Metropolitan Governance

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Metropolitan Governance

Unique ID: EURS0199

Emília Malcata Rebelo

University of Porto (Portugal), Faculty of Engineering, Territorial, Urban and Environment Planning Division, Research Centre for Territory, Transports and Environment, Porto, Portugal

[[email protected]] 2971 words

Abstract

The concept of metropolitan governance embraces the whole set of

institutions and actions that rule or settle conditions for metropolitan territorial policy. It extends beyond the city or municipal jurisdictional boundaries, surpassing pre-existing agreements and institutions, and demanding bigger geographical units and access to financial and human resources to deal with broader metropolitan issues. It enhances metropolitan economic productivity and competitiveness, social cohesion, and fiscal feasibility; solves inter-territorial coordination issues; and approaches regional problems.

Despite in literature the concept of metropolitan governance is subject to many different senses, it is consensual that it conveys conditions, restrictions or specificities concerning the management of common public functions. They generally include all kinds of networks and institutional or voluntary

cooperation forms, regulation strategies, governance plans, capacities of local governmental bodies, interactions between public and private stakeholders; and agreements among different governmental and organizational layers.

Changes over time in metropolitan governance and its treatment

In far-off days governance processes strongly focused on keeping cities´ economic hegemony. More recently, within a scope of globalization and

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neorealism, the research on metropolitan governance started focusing on free competition among cities that aim at enlarging their economic basis through the attraction of foreign investment (Cox 2010).

The theory of metropolitan reform – that showed up in the sixties – consisted in a set of measures against the urban sprawl, regional disparities, institutional fragmentation and shortage in service provision. At the beginning it proposed a governmental restructuring based on institutions, administrative structures, and decision-making formal processes, but thereafter networks of agencies and organizations linked together horizontally were further considered (Ye 2014).

At the end of the seventies and in the eighties emerged the public choice´s approach that advocated the Keynesian welfare-state (Lackowska and Zimmermann 2010).

Within an increasing globalization and metropolitanization context, the “new regionalism” – that turns up in the nineties – claims for entrepreneurial-based policies at a transnational level, aimed at regional wealth and growth through competitiveness and efficiency in public services. Some authors further considered sustainability, growth management, and fiscal and social equity within metropolitan areas (Lackowska and Zimmermann 2010).

In the latter two decades concerns have been focusing on the

inter-connections among competitive metropolises in a global market. The most recently studied forms of metropolitan governance embrace all kinds of networks and voluntary and flexible forms of cooperation, spanning a continuum of institutional bodies – from fragmented agreements to highly integrated governance forms (Lackowska and Zimmermann 2010), involving public and private stakeholders. Whereas the main concerns in the past centred on cost control of public services and on keeping political

independence, current concerns focus on quality and efficiency of governance, considering the economic recession and political pressures (Delabbio and Zeemering 2013).

Metropolitan governance assumes different forms, structures, and practices in different countries according to their political, social and economic features, and its historical-institutional heritage.

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In Asian countries (especially in China), where remains a tradition of a strongly state-centralised dirigiste metropolitan governance, the vertical dimension prevails over the horizontal interactions among governments and non-public stakeholders. However, a new political and spatial organization is emerging founded on the decentralization to regional and metropolitan layers, and on the social, economic and political interaction and integration among previously autonomous local jurisdictions (Ye 2014; Vogel et al. 2010).

The central governments of Japan and Singapore have invested on the advanced industry and services´ driving force to trigger urban and regional economic restructuring (Hutton 2004), whereas in Tokyo the provincial governments manage directly the regional affairs though set up and management of city-regions (Ye 2014; Vogel et al. 2010).

In the United States of America governance is implemented through

jurisdictionally fragmented bodies, and scale considerations, as well as public participation concerns, are outstanding for their decisions (Cox 2010).

In Canada the traditional east-west-based governance have been replaced by a north-south-based one, taking as reference the United States of America. Global, dynamic and successful city-regions have increasingly settled, side by side with a great number of cities´ decay (Boudreau et al. 2006).

The urbanization processes in Latin America that accrued from massive migrations from and among urban areas have been accompanied by

governmental decentralization and strengthening of local governments. These processes are mainly due to international organizations (namely the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, the United Nations

Development Program and the US Agency for International Development), thus emerging big cities and megacities (with more than a million and five million people, respectively). But despite the increased authority and flexibility of local governments, the economic crisis has hampered governance

processes. Thus associations among local authorities have been developed – that have reached efficiency in planning, coordination and communication among local municipalities, and in resource management – despite restricted by legal frames, policies and structures of respective governmental layers (Rodriguez-Acosta and Rosenbaum 2005).

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To better understand the evolution of metropolitan governance´s concepts and practices it is important to realize the content, meaning, and the

macroeconomic rationale that underlies metropolitan policies; and the changes in involved stakeholders´ interests and behaviours, that have chosen the metropolitan field as a reference for the implementation of their decisions (Boudreau et al. 2006).

Metropolitan governance´s intellectual, social, economic and environmental context

Metropolitan regions – that are currently becoming the world prevailing

settlement – have been increasing worldwide in response to the globalization dynamics and its economic, social, political and cultural challenges,

accompanied by governance economic and societal changes that incessantly shape the social and spatial structures of these regions. They are featured by strong interdependencies and synergies at social, economic, environmental and political-administrative levels, and by externalities among local

jurisdictions (Bird and Slack 2007).

The concept of metropolitan governance embraces the whole set of

institutions and actions that rule or settle conditions for metropolitan policy. It extends beyond the city or municipal jurisdictional boundaries, surpassing pre-existing agreements and institutions, and demanding bigger geographical units and access to financial and human resources to deal with broader

metropolitan issues (Sellers and Hoffmann-Martinot 2009; Ye 2014; Bird and Slack 2007).

The metropolitan governance enhances metropolitan economic productivity and competitiveness, social cohesion, and fiscal feasibility; solves inter-territorial coordination issues; and approaches regional problems (Bird and Slack 2007). Thus it supports the competitive advantages of a certain region, being more flexible and functional than local municipalities (Ye 2014).

Despite in literature the concept of metropolitan governance is subject to many different senses, it is consensual that it conveys conditions, restrictions or specificities concerning the management of common public functions – public

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transport, water supply, sewerage, garbage collection and disposal, police protection, fire prevention and suppression, parks, recreation and culture, affordable housing, and welfare assistance (Bird and Slack 2007). They generally include all kinds of networks and institutional or voluntary

cooperation forms, regulation strategies, governance plans, capacities of local governmental bodies, interactions between public and private stakeholders (Lackowska and Zimmermann 2010); and agreements among different governmental and organizational layers (Ye 2014).

Governance strategies include, namely, changes in existing jurisdictional boundaries; settlement of supra or inter-municipal agencies, councils,

administrative districts or planning bodies; and enforcement of legal bounds to rule urban sprawl by upper-level power layers (states or federal governments). The metropolitan governance may be assessed by its efficiency in service delivery and coordination, in benefits´ distribution, and in cost control. However, it ought to deal with a continuous population growth, with

increasingly broader, diversified and divided spaces, and with institutional fragmentation and conflicts.

Kinds of metropolitan structures

Metropolitan governance structures worldwide are wide-ranging, but the most common are one-tier structures, two-tier structures, voluntary cooperation and spatial-purpose districts (Bird and Slack 2007).

In one-tier structures metropolitan decisions concerning service delivery, taxes and expenses are taken by a sole local organisation. They may be

institutionally implemented through a set of little fragmented municipalities or through a big consolidated municipality in a metropolitan area. The former is usual in the United States of America, and involves a network of polycentric nuclei that approaches broader metropolitan concerns (Ye 2014). The later may result either from “amalgamation” – fusion of one-tier shorter

municipalities – or from “annexation” – appropriation of at least part of a municipality by an adjacent one (Bird and Slack 2007).

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The advantages of these structures derive from their ability to coordinate services (accruing from resource gathering); better funding and quality (based on a larger tax collection); efficiency (derived from economies of scale and reduction of personnel, which involves a better cost control); accountability; and increased rationality in decision making. The disadvantages accrue from higher competition among professionals within the same field (wages and benefits are thus settled at the previously higher municipal level); from subsequent cost aggravation (that superimposes occasional savings); and from competition slackening among municipalities (thus lowering efficiency in local responses, aggravating costs again). This is the prevailing governance structure in South Africa.

The two-tier model consists in two governance layers: the upper one manages a region, district or metropolitan area, whereas the lower one represents cities, towns or villages. The former provides services on behalf of the whole region, engender externalities and economies of scale, and involve redistribution: regional land use planning; general urban infrastructure; economic

development; welfare assistance; social housing; public health; ambulance; public transit; water and sewerage systems; garbage collection and disposal; police protection; and fire prevention and training. Local services are carried out by the lower layer: roads and bridges; street lighting and sidewalks; fire suppression; local planning of land use; parks and recreation; and libraries. These models are advantageous in relation to one-tier ones because they are more accountable and efficient in local responses. Their disadvantages accrue from their higher costs (duplication in service provision); lower clearness and higher confusion (the accountability for each kind of service is not clear for citizens); higher conflict in decision processes; lower efficiency and delays in policy implementation (Bird and Slack 2007).

A voluntary cooperation is a governance-collaborative structure (without a permanent and independent institutional status) among adjacent cities

involving the active collaboration of community-based organizations to decide and implement metropolitan policies (land use, planning and development, and provision of services) (Ye 2014). These structures are currently used in the United States of America, Canada and France owing to its popularity and

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flexibility, and they are successful whenever municipalities share the same goals.

The voluntary cooperation model take different forms according to the country: voluntary-based intergovernmental cooperation (Italy); partnerships,

communes or urban communities (France); inter-municipal agreements (Spain and Belgium); public bodies, joined agencies, and sets of towns (Holland) (Bird and Slack 2007). In the United Kingdom certain public functions are mainly performed by non-governmental almost-autonomous or extra governmental organisms for a long time.

The main advantages of these structures accrue from economies of scale and control over externalities in service delivery, what potentially engenders

significant cost reductions (if costs are clearly identifiable and ascribable) and high coordination and efficiency in specific services. Their main disadvantages derive from their limited accountability when services are delivered by other municipalities; from the big problems faced by metropolitan areas - especially in developing countries - (that require more institutionally standing governance structures); from possible inter-municipal conflicts; from its difficult intelligibility for citizens; and because they fail to contribute to the external strengthening of metropolitan areas within the global economy.

Special-purpose districts (structures often used in countries provided with strong and autonomous governments) are responsible for the provision and management of services with strong externalities to different municipalities, being able to enforce the law and to collect taxes. They correspond to

jurisdictions organised according to functions instead of territories. Their main disadvantages turn up because each organism is in charge of a sole service; it is difficult the coordination of activities among different territories; the

proliferation of these bodies is hardly understandable; the relation between their goals and the goals of local governments (that collect taxes) isn´t clear cut (Bird and Slack 2007); and an higher technological efficiency doesn’t necessarily involve increases in economic efficiency and respective accountability.

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The major dimensions of metropolitan governance refer to the horizontal and vertical organization of powers and institutions; governance scale;

externalities; innovation; funding and taxation; the economic efficiency of public services and equity in their delivery; governance contexts; its closeness to citizens and incentive to public participation; and institutional fragmentation. The provision of public services is usually the more efficient the more power lays near citizens, what engenders more appropriate answers to local

problems, stimulates competition and accountability, and enhances citizens´ participation (Song and Yang 2009). Strictly municipal or local governance, however, faces resource and institutional restrictions, and doesn´t deal with neighbouring communities´ bodies to solve common issues.

Territorial disparities between central urban regions and outlying city-regions attest the way from a national to an international system, reinforcing the north-south orientation, what requests the reinforcement of vertical governance processes, and the institutional building within new geographic scales

(Delabbio and Zeemering 2013; Boudreau et al. 2006). However, they require a careful handling of the relations with other institutional and legal layers in spatial policy coordination, as a bigger dimension generally implies more bureaucracy and higher costs (Bird and Slack 2007). Sectorial policies settled at higher levels will become more efficient if they are linked together with local decisions (concerning land use planning, environment, public transport and economic development). Also higher governmental layers should assure the main services and responsibilities, providing infrastructure and ensuring inter-municipal and inter-local social equity.

Complementarily, the institutional consolidation of horizontal governance strengthens the strategic vision of problems that impinge on neighbouring communities, and lead to integrated decisions and actions, gathering

resources and exploring them jointly (taking advantage of economies of scale and efficiency gains, namely through the separation of public services

production and distribution´s responsibilities) (Delabbio and Zeemering 2013; Sellers and Hoffmann-Martinot 2009). Besides, it supports a better

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the assignment of benefits to the whole population, regardless of their tax-paying capacity.

Despite the similarities among the problems faced by different metropolitan areas, responses are contextual, depending on local physical, economic, social, environmental, political, institutional and cultural characteristics.

Funding and self-funding capabilities and collected taxes affect public services ´ quantity, quality and efficiency, so they are critical in governance strategies in metropolitan areas. These strategies should also be able to attract highly skilled workers, reserving innovation a leading role in economic development, in a high-quality economic, social and environmental scope.

Current emphasis in work on metropolitan governance and future directions in research, theory and methodology

Currently, the governance structures - covering a continuum between

integrated and fragmented forms - include consolidated, multilayer governance forms; specific-purpose, trans-sectorial and multi-purpose organizations, and complex networks with different compositions of stakeholders (Lackowska and Zimmermann 2010).

An issue that has called the attention of current research refers to the contraposition between the power fragmentation versus concentration in metropolitan areas. Different indicators of geopolitical fragmentations were proposed and applied to OECD countries (Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers 2005). They conclude that the countries with higher geopolitical fragmentation are Israel and Switzerland (30%), Germany, United States of America and France (31%, 34% e 36%, respectively), stressing the recent fusion among municipalities in different countries (namely Canada, Sweden, Holland, Poland, Israel and Norway).

Recently has emerged a trend for inter-local cooperation for public services´ acquisition, and for responsibilities´ share in their provision, framed by public entrepreneurship theories, and favoured by the institutional collective action and by the role of regional leaders. It is thus important to deepen the research on these new kinds of institutional arrangements, namely assessing how

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prepared are regions for this cooperation, and how far-reaching is managers´ entrepreneurship (Delabbio and Zeemering 2013).

Other issues that deserve further insight relate to the reassessment of the geographic scale for public services´ delivery; the organization and

management of those services; the development of joint models or tools to accomplish them (Delabbio and Zeemering 2013); the attitudes, actions and leadership roles of the involved public administrators; as well as the role of regional governments in inter-local development and growth.

See also EURS0123 EURS0237 EURS0315 EURS0331 EURS0366 EURS0502 References

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