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1_{KEOHANE, Robert O; MILNER, Helen V. Internationalization and Domestic Politics: A Conclusion.} In:________(Eds.). Internacionalization and domestic politics. 1. reimp. Nova Iorque: Cambridge University, 1999. p. 256.

2_{“´Interdependence` may be overused, but it accurately describes our world today. Economics forces flow}

with great rapidity from one country to the next. Despite all talk about sovereignty and independence, these concepts can mislead when applied to today´s world economy. How `sovereign` is a country with an economy so dependent on trade with others countries that its government cannot readily affect the real domestic interest rate, implement its preferred tax policy, or establish an effective program of incentives for business or talented individuals?”. JACKSON, John; DAVEY, William ; SYKES JR., Alan o. Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: cases, materials and text. 4th ed. St. Paul: West Group,

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3_{Os autores quando tratam da internacionalização do mundo econômico aduzem que “}_{The clearest effect of}

internationalization has been to undermine governments ´autonomy in domain of macroeconomic policy [...]” KEOHANE, 1999, p. 256.

4_{Verifica-se de forma comum a pronúncia de}

subsídio apresentado com /Z/ para a letra S. Apesar dessa tendência, o dicionário Houaiss aponta como forma correta de pronúncia a utilização do som /S/ para a letra S no termo subsídio. HOUAISS, Antônio; VILLAR, Mauro de Salles; FRANCO, Francisco Manoel de Mello. Dicionário Houaiss da língua portuguesa. Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 2001. p. 2922.

5_{A “política industrial” envolve, na verdade, uma série de “políticas” (política de subsídios, política de} investimentos em infra-estrutura, política tributária, política de exportações, cambial, etc). Desta forma, é necessário destacar que a utilização do termo “política industrial” neste trabalho refere-se a um conjunto de decisões tomadas pelos Estados para aprimorar seu grau de industrialização.

6_{O site do Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior do Brasil traz uma explicação sobre} em que consiste a política industrial; “A Política Industrial, Tecnológica e de Comércio Exterior consiste em um plano de ação do Governo Federal que tem como objetivo o aumento da eficiência da estrutura produtiva, aumento da capacidade de inovação das empresas brasileiras e expansão das exportações. Esta é a base para uma maior inserção do país no comércio internacional, estimulando os setores onde o Brasil tem maior capacidade ou necessidade de desenvolver vantagens competitivas, abrindo caminhos para inserção nos setores mais dinâmicos dos fluxos de troca internacionais.” BRASIL. Ministério do BRASIL. Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior. Secretaria de Comércio Exterior. Departamento de Defesa Comercial. Instrumentos de Defesa Comercial: investigações. Disponível

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7_{MAGNUS, John R. World Trade Organization Subsidy Discipline: is this the “Retrenchment Round”?}

Journal of World Trade, Geneva, v. 38, n. 6, p. 985-1047, 2004. p. 985. 8_“

As long as there are governments, there will be subsidies”. Os autores mencionados abordam o assunto de forma ainda mais enfática, quando afirmam: “For better or worse, the world is a wash in subsidies”. KAYE, David ; KLEINFELD, George. Red Light, Green Light: the 1994 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Research and Development Assistance, and U.S. Policy. Journal of International Arbitration, Geneva, v. 11, n. 6, p. 43-63, Dec. 1994. p. 43.

9_“

From a rule-making perspective, a problem that arises is that subsidies may be a desirable form of government intervention”. HOEKMAN, Bernard M.; KOSTECKI, Michael M. The Political Economy of the World Trading System. 2. ed. Oxford: Oxford University, 2001. p. 172.

10_“_{subsidization […] is present in virtually every country. It is meant to achieve a variety of policy objectives,}

such as encouraging new (high-tech) technologies, structural adjustment, research and development, regional development, correcting current account imbalances, increasing employment, and transferring income. Some among these, such as structural adjustment and regional development, have been considered crucial by most governments”. GAGNÉ, Gilbert. The WTO Subsidies Agreement: implications

for NAFTA. Canadá: Centre for Trade Policy Law, 1998. (Occasional papers in international trade law and policy, n. 45). p. 3.

11_“

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12_{John R. Magnus explica de maneira precisa a razão para a utilização do subsídio: “}

Subsidies present a classic case, [...] of diffused costs and focused benefits”. MAGNUS, 2004, p.985.

13_{ZAMPETTI, Americo Beviglia. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies: a forward-looking} assessment. Journal of World Trade, Geneva, v. 19, n. 2, p. 5-29, Dec. 1995. p. 7.

14_“_{Governments use subsidies for many reasons, some easier to understand and defend than others”.} Conforme o Report da OMC Subsídios são oferecidos para construir infra-estrutura, para ajudar empresas em perigo ou até mesmo para promover novas empresas, promover pesquisa e desenvolver novos conhecimentos, redistribuir rendas, ajudar consumidores pobres, dentre outros objetivos políticos. WORLD Trade Report 2006 - Exploring the links between subsidies, trade and the WTO. p. xxii. Disponível em: <www.wto.org>. Acesso em 20 mar. 2007.

15_{Ao encontro disso, o}

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16_{BLIACHERIENE, Ana Carla. Subsídios: efeitos, contramedidas e regulamentação – uma análise das} normas nacionais e das normas da OMC. In: TÔRRES, Heleno Taveira (Coord.). Direito Tribitário Internacional. São Paulo: Quartier Latin, 2003. p. 291.

17_“[…]_{subsidies may alter market prices and costs, leading to distortions in resource allocation and a}

reduction in the subsidizing country´s economic welfare. In an open economy they create a wedge between foreign and domestic prices and may distort international competition. On the other hand, subsidies can correct market failures and thus enhance economic welfare in the subsidizing country. They can also enhance or reduce world economic welfare”. ZAMPETTI, 1995, p. 6.

18_{Entendimento semelhante é o de Maguire quando aduz: “}

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19_{Esse protecionismo negativo pode ocorrer não só com a utilização dos subsídios não permitidos, mas de} diversas outras formas de proteção do mercado interno infringindo as normas gerais do comércio internacional.

20_{A autora Bliacheriene explica que “a manutenção de um programa governamental de concessão de} subsídios é um instrumento da política econômica implementada por um país para alcançar as metas econômicas e sociais que deseje e, por isto mesmo, não deve ser classificado, a priori, como ilegal.” BLIACHERIENE, 2003. p.306.

21_{Corrobora essa idéia o World Trade Report 2006}

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22_{FONSECA, Adriana Dantas Q. da; SANCHEZ, Michelle Ratton; NASSER, Rabih Ali. Subsídios e Medidas} Compensatórias. In: THORSTENSEN, Vera; JANK, Marcos S. (Coord.). O Brasil e os Grandes Temas do Comércio Internacional. São Paulo: Lex ; Aduaneiras, 2005. Cap. 6, p. 188-189.

23_{Deve-se partir da pressuposição de que, apesar da existência de normas de contensão aos subsídios, o} sistema ainda detém algumas falhas, e por vezes não é capaz de prover uma completa proteção contra os chamados “efeitos adversos” dos subsídios. As palavras de Marc Benitah vão neste sentido, ao que afirma: “[...] the international legal system cannot provide complete protection to the party being subjected to the “adverse effects” of subsidies. That would amount to a prohibition of subsidies with all its economics and social consequences”. BENITAH, Marc. The Law of Subsidies under the GATT/WTO System. United Kingdom: Kluwer Law International, 2001. p. 1.

24_{WORLD…, 2006, p. 196. .} 25_{ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de.}

O Brasil e o multilateralismo econômico. Porto Alegre: Livraria do

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511-605, 2000. p. 516.

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