Inquiries about reproduction outside the. scope of the above should be sent to the Law Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. I started writing this book two years before the announcement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) among the P5+1 states (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China), the European Union and Iran in July 2015.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to acknowledge the significant research assistance provided by many people in the process of producing this book. In this book, I want to provide an international legal analysis of the most important legal issues that have arisen since 2002 regarding Iran's nuclear program and place these legal issues in their historical and diplomatic context.
INTRODUCTION
Development during the Shah’s Reign
In the early 1970s, Iran's nuclear program continued to grow and develop with the support of the United States and other Western powers. Diversification – including the development of nuclear energy – is the only sound and responsible energy strategy for Iran.” Id.
Shift in Attitude after the Revolution
While the French company Eurodif refused to return the $1 billion that Iran had invested in it, Eurodif and Iran reached an agreement under which they would supply Iran with 35,000 tons of equipment and half of the fuel needed for the reactors.44
Influence of the Iran- Iraq War
Four years after the Islamic Revolution and two years after Iran's new leaders dusted off the ousted Reza's nuclear program. Declassified CIA files show that the United States decided that Iran might not find evidence of chemical attacks and that it would be in the United States' best interests to allow the attacks to continue.
Developments in the 1990s
After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, Iran provided significant support to Iranian hardliners, the U.S. suggested that “[i]f you give in, if you help from a position of weakness, then you get negative results.”82 As he writes Trita Parsi in A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama's Iran Diplomacy, “The experience in Afghanistan negated what little trust existed between Washington and Tehran and made any future cooperation more difficult.”83.
Discovery of the Natanz Facility
Neither the uranium nor the existence of the JHL had been reported to the IAEA. Even after the IAEA found evidence of Iran developing a secret nuclear facility, Iran insisted its actions were justified.
EU- 3 Negotiations and the Paris Agreement
In March 2005, Iran submitted a proposal to the EU-3 proposing that Iran be allowed to continue certain uranium enrichment activities under strict controls, along with Western technology incentives and trade agreements.135 The EU-3 took considerable time to respond to this proposal. , and when he finally submitted a proposal to Tehran in August 2005, the proposal contained only vague language and no assurances that Iran would not be attacked, but demanded that Iran completely dismantle its nuclear facilities. 136 Iran rejected the August proposal of EU-3.137. While Iran was trying to negotiate with the EU-3, it continued to develop its nuclear program in other ways.
U.N. Sanctions
Despite Iran's rhetoric suggesting it would no longer be open to negotiations, it submitted a response to the European proposal as scheduled on August The response suggested that Iran. Security Council issued six resolutions applying an increasingly stringent multilateral economic/financial sanctions regime against Iran.173 Unilateral U.S.
ElBaradei’s 2008 Report to the IAEA
One of the main remaining questions about the nature of Iran's nuclear program is the alleged studies on the green salt project, the testing of high explosives and the missile re-entry vehicle. This is a matter of serious concern and critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension of Iran's nuclear program.
Obama’s Election in 2008
The remaining issues that ElBaradei flagged as an ongoing, unresolved concern for the IAEA were not issues involving nuclear material, but rather related to the issue of possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program—that is, issues that might keep researching and developing a nuclear explosive device. During the period of crisis regarding Iran's nuclear program, Israel has consistently tried to emphasize the gulf between Iran and the Western world, and to portray Iran as the enemy of the. West, while viewing itself as the United States' one democratic ally in the Middle East.184 For Israeli officials, Iran's potential possession of a nuclear weapons capability is typically viewed as an existential threat, in addition to a threat to Israel's power and influence in the region.
The TRR Fuel Deal
Both Iran and the United States have grown frustrated with the lack of progress made. Thus, they argued, the benefits of the agreement were greatly reduced.226 In short, Washington did not expect Turkey and Brazil to succeed in negotiations with Iran, and when they did, it was too late for the United States. to accept an agreement .227 The sanctions route was now the more attractive option. The United States has insisted that Iran suspend enrichment as a condition for negotiations, while Iran has asserted that it has a sovereign right to enrich uranium.
The Fordow Facility
- New IAEA Director General
When Yukiya Amano succeeded Mohamed ElBaradei as Director General of the IAEA in December 2009, he demonstrated a markedly different approach to the Iranian nuclear situation than ElBaradei. In the Parchin case, the IAEA relies on secret information from unspecified states or parties. However, the IAEA has not been able to argue that these experiments took place.
The Post- 2011 State of Iran’s Nuclear Program
The potential for politicization and falsification in such intelligence-sharing activities, and the fact that the IAEA did not disclose the sources of the intelligence it relied on in these reports, emerged as a major concern with regard to the allegations by the IAEA regarding possible military dimensions. to that of Iran. President Rouhani's inauguration offers Iran an opportunity to act quickly to address the international community's deep concerns about Iran's nuclear program. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated in an August 19, 2013 interview that "nuclear weapons have no place in our national security doctrine and are even detrimental to our national security."262.
Targeted Killings, Sabotage, and Cyberwarfare
President Rouhani also expressed his interest in reaching a peaceful solution, stating that "Iran has a serious political will to resolve the nuclear issue while protecting the rights of the Iranian people at the same time as seeking to remove the concerns of the other side. "261 Iran continues to assert that it is not pursuing nuclear weapons. The most significant of these attacks was the introduction of the Stuxnet computer virus into the Natanz facility in 2009. Thus, Iran was likely able to recover from the simultaneous catastrophic destruction of its centrifuges faster than it was able to recover from this continuous attack. 279 Langer further suggests that the operation of the Stuxnet virus at Natanz sends a clear message that “[g]igant weapons work”.
The 2013 Joint Plan of Action
Iran's commitments under the 2013 JPOA included a more significant list of concessions than expected by most observers.288 Some experts have pointed to Iran's acceptance of the JPOA as evidence that economic sanctions have contributed to a shift in Iran's core policy. For the first time in nearly a decade, we have stopped the progress of the Iranian nuclear program, and key parts of the program will be rolled back.”290. Greg Thielmann, a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association, suggested that the JPOA was successful in alleviating the most acute proliferation concerns.291 Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, praised diplomacy for “deliver[ing] the U.S.
The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
- tHe nPt reGIMe
- nPt artICLe II and “ManufaCture”
In summary, Western countries and the IAEA have argued that Iran has failed to fulfill its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement in a number of respects, starting most notably with the disclosure of the Natanz and Arak facilities in 2002. Since the obligation to enter into and comply with the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA stems from the first of paragraph III. NPT. Finally, Western countries and the IAEA insisted that Iran had violated its international legal obligations stemming from UN resolutions.
Interpreting NPT Article II
The fact that both terms had been considered by the drafters and that the term "manufacture" was the term eventually agreed upon by all NPT treaty parties tends to confirm the limited meaning of the term. These considerations are in fact closely analogous to the considerations that prompted the framers of the United Nations. Facts that can be objectively determined to exist, rather than interpretations of others' subjective intent to act in the future.
Application to the Iran Case
- Iaea safeGuards LaW oVerVIeW
- CoMPLIanCe WItH safeGuards treatIes
- aPPLICatIon to tHe Iran Case
This conclusion is shared by the two IAEA Directors General who immediately preceded the current Director General, Yukiya Amano. This process led to the adoption in 1997 by the IAEA Board of Governors of the Model Additional Protocol Agreement (INFCIRC/540). This perhaps raises the aforementioned question of the legal meaning and implication of a finding of non-compliance with safeguards by the IAEA Board of Governors.
Was Iran in Violation of Its Safeguards Obligations in 2003?
Formally, Resolution GOV/2003/81 can probably only be understood as the recognition by the Board of Governors of the Director General's report on non-compliance with the Iran Safeguards Agreement in the Government and not as the Board of. The law of state responsibility concerns the legal implications of the violation of a primary international law obligation by the international legal person on whom the obligation rests. As of the February 22, 2008 IAEA report, therefore, Iran's international legal responsibility for the international wrongful act it had committed prior to 2003 ceased.
Did Iran Violate Its Safeguards Obligations through Failure to Make Timely Declarations
- undeCLared nuCLear MaterIaLs
So, again, the reaction of the IAEA and Western governments criticizing what can reasonably be perceived as unjustifiable. The next question, then, concerns Iran's alleged 2007 return to applying the original Code standard 3.1. To understand and appreciate this debate, we will have to go back to the text of the INFCIRC/153 comprehensive defense agreement, and in particular Iran's CSA with the IAEA.
In other words, the IAEA's right and obligation to apply safeguards inside Iran is limited to the provisions and the procedures set out in Part II of the treaty. In 1997, the General Conference of the IAEA adopted a model Additional Protocol to the existing—inadequate—model safeguards agreement.
