Beyond Development Aid is a publication of the Europe-Africa Policy Research Network (EARN) that aims to address EU-Africa policy dialogue on global issues of common interest. Perspectives for revitalizing an innovative framework'.3 It also adds original research on the political dialogue undertaken in the context of the EU-Africa Troika meetings held before and after the advent of the JAES, as well as other recent developments before the Summit of 3rd.
A short reminder of the ambitions of the JAES
For this purpose, the EU commits to further support the "continuous process of institutional transformation of the AU"9. This reflects the creation of the AU and the need to support its pan-African integration agenda.
The track record so far
Assessing progress: a challenging job
However, the report recognizes important institutional bottlenecks such as the limitations of the EU-Africa Troika format (as the main body for political guidance); the less than optimal levels of ownership and involvement of key players such as both European and African Member States and the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs); and the insufficient connection between the (technical) expert work of the JEGs with (political) decision-making processes. The lack of a solid political analysis of the interests at stake in the JAES is particularly visible in sensitive partnerships.
How to deal with politics, interests and incentives?
The proposals were accepted and the African Union was specifically mentioned as part of the CPA. Regardless of which perspective we take, moving forward requires deep reflection on the future of JAES.
The dynamics of political dilution?
As a fundamental political partnership, the question of interests is at the heart of the JAES. The political vision of the JAES is expressed in language with a strong 'process connotation'.
The continuing relevance of the JAES vision
The combined effect of these factors can help to explain the difficult start of JAES and the consequent gradual 'political dilution' of the new partnership framework.37 In general, we can see that several African actors/sectors, on the one hand, are still skeptical to the motives of European actions. This creates opportunities for joint Africa-EU cooperation on global issues that could be conveyed through JAES.
Trends before the 3rd EU-Africa Summit
The Joint Options Paper was discussed in the new format of the joint EU-Africa troika with the entry into force of the EU-Lisbon Treaty. 42 For an overview see ECDPM Implications of the Lisbon Treaty for EU-Africa relations.
Back to Basics: Promoting the JAES added-value
Start the dialogue to consider sustainable funding strategies for the JAES continental agenda. How do African member states collectively see the future of the ACP and its relationship with the JAES?
Conclusions
On the African side, too, there is no shortage of “existential” questions to be answered. However, the responsibility for “making the JAES work” as intended should not just be “dumped” to the respective Commissions, or merely transferred to the EEAS on the European side.
Think Piece
Africa-Europe: A relationship in need of change
Introduction
EU-Africa and the burdens of history
The Lisbon Summit, called 'the summit of equals' by Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Socrates, hoped to undo this burden of history and lead to a partnership based on equality, common interests and mutual respect. He believed that the Lisbon summit should only lay the groundwork for redefining this relationship, meaning that he expected the summit to begin a process of removing the burden of history that stands against a cordial relationship of equals argued.
Africa: the global problem child
No new African agenda for EU-Africa relations?
A third problem is poor consultation with non-state actors in important decision-making in the AU. When AU central bodies introduce common policies, representatives of national capitals treat them with distrust.
The new cold war: North-Atlantic versus Asian Interests
Part of the challenge for Africa is the way in which decision-making takes place. As a result, the mandate of the AU Commission, for example, is so limited that it is unable to guide the development of a supranational agenda for Africa.
The future
While it makes sense for Africa to drag its feet to extract as many concessions as possible from partners, the lack of a coherent continental policy means that the continent does not know how to act once concessions are exhausted or as a partner simply refuse to move. This translates into what is called a lack of capacity to implement, when in reality it is a weak policy framework for Africa to carry out commitments made in partnership agreements.
Peace
Peace and Security
Progress: less conflicts, improved institutional framework and enhanced co-operation
2010; Dersso, S, "The Role and Place of African Reserve Forces in the African Peace and Security Architecture". 7 See Sturman, K & A Hayatou, “The African Union Peace and Security Council: From Plan to Reality”.
Challenges: diverging perceptions of security and persisting asymmetry
The classic security threat of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is still seen as a top priority, at least within the European security community. While EU membership requires mandatory compliance with certain democratic standards, despite the AU's improved record.
Conclusion and suggestions
On the one hand, the continued donor-recipient relationship seriously undermines the partnership between the two continents, both in terms of ownership and equality. A debate about truly shared values and interests seems overdue, not only within the two organizations, but also between the two partners.
The African Union Peace and Security Partnerships
EU-Africa collaboration on peace and security
The AU's commitment to promoting internal peace and security is evident in its commitment: from AU missions, unilaterally in the Comoros and initially in Burundi (AMIB) and Darfur (AMIS); of AU special envoys and the establishment of AU liaison offices in war-affected countries on the continent. For example, the serious challenges facing the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); the AU's inability to cooperate effectively with non-compliant member states such as Sudan, Zimbabwe and currently Guinea.
Collaboration with other relevant actors: The UN, NATO and AFRICOM
The UN is already engaged in a joint initiative with the AU, notably the deployment of the AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Therefore, the AU's concerted engagement with the UN can, at times, be disorganized and unfocused.
Towards a working relationship between the European common defence and security and the APSA
The AU also expects the EU to support the operationalization of APSA and AU peace operations, although, again, the mode of engagement remains a key issue. The AU wants to be able to define its needs and then get the necessary support from partners such as the EU.
Collaboration to enhance the operationalisation of the APSA
The AU seeks to engage with the EU as a partner, but not one that dictates the terms of the relationship. The AU's other political interest is to ensure predictable support for the operationalization of APSA from partners such as the EU.
The role of civil society in advancing the EU-AU partnership
However, this is not guaranteed due to the internal political interests, dynamics and willingness of the EU institutions for unlimited and indefinite funding, especially the challenges of internal financial management and accountability within the AU.
Conclusion
Coordination mechanisms between the EU and Africa need to be further strengthened and, if necessary, new ones developed. Therefore, the future relationship between the EU and the AU should be characterized by mutual respect, legitimacy and effectiveness.
Global
Governance
International Governance Reform in the Africa-European Union Partnership
The increasing weight of these new players is already forcing a redistribution of power in the world order, which directly affects global governance. In this context, Africa must formulate an agenda for global governance reform that takes into account the common interests of the countries that make up the continent.
Makings of the contemporary global governance order
In the second half of the 20th century, Germany and Japan also became key global economic centers, playing an important role in "managing" the world economic system alongside the United States. The core countries at the heart of the EU today were the main partners of the USA in shaping the modern world governance arrangement, managing its central institutions and directing relations with these countries, which are considered military-ideological rivals, especially the USSR and China. , who also tried to build an alternative domestic and global model of economic management and development.
Discontents of the global governance system
The core countries at the heart of the EU today were America's main partners in creating the contemporary global governance order, managing its core institutions and managing relations with the countries considered military-ideological rivals, especially the USSR and China. , who also tried to build an alternative national and global model for economic governance and development. reform of the UN system in general, and the UNSC in particular, with a view to a) . to expand representation at the highest levels of global decision-making and to discipline the great powers' use of the veto to prevent routine subversion of the will of the international community; .. recalibration of voting rights and decision-making processes in b). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to ensure a greater voice for the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America; . generalized reform of the international trading system to make it fairer, c).
Dysfunctionalities of a polarised global order
In turn, the Bretton Woods institutions became instruments aligned with the global strategy of the US-led G7 countries. The shift from the US and its allies to the Bretton Woods institutions, at the expense of the UN, has significantly increased the influence of the IMF and World Bank on the economic management and broader policy processes of the NAM/G77 countries; the executive committees of the Bank and the Fund were also effectively dominated by the G7 countries.
Makings of a New Global Order
Within the UN system, high-level discussions on the reform of the General Assembly and the UNSC have been held and consultations continue. Within the framework of the Africa-EU dialogue, it is clear that when examining the possibilities for co-.
Uneasy quests for global governance reform
Thus, an intense diplomatic effort has been deployed by individual regions and states to gain allies and friends in the emerging international politics of reform. The ongoing dialogue between African countries and EU member states on global governance reform is one of several dialogues taking place in the international system.
Towards common principles and values for global governance reform
Recognize the full and inalienable rights of each member state in in- b) . international system to determine their own economic and social development path and the development policies corresponding to the path they have chosen. Address long-term development concerns and democratic ambitions d) . where they exist, on the basis of the priorities defined by the member states of the international system themselves and the subregional commissions and regional institutions.
Concluding remarks
Opportunities and Obstacles for EU-Africa Cooperation on Global Governance Issues
EU and AU positions on governance
UN reform, G8 and G20
The AU is more united behind calls for a permanent place for the AU in the G20, but there are grumblings about Nigeria and Egypt not being included as members of a post-G8 group.
International justice and the ICC
South Africa is actively seeking alternative alliances to that of the AU, via IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) and other alliances, to influence both the UN and G20 agendas, with a particular eye on reform. Despite this, issues of European-dominated legal processes that 'target' Africans tend to dominate international justice discussions relating to Europe and Africa, indicating the essentially emotional nature of the debate, which touches on historical grievances, the legacy of colonialism, and the ongoing power imbalances between Europe and Africa.
International trade
The EU and the US have built-in veto power over these institutions, as votes are divided according to the level of financial contributions. However, such support cannot fully replace the sheer size of EU negotiating teams.
Development assistance and the MDGs
Climate Change
However, as with trade, the very different conditions in the EU and AU present significant obstacles to establishing a common position for international negotiations involving other developing and developed regions. This greater freedom of maneuver and decreasing dependence can open up space for more genuine cooperation between the EU and the AU – of which the Joint Africa EU strategy is perhaps proof.
Trade &
Development
Regional Integration, EPAs and the Trade & Development Agenda
EU support to regional integration, trade and development
Bilal (2009), The Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure Partnership of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy: Assessment and way forward, ECDPM note. Another sensitive issue in the implementation roadmap of the TRII partnership is the African Union's Minimum Integration Program (MIP).
Impact of EPAs on regional integration
When assessing the impact of EPAs, consideration must be given to the consequences of the parallel implementation of EPAs and of endogenous regional integration initiatives in the ACP. It is therefore essential that the closure of EPAs keeps the regional integration processes in place.
Practical proposals for the future of Africa-EU relations
Failure to fulfill these development promises would mean a serious setback for the EU's trade and development agenda, including in the context of the Doha round and the JESC. The identified priorities of the strategy should first be included in all cooperation instruments between the EU and Africa.
Facing the challenges of climate change: The case of EU-Africa cooperation
The global challenge of addressing climate change
New strategic alliances on climate change
Climate change is primarily a development threat to Africa and therefore to the EU, c) . as Africa's most important development partner, it must integrate climate adaptation into all its development activities on the continent. Because Africa is the most vulnerable continent and unable to deal with the im-d. In climate change pacts alone, the international community must help through increased financial, human and technical support.
Mainstreaming climate change into all other sectors
However, Africa must also address medium- and long-term mitigation scenarios by lobbying the West for further commitments under the Kyoto Agreement and future climate change agreements. Adaptation and mitigation actions must be implemented simultaneously, which means that climate change activities in Africa require a mixed portfolio of strategies, including mitigation, adaptation, and technological development and research.
Focusing on the climate change and development nexus
Adaptation to climate change is comprehensive and includes actions that reduce vulnerability and potential damage, such as strengthening/resilient climate bridges against storms and floods, planting a wider range of crops to reduce sensitivity to changes in rainfall, and finding and how to take advantage of the opportunities associated with climate change. The continent, which is heavily dependent on fossil fuels (traditional biomass and coal) for its electricity production, must also find ways to transition to a low-carbon growth trajectory without jeopardizing its economic growth.
Mainstreaming climate change adaptation into existing policymaking
The AU adopted the Declaration on Climate Change and Development in Africa in this regard (Addis Ababa, 2007). The EU provides financial support (`8 million) to ClimDev Africa and to increase the capacity of the Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture (AU Commission) through the Unit on Climate Change and Desertification Control.
Measuring the success of the EU-Africa climate change partnership
It is important that Africa speaks with one voice to ensure a coordinated approach to the pressing global adaptation issues, especially in light of the upcoming UNFCCC meeting in South Africa in December 2011 – the first such meeting to be held on African soil. 16 Friedman L, 'South Africa wants to cut emissions but lacks policies to match its rhetoric', The New York Times.
Costs of adapting to climate change
Each country will benefit from tailored support on climate change issues, together with an enhanced political dialogue with the EU. According to a UNDP Human Development Report 'estimate', by 2015, poor countries may need up to $86 billion a year in additional financing in order to adapt to the impacts of climate change. The UN report also states that in the same period 'at least $44 billion will be required annually to climate-proof development investments'.
Getting started: Renewable energy projects on the ground
Policies to address climate change should not detract from, but seek to enhance, the continent's development agenda. This link between climate change and development is indisputable and highlighted by the EU's approach to Africa.
Policy recommendations going forward
The EU has made significant progress in mainstreaming climate change into its development policies towards Africa and has also worked to climate-proof all its development programs in the region. Climate adaptation projects (which are really about development cooperation) are easily achievable and can add enormous value at the grassroots level.
Beyond Development: political context analysis as a tool for a more effective EU-Africa Partnership
Accumulation of climate change effects in Africa
A third issue to consider is the agricultural sector, which is very directly affected by climate change. An IPCC report published in 2007 highlighted that Africa is the most vulnerable continent to climate change due to its weak adaptive capacity.
Collaborative research: a way out of the energy and development nexus?
The real catch for African countries is that those who will be hardest hit by the impacts of climate change will not be able to cope with its impacts. Norway argues that a new climate regime under the Climate Convention should ensure that incentives are created to promote the diffusion of carbon capture and storage technology for the major emitters that currently have no obligations.
Inclusion of climate change policy
On 25 November 2009, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre announced that Norway and South Africa would work together to develop carbon capture and storage capabilities. That is why Norway will support the carbon capture and storage center recently established at the South African National Energy Research Institute.3 This research is all the more important because most African countries are still heavily dependent on fossil fuels for their primary resources. electricity and it is difficult to find a compromise between energy security and the development of sustainable energy sources.
Implications of African political economy for climate change
This example reinforces the idea of the cascading effect that multi-layered conflicts can have. It also illustrates the paramount importance of in-depth knowledge of the local and regional socio-economic and political context.
South Africa’s position in the climate change negotiations
Second, South Africa is keen to secure further international investment and was a prominent member of the African delegations invited to the China and South Korea summits. Environmental Politics in the Horn of Africa: The Political Economy of Nile Water Management.
Environment policy in the Horn of Africa: the political economy of the Nile River water management
The Political Economy of the Nile: Egypt and Sudan The 1959 Water Agreement or Regime Change for Sudan. Historically, Egypt's foreign policy has been shaped by the hydro-politics of the Nile and access to the Red Sea.
Agenda for Action
An EARN Proposal on the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the Future of Africa-EU Relations 1
The Joint Africa-EU Strategy: What has been achieved and what next?
The inability to address sensitive issues and face the inevitable differences of opinion and diverse interests may undermine the political significance of the JAES. We hope that EARN's recommendations will now be taken into account in discussions during the upcoming Africa-EU Summit and in the follow-up to the Summit and the 2nd Action Plan of the Africa-EU Joint Strategy.
Crosscutting challenges to change the culture of the partnership
If the JAES Action Plan is more directly linked to the development plans and respective interests of African and European countries and regions, it can promote greater participation and a sense of 'ownership' of the process. However, some investment in an active communication and information strategy about the JAES through the involvement of media and other stakeholders in both continents can be beneficial.
Policy oriented recommendations in key thematic areas of the JAES
The Partnership on Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure (TRII) should have the opportunity to help clarify the links and complementarities between bilateral trade agreements, existing processes at sub-regional level – including the EPAs and the Union for the Mediterranean – and the activities carried out at continental level within for the JAES framework. This could best be done through grassroots climate adaptation projects, which are really about development cooperation, thus bringing JAES's impact closer to the population.
Geert Laporte
He has a large publication of articles and books, mainly on development and on African issues.
Jean-Chistophe Hoste
Kerstin Pettreto
Adebayo Olukoshi
Andrew Sherriff
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos
Fernando Jorge Cardoso
Siphamandla Zondi
Stefan Mair
Tim Murithi
Tom Cargill
Patricia Magalhães Ferreira
Romy Chevallier
Sanoussi Bilal
ABOUT EARN
ADRA - Acção para o
Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente
AGI - Africa Governance Institute
Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies
CEAN - Institut d’Études politiques de Bordeaux
CEEI-ISRI - Centro de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais
CERI - Centre d’Études et de Recherches Internationales
CODESRIA - Council for the Development of Social Science
CPRD - Center for Policy Research
DIE - German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für
EADI –European Association of Development Studies
ECDPM - European Centre for Development Policy Management
Egmont - The Royal Institute for International Relations
EPC - European Policy Centre
EU-ISS - European Union Institute for Security Studies
FARA – Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa
FNSP - Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques de Côte d’Ivoire
FRIDE - Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el
IEEI – Institute for Strategic and International Studies /
IJR - Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
NAI Nordic Africa Institute / Nordiska Afrikainstitutet
NIIA - Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
RIIA - The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham
SAIIA - The South African Institute of International Affairs
SWP - German Institute for
International and Security Affairs / Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
EARN Coordination Team
BEYOND DEVELOPMENT AID
