The Conference of African Heads of State on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), held prior to the Copenhagen Summit of November 2009, agreed on a common African position, which centred around the need for immediate and deep reductions in carbon emissions by developed countries, allowances for developing countries to keep increasing their emissions, and mitigation, and adaptation and com- pensation measures to benefit African states23. Although this position foundered under the pressure of the international negotiation process, it remains an im- portant assertion of principles24.
Two ‘conclusions’ set out the views of the EU environment ministers and European Council25. The EU and AU positions overlap in broad terms, with the main differ- ences being over scale and timeframes. In the autumn of 2010, a key difference
20 ‘The European Consensus on Development’, policy statement, 2005 http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/consensus_en.cfm 21 New Partnership for Africa’s Development http://www.nepad.org/system/files/framework_0.pdf
22 EU-US Development Dialogue: Roadmap on the Millennium Development Goals in 2010-2011 http://ec.europa.eu/development/
icenter/repository/eu_us_roadmap_mdg_en.pdf
23 Africa Position on Climate Change http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csd/csd15/statements/africa_cc.pdf
24 Hoste. J ‘Where was united Africa in the climate change negotiations?’ Africa Policy Brief, Egmont Institute, February 2010 http://
www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/10/afr/2010-feb-Afr.P.Brief-Hoste-climate-change.pdf
25 Building a post-2012 global climate regime: the EU’s contribution http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/future_action.htm
remains the transfer mechanisms for mitigation and adaptation funding: Euro- pean countries favour their own individual development agencies, while African states argue that UN agencies would be more democratically accountable. Despite this difference, climate change is one area where the Africa-EU partnership of- fers significant overlap and potential for co-operation on global issues beyond immediate mutual concerns, which the joint Africa-EU Declaration on Climate Change of 2008 highlights26. Yet, as with trade, the very different circumstances of the EU and AU offer significant obstacles to establishing a common position for international negotiations involving other developing and developed regions.
In Europe, short-term national interests create tensions in the EU position on climate change, but in Africa, although fully aware of the reality of climate change, governments are uncertain how to place a response amongst the range of policy tools available. Financing is a particular bone of contention, as African governments do not, understandably, consider themselves responsible for the cost. This is changing slowly and is at risk of reversals in the aftermath of the financial crisis, which tested the commitments from all parties. For many Af- rican leaders beset with more clearly defined concerns, an added deterrent to prioritising climate change is the shortage of compelling policy-relevant predic- tions on the impacts of climate change and timescales. However, at the 14th AU Summit in February 2010, the AU reaffirmed its support of the CAHOSCC position, which shows a commitment to a common stance that may become more sub- stantive over time27. This is important, as the process by which the AU negotiated the common stance could serve as a useful blueprint for co-ordinating common positions on a range of other issues, including governance and trade28.
Conclusion
On the one hand, while the EU and AU agree on some fundamental aspirations concerning international governance, they differ significantly on how it should be implemented in practice. On the other hand, the EU and AU have deep and inextricable links, and longer term interests that may in some ways be set to converge while other interests are clearly divergent.
Managing such a transition will not be easy, and it is unrealistic to expect rela- tions to be divorced from the fading but still potent historical context of colo- nialism. In many respects, the current imperfect dispensation may be the most practical, as both groupings concentrate on resolving the developmental gap between them that prevents more firmly grounded partnership on global issues.
In this sense, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, while capable of improvement, is a good process. Yet, also important is minimising the scope for conflict, accepting the inevitability that positions will conflict and mitigating the impact of such conflicts in the longer term interests of the partnership. Here, diplomacy will continue to play a fundamental and growing role, particularly as the interna- tional system becomes less predictable.
26 Africa EU Declaration on Climate Change http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/20081201_africa_eu_
declaration_on_climate_change_1.doc
27 Division of Communication and information Press Release No. 30/ 14 AU Summit. Decisions of the 14th African Union Summit http://www.africa-union.org/root/ua/Conferences/2010/Summit/doc/Media/PR%2030%20-%2014%20EME%20SOMMET%20 UA%20-%20DECISIONS%20SOMMET%20-%2004-02-10%20english%20translation.doc
28 Keating. M. ‘With One Voice’, World Today, October 2009, P10.
Given the inextricable links outlined above, over the longer term, it is in both con- tinents’ interests to establish areas of consensus, in order to prevent one regional grouping from continually offering more threats than opportunities to the other.
Realistically, this can only take place after substantively addressing the source of much mistrust – the disparity in relative power between AU and EU due to Africa’s developmental, security and governance challenges. In this sense, the EU and its member states need to recognise that addressing these challenges is a strategic imperative and in their self-interest. Both groupings need to develop a more self- confident and well-defined narrative of what they can offer the world, and each other. For Europeans, this means a more practical and grounded appeal rather than lofty rhetoric about being a ‘moral power’. For the African Union, it may be a more confident narrative, beyond one of historical grievance and resistance.
Both groupings must be prepared to engage with the messy and compromising business of diplomatic and trade engagement without returning to an exploitative and short-termist relationship. Such an approach might also influence the manner in which both groupings approach global governance reform issues, encouraging them to share more power and promote greater mutual consensus and trust.
Given the apparently intractable obstacles to substantive co-operation on the big issues, the apparent level of co-operation is in many ways surprising. Some of this might be cynically explained by the quantity of money that the EU, as Africa’s largest donor and trade partner, brings to the relationship. On this basis, the relationship is set to decline inevitably, if gradually, as the balance of global power shifts, with African states becoming wealthier and emerging powers, such as Brazil, China and India, increasing their influence. Indeed, these powers have legitimate claims to be more reliable, coherent and appropriate partners for the AU, given their shared practical experiences of the situations currently facing many African states.
Yet, money is not the only driver of EU-AU relations. What sets the relationship apart is the historical and emotional complexity of the relations between the two regional groupings, which suggests that far brighter prospects for co-operation exist than cynical logic might dictate. Certainly, the AU and its members are be- coming less Eurocentric in outlook and are developing relationships with a whole range of international actors. This greater freedom of manoeuvre and decreasing dependency could open up space for a more genuine co-operation between the EU and AU – of which the Joint Africa EU strategy is perhaps evidence. It is not only from the African side that historical ties are loosening. Many of the EU’s newest members have very little common history, and some (such as the former commu- nist countries) have a different historical engagement with Africa, compared to the Western European countries that dominate EU relations with Africa, for now.
The former colonial powers, which still dominate the EU side of the EU-AU re- lations, are also becoming socially and culturally more linked to Africa, as im- migration establishes increasingly influential communities of African-origin Eu- ropeans with extensive ties across the AU. While Brazil, the United States and other parts of the world contain large diasporas, the shared time zones, strong political, cultural and sporting links, geographical proximity, and relatively easy communications between the EU and AU, give added power to European Afri- cans and underpin the importance of the EU-AU relationship. Despite all the mistrust, for now at least, fundamental cultural affinities and shared outlooks remain among most political elites in both groupings.