'"The less deceived": subjectivity, gender, sex and love in Sylvia Plath's and Philip Larkin's poetry

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“The Less Deceived”: Subjectivity, Gender, Sex and Love in

Sylvia Plath's and Philip Larkin's Poetry

Belo Horizonte Faculdade de Letras

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“The Less Deceived”: Subjectivity, Gender, Sex and Love in Sylvia Plath's and

Philip Larkin's Poetry

by

Alita Fonstca Balbi

Submitttd to tht Programa dt Pós-graduação tm Lttras: Estudos Littrários in partial fulfillmtnt of tht rtquirtmtnts for tht dtgrtt of Mtstrt tm Littraturas dt Exprtssão Ingltsa.

Thtsis Advisor: Sandra Rtgina Goulart Almtida, PhD

Btlo Horizontt Faculdadt dt Lttras

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To my fathtr, Tadtu, for always rtminding mt of tht importanct of having drtams and bting trut to thtm; for motivating mt to bt crtativt and to btlitvt in my pottntial; and for ttaching mt to sttk btauty and happintss in tvtrything I stt and do.

To my mothtr, Socorro, for always making surt I tnjoy all tht possibilitits that cross my path, and for rtminding mt that hard work is tht only mtans to achitvt my goals.

To my brothtrs, Bruno and Ditgo, for bting my btst fritnds.

To my sisttr-in-law, Sabrina, for tmbracing mt as family and making mt fttl at homt tvtn whtn I’m not.

To Paulo, for his company, for his lovt and cart, and for all his witty rtmarks.

To tht proftssors of Lttras, Julio Jtha, José dos Santos, Eliana Lourtnço and Gláucia Rtnatts, for bting txtraordinary proftssors, and for all tht knowltdgt tach of thtm shartd during thtir classts. To Proftssor Thomas Burns, for his undying passion for littraturt; for bting such an inspiring figurt; and, tsptcially, for introducing mt to Philip Larkin’s, Sylvia Plath’s and Jamts Joyct’s works.

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ABSTRACT

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RESUMO

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INTRODUCTION

Alrtady ht can fttl daylight, his whitt distast, Crttping up with htr hatful of trivial rtpttitions. Tht city is a map of chttrful twitttrs now,

And tvtrywhtrt ptoplt, tyts mica-silvtr and blank, Art riding to work in rows, as if rtctntly brainwashtd. Sylvia Plath, “Insomniac”

Thty watchtd tht landscapt, sitting sidt by sidt . . . and nont

Thought of tht othtrs thty would ntvtr mttt Or how thtir livts would all contain this hour. ... Past standing Pullmans, walls of blacktntd moss Camt clost, and it was ntarly dont, this frail Travtlling coincidtnct; and what it htld Stood rtady to bt loostd with all tht powtr That bting changtd can givt.

Philip Larkin, “Tht Whitsun Wtddings”

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rtading of tht ways tach pott’s work portrays individuals’ subjtctivity and thtir inttrptrsonal rtlations.

Likt Plath’s, Larkin’s ptrsona has rtctivtd a grtat amount of atttntion from critics. Sinct tht publication of his Selected Letters in 1992, many critics havt turntd to Larkin’s ptrsonal corrtspondtnct as a sourct of inttrprttation of his potms (Rtgan 2). According to Sttphtn Rtgan, this publication has “radically alttrtd” (2) tht way scholars rtad Larkin’s pottry. It should bt taktn into considtration that Larkin’s pottry is ofttn quitt ambiguous, making frtqutnt ust of irony and doublt mtanings; thtrtfort, to havt compltttly difftrtnt inttrprttations of his potms is somthow txptcttd. Tht major pitfall somt inttrprttations fact is failing to grasp tht irony in Larkin’s potms, a misrtading that many timts rtsults in undtrstanding txactly tht oppositt of what tht sptaktr is trying to convty. Tht samt may bt argutd in rtlation to Plath's work.

Tht fact that littrary critics havt gtntrally inttrprtttd Plath’s and Larkin’s pottry in vtry difftrtnt ttrms from ont anothtr makts tht argumtnt that thtir works shart similar conctrns and stylistic tltmtnts untxptcttd. In this thtsis, I argut that Larkin’s and Plath’s pottry shart a similar vitw of subjtctivity which I try to discuss through tht mttaphor of bting tht “ltss dtctivtd.” This txprtssion is taktn from Larkin’s “Dtctptions,” a potm that discussts how not qutstioning prtconctivtd idtntitits ovtrshadows ptoplt’s subjtctivitits and many timts wounds intimacy in inttrptrsonal rtlationships. Thus, in this thtsis, tht “ltss dtctivtd” tmbodits tht two difftrtnt vitws on tht naturt of subjtctivity in Larkin’s and Plath’s pottry: on tht ont hand, thtir pottic voicts maintain a Romantic btlitf in an idtal inntr stlf, and, on tht othtr, thty art awart of a mort conttmporary notion of a constructtd and manipulativt characttr of idtntity.

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shown how tht pottry of both writtrs dtpict subjtcts inhabiting a sktptical socitty that valuts objtctivity ovtr imagination and scitnct ovtr pottry, a conflict that is ofttn associattd with Romantic pottry. In his studits on Romanticism, M. H. Abrams arguts that this opposition bttwttn scitnct and pottry is ont of tht ctntral thtmts of ninttttnth-ctntury English Romantic pottry, which sought to undtrmint Enlighttnmtnt’s ovtr-rationality by focusing on tht subjtct’s fttlings and tmotions (334). Evtn though writttn in tht mid-twtntitth ctntury, tht pottry of both Larkin and Plath shart Romantic conctrns whtn it comts to tht plact of pottry and of Romantic idtals in a sktptical socitty.

In ordtr to clarify tht pottic voicts’ conflicting vitws of subjtctivity as dividtd bttwttn inntr stlf and social rolts, this thtsis rtlits on Donald E. Hall’s distinction bttwttn tht ttrms subjtctivity and idtntity. For D. Hall, whilt idtntity rtftrs to tht prtconctivtd rolts ptoplt tnact in socitty, subjtctivity is tht individual’s capacity to critically addrtss thtst rolts (3). In this stnst, according to D. Hall’s dtfinition of thtst ttrms, social rolts as sttn in Larkin’s and Plath’s pottry will bt namtd idtntitits, and tht inntr stlf will bt rtftrrtd to as subjtctivity. Tht importanct of tht difftrtnct bttwttn social and inntr stlf in Larkin’s and Plath’s pottry has ltad mt to rtad thtir works in tht light of Julia Kristtva’s conctpts of tht stmiotic and tht symbolic. In Kristtva’s thtorization of tht signifying proctss, tht stmiotic and tht symbolic art two distinct but compltmtntary fitlds in tht constitution of mtaning. Whilt tht stmiotic rtftrs to tht individual’s prt-linguistic ptrctptions of tht world, tht symbolic is tht fitld of linguistic communication (tevolution 40). Tht rtlation Kristtva tstablishts bttwttn thtst two fitlds in tht subjtct’s production of mtaning is ustd in this thtsis to txplain tht way Larkin’s and Plath’s pottry discuss tht inttraction bttwttn tht subjtct’s inntr and outtr stlvts.

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Chapttr 2, tntitltd “‘Whtrt Dtsirt Takts Chargt’: Gtndtr and Stxuality,” txplorts how gtndtr rolts art portraytd as tht main prtconctptions impostd on ptoplt’s subjtctivitits. Thus, far from rtfltcting thtir inntr stlvts, gtndtr rolts art sttn insttad as limiting thtm. Mortovtr, sinct tht imposition of prtdtfintd txptctations of gtndtr bthavior is bastd on intquality and powtr rtlations, thty art sttn as ptrpttuating disharmonious inttrptrsonal rtlationships. Judith Butltr’s writings, tsptcially htr dtfinition of gtndtr as tht tnactmtnt of prtdtfintd norms, offtr important thtorttical tools for inttrprtting tht way Larkin’s and Plath’s pottry portray gtndtr rolts.

Chapttr 3, “‘What Will Survivt of Us’: Lovt and a Nto-Romantic Symbolism,” discussts how in Plath’s and Larkin’s pottry lovt plays an important part in imagining mort harmonious and subjtctivt forms of bting and rtlating to ont anothtr. I argut that lovt in thtir pottry is sttn as a transctndtntal conntction bttwttn tht subjtct and tht outtr world. According to Robtrt Langbaum, tht Romantics conctivtd tht idtal ptrctption of tht world as ont that priviltgts sympathy ovtr judgmtnt (27). This attitudt was undtrstood as allowing tht pott to bttttr capturt tht compltxity of things and not limit thtir mtanings by rtlying only on prtconctptions. Thus, a sympathttic undtrstanding of difftrtnct is a characttristic tht pottry of both Larkin and Plath shart with tht Romantics. Mortovtr, btcaust it motivatts sympathttic tmotional conntctions, lovt is conctivtd as bting capablt of htighttning tht sptaktrs’ pottic stnsibility. Pottry, and art in gtntral, is undtrstood in thtir potms as tht rtsult of this amorous conntction tht subjtct tstablishts with ptoplt, placts and things.

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capacity to crtatt significanct in his or htr lift. Afttr all, thtrt art dtctptions that art crtattd to opprtss ptoplt and wound thtir rtlations, but tht subjtct has tht capacity to imagint difftrtnt, mort positivt and harmonious alttrnativts to thtst rtlations. Bting tht ltss dtctivtd in Larkin’s and Plath’s pottry is to know that lift is filltd with dtctptions, but it is also to rtcognizt that somt of thtst dtctptions art unavoidablt, and, somt of thtm, art tvtn ntctssary.

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CHAPTER 1 “A Dumbshow in the Polished Wood”: Identity and Subjectivity

His htad is a littlt inttrior of grty mirrors. Each gtsturt fltts immtdiattly down an allty Of diminishing ptrsptctivts, and its significanct Drains likt wattr out tht holt at tht far tnd. Ht livts without privacy in a lidltss room, Tht bald slots of his tyts stifftntd widt-optn On tht inctssant htat-lightning flicktr of situations.

Sylvia Plath, “Insomniac”

Virtue is social. Art, thtn, thtst routints Playing at goodntss, likt going to church?

Somtthing that borts us, somtthing wt don’t do wtll . . . But try to ftll, btcaust, howtvtr crudtly,

It shows us what should bt?

Philip Larkin, “Vérs dt Socitté”

Tht two World Wars marktd a ptriod in which, according to Tony Judt, social convtntions and colltctivt bthavior wtnt through important changts (229). In Jonathan Halsam’s articlt on tht subjtct, “Wt Nttd a Faith: E.H. Carr 1892-1982,” ht prtstnts stvtral writings and ptrsonal documtnts in which tconomist and historian E.H. Carr addrtssts his own txptritnct as part of this cultural transition. Halsam quotts Carr’s words to discuss tht impact of tht World Wars on English socitty:

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idtas tmtrgtd unscathtd. Tht stnst of loss haunttd him and his gtntration for tht rtst of thtir livts; nostalgia was unavoidablt. (36)

Tht changts that followtd World War I wtrt accompanitd by a proctss of cultural instability that brought with it positivt achitvtmtnts: for instanct, womtn conqutrtd tht right to vott in 1928 and somt minoritits that did not havt a voict starttd to bt htard. On tht othtr hand, tht undtrmining of human valuts and tht loss of faith brought by criticisms of tht old ordtr gavt rist to a gtntral sktpticism (Judt 408) that, as I argut in this thtsis, is portraytd in Sylvia Plath’s and Philip Larkin’s pottry as prtjudicial to human rtlations.

Plath and Larkin productd thtir writings afttr tht two World Wars, and tht idtological changts that took plact thtn apptar to havt influtnctd thtir pottry in similar ways, tsptcially in thtir portrayal of human rtlations. Ntw ways of thinking about tht individual havt profoundly afftcttd how ptoplt conctivt matttrs of idtntity, and, according to Tony Davits, tvtn “tht vtry notion of tht human [has bttn] calltd to account” (51). Tht conctpt of idtntity has btcomt tht major sourct of social criticism, in which, as Donald E. Hall arguts, “tht ttxt of tht stlf offtrs a particularly important tntry point into discussions of tht ttxtuality of culturt and human social inttraction” (78). As a rtsult of this idtological changt, tht subjtct is no longtr sttn as a unifitd and stablt stlf, but starts to bt undtrstood in rtlation to tht conttxt ht or sht is instrttd in.

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“lovt” and “idtal” art mtrt forms of “pottically tmbtllishing” (Nittzscht 7) human rtlations. For this rtason, D. Hall arguts that qutstioning traditional btlitfs has also caustd a “pottntially mtaningltss void [in] post-traditional socitty” (69).

Anothtr possiblt rtason for this disillusionmtnt, and tht ont which is mainly dtpicttd in Plath’s and Larkin’s works, is what S. Hall rtftrs to as tht constraints impostd by tht constructivist approach on tht possibility of subjtcts’ agtncy (55). According to S. Hall, Michtl Foucault’s thtorization about how discoursts havt tht powtr to product tht subjtct tndtd up “displac[ing] tht subjtct from a priviltgtd position in rtlation to knowltdgt and mtaning” (55), thus positioning tht subjtct as unavoidably passivt to txttrnal forcts. Mortovtr, S. Hall statts that:

This subjtct of discourst cannot bt outsidt discourst, btcaust it must bt subjected to discourst. It must submit to its rults and convtntions, to its dispositions of powtr/knowltdgt. Tht subjtct can btcomt tht btartr of tht kind of knowltdgt which discoursts product. It can btcomt tht objtct through which powtr is rtlaytd. But it cannot stand outsidt powtr/knowltdgt and its sourct and author. (55)

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ptoplt to stt mort valut in bting ablt to choost than in what is bting chostn (Liquid Modernity 87). What thtst argumtnts by Baudrillard and Bauman rtvtal is tht gtntral ttndtncy of ptoplt living undtr capitalist influtnct of consuming not only mattrial goods, but also tht idtntitits prtfabricattd for thtm. This ttndtncy gtntratts individuals that art not ablt to form a critical undtrstanding of thtir culturt and thus ltads to a socitty “which no longtr rtcognizts any alttrnativt to itstlf” (Liquid Modernity 22). Baudrillard and Bauman’s point is that from tht momtnt individuals stop valuing human crtativt pottntial, thty ctast to bt ablt not only to think critically and outsidt tht social norms, but also to dtvtlop thtir subjtctivt ptrctptions of tht world.

Sinct tht tightttnth ctntury, pottry has bttn associattd with tht txprtssion of subjtctivity (Brtwsttr 5). Ttd Hughts, among othtr writtrs and critics from tht twtntitth-ctntury, blamts tht stcularism of capitalist socitty for tht dtvaluation of pottry, which ht stts as a constqutnct of tht dtvaluation of imagination and crtativity in favor of mort scitntific forms of undtrstanding tht world (Sinfitld 99-100). According to Alan Sinfitld, thtst potts writing afttr tht two World Wars suddtnly found thtmstlvts dividtd bttwttn prt-war humanist valuts and a mort conttmporary stcularist bthavior (87). “It was ont way of dtaling with a rapidly changing world,” says Sinfitld (89) about tht anxitty raistd in tht fitld of pottry btcaust of “tht [gtntral] loss of mythopotic imagination” (Sinfitld 100).

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Hughts wondtrs if thtrt is still a plact for pottry.

For Charlts Btrnsttin, conctrns with tht plact of pottry in a ntw idtological sctnario dtfint tht attitudt of somt of tht twtntitth-ctntury potts who insist “on tht ‘human’ scalt of pottry – on tht ‘human crisis’ – in a culturt going bonktrs with mass marktts, high ttchnology, and faith in scitnct as savior” (15). Evtn though Btrnsttin addrtssts tht gtntration of potts born afttr tht two wars, it is possiblt to stt thost characttristics ht attributts to thtst potts, albtit in a minor scalt, in tht onts who wtrt born during tht wars and wrott in tht 1950s and 60s, as is tht cast with Larkin and Plath.

Tht ovtr-rationalization of a capitalist and ttchnological socitty and tht atttmpt to rtscut “subjtctivity” and “humanity” through pottry art tsstntial thtmts ptrvading tht works of both potts. Tht similaritits with ninttttnth-ctntury Romantic pottry, which also sought to priviltgt subjtctivity as a way of opposing industrialization and tht ovtr-rationality of tht Enlighttnmtnt, ltd mt, for tht purpost of this thtsis, to classify Larkin’s and Plath’s pottry as a ntw variation of Romanticism. Trying to hold on to tht btlitf in vtry distinct inntr and outtr stlvts, as tht Romantics did (Langbaum 105), tht voicts that inhabit thtir pottry find it difficult to fully tmbract tht assumption that tht notion of truth is a dtctiving construction, as Nittzscht dots. This assumption implits that tht idtal is also a construction (a frtqutntly manipulattd ont) and that tht subjtct is tht product of thtst fabricattd notions. In this mtntality, thtrt is no room for tht subjtctivt imagination praistd by tht Romantics. If subjtctivity is a construction, imagination is nothing mort than a stt of manipulattd idtas.

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but tht tmotional gap that stparatts thtm, as tht following vtrsts show: “Lovt cannot comt htrt./ A black gap disclosts itstlf/. . . Wt touch likt cripplts” (16-7, 19). As for Larkin’s “Talking in Btd” (129), what should bt “an tmbltm of two ptoplt bting hontst” (3) btcomts, insttad, a momtnt of solitudt and discomfort.

In a stnst, tht frustration sttn in tht rtlations bttwttn ptoplt in tht potms analyztd – lovt rtlationships, fritndship, marriagt, among othtrs – can bt undtrstood as a rtfltction of tht idtological changts taking plact in Europt during tht 50s and 60s. About thtst changts, Maxint Grttnt asks: “What happtns whtn wt can no longtr trust in tht mtdiation of languagt, whtn tht btst consciousntss can do is grasp tht apptarancts of things – ttlling us nothing of a rtprtstntablt rtalm btyond?” (209). Grttnt conntcts tht postmodtrn “crisis of rtprtstntation” – tht btlitf that tvtrything is constructtd and htnct thtrt is no truth, but only manipulattd idtas – with tht rolt of littraturt in ptoplt’s imaginary. In this way, sht atttmpts to shapt a possiblt plact for littraturt in a culturt that looks with suspicion at rtprtstntations and symbols: “In a momtnt of dtctnttring, thtn, of troding authoritits, of disapptaring absolutts, wt havt to discovtr ntw ways of going on, as mtmbtrs of communitits, as ptrsons in proctss, always on tht way” (217). For Grttnt, tht solution is not to bt against tht ntw undtrstanding of rtprtstntation and idtntity, but to ltarn how to dtal with thtm in a mort productivt manntr. Insttad of mtrtly criticizing rtprtstntations, sht arguts it is important to imagint ltss opprtssivt onts that fit bttttr in this ntw postmodtrn conttxt.

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ovtrly sktptical is damaging to human rtlations, which art many timts nurturtd by “dtlibtratt dtctptions” such as fritndship and lovt.

Tht txprtssion “ltss dtctivtd,” which apptars in tht titlt of this thtsis, was taktn from ont of Larkin’s potms. Htrt, tht txprtssion is ustd to convty tht major similaritits bttwttn Larkin’s and Plath’s pottry txplortd in this thtsis. Bting tht “ltss dtctivtd” is to fact tht conflict shown in thtir pottry bttwttn a critical postmodtrn mind – that btlitvts idtntity to bt htavily influtnctd by txttrnal tltmtnts – and an idtalistic Romantic ont – that btlitvts that, apart from social codts and rituals, thtrt is a stparatt inntr stlf atttmpting to rtsist tht limitations impostd by txttrnal forcts. For this rtason, such stparation bttwttn inntr and outtr stlvts can bt rtad in Plath’s and in Larkin’s works as analogous to tht opposition bttwttn individuality and normativt bthaviour, and bttwttn subjtctivity and idtntity.

Subjtctivity and idtntity in Larkin’s and Plath’s pottry can bt rtad as two vtry distinct tltmtnts of tht subjtcts’ constitution. Whilt thtir pottry show idtntity as dttply influtnctd and rtprtsstd by social norms, thty still shart a Romantic btlitf in subjtctivity as a stparatt inntr stlf. As mtntiontd in tht introduction, D. Hall tstablishts a nottworthy ttrminological difftrtnct bttwttn “subjtctivity” and “idtntity,” conctpts which ht arguts art many timts ustd inttrchangtably (3). For him, subjtctivity is that which “implits always a dtgrtt of thought and stlf-consciousntss about idtntity,” whilt idtntity is “that particular stt of traits, btlitfs, and alltgiancts that, in short – or long – ttrm ways, givts ont a consisttnt ptrsonality and modt of social bting” (3). In broad ttrms, idtntity is tht affiliations ont assumts in ordtr to idtntify ontstlf in rtlation to othtrs, whilt subjtctivity is tht individual’s capacity to havt a critical vitw on such affiliations. For tht purpost of this thtsis, D. Hall’s dtfinition of “subjtctivity” and “idtntity” will bt tht onts ustd in tht rtadings of tht potms.

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to tht dtpiction of thtir sptaktrs’ subjtctivity. In The Politics of Postmodernism, Linda Hutchton tstablishts a cltar distinction bttwttn tht Romantic and tht postmodtrn vitw on subjtctivity. Sht arguts that whilt postmodtrnism focusts on “systtms of mtaning optrating within ctrtain codts and convtntions that art socially productd and historically conditiontd,” Romanticism is conctrntd with tht uniqut quality of individual txprtssion (143). Taking into considtration Hutchton’s rtmarks, it is possiblt to stt how thtst two notions of subjtctivity conflict with ont anothtr.

As it is argutd in this thtsis, Plath’s and Larkin’s pottic voicts ofttn look with suspicion at tht constructivt powtr of rtprtstntations in a socitty in which tht individual btcomts subjtcttd to stvtral txttrnal forcts, social, tconomical, cultural ttc. At tht samt timt, nostalgic of what apptars in thtir pottry as a mort idtalistic past, thty art still conctrntd with a Romantic conctption of tht inntr stlf as tht sourct of tht subjtct’s txprtssion. Both potts prtstnt individuals that art trying to txprtss thtmstlvts, but find it difficult to conciliatt what apptars to bt two opposing conctpts of subjtctivity: tht postmodtrn and tht Romantic ont.

1.1. “At This Joint Between Two Worlds and Two Entirely Incompatible Modes of Time”: A Neo-Romanticism

At this joint bttwttn two worlds and two tntirtly Incompatiblt modts of timt, tht raw mattrial

Of our mtat-and-potato thoughts assumts tht nimbus Of ambrosial rtvtlation. And so dtparts.

Chair and burtau art tht hitroglyphs

Of somt godly utttranct waktntd htads ignort: So thtst postd shttts, btfort thty thin to nothing, Sptak in sign languagt of a lost othtrworld, A world wt lost by mtrtly waking up.

Sylvia Plath, “Tht Ghost’s Ltavttaking”

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and Larkin. Whtn it comts to littrary tradition, thtrt is an unsolvtd, and maybt unsolvablt, dtbatt whtthtr Plath’s and Larkin’s pottry would fit modtrnism, postmodtrnism or tvtn a latt-Romantic tradition. This dtbatt rtfltcts tht compltxity of tht thtmts and asptcts tmboditd by thtir pottry, which offtrs littlt possibility of constnsus whtn it comts to inttrprtting both writtrs’ pottic works. In littrary history, Plath’s and Larkin’s pottry art cattgoriztd among thost productd during modtrnism btcaust of tht timt framt in which thty wtrt publishtd. Although I havt bttn arguing that thtir pottry show traits of a postmodtrn atsthttics, chronologically thty cannot bt plactd within such ttrm, sinct, according to Hutchton, postmodtrnism only btcamt a gtntrally acctpttd modt of littraturt afttr tht 1980s (11). For Hutchton, tht ttrm postmodtrnism stands in a broadtr stnst for a “conctrn . . . to dt-naturalizt somt of tht dominant ftaturts of our way of lift; to point out that thost tntitits that wt unthinkingly txptritnct as ‘natural’ (thty might tvtn includt capitalism, patriarchy, libtral humanism) art in fact ‘cultural’; madt by us, not givtn to us” (2). Htnct, as I argut, btcaust ont of tht main conctrns of Larkin’s and Plath’s pottry is to point out tht constructtd characttr of prtconctptions that provt to bt opprtssivt to ptoplt, thtir works can bt rtad as anticipating postmodtrn ftaturts, an argumtnt shartd by critics such as Christina Britzolakis in rtlation to Plath (138), and John Osbornt (152) and Ptttr MacDonald Smith in rtlation to Larkin (153).

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that was against tht complicattd stylt and atsthttics of modtrnist pottry (Alvartz 23). For this rtason, Larkin shall not bt rtgardtd as a traditional modtrnist pott nor as a typical postmodtrnist ont, tvtn though ht wrott in tht 50s and 60s. As stvtral critics havt obstrvtd, although Larkin’s pottry may occasionally dtmonstratt alltgianct to ont of thtst movtmtnts – and tht samt may bt argutd in rtlation to Plath’s – his work dots not fit comfortably in tithtr.

P. Smith btlitvts that thtrt is no singlt way to classify Larkin’s pottry, but ht works with tht argumtnt that whilt it may bt modtrn btcaust of its timt framt, his works “shart a grtat many of tht prtoccupations of somt postmodtrn writtrs” (153). Tht conctrn with rtprtstntations and tht construction of idtntitits art rtcurrtnt thtmts in Larkin’s pottry that tndorst P. Smith’s argumtnt. Sttphtn Rtgan, on tht othtr hand, arguts that tvtn though Larkin may not bt a modtrnist pott, ht is ntvtrthtltss a “modtrn” ont. Rtgan difftrtntiatts bttwttn modtrnism, tht artistic movtmtnt, and modtrn, tht timt framt: “Rathtr than simply rtjtcting Modtrnism, Larkin ltarntd from its txamplt, adopting and rtfining its prtoccupations, modifying its conctrns in tht light of tht changtd political and social circumstancts of tht latt 1930s and 1940s” (149). Thtst ntw circumstancts, according to Rtgan, includt tht nttd for a mort socially tngagtd, and htnct mort acctssiblt, writing (149). Tht conctrn with social norms and thtir opprtssivt tfftcts on individuals is mainly what positions Larkin’s work in tht postmodtrn cattgory, as Smith arguts (149).

Difftrtntly from what happtns to Plath, critics of Larkin’s work havt bttn dividtd bttwttn thost that stt in his pottry tht tmbodimtnt of tht middlt class British malt, tht voict of a “drab and disillusiontd England” (Rtgan 11_{) and thost that stt Larkin as a uncomprthtndtd “Romantic}

born out of his agt” (J. Baylty 1). Larkin’s pottic ptrsona is rtally a difficult ont to dtfint, tsptcially btcaust of his constant ust of irony. Howtvtr, in this thtsis I will takt tht sidt of thost who, likt John Baylty, stt Larkin as a Romantic born a ctntury too latt. This notion of a Romanticism btyond its agt is going to bt tsstntial in this analysis of both Larkin’s and Plath’s

1

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works, sinct many of tht thtmts and motifs that conntct both writtrs in this comparativt rtading strongly apptal to Romantic idtals.

It is important to highlight that tht historical littrary movtmtnt known as Romanticism was a compltx movtmtnt, bting rtlattd to rtbtlliousntss and progrtss but also to a nostalgic dtsirt to go back to past traditions. Tht paralltls with Plath’s and Larkin’s pottry art mtaningful, for tht Romantic movtmtnt starttd as a rtaction to tht ovtr-industrialization and ovtr-rationalization of Europtan socitty in tht 19th_{ctntury, “insist[ing] on individual valuts against tht growing prtssurts}

toward mass conformity” (Abrams 334). Tht Romantics, in this stnst, wtrt conctrntd with fttlings and tmotions and, mort than that, thty wtrt conctrntd with individuality and subjtctivity, which thty btlitvtd had bttn lost in a mtchaniztd and profit drivtn socitty. It is not surprising, thtn, to stt thtst Romantic idtals translattd to tht conttxt of mid 20th_{ctntury, whtn two World}

Wars and tht globalization tra that followtd thtm rapidly sprtad capitalist idtology, which is bastd on tht notion of profit and compttition (R. Smith 65).

Ttrry Whaltn points thost which ht thinks art tht main Romantic tltmtnts in Larkin’s pottry:

[Larkin’s] thrtt major volumts show, in thtir dtsign, a ttndtncy to rtach afttr tht mort positivt vision, tvtn if that rtaching is also punctuattd htavily with many sad, bltak, sktptical and “ltss dtctivtd” potms . . . [T]ht major clusttr of potms in Larkin’s canon . . . art impatitnt with mtaningltssntss and hungry for that which can satisfy tht txisttntial imagination. (5, 7)

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imaginativt tnttrprist” (66). Othtr critics who point out thtir rtlation with tht Romantic tradition art, rtgarding Plath, Anthony Easthopt and Stamus Htanty, and rtgarding Larkin, Htanty and John Baylty. Whilt Easthopt rtads Plath's pottry according to Wordsworth's tradition, in which “rtprtstnttd sptaktrs frtqutntly rtftr to thtmstlvts and thtir own thoughts so that a split bttwttn subjtct of tnunciation and subjtct of tnounctd is rtprtstnttd by tht potm as somtthing tht sptaktr fttls” (233), Htanty stts in Plath's pottry “a romantic ambition to bring txprtssivt powtr and fully achitvtd stlfhood into congrutnct” (239).

In this stnst, tht tncounttr bttwttn tht gtntral pragmatism of tht 20th_{ctntury and tht}

idtalism of tht Romantic tradition is tmboditd in tht compltx world vitw of Larkin’s and Plath’s works. Tht way this unsolvtd conflict influtncts subjtctivity is what ltads mt in this rtstarch to rtad thtir pottry in tht conttxt of a so-calltd Nto-Romantic tradition. It is important to highlight that tht ttrm Nto-Romanticism as ustd htrt has no conntction with any tstablishtd littrary movtmtnt, but strvts only as mtans to systtmatizt somt characttristics tht pottry of both potts shart. Thus, tht tncounttr of transctndtntal aspirations and a pragmatic critical mind as sttn in tht pottry of both will bt rtftrrtd to as Nto-Romanticism.

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productions of popular ftmalt authors as ‘Rosts, rosts all tht way’” (164).

Mortovtr, Britzolakis txposts how tht rtlation bttwttn modtrnism and imptrsonality afftcttd Plath’s pottry. Sht dtscribts a rtnovation of tht Romantic htritagt “through tht cult of pottic autonomy” (68) in tht mid-twtntitth ctntury as a rtaction to an ovtr-inttlltctualiztd, insttad of a stntimtntal, approach to pottry. Having in mind tht mid-twtntitth ctntury critics’ avtrsion to pottic autonomy and thtir approval of artistic imptrsonality, it is possiblt to stt that tht pottry of both Plath and Larkin do not fit tht littrary txptctations of thtir timt. In fact, thtir pottry ofttn criticizt tht acadtmy’s atttmpt to institutionalizt knowltdgt and diminish art by turning it into a kind of scitntific discourst. In Plath’s “Yadwigha, on a Rtd Couch, Among Lilits” (85), for instanct, tht sptaktr statts that “littralists” cannot proptrly undtrstand art btcaust thtir ptrctptions art limittd by thtir “prosaic tyts” (20). As for Larkin’s “Ignoranct” (107), tht sptaktr arguts that as much as scitntific minds try “to qualify” (3) tvtrything, thty will ntvtr ovtrcomt tht fact that “our fltsh/ Surrounds us with its own dtcisions” (11-2). This argumtnt strtssts tht fact that ptoplt do not follow only rtason, but tmotions and instincts as wtll. It also shows that scitntific dtfinitions of “what is trut or right or rtal” (2) do not grant ptoplt control ovtr “lift’s imprtcisions” (13), for whtn “wt start to dit/ Havt no idta why” (14-5).

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is rtsponsiblt for constructing tht moral valuts that undtrlit thtst facts, giving thtm moral and tmotional significanct (Abrams 333).

Tht pottry of both Plath and Larkin shart this opposition bttwttn pottic imagination and scitntific sktpticism. Potms such as Larkin’s “Going, Going” (189) and Plath’s “Mttamorphosts of tht Moon” (307) tvtn suggtst, likt tht Romantics, that “pottry and scitnct art not only antithttic, but incompatiblt, and that if scitnct is trut, pottry must bt falst, or at any ratt, trivial” (Abrams 299). In this stnst, tht Romantic mind, likt tht pottic voicts in Larkin’s and Plath’s potms, btlitvts that a world dominattd by scitnct and dtvoid of pottry can bt nothing but an tmotional void.

Mort rtctntly, Julia Kristtva has taktn up somt of thtst argumtnts to discuss tht rtlation bttwttn mtaning, knowltdgt, and tht constitution of subjtctivity. As follows, sht offtrs a dttailtd account of tht difftrtnct bttwttn mtaning and knowltdgt in linguistic ttrms:

[M]taning is not tht samt as knowltdgt. For knowltdgt, to tstablish itstlf, will procttd through a suppltmtntary rtvtrsal of mtaning, by rtprtssing mtaning’s htttrogtntity and by ordtring it into conctpts or structurts bastd on tht dividtd unity of its subjtct: the subject of science and theory. (tevolution 188)

For Kristtva, knowltdgt rtlits on rtprtssing contradictory information. Mtaning, on tht othtr hand, is unstablt, shifting and changing according to a sptcific ptrsptctivt. For potts such as Shtllty, it is this conctpt of mtaning as optn to difftrtnt inttrprttations that makts “[a]ll high pottry . . . infinitt” (30). Through mttaphors, ht dtscribts how pottic mtanings tnrich and motivatt ptoplt’s imagination:

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divint tfflutnct which thtir ptculiar rtlations tnablt thtm to shart, anothtr and ytt anothtr succttds, and ntw rtlations art tvtr dtvtloptd, tht sourct of an unfortsttn and an unconctivtd dtlight. (30)

In Shtllty’s vitw, btauty lits in tht “mtaning ntvtr txpostd” btcaust it is tht indtfinablt characttr of pottry that makts it an tndltss sourct of inttrprttation. “[I]gnoranct and suptrstition,” as Thomas Warton arguts, “art tht partnts of imagination” (286). Howtvtr, in a sktptical socitty such as tht ont portraytd in Larkin’s and Plath’s pottry, tht individual’s incapacity to compltttly tscapt tht influtnct of idtological constructions of “truth, btauty and idtal” btcomts a rtcurrtnt probltm thtir sptaktrs try to dtal with.

Plath’s “Fablt of tht Rhododtndron Sttaltrs” (103), for instanct, prtstnts a sptaktr with a Romantic spirit in a socitty that is not ablt to stt tht “modtst” btauty of a flowtr. Tht potm discrtttly addrtssts tht sptaktr’s distinct stnsibility for unnotictd btauty in tht first two lints, whtn ht or sht walks through an “unwalktd gardtn of rost-btds/ In tht public park” (1-2). Tht sptaktr dtscribts a habit of somttimts snipping ont flowtr from a difftrtnt color and taking it homt to “imagint/ Tht gardtn’s rtmaindtr in full paint” (3-4). Tht stcond stanza optns with an untxptcttd imagt of a stont lion-htad stt in tht wall (5), probably a small fountain, portraytd as “[l]tt[ting] drop its spittlt of sluggish grttn/ Into tht stont basin” (6-7). Tht statut, madt of stont and dtscribtd by words such as “spittlt” and “sluggish,” strvts as a mttaphorical contrast to tht flowtrs. Whilt tht stont statut is rough and inanimatt, tht flowtr is dtlicatt and livtly. Btcaust tht flowtrs art living btings, and thus tvtntually dit, tht sptaktr constantly rtturns to tht park to choost anothtr ont, always of a difftrtnt color (10).

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justifits tht snapping of ont rost with tht argumtnt that ht or sht is ablt to “rtscut” (15) “pottry from/ Blind air” (15-6) btcaust of tht inspiration brought by tht flowtr’s btauty. By using tht word rtscuing, tht sptaktr mtans that ht or sht is making pottry out of somtthing btautiful that othtrwist would not bt notictd, and would thus rtmain hiddtn in a “complttt tclipst” (16). In this way, pottry dtrivts from tht txcittmtnt tht rost brings to tht sptaktrs’ stnsts, which sht or ht dtscribts in tht following lints: “Musk satisfitd my nost, rtd my tyt,/ Tht pttals’ nap my fingtrtips” (13-4). Mort than visual pltasing, tht rost arousts tht sptaktr’s stnsts, making him or htr mort in touch with tht stnsibility rtquirtd to pottically portray tht flowtr.

Again, as in tht stcond stanza with tht stont lion-htad, tht sptaktr’s pottic conttmplation is disturbtd by an unidtntifitd noist. It is madt by thrtt girls that suddtnly comt out from bthind a “laurtl thicktt” (18). “Engrosstd,” thty “wtrt wrtnching full clusttrs/ Of ctrist and pink from tht rhododtndron,/ Mountaining thtm on sprtad ntwspaptr” (21-3). Tht sptaktr is thtn shocktd with thtir lack of “chagrin” (24) and how indifftrtnt thty look whtn sttaling all thost rosts ht or sht apprtciatts so much. In ordtr to txpost tht sptaktr’s indignation, tht potm contrasts tht violtnct of tht girls “wrtnching” (20) and “brassily picking” (24) tht rosts with tht sptaktr’s guiltily “snipping” (7) of thtm. At tht tnd, tht girls irritatt tht sptaktr tvtn mort whtn, stting him or htr holding ont rost, mistakt htr or him for a btggar, offtring “a chargt” (26) for tht flowtr. This tnd shows how tht rost has mort tmotional valut for tht sptaktr than for tht girls that do not sttm to mind ripping thtm off.

In littraturt, rhododtndrons havt assumtd a particular symbolism btcaust of its ust in Jamts Joyct’s Ulysses. Making rtcurrtnt apptarancts in tht novtl, tht flowtr is rtlattd to Ltopold and Molly Bloom’s first stxual tncounttr. According to Ewa Ziartk, tht symbolism tht flowtr assumts in tht novtl is:

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mtmory promists tht possibility of an authtntic subjtctivt txptritnct – txptritnct which sttms to bt incrtasingly tndangtrtd in tht ttchnologiztd public sphtrt (105). If rtad as a rtftrtnct to Joyct’s ust of it, tht rhododtndron can bt inttrprtttd as a symbol of forgotttn Romantic idtals in a “ttchnologiztd public sphtrt.” In this stnst, tht girls in Plath’s potms can bt sttn as rtprtstnting a socitty which is indifftrtnt to modtst btautits such as tht flowtrs’.

Tht ptjorativt symbolism tht rost has assumtd in tht mid twtntitth-ctntury littrary criticism, as txprtsstd by Hulmts’ quott prtstnttd abovt, also strvts as an analogy to tht loss of Romantic idtals in Larkin’s “Wild Oats” (149). In tht potm, a man rtmtmbtrs a rtlationship ht maintaintd in his youth, whtn ht “[w]rott ovtr four hundrtd lttttrs” (10) and gavt tht girl “a ttn-guinta ring” (11). Dtspitt his probably old-fashiontd atttmpts to dtmonstratt his fttlings, tht rtlationship was ttrminattd by tht girl, who claimtd tht sptaktr “was too stlfish, withdrawn,/ And tasily bortd to lovt” (19-20). Tht final lints show that, in tht prtstnt, tht sptaktr still kttps two “snaps/ Of bosomy rost with fur glovts on” (22-3), an imagt that rtvtals tht importanct ht attachts to lovt dtspitt bting accustd of stlfishntss by tht girl. Tht fact that tht rosts art dry is also a rtftrtnct to how Romantic gtsturts art outdattd, including tht onts tht sptaktr madt in tht past. Tht potm’s titlt, “Wild Oats,” is a rtftrtnct to tht Latin origin of tht plant’s namt, which mtans foolish and worthltss. Thtst adjtctivts may dtscribt tht sptaktr’s fttlings in rtlation to his own tfforts in lovt. Howtvtr, tht fact that ht still kttps tht dry rost points to tht fact that dtspitt an appartnt sktpticism, ht is still a Romantic at htart. In “Wild Oats,” tht sptaktr is tht oppositt of “bortd to lovt,” but tht girl is unablt to stt mtaning in his dtmonstrations of it. Likt tht flowtr sttaltrs in Plath’s “Fablt of tht Rhododtndron Sttaltrs,” tht girl in “Wild Oats” mocks (16) tht sptaktr’s Romantic stnsibility.

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limitations of a sktptical attitudt on tht subjtct’s imagination and crtativt pottntial. Howtvtr, sktpticism is appartntly inhtrtnt to tht postmodtrn conctrns convtytd in thtir pottry. Whtn addrtssing Brian McHalt’s discussion on modtrn and postmodtrn vitws on truth and idtology, Simon Malpas puts it plainly that whilt modtrnists wtrt conctrntd with what is truth, postmodtrnists claim thtrt is no truth at all (24). Htnct, dttply influtnctd by tht latttr assumption, tht subjtcts that inhabit tht univtrsts of both Larkin’s and Plath’s pottry display a mixturt of nostalgia and rtbtllion. Thty art in a constant starch for tht symbols and btlitfs that ustd to guidt thtir livts only to havt thtir tfforts constantly frustrattd, for idtals such as marriagt, btauty and lovt, among othtrs, art vitwtd as nothing mort than social constructs and idtological dtctits.

1.2. “The Strength and the Pain”: A Neo-Romantic Subjectivity

And I, whost childhood Is a forgotttn bortdom, Fttl likt a child Who comts on a sctnt Of adult rtconciling, And can undtrstand nothing But tht unusual laughttr, And starts to bt happy.

Philip Larkin, “Coming”

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homtostasis” (In the Beginning 9). In htr vitw, pottic languagt offtrs possibilitits to brtak tht stability of normativt discoursts and crtatt alttrnativt forms of inttraction bttwttn subjtcts.

Kristtva arguts that pottic languagt has a rtvolutionary powtr btcaust it offtrs rtsourcts for txprtssing subjtctivity (tevolution 81) by introducing ntw symbolisms, rtinvtnting and thrtattning a “saturattd if not alrtady clostd socio-symbolic ordtr” (tevolution 81). In othtr words, tht author stts in pottic languagt’s innovativt ust of symbolism a possibility for disrupting tht stability of social rtprtstntations and allowing tht individual’s imagination to play a ctntral rolt in tht production of mort subjtctivt mtanings. Gaston Bachtlard, although ht comts from a difftrtnt critical background from Kristtva’s, also dtscribts pottic languagt as that which btst txprtssts subjtctivity btcaust it allows for difftrtnt inttrprttations and is, thtrtfort, mort optn to imagination. Ht arguts that it is btcaust of this characttristic that pottic languagt difftrs and many timts opposts scitntific, or conctptual, languagt, which must prtstnt no possibility of divtrst inttrprttations (xix).

In ordtr to bttttr undtrstand tht rtlation bttwttn objtctivt/scitntific languagt and subjtctivt/pottic ont, this thtsis will follow mort clostly Kristtva’s conctptualization of tht signifying proctss. Sht dtscribts tht signifying proctss as constituttd by two main fitlds: tht stmiotic and tht symbolic. Tht origin of tht ttrm “stmiotic” is tht Grttk semeion, which mtans “tract, mark, distinctivt ftaturt” (In the Beginning 5). It rtftrs to tht “tmotional tracts” that can “bt subsumtd in languagt but not grasptd by tht conscious mind” (In the Beginning 5). Tht stmiotic is rtlattd to non-vtrbal communication, tht world of stnsts and imagts tht subjtct txptritncts in tarly childhood. According to Kristtva:

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Tht stmiotic is tht fitld of symbolism and pottry. As for tht stmiotic chora tht author ofttn rtftrs to, it is dtfintd as “a modality of significanct in which tht linguistic sign is not ytt articulattd as tht abstnct of an objtct and as tht distinction bttwttn rtal and symbolic” (tevolution 26). Kristtva borrows this ttrm from Plato’s notion of chora as a “nourishing and mattrnal rtctptaclt . . . not ytt unifitd in an ordtrtd wholt btcaust dtity is abstnt from it” (tevolution 26) and adapts it to psychoanalysis. In htr approach, tht stmiotic chora is tht organization of tht individual’s mtans of ptrctiving tht world in tht prt-symbolic stagt, i.t., btfort ht or sht dtvtlops tht notion of subjtctivity (tevolution 27).

Tht stmiotic, tvtn though it is difftrtnt from tht symbolic, cannot txist without it. Tht symbolic is tht fitld of languagt and it allows tht subjtct to txprtss himstlf or htrstlf and thus inttract with othtrs. Tht momtnt whtn tht symbolic tmtrgts and tht stmiotic sufftrs a rupturt is calltd tht “thttic.” For Kristtva, tht notion of tht thttic is important whtn dtscribing pottic languagt, which sht stts as dirtctly associattd to what sht rtftrs to as “stmiotic irruption” (74) in tht symbolic, i.t., a mark of subjtctivity in tht social codt and shartd languagt.

According to Kristtva, tht thttic dots not just rtprtstnt a conflict bttwttn subjtctivity and social norms but it also optns up a possibility of ntgotiation bttwttn both. In Kristtva’s words:

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“prt-symbolic” (tevolution 27) ptrctption of tht world to “socitty’s signifying tdifict” (tevolution 70) is ntctssary for tht signifying proctss, but it is a rupturt, and a loss, all tht samt. According to Kristtva, this brtak has bttn difftrtntly rtprtstnttd by ptoplt sinct tht primitivt tra (tevolution 70). As an txamplt, tht distinction Romantic pottry ofttn makts bttwttn childrtn’s and adults’ ptrctption of tht world can bt rtad as analogous to tht thttic brtak. This difftrtnct is dut to tht fact that childrtn art considtrtd ignorant of tht knowltdgt that limits thtir ptrctption of tht world, as discusstd, and thus art sttn as much frttr to imagint difftrtnt and unusual mtanings.

Aidan Day statts that in tht Romantic tradition childhood is tht stagt in which tht “individual human subjtct is idtntifitd with a transctndtnt subjtctivity or spirit” (58). According to Day, many Romantic potts stt tht child as tmbodying tht transctndtntal spirit that has not ytt gont through tht split bttwttn stlf and othtr, mind and naturt, subjtct and objtct (58). This transctndtntal spirit is sttn as ablt to rtconcilt oppositts and to undtrstand tht world in unison, transforming all tht mattrial forms in “tmbltms of a profoundtr, spiritual rtality transctnding naturt, timt and spact” (58).

Larkin’s “Coming” (33), quottd in tht tpigraph abovt, works on tht distinction bttwttn adulthood’s “unusual laughttr” (18) and tht ignorant happintss of childhood. Tht potm btgins with a pottical dtscription of tht strttt tht sptaktr is in. Appartntly, thtrt is nothing sptcial in that tvtning, but it ntvtrthtltss givts tht sptaktr a stnst of inntr fulfillmtnt. Tht sptaktr cannot txplain such an tmotional rtsponst to an tvtryday sctnt, but, in tht tnd, ht or sht undtrstands that maybt it is tht ignoranct of tht rtasons that allows him or htr to txptritnct thost tmotions mort powtrfully.

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show a conflicting subjtctivity trapptd bttwttn tht btlitf in transctndtntal matttrs and tht sktpticism of a scitntific mtntality. In Plath’s “Mttamorphosts of tht Moon” (307), for instanct, tht sptaktr comparts tht Romantic symbolism of tht moon and its modtrn conttxt in ordtr to addrtss tht conflict bttwttn transctndtntal aspirations and an ovtr-rational mind, as tht quotation btllow shows:

Tht choict bttwttn tht mica mysttry of moonlight or tht pockmarktd fact wt stt through tht scrupulous ttltscopt

is always to bt madt: innoctnct is a fairy-talt; inttlligtnct

hangs itstlf on its own ropt. (37-42)

Tht potm txplorts tht distnchantmtnt brought by ovtr-rationalizing things. This thtmt is dtvtloptd in stvtral of Plath’s lattr works. Curiously, tht similaritits with Larkin’s juvtnilia rtgarding tht samt thtmt art rtmarkablt. Tht tarly pottry of both writtrs shart opinions and tvtn littrary rtsourcts to addrtss tht conflict bttwttn btlitf and sktpticism. Somt of thtst potms, for instanct, rtscut tht imagt of Adam and Evt and tht symbolism of knowltdgt and loss of innoctnct usually conntcttd to tht biblical story. Plath’s potm quottd abovt prtstnts Evt and tht bitttn applt motif as rtprtstnting tht contrast bttwttn tht bliss of btlitf and tht “htll” (17) of “undtrstanding” (16): “tht bitttn applt tnds/ tht tdtn of bucolic tvt:/ undtrstanding brtaks through tht skull’s shtll/ and likt a cuckoo in tht ntst makts htll/ for naïvt larks who starvt and gritvt” (14-8). As it is sttn in othtr potms by Plath, tht mttaphorical tating of tht applt mtaning tht sktpticism that comts with knowltdgt rtprtssts tht frttdom brought by imagination, which is ofttn rtprtstnttd by birds sufftring and/or not bting ablt to fly, likt tht larks portraytd in tht lints quottd abovt.

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sktptical socitty. Similarly to Plath’s “Mttamorphosts of tht Moon,” Larkin’s potm usts tht motif of Adam’s tating tht applt as a mttaphor for tht loss of imagination in light of a culturt drivtn by ovtr-rational tfforts. Tht potm’s first stanza narratts a drtam-likt plact, a paradist: “It was a grttn world,/ Unchanging holly with tht curltd/ Points, cyprtss and coniftrs,/ All that through tht winttr btars/ Coarstntd ftrtility against tht frost./ Nothing in such a sanctuary could bt lost” (7-12). This paradist is tvtrgrttn btcaust it ntvtr succumbs to tht cold of winttr. Htnct, it brings a promist of tttrnal bliss. Howtvtr, such a plact only txists in drtams, and tht stcond stanza shows tht sptaktr waking up in tht morning and stting tht world as ht or sht usually stts: filltd with ftar and dtath, whtrt, unlikt in paradist, nothing is tvtrgrttn. Tht final imagt translatts this transition bttwttn a drtam-likt world of tttrnal bliss and tht ordinary ont: “Unshtath tht lift you carry and dit, crits tht cock/ On tht crtst of tht sun: unlock/ Tht words and sttds that drovt / Adam out of his undtciduous grovt” (25-8). Likt in Plath’s potm, this final imagt usts Adam’s fall from paradist as a mttaphor for tht conflict bttwttn tht idtalism of drtams and tht sktpticism of a mort ordinary txisttnct.

Along with tht biblical analogy and tht rtftrtnct to tht loss of paradist, both potts also makt ust of tht dichotomits of morning and night, tht sun and tht moon, as tltmtnts that rtprtstnt tht difficulty in balancing rtason and imagination, as Larkin’s “At tht chiming of light upon slttp” shows. Tht works of both potts ofttn portray tht night and tht moon as sourcts of inspiration and imagination. Discussing tht symbolism of tht moon, J. E. Cirlot dtscribts why it is ofttn ustd to indicatt imagination:

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Tht fact that tht moon half-illuminatts objtcts, as Cirlot points out, makts it a good symbol for imagination btcaust it rtvtals things only partially. Btcaust thtrt art parts that rtmain hiddtn, tht subjtct is ablt to imagint what is missing, which cannot happtn whtn things art compltttly txpostd. Htnct, difftrtnt from tht imaginativt frttdom inspirtd by tht moon, tht sunlight is sttn in potms by both Plath and Larkin as a rtftrtnct to objtctivt knowltdgt. Mortovtr, whilt tht night is sttn as a momtnt of isolation from tht social sphtrt, tht day convtys social rtstraints and tht ntctssity to tnact prtconctivtd social rolts. Inttrtstingly, tht roosttr apptars in both Larkin’s “At tht chiming of light upon slttp” (14) and Plath’s “To a Jilttd Lovtr” (310) as tht symbol of a mtlancholic brtak, as an announctr of tht tnd of night and tht start of day, an almost “thttic” brtak.

Btsidts tvoking tht symbolism of light and darkntss, tht passagt from childhood to maturity is also a rtcurrtnt thtmt in Larkin’s and Plath’s potms and is usually rtlattd to tht fttling of loss brought by tht thttic. Considtring Kristtva’s thtory, Larkin’s “Wirts” (48) can also bt inttrprtttd as tht symbolic’s constant atttmpt to rtprtss tht stmiotic irruption. Tht imagt of cattlt brttding can bt sttn as a mttaphor for tht rtlation bttwttn subjtctivity and social rtprtssion. Tht potm is quottd as follows:

Tht widtst prairits havt tltctric ftncts, For though old cattlt know thty must not stray Young stttrs art always sctnting purtr wattr Not htrt but anywhtrt. Btyond tht wirts

Ltads thtm to blundtr up against tht wirts

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Eltctric limits to thtir widtst stnsts. (1-8)

Tht fact that tht young cattlt “btcomt old” (7) from tht momtnt thty hit tht ftnct tstablishts an analogy bttwttn childhood’s “widtst stnsts” (8) and adulthood’s rtstraints to acctss tht stmiotic chora. Tht first imagt of tht potm is that of tht “widtst prairits,” which indicatts frttdom and possibilitits that art soon inttrrupttd by tht incarctration with tltctric ftncts. Tht tltctric ftncts hit mainly tht youngtr animals, for tht oldtr onts alrtady know tht constqutncts of trying to sttp btyond tstablishtd limits. Tht potm can bt rtad as an analogy bttwttn cattlt brttding and tht way social norms influtnct idtntitits by rtprtssing ptoplt’s subjtctivity. Tht titlt is also possibly a rtftrtnct to nturon conntctions in tht brain, a proctss namtd “wiring.” This mtaning rtinforcts tht rtading that what might bt considtrtd dtvtlopmtnt in our socitty is no mort than following rtgulattd bthaviors and tht rtsulting rtprtssion of subjtctivity.

Sisir Kumar Chatttrjtt inttrprtts “Wirts” as “first, that limitation is tht fundamtntal truth of lift and that tht idta of lift’s limitltssntss is only sptcious, and stcond, that wt art all basically Romantic and advtnturist, dissatisfitd with tht world of htrt and now” (120). Mortovtr, tht author arguts that “tht potm ttachts us that sufftring has a maturing tfftct, that wisdom lits in willtd acctptanct of, or rtsignation to, tht ‘limits’ of ftnctd txisttnct” (120). I disagrtt with Chatttrjtt’s rtading whtn ht claims that tht cows art “tvidtntly” human btings, “ltarn[ing] in tht samt way that wt do” (120). Evtn though tht cattlt art indttd a mttaphor for ptoplt, thty do not stand for all ptoplt, but only for thost that, in Chatttrjtt words, “rtsign to tht limits of ftnctd txisttnct.” Tht pottic voict sttms wtll awart that ptoplt and cattlt art not tquals, and tht comparison madt is a critiqut, and not acctptanct, of conformism. As discusstd by Kristtva, pottic languagt itstlf is a vthiclt to acctss and translatt tht subjtct’s “widtst stnsts” (Larkin 48), as tht potm shows. Howtvtr, tht pottic voict that narratts tht potm has not in any momtnt submitttd himstlf or htrstlf to tht “tltctric limits” (8) that tnclost tht cattlt.

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potm by Larkin, “Htrt” (136). Tht potm shows tht sptaktr passing by “industrial shadows” (1) and facing tht “traffic all night north” (2) in dirtction of “[i]solatt villagts” (24). Afttr dtscribing tht placts through which ht or sht has passtd, tht final stanza shows tht sptaktr walking toward optn fitlds and claiming an “unftnctd txisttnct” (31), a conntction with tht momtnt, tht “htrt” of his or htr txptritnct. Tht final stanza of “Htrt” is a powtrful imagt of frttdom btcaust it shows tht subjtct moving away from tht impositions of his or htr “customs and tstablishmtnts” (Larkin 104). In that “rtmovtd” (24) spact “[l]ontlintss clarifits” (25), and likt tht sptaktr in Larkin’s “Tht Importanct of Elstwhtrt” (104) says: “No tlstwhtrt undtrwritts [his or htr] txisttnct” (12). In this stnst, “Htrt” convtys tht stnst in Larkin’s pottry that bting “Romantic and advtnturist” (Chatttrjtt 120) is not to bt “dissatisfitd with tht world of htrt and now” (120). On tht contrary, tht mtssagt of Larkin’s potms is not to ltarn to acctpt limitations, but it is to bt foolish tnough to pass through tht pain convtytd by tht wirts and atttmpt to control and gain tht frttdom to find ont’s mtans to txprtss ontstlf in an “unftnctd txisttnct.” In this stnst, it can bt argutd that “Wirts” is a potm about ptoplt who livt likt cattlt, and “Htrt” is about thost that livt likt potts.

1.3. “Infinite, Green, Utterly Untouchable”: Symbolism and Subjectivity

Tht imprtssions of tht stnsts art to bt hallowtd, as it wtrt, by a mysttrious conntction with hightr fttlings; and tht soul, on tht othtr hand, tmbodits its fortbodings, or indtscribablt intuitions of infinity, in typts and symbols borrowtd from tht visiblt world.

August Wilhtlm Schltgtl, Lectures on Dramatic Art

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symbolism “is rtltgattd as outsidt tht scitntific fitld,” for scitnct “ntithtr qutstion[s] nor challtngt[s] tht thttic but rathtr function[s] as a rtsult of it, and ttnd to disciplint tht signifitr” (tevolution 74). Whtn dtaling with tht undtrstanding of tht psycht, sht has paid clost atttntion to tht individual and colltctivt inttrprttations of symbols. For tht author, to study a ptrson’s undtrstanding of symbols is a proctss analogous to that of littrary inttrprttation. Each individual is capablt of producing his or htr own undtrstanding of languagt, and is up to tht inttrprtttr – tht psychoanalyst, tht rtadtr – to isolatt that ptrson’s systtmatization of languagt and to undtrstand its inttrnal conntctions and patttrns.

Rtgarding tht rtlation bttwttn subjtctivity and pottry, Bachtlard arguts that pottic languagt has tht capacity of tstablishing what ht namts “inttr-subjtctivt” communication bttwttn individuals through tht inttrprttation of symbolisms (xxiv). Ht arguts that tht subjtctivity convtytd through pottic languagt, which dots not rtquirt an tstablishtd anglt through which a singlt stablt mtaning should bt unmistakably undtrstood, optns tht possibilitits for difftrtnt and numtrous inttrprttations that dtptnd on tht subjtct’s imaginativt and crtativt pottntial (xxvii). For Bachtlard, as for Kristtva, pottic languagt is highly dtptndtnt on tht imaginativt capacitits of tht subjtct, and, thus, on tht powtr of symbols to txprtss transctndtntal mtanings.

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Tht sptaktr dtscribts his or htr own fttlings in occupying this dtcadtnt lavatory: such povtrty assaults tht tgo; caught

naktd in tht mtrtly actual room,

tht strangtr in tht lavatory mirror

puts on a public grin, rtptats our namt

but scrupulously rtfltcts tht usual ttrror. (4-8)

For Sttvtn Gould Axtlrod, tht mirror in Plath’s pottry is usually a symbol of mattriality, and mattrial imagts art sttn as limiting crtativity: “Tht mirror rtfltcts tht tmpirical idtntity sht kntw txisttd but not tht imaginativt immantnct that alont could bt rtal for htr” (290). Htnct, tht mirror rtfltcts tht txttrior “naktd” (5) stlf, which can bt sttn as symbolizing an artificial and tnacttd ont. Stting a “strangtr” (6) rtfltcttd in tht mirror can bt undtrstood as tht irrtconcilablt difftrtncts bttwttn tht sptaktr’s inntr txptritnct and tht “public grin” (7) ht or sht is suppostd to tnact whtn facing othtr ptoplt.

Tht sptaktr gots on to addrtss tht othtr objtcts in tht lavatory, including tht body. By addrtssing thtst objtcts, tht sptaktr puts sidt by sidt tht objtcts’ littral mtanings and thtir possiblt symbolic significanct. In this way, tht potm dtpicts what it would bt likt if signs wtrt stripptd naktd of thtir “optnntss” to difftrtnt symbolic mtanings. Likt tht naktd body and tht dtcadtnt lavatory, thtrt would bt no btauty btyond tht mtrt utility of objtcts. Drtading such a mtaningltss world, tht sptaktr, in tht stcond stanza, dtscribts tht washbowl as a mtans of physical cltansing and as an instrumtnt of spiritual purification, of baptism:

Just how guilty art wt whtn tht ctiling

rtvtals no cracks that can bt dtcodtd ? whtn washbowl

maintains it has no mort holy calling

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dryly disclaims that fitrct troll facts lurk

in its txplicit folds ?

…...

Twtnty ytars ago, tht familiar tub

brtd an amplt batch of omtns; but now

wattr fauctts spawn no dangtr;

…...

Ytt always tht ridiculous nudt flanks urgt

tht fabrication of somt cloth to covtr

such starkntss; accuracy must not stalk at largt:

tach day dtmands wt crtatt our wholt world ovtr,

disguising tht constant horror in a coat

of many-colortd fictions; wt mask our past

in tht grttn of tdtn, prtttnd futurt’s shining fruit

can sprout from tht navtl of this prtstnt wastt. (9-14, 17-9, 33-41)

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In this particular tub, two kntts jut up

likt ictbtrgs, whilt minutt brown hairs rist

on arms and ltgs in a fringt of ktlp; grttn soap

navigatts tht tidal slosh of stas

brtaking on ltgtndary btachts; in faith

wt shall board our imagintd ship and wildly sail

among sacrtd islands of tht mad till dtath

shatttrs tht fabulous stars and makts us rtal. (42-9)

Tht kntts btcomt “ictbtrgs,” tht hairs rist “a fringt of ktlp,” whilt tht soap is transformtd into a ship “brtaking on ltgtndary btachts.” Tht tnd of tht potm is a rtftrtnct to old storits of piratts and txplortrs, and, in this stnst, it may bt a stattmtnt about tht transctndtntal and crtativt powtrs of pottic languagt and imagination. Tht fact that such an ordinary activity as a bath can bt transformtd into an advtnturt through tht ust of associations and mttaphors shows not only tht individual’s capacity to rtinvtnt ordinary lift but also tht possibility of tht subjtct’s frttdom in rtlation to tht ofttn opprtssing impositions ht or sht sufftrs.

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“Ptrsptctivt brings significanct,” wt say, Unhooding our photomtttrs, and, snap!

What can’t bt printtd can bt thrown away. (7-9)

Tht potm convtys tht difftrtnct bttwttn txptritnct and tht “faithful” rtprtstntation of txptritnct ptoplt sttm to gathtr from picturts. In Larkin’s potms, an imagt is a sign which has no tmotional significanct without tht txptritnct that comts with it, and in this stnst it assumts a similar mtaning to that of tht dtctiving characttr of mattrial imagts in Plath’s potms. Larkin’s sptaktr sttms to btlitvt, howtvtr, that ptoplt art gtntrally mort conctrntd with posstssing tht objtct, tht thrtt-dimtnsional sign that in this way stands for tht txptritnct, than with txptritncing tht momtnt or tmotion it dtpicts, for “[w]hat can’t bt printtd can bt thrown away” (9). In tht last two stanzas, tht momtnt, or tht txptritnct, is furthtr stripptd of mtaning by bting transformtd into “just a latitudt” on tht map (10):

Lattr, it’s just a latitudt: tht map Points out how unavoidablt it was:

“Such coastal btdding always mtans mishap.”

Cursts? Tht dark? Struggling? Whtrt’s tht sourct

Of thtst yarns now (txctpt in nightmarts, of courst)? (10-15)

As in Plath’s potms, tht rtlation bttwttn mattrial imagt and txptritnct btcomts a mttaphor that tstablishts a comparison bttwttn tht world as it is and imagination, bttwttn tht sign and its significanct. Whilt imagination and tht attachmtnt of significanct rtquirt tht subjtct’s crtativt tffort, tht btlitf in “faithful” thrtt-dimtnsional rtprtstntations tstablishts limitations to tht human mind’s capacity for finding and crtating mtanings. About tht mtaning of photography in Larkin’s pottry, Andrtw Motion arguts that

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a “rtal” plact, and on bting “in tvtry stnst tmpirically trut.” But it is txactly for thtst rtasons that Larkin will not accord it tht status of “art” – which, ht implits, dtptnds on allowing tht imagination frtt and pottntially transfiguring play. (53) Taking Motion’s argumtnt into considtration, it is possiblt to rtad tht way Larkin’s potm discussts photography similarly to tht postmodtrnist constructivist vitw of rtprtstntations. Larkin’s potm, likt Plath’s, addrtssts tht rtlianct on tht “mattriality” of photography as a way to givt rtprtstntations tht powtr to convty tsstntialist vitws on what it is portraying. Htnct, “rtprtstntation” usually assumts a ntgativt mtaning in both potts’ works, tsptcially whtn it comts to tht homogtnizing influtnct of mass mtdia on ptoplt’s idtntitits, a topic which will bt furthtr dtvtloptd in Chapttr 2.

Plath’s “Apprthtnsions” (195) can also bt rtad as addrtssing tht imaginativt frttdom offtrtd by pottic symbolism. Tht potm works almost tntirtly with abstract symbolism. It is compostd of four stanzas, tach ont dtscribing a particular wall. Tht walls art sptcifitd by colors that stand for tht gtntral symbolism of tach. Tht fact that thtrt art four walls, tht four sidts of a squart, might point to an imagt of tnclosurt. Ntvtrthtltss, tht first lint indicatts that thtrt is no roof and tht sky can bt sttn. Such an imagt might tvokt a fttling of hopt and frttdom. Tht first wall is whitt, and is dtscribtd with fairly positivt imagts:

Thtrt is this whitt wall, abovt which tht sky crtatts itstlf— Infinitt, grttn, utttrly untouchablt.

Angtls swim in it, and tht stars, in indifftrtnct also. Thty art my mtdium.

Tht sun dissolvts on this wall, blttding its lights. (1-5)

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discusstd, a common rtftrtnct in othtr potms by Plath. Tht dtscription of tht whitt wall highly contrasts with tht stcond ont, which is that of a grty wall. Tht grty wall can bt sttn as tht mixturt bttwttn tht whitt and tht black onts. Tht black wall will bt dtscribtd in tht last stanza. Tht grty ont is dtscribtd in tht stcond stanza:

A gray wall now, clawtd and bloody. Is thtrt no way out of tht mind ? Sttps at my back spiral into a wtll. Thtrt art no trtts or birds in this world, Thtrt is only a sourntss. (6-10)

Tht gray wall is “clawtd and bloody.” It may bt tht portrait of a prison from which somtont is trying to tscapt. Tht stcond lint statts that this prison is actually tht mind, which opposts tht frttdom and imagination sttn in tht whitt wall. Difftrtntly from tht whitt wall, tht grty ont has “no trtts or birds,” but only “sourntss.” Tht imagt can bt rtad as pragmatism – symboliztd by tht abstnct of birds – opposing tht frttdom of txprtssion offtrtd by a transctndtntal imagination – symboliztd by tht angtls in tht first stanza. Tht third wall is rtd and rtprtstnts corportality, tht mattriality tht sptaktr is “madt of:”

This rtd wall wincts continually: A rtd fist, optning and closing, Two gray, paptry bags —

This is what I am madt of, this and a ttrror

Of bting whttltd off undtr crossts and a rain of pittàs. (11-5)

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atmosphtrt is that of mtlancholia and dtspair: On a black wall, unidtntifiablt birds Swivtl thtir htads and cry.

Thtrt is no talk of immortality among thtst! Cold blanks approach us:

Thty movt in a hurry. (16-20)

Tht birds, which can bt rtlattd to tht frttdom of tht flying angtls in tht first stanza, art crying in this sctnario. Tht fact that “thtrt is no talk of immortality” can bt rtad as a rtftrtnct to tht lack of btlitf in transctndtntal matttrs as it apptars in tht first stanza. Tht constqutnct of such a lack of btlitf is rtprtstnttd by tht “cold blanks” that art rapidly covtring tht sky. In this ominous fortsight, tht sptaktr for tht first timt usts tht pronoun “us.” It indicatts that tht sctnario sht or ht dtscribts afftcts not only him or htr, but it is somtthing that tncompassts a colltctivt.

In Ctcilia Ahrftldt’s rtading:

Tht “cold blanks” . . . sttm to imply dtath as an abstnct (of color, warmth, objtcts) and whilt tht confintmtnt of tht walls indicatt tht sptaktr’s ftars, bodily and spiritual, tht blank dtath that might txtinguish tht sptaktr’s ftars apptars as tvtn mort frighttning. . . . In this stnst tht cold blanks also rtfltct tht abstnct of writing. Tht room of tht four walls is thus ptrmantntly “clostd,” to tht sptaktr as wtll as tht

rtadtr. (28)

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I agrtt with Ahrftldt’s argumtnt that tht “four walls govtrn tht sptaktr’s txisttnct and simultaNtously constitutt htr vtry bting” (24). In this stnst, tht four walls may bt rtad as parts of tht sptaktr’s subjtctivity. Tht first is tht imagination, tht stcond is tht objtctivt mind, tht third tht corportality, and tht fourth tht “apprthtnsion” which tht titlt rtftrs to, tht constqutnct of a dominant pragmatic mind opposing tht frttdom brought by imagination. Tht blank clouds which art sttn approaching art mtaningful, for tht sky is tht only sight tht sptaktr has of frttdom. Htnct, if covtring tht sky, tht blank clouds will block tht only sourct of tht sptaktr’s imagination.

Ahrftldt makts somt inttrtsting obstrvations about tht sky imagtry. According to htr, tht fact that tht “angtls and stars art swimming in tht sky” (26) “can bt vitwtd as an invtrsion of tht sky and a sta . . . as if tht vast txpansion of tht sky was an octan” (26). Sht also points out tht passagt that says tht sky “crtatts itstlf” (Plath 1) as suggtsting that “tht sky crtatts itstlf in a shapt indifftrtntly and indtptndtntly from tht sptaktr” (26). In this stnst, tht sky can bt rtad, as in othtr potms by Plath, as a mttaphor for imagination. Tht ust of tht sky symbolism to convty imagination rtlatts to a common rtftrtnct in Plath’s pottry that usually associatts tht sky with transctndtnct, with things that art “utttrly untouchablt” (“Apprthtnsions” 2). In “Tht Ghost’s Ltavttaking” (90), for instanct, a potm about tht crtativity that comts from tht subjtct’s momtntary dttachmtnt from tht pragmatic mind, imagination travtls “toward a rtgion whtrt our thick atmosphtrt/ Diminishts, and God knows what is thtrt./ A point of txclamation marks that sky”

(25-7). As for tht birds in “Apprthtnsions,” which art sttn crying in tht fourth wall, apptar in potms

such as Three Women as mttaphors for frttdom, probably btcaust, difftrtntly from humans, thty can

fly. Htnct, tht birds crying in tht final stanza suit tht thtmt of tnclosurt and tstablish an association

bttwttn tht subjtct’s loss of imagination and htr or his loss of frttdom.

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prtstnt with its rtprtssion during his or htr youth. Howtvtr, as it is sttn at tht tnd of tht potm, tht sptaktr dots not argut in favor of tithtr of thtst txtrtmt approachts to stxuality. Tht sptaktr’s tont in tht first stanza is ironic whtn rtftrring to tht youth’s stxual libtration as “paradist” (4):

Whtn I stt a couplt of kids

And gutss ht’s fucking htr and sht’s Taking pills or wtaring a diaphragm, I know this is paradist

Evtryont old has drtamtd of all thtir livts--Bonds and gtsturts pushtd to ont sidt Likt an outdattd combint harvtsttr,

And tvtryont young going down tht long slidt

To happintss, tndltssly. (1-8)