economic consequences – a significant slowdown in global economic activity, a collapse in global trade, debt- and unemployment-related problems in a number of advanced economies – have not only encouraged a re-evaluation of the prospects of global economic growth but have also prompted a re- design of global regulatory and economic policy frameworks. The effects on developing countries have been severe (e.g. te Velde et al., 2010).

Increased volatility in capital flows has made macroeconomic management difficult worldwide.

Moreover, global economic policies (monetary, financial, and fiscal) that address the volatility of finance flows can have major impacts on developing countries.

Take, for example, the effects of monetary policy in developed countries. Faced with a major crisis and lack of effective conventional monetary measures, with interest rates reaching the zero bound, central banks turned to unconventional monetary policies by making large-scale purchases of assets, including government

bonds and asset securities. This significantly affected bond and equity markets, and the wider economy, across developed and developing countries. Ending these unconventional policies will also affect developing countries. A modelling study undertaken for this Report (commissioned modelling paper; Fic, 2015) suggests that the (announcement of a) withdrawal of the US monetary stimulus in 2013 led to an increase by 80 basis points in the USA and some 100–300 basis points in emerging economies’ bond yields.

Using a global econometric model, the tapering of US monetary stimulus is expected to take 0.8%

off the GDP of countries in SSA. In Latin America and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the more restrictive monetary policy taken by the US Federal Reserve (‘the Fed’) may have spillovers amounting up to 0.25% of their GDP.

The Middle East and the Far East are likely to be least affected. Overall, higher bond yields result in a decrease in the US GDP of about 1%, and of about 0.5% in developing countries. This suggests that global coordination of monetary policies, a global public good, can have major impacts on the stability of financial flows.

A further example (commissioned modelling paper;

Fic, 2015) is the attempt to create stable global banking rules aimed at preventing costly financial crises. Basel III rules require banks to implement stricter capital requirements. This leads to an increase in borrowing costs. Modelled through an increase in the investment premium reflecting tighter regulation in the area of bank capital and liquidity, GDP in all of the major developed and emerging economies would be reduced by up to 0.25 basis points. In SSA, higher capital and liquidity effects would also lead to a decrease in GDP of up to 0.1%. These costs are, however, much smaller than the benefits associated with averting financial crises by adopting more stable banking rules. In SSA, the impacts of a crisis are more than ten times greater than the introduction of tighter capital requirements, which means that the region as a whole would ultimately benefit from more stable global financial rules.