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i dirilli riservati:
Vietata a~ichc
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0
2009 Minislero ctlella Difesa
CISM
-Commissione Italiana di Storia Militare
Salita S. Nicola da Tolentino,
I/B
-
Roma
quinto.segrstorico@s~iid.diresa.it
Comitato
diredazione
direttore
Col. Matteo Paesano
coordinatore generale
Amm. Paolo Alberini
consulenti scientifici
Prof. Piero Del Negro,
Prof. Massimo de Leonardis
collaboratori
Ten. Col. Gianearlo Monlinaro
Magg. Luea De Sabato,
Mar.
1
cl. Pierluigi Gabrielli
The
impact
of
the Peninsutia~
War
on
the
Porlaguose
civi1
popn8"ation (~889-%809)
JQRGE MARTINS RlBElRO
'The Peninsular Wal; as ;l11 wars, hacl a negative impact on civil popt~lations, ant1 the Frencl~ armed intcrventioti i n Portugal betwcc~i 1807 ;~ntl l812 was
oo
cxccption. O f coursc\VC have to think that this was all carly 19'" centory collliict, in ~nally aspects tliffcrcut horn
the wars o f the beginning o f thc 21" cc~ltury, but thc suffcrings it causecl on the civilians is
11ot very tlilfcrcnt from i~owatlays. Perh;~ps (het-c is a change on scale ancl
I
would probablytlarc to aflirlrl that ~~ow:~days impact, tluc to tile new technologies ant1 to the fact tllat there i s not a rcal war front, i s worsc than i t was ill those days.
I t is important howevcr to e x p l a i ~ ~ what brought tlic Nai~olconic Amiics to the lbcria~l Pcninsul;~, namely to Portug;tl. Napolcon neetletl to close Portuguese ports to British ships
ant1 navig;ttioo, sincc Port~lguese ports werc a gootl base ibr tllc Royal Navy in the Eulopcau
Continent. In fact, 21s carly as l SO I, by incalls o f his brother I,~~cien Bonaparte, sent as envoy to Matlrid, llc inanagctl to pcrsuatle D. M a ~ ~ o c l Gotloy, Spain's I'rin~c-minister, to ;rcccpt the possibility o f a war against his Iberian oeigbboun A f e r the signature ofthc Matlsitl Convcn- tion, in Janoary 1801, Portogal was attackctl t l ~ r o ~ ~ g l ~ tllc bortlcrs o f the A l c ~ ~ t e j o in Map.
'rile inv;~sion l;tstetl 2 \vceks ant1 the so-calletl Treaty of' Batl;!joz, whose articles ~verc very unfavourable to Lisbon, put all entl to it on June l801 (ScrrAo, 1982: V1,326).
Tllings howevcr cbangetl witli the battle o f Trafalgar, as great victory for Bsitain as it
was a big tlefcat to Napolcon. Aftes Octobcr I805 t l ~ c Bsitish bccamc mastcrs o f the occan
;~otl as French I-listorian, Antlrb Latrcille writes, Napolcon was conlil~etl to thc co~ltincnt ancl
contlemnetl to its cooquest. 'The E~npcrol. won scvctal victories over Austria (Ulm), Russia
(Austerlitz) ancl I'russia. After the signature of tile l'eacc o f Tilsit, Russia adlleretl to thc
C o ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ c ~ r f c r l fllock~r~k (Latreille, 1974: 143; Gotlccliot, 1984: 166- 170, 174, 176; Droz, 1972: 232,237-238; Fugier, 1994: 11, 17 1, 176- 177).
Unable to beat Britain militarily, Napolcon tlccidctl to L I S ~ an economic weapon to tlefeat
her. So, by the tlccrccs o f Berlin (21" Novembcr 1806) allcl Milan (17"' December l807), he forbatle all tratle betwccn thc Unitetl Kingtlom and continental Eurol,e. I l c hopctl this would provoke scrious social l)roblclns ancl force the Englisl~ cabinet to negotiate peace. Lontlon llowever replied by the Oldcrs i r t C o t ~ ~ i c i l , tlcclaring France ac~d 1rer;tllies io state of'block;~de (Gotlechot, 1984: l 8 1 - 1 82; Macctlo, S.*.: 339; Ribciro; 1990: 5 L).
These events wcrc going to have scrious repercussions in Portugal, as Lisbon pcrsistetl
in being faithtill to thc Unitcd Kingdom's allia~lce, Pol.tuguesc ports continuetl open to all 13ritish shipping, remaining an important base for thc Royal Navy. At tllc same time wc inost not forget that by 1807 al~nost all European ports iverc closed to the navigation o f Grcat Britain.
Napolcon tlecitletl to invz~tle Portogal, i n ortler to avoid a possiblc R1.itis11 lantling on Portlcguesc shores, enabling an attack to Spain, since met~.o[)oIita~i I'ortugal llatl all important stralcgic position, at the entrance of the Metlitcr~.anean. Besitlcs this, thc Atlantic islantls
(Madeira, the Azores ancl the C;lpc Vcrtlcs) were Portugocse [~osscssious aotl wcl-c important points for 14tlanIic navigatio~i. On the other hantl Napolco~i fcsred II1;tt i f Spaill tlccitlctl to bcco~ue n e u t ~ t l - her ports coultl be ~isctl by the Royal Navy. CVc 111tlst 11ot I'orget t l ~ i ~ l ill N:I- polcon's mind Portugal \\,;is also economically imporl;lnt to 1:t.a1ice. Me \ \ ~ ~ n t e t l to rc[)lacc 1i1igland in tile I'ortt~gucse ni;lrltet ancl gain access to the ricllncss ol' Brazil. A l l this 11cll)s to cxplain why Nepolcon tlecitletl to i~iv;ttlc Porti~g;~l (Ribcila, 1990: 52, 101; Mi~cetlo, s.tl.: 344-345,348; Silbcrt, 1977: 5 1,57).
At the apprw~ch of the Frc~icli Ar~nies, the Portuguesc royal kllnily, f o l l o i v i ~ ~ g a previous tlccision, left for Bra~iI: so that tlie king as tllc I'untla~i~ctllai focus oTpolitical po\vershoultlll't fall into French harltls a ~ l t l avoid thc possibility
of
being obligctl to take dccisio~ls that wooltl~ L I L in jeol)a~.clize the country's intlepc~itlc~lcc.
L,isbon ditln't ngrce with tlie 1:rencli Ultitiiatum as the co~ltlilio~ls were quite onacccpt- able: closiny the ports to British tl.atle aotl shij)pi11g, imprisooi~lg ;kll the l.?tlglish s~~bjects that i~ilrabitetl in the c o u ~ ~ t r y autl seizing their properties. In the hce of this decision, Napoleon or-
l
tlcred tllat thc Army of Girontlc, co~n~na~itlctl by ge~lcral Junot, governor of Paris ancl formera~nbassador it1 1.isbot1, to wlio~n he will bestow the title of Dc~quc tlc Abrantcs, be prepared
i
to march towalrls I'ortug;~I (blacctlo, s.tl.: 350-35 1). Ncverthclcss, in ortlcr to reach Portugal i t w;ls necessary to have the co~nplicity o f Matlritll
as Fretlcll troops had to cross Spain. I t w;~s not tlil'licl~lt to obtain tlic (necessary authorizationl
itntl eve11 ~ n i l i t l ~ r y help tluc to problems ill ilic Spanish Roy;rl family ancl tllc anlbition of D.Mnnucl Gotloy. In cxcllarlgc for a pri~icipality Gotloy ncgotiatctl with Napolcon tlie'rreaty o f
.
.Fonlaincblc:\u, sig~retl in 29"' October 1807. Metropolitan I'ortogal was to be tlividetl in three
!
p;trts. Tlle Alcutcjo alld theAIgar\,e would be give11 to D. Ma~luel Gotloy, w l ~ o woultl bccotlici
Prince o f the Algarvcs. Northwest I'ortl~gal (Entre-Douro c Minho) was to be gra~~letl to LlleI<ing of Etruria, with tlie title of Icing of Northern 1.ositania. TIE rc~naiotler ol'thc territory woultl stay occupietl by French troops l111til B gc~icl.i~l peace was to be scttlctl aotl only t1ic11
woultl its tlcsti~iy be decidecl (liibeiro, 1970: 102; Macctlo, s.tl.: 352).
Tlic 1:rct~ch army crossetl tlie Portuguese bortlcr duri~lg tlie first clays of Novembcr 1807
a~ltl e~lteretl Lisbon 011 the 30'" of the sa~ne month. Ju~lot was not able to imprison the Royal
1:xmily sitice i t llatl alreatly embarked to l3razil. He dis~liissctl llie governors left in clralgc
of tlie country by the Prince Regent, appointed a ncw government, took scvcral measures to
neutmlize tlie Portoguese armetl foxes ant1 put I~renclimen ill key posts. At the salnc tinle
North-westcro Portugal, the Ale~ltcjo arld the A1g;trve werc occupietl by Sppaisli troops ill
accortlance with the stip~~latio~ls of tlie F:ontaineblcau Treaty (Macctlo, s.d.:353-354; Sel.r:o, 1982: V1: 334-335; Serrgo, 194: 20-21,24).
'rlie i ~ n p o r t a ~ ~ t alltl porverful co~nrnclr~it)~ o f British melrlianls cstablislied ill Oporto, wlio Iratletl in all kind of co~umodities, i s a good cxa~nple of the i~iipact of war on civilians, as they u~ltlertook effective measures to escape 1:rencIi fury, ;IS soon as they realizctl Portugal col~ld
[lot 1e11iai11 t~et~tritl and there rvas n strong possibility o f beilrg irivnded.
13efore tlle French armies arrived, tlie English were able to leave the eouotry, taking eve- rything they coultl with them. 111 this \\*ay they tnatiagcd to save their belongings liom (lie seizures or(Icrc(I by F r e ~ ~ c l i illid CVCII by l'ortc~guese authorjtics. I n Noveniber 1807, u~lder the
l'rior to their clcpartt~rc the mercha~its took disl~ositions
to ensure that thcir I-eal cstate was
not going to be t;tkcn by tl~c
occupants. For that purpose thcy usctl several stntagen~s.
'Sltey
contracted mortgages giving their lantlctl prol~crty
illplctlge and dcclaletl before :a public no-
tary they o\vctl r~~oney
to Portugocse citizens, goaranteeing the payolelu of these debts xvith
their estate if thcy \vcrc never to return. Tlie mcrcbants also left powers of attorney to thcir
employees,so that thcy coultl t;lke care of their business ivhilc they werc arvay.
Some Britis11 subjects, however, stayctl in Oporto, throughout the occupatiot~
to look after
tlair prolxxty antl thcir fellow-country111c11's
business antl were arrcstctl, in Decelnber 1807,
by the Spanish i~lvatlers
who in accortl;lncc with the stipolations ofthe Fontaincbleau Treaty,
sig~~ccl
betwcct~ Napoleon ttntl Spiiil~,
tvcre occt~pying
the r~ortliwcst
of Portog:tl.
'Slrc measures taken by the 1':nglish merchants, wc tlescribetl, proved to be ctTcclivc as
they
tlitln'tsufSer nn~ch
loss i n the course ofthe R.cnch interventio~ls
of 1807-1 808 ancl 1809,
khc o111y ones that rcacbetl Oporto. In fact, as soon as the Napoleonic armies rctirctl iix~ny
of
these tratlesmeo returnetl ant1 \vent otl wit11 their b~~si~less
(Ribeiro, 1990: 34,51,54-55, 59,
87, 107-130, 183-187; Sanceau, 1970: 63).
At the economic level, war also hat1 an impact o ~ i
the activities oftlicsc ~ncrcht~nts
as they
shil~pecl
\vine to the United I<ingtloni antl importetl the i~rtlispcnsablc
l"ootlstoffs to feed the
British ant1 I'ortuguesc arniies. I n facl, drle to iv;trcor~tlitions,
I'orttrgal was cut froin herorher
tratlitiooal markets sue11 as Spain, France tind I-lamburg, a Britisll Army was stationed in her
territory ancl Portugal iiad to rely mainly on tllc Unitctl l<ingtlom as a provider ol'footlstt~ffs
ant1 as a buyer oflier protlucts. Actually, the qui~ntitics
of protlucts entering Porlugal were by
Tar r~urcli snperior tlian
tileneetls, as ptrrt of tlicrn iv:ts to be setit to Spain (RIBEIRO, 1998:
135).
North I'ortogal \vas the first placc in the coulltry to rebel against the i~ivader
allcl because
of this con~ti~a~idcd
the restoratio~l's movement of the legiti~iiatc
government. This is con-
~~cctetl
ant1 artictrlntcd ivitll the Spanisl~
Jrlnlcr's movclnent of resloration of l:er~iando Vll's
authority. I n fact the 2"" of
May
illMatllid started the rupture of the cooperation bctwecli
Rance ancl Spain. In the IS"' of June
inOporto took placc the proclamation of intlepct~tlcnce
(Capela, Matos, Borralhciro, 2008: 23,57-58; CRUZ, 1970: 21 -22).
It can be said that in 1808 tllcrc was a popnlar insiln'ection and in 1809 a oatiorial war;
because in this year the reaction against the invatler took place within a military framilig. The
~)eoplc
is intleetl present
illthis revolutionary moveoient
illsonie places and as
ittlolninatetl
the evetits obliged the local clites ancl authorities to join it. Quickly Ilowevcr legal authorities,
military corn~nandcrs, city 11;1lls, magistmtes, ecclesiaslical il~stitulioos,
meri of letters nr~d
evcli mercha~~ts
took over the leadersliip. At this tinle what can be describecl as the populace
seems to retnairi abse~it
~ ~ O I I Ithe dy~iamics
that will organize the political organs issued from
these movements.
Onthe other hand, the tlo~ninatlt classes wanted that the tlcmo~~strations
OF
patriotism to lit in10 tlic established system, bat the people more anarchically ira~~sforn~etl
thcir actions into guerrilla movements against everybotly and everything. In collseqoence in
some northern municipalities appeared ilew organs of govcrn~nent,
ihc
J~trrtcrs,a
kintl
t h t ~ twill spread all over the country (Matos, 2000: 149-15
l ,177).
In the cotlrse of 1809 a new ir~vasioo
took place, tliis time llle occctpa!ior~ army i r ~ s
corn-
nia~itled by Marshal Soult, tluke of Dalmatia, and northwest Portugal was specially attained.
cicrl irrc,rti,:,." 5 or 6 persolis colisitlerctl goilty were killetl. I t seems, bowcvcr. tliat the real
i~idivitlual responsible, ;I major o f militia togctlier with sotnc conipaliions managecl to esc:lpc
(Nallicr, 1993: 11, 227-23 l).
During tlic occktpation o f Oporto, civiliztns liatl to live together \\,it11 their eticriiy, the i.'rct~ch troops. S o ~ i ~ c tlivisiolis werc quarteret1 in b;trl.acks and convents, while the oflicers werc lotlgctl in the inhabita~its' ho~cscs. In fact, 167 officers, 50 servants. 129 hot.ses tuitl ;I
donkey were nccom~nc~tlatetl in the city centre. WC obtai~ietl these data in a document kept
in tlie Oportc~ Mutiicipal Arcliives ancl we cooltl ascerlaili that the major part o f them, \\'ere billetet1 with the knowletlge o f their superiors. 11s we can image this most liave causetl a great tleal of inconvenicl~ce to tlie civilian populalion (ANMI', Mayo 11". 1832). On the other ha~itl
I'O~~LI~LICSC authorities t v c ~ strti~t~~oried to deliver f~~srij~usc, l~ouschold-linen, table-line~i, bed-clotlies a~ttl other objects o f tlaily itsc, all oftlie best quality, to tile occupant. This \itas o f
course very o~iclous to the city (Basto, 1926: 148-156).
WC would also like to tlraw attcntiot~ to the collaboratio~~is~~i that took place bclr~ccn the illhabitants ant1 tlic military occupant. I n I'itct, solnc o f tlic I'ortltgllesc were convincetl that tlic ottly way to motler~iizc anti tlcvclop Portug;~l was ~ ~ t i t l c r Nnpolcon's rule, which could give tlic country a Constitutio~r ant1 put ill practice thc Revolution's itlcas and acliicvcmcl~ts.
Obviously mziny o f tllcse pcoplc h;ttl problclns aftcr [lie war. But, bcsitlcs this, tlierc was also whal we coultl j)r.obably call i~noiher li11.m of collaboi.aIionism. Aller tlic relrcat o f SoulL's itrlny one womati \v;ts ;~n.cstctl ;ttitl accusecl
or
receiving at her home French olliccrs ;tnd that slle 1i;ttl s;~itl tltat tllcy woultl returli alitl play ball with (lie heat1 o f the I'orlugucsc. Slie de-11ied all tliesc accusations ;tntl t1ecl;tretl Lli;11 [lie plainliffs were two I'ol.tuguesc soltlicr:v n'ho bcsitlcs tlcsiriog to maintaiti with her illicit relatiol~s, ivantetl to rob licc Tile Ittct that tliey waliletl to steal f r o ~ n her \vas proved. But on llle other lhantl liowc\cr although thc in\,entosy lnatlc by the jutliciary authorities o f all her belongir~gs, sho\\lctl t11;tt she owtled liioney ant1 sotne valuable objects, like silver-plate, jewels atid a big qualitity o f other itetiis such as f~tr~lit~rl.e, household line11 a ~ i t l nice clothes. Anrl we ~nust bear in tiiintl tliat the city was plutl- tleretl for three clays. Besitles, tllis itlvcnlory was made on tletiialid o f a
man
who watiletl to know i f some o f his things werc amolig thcm. This was possible, bccaltsc at tlic approach o f the Fsetich army lie had lied his Ilo~iic, liviltg belii~ld ;tll l ~ i s [~ersonal property a ~ ~ d the house was uset1 by several Fretich oflicers who lived there some wonietl, i~iclutling tlic accusctl. We also ascertainctl that this wom;tli sometimes rcceivetl at her home Frctich oflicers anclthat although single she liatl a nine year old tlaughtes, whose deceased father [lad lefl her an
imporlant heritage in Brazil. So, after analyzing [lie judiciary pmcess we call guess that even
if slie had 11ot been favourable to Soult's government, she ~naintainetl closed relations with
some I'sencli officers, making i t possible that she c o ~ i t i ~ i l ~ e t l in possessioti o f all her assets. This fact aroused the cupidity o f tile Portuguese soltliers (BI'MP, Ms. 1773).
As we have seen on lllis papet; t a k i ~ ~ g as an ex;unple tlie ar~netl French ioterverltions of 1807-1808 ant1 1809, precisely 200 years ago, we can see liow the military operations tlisruptetl everyday life ruld affectet1 the civilians.
To
start with tile Portuguese royal family ant1 the court left to Brazil, [lie country was invaded alitl becatilc a theatre o f operations tliat causetl suffering alitl deslroctions. Not olily Portugal het1 ill its territory the F r e ~ ~ c l i occul~a- tion asniy, but after the begitining o f August I 808 also a British artlly, ul~tler tlie command o fSir A r t h ~ t r Welleslcy, inturc tlukc o f Wcllingtoti, that cainc to Petlinsula to liclp to tlct'cat thc
Frcncli. The fact lliat thcrc were t\vo i'orcigii ;~rmics it1 Portuguesc soil was vien~etl by some
as ;I negative t l i i i ~ z ;incl b y others as a hope for the country's t l e v c l o p ~ ~ i e ~ i t ancl modcrnizn-
lion. A t least this seetns to have been i'a'avou~.ablc to tile British ~ncrchants busitless. It1 spite
o f wllat one bclicvctl, all, the English i ~ ~ l ~ a b i t a t ~ t s includetl, cxpectctl tlre end 01' the ~ n i l i t a r y
operations to elljoy a n o r ~ n a l a ~ ~ l better life. 111 Oporto and ilorthertl I'ortogal the occopation
was
very hartl i h r the inllabitaiits, who hat1 to socialize, lodge ant1 Seed lhc occupsiits.Manuscripls:
Oporto Mitt~icipnl Arcliives (AHMI'), M i r ~ o . ir". 1822
I
l
Oporto Mutiicipal Library (BPMP), illoirrr,so.i/)l 177.1 Arcliivc o f Si~igcvcr#i's Motiastwy (AMS). I)icr(irio rlc 7i'bri(,s 1798-I829Private Collectioo, Mo~~teiro, 1\nt6nio Jose - Oicirio i l i r r~~iriho ~,idiirlar 11809-lS.?7)
- .
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Nouveiiu Mo~idc ~tli~ions/~o;ond:itio~i NapolCon, 2006.
Basto, A. dc Magalliiies
-
1809. 0 l'ovlo sob rr scgiorilir ;irr~rr.sfio/,Ji.rr~~ci~.srr. Lisboa: Emprcs;i Litcr5rinFlumineiisc. 1926.
Capela, JosC; MATOS, I-lcnriqocs: Bor~.alIicitn. Ilog6rio - 0 1ro.iiico polriori.srrro dcrs 1)wi~irtcirr.s (10
rtorle. 0 s co~rcrllros rrir Rc,s/irrrrir(:rio (/c Porrrr~irl rle I<S08. S.I.: Clsit Muscu tle Mon$Ao/lJ~iive~.si-
tlatle do Miolio, 2008.
Cruz, Alitbnio - As irrl'(rs8e.s J~iorc~~sir.~ c (IS SIICIS ~~/I~~(.II.s.s~cs !I(! ciilrr(Ic iIo 110r10. S.[: Ceiitro dc ES-
tltdos tIu~nanisticos/P;~citItliitIc tle Lctras da U~iivcrsitladc tlo Porro, 1970.
Droz, Jacqucs - Ni.sroiw Dil)lorrroliqrre ilc l648 ir 1919. 3;' etl.: Paris: Dalloz, 1982.
Fugicr, Andre
-
1.0 Ri~~olrrriorr I;'rcrrr~iri.sc er 1'Eirrl)irz. ~ ~ r r l ~ o l ~ o r ~ i o r . In "RENOUVIN, Pierrc - tlistoilr tles llelntions lnternationales". Paris : Macliclte, 1994, vol. I1 (1789-1791), p. 7-332).Gotlcchot, Jacqties - A E ~ r r o l ) ~ I! i r Anririccr rro rcrirl~o dc N(rl)olcfii~ (1800- 1815). Siio Paolo: Li\'rnria
Pioticifii Editorn/Editora tla Utiivcrsidatlc dc Siio Paulo, 1984.
Lalreillc, A ~ i d l e -
re
rt~r1)o1ioiricrrrrc. Paris: Artl~atid Colin, 1974.Le Noble, I'ierre - Merrrorios dc l ~ r s o/)ercrciorrc,s rrrili~trrcs ilc los/r.crirce,s~s or Girlicin. P o r ~ ~ r g o l g c l
~ ~ o l l c del 7i!j[r cn 1809. L a Coruia: Librcria Are~las, 2005.
Maccdo, Jorgc Borgcs tle
-
Hi.srdrio Diplorrrriricrr Porrrrgrrcs[~. Ci~rr.s/oi~/es c Lirrhns rlc Fr~r(:rr. E,s/rriIr~rle C c r ~ ~ ~ o l i ~ i r n . S.tl.: lnstituto tlc Dcfcsa N;~ciolial, s.1.
Miitos, I~lc~lt'iqoc Jose Martitis tlc
-
0 Mirrl~o c as lrri~o.s0cs Friirrcc,str.s. Urrro /)<,,:sl~cr/;~~ir rrririricil)rrl.Napicr, W.I11'. - Ilisror? of rlrc Iikrr i r r 1111, I'r~riri.srrlo orid it1 /hc Sortlli (IJl"~'irtr~'ejiwr~ rlrc ~crrr- /<SO7 10
rlrc ).mrr 1814. Z'cd. 1.o11don: Coostnblc, 1991, vol. II.
Ornail, Sir Cllarlcs
-
A ilis/or:r of /Ire Poiitisrtlnr Ii'rrr. 1.o11don: Glrcnhill Books c I'ci~nspI\'a~~i;~:Stackpole Books, 1995, vol. 11: Janu;lry
-
Scl~tcillbcr 1809.Itibcim, lorgc Martins
-
A C~~rrrrrtii~lrr~lc llrir4riicrr rlo /'or10 ~ltrrcrtire os ltr~~(~,srie.s i;i.urrcc.srrs 1807- /S//. Porto: Ful~da$io E I I ~ . Antbnio dc Almcitla, 119901.Itibciro, Jorge m~rtios
-
Corrrirrio c cmrtie,r.i~t~r/r,s hri/ri~ri<;o,s rro Porro trrr l~rirrtcirri rtrer(rd~ [/(I sicrtlo XIS, l'orto: aDouro - Bstudos & llocurnci~toss, 5, 1998, pp. 133-156.S;~ncci~o, Elaii~c - Tlrc Bririslr I.irc/o,). O/)orro. Porto: Bi'itisll Associ;ltion, 1970.
Serrio, Joaqoioi Vcrissi~llo
