ECONÓMICOS
E ESPAÇOS
DE SEGURANÇA
Luís Moita Luís Valença Pinto
Económicos
E Espaços
dE sEgurança
Luís moita Luís Valença pinto
Moita, Luís; Pinto, Luís VaLença (Coord.) (2017). esPaços eConóMiCos e esPaços de segurança. Lisboa: uaL; oBserVare. disponível em http://hdl.handle.net/11144/3037. isBn 978-989-8191-73-1 e-isBn 978-989-8191-79-3 economia, segurança Cdu 33 35 Coordenação
Luís Moita e Luís Valença Pinto Edição
Madalena romão Mira e Paula Pereira Design
inês rosário e rita romeiras Impressão aCd Print ISBN 978-989-8191-77-9 e-ISBN 978-989-8191-82-3 Depósito Legal 426352/17
Nota: Foi respeitada a diversidade de escrita dos autores, tanto quanto à língua original utilizada, como quanto ao sistema de referenciação bibliográfica escolhido e quanto aos acordos ortográficos seguidos
Prefácio — Luís Moita e Luís Valença Pinto 7
international regimes as an analytical tool
— Isabel Ferreira Nunes 15
integración, economía y seguridad: una revisión crítica de su construcción y límites — Paloma García-Picazo 41
il rifiuto della guerra nelle costituzioni Postbelliche di giaPPone, italia e germania — Mario G. Losano 71
a soberania no século XXi — Patrícia Galvão Teles 127
(in)segurança num mundo Policêntrico
— Álvaro de Vasconcelos e Maria João Seabra 151
a globalização envolve uma dimensão de segurança? o crime e Policiamento transnacional.
— Priscila Villela Frascino e Helena Salim de Castro 171
os mares como esPaços económicos e de segurança
— Jaime Ferreira da Silva 199
a segurança dos Pontos de articulação estratégica
— Carlos Branco 227
ricostituire la coesione e la centralità mediterranee: il tentativo italiano Per un mediterraneo allargato
— Matteo Marconi e Enrico Mariutti 259
el esPacio de seguridad de la federación de rusia: intereses estratégicos y económicos
áfrica nas estratégias norte-americana e francesa
— Fernando Jorge Cardoso 315
ásia-Pacífico: esPaço regional? económico e de segurança?
— Luís Tomé 341
novas dinâmicas geoPolíticas e de segurança
no golfo Pérsico: a ascensão da arábia saudita e dos emirados árabes unidos
— Vânia Carvalho Pinto e Luíza Gimenez Cerioli 365
Perceções de (in)segurança e a comPetição geoestratégica sino-indiana na região do oceano índico
— Alexandre Carriço e Constantino Xavier 385
o sistema de Paz e segurança das nações unidas: asPirações
e evolução — Mateus Kowalski 427
sentido e dilemas dos brics na construção de um novo Paradigma mundial
— Silvério da Rocha-Cunha e Marco António Baptista Martins 459
brazil’s international insertion in the military asPect, defense and international security: the brazilian
ministry of defense, its armed forces in un PeacekeePing oPerations and the case of haiti
união euro-asiática e Política eXterna russa: que Peça no Puzzle da integração regional? — Maria Raquel Freire 529
united nations security council Primacy over military interventions in africa and the african Peace
and security architecture — Ricardo Real P. Sousa 553
as novas dinâmicas do desenvolvimento económico e da segurança no esPaço da igad
— Luís Bernardino e Luís Valença Pinto 607
la seguridad en los Procesos de integración regional
latinoamericana — Heriberto Cairo Carou e Jerónimo Ríos Sierra 625
áreas Protegidas transfronteiriças: confluência entre segurança e desenvolvimento económico
— Brígida Brito 651
recursos energéticos fósseis e segurança:
os casos brasileiro e argentino — Filipe Vasconcelos Romão 677
Water security: furthering Peaceful co-eXistence of PeoPle and societies
— Catarina de Albuquerque, Alice Bouman-Dentener e Josefina Maestu 699
a internet como esPaço económico e de segurança
— Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho e Sofia José Santos 725
a crise global do ambiente no cruzamento da geoPolítica e da geoeconomia — Viriato Soromenho-Marques 761
Se a pirataria marítima prolifera ao largo da Somália, a quem compete garantir a segurança das rotas? Se o desmatamento da Amazónia põe em causa equi-líbrios ecológicos globais, quem tem autoridade para lhe pôr cobro? Se o conflito na Ucrânia alastra ao ponto de comprometer o fornecimento de gás natural à Europa do Leste, quem estaria em condições de o impedir? Perguntas como estas têm um pressuposto razoavelmente evidente: o normal
fun-cionamento das actividades sociais e económicas é suportado por garantias de segurança. Todavia, sobre quem recai a responsabilidade? Durante um largo período do passado ainda recente a resposta teria contornos bastante simples: são os Estados nacionais, dotados de meios de coerção, que prote-gem o mercado interno e o sistema de trocas com o exterior, garantindo a integridade física do espaço delimitado pelas fronteiras terrestres e maríti-mas. Ou então, numa fase histórica bem conhecida, o condomínio mundial das superpotências levou a que, no hemisfério norte, dois grandes dispo-sitivos militares garantissem a segurança dos respectivos espaços: o Pacto de Varsóvia para o campo do chamado socialismo real, a Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte para o campo da chamada economia de mercado. Na actualidade, ambos estes cenários – o dos espaços nacionais e o dos blocos –
estão fragilizados ou mesmo despareceram, deixando em aberto um gran-de número gran-de incertezas. Em tempos gran-de fronteiras voláteis, gran-de regionali-zação interestatal e de processos globalizadores nem sempre é claro se são
necessários sistemas de segurança colectiva ou, achando-se necessários, como os organizar, como não é claro quais os agentes e quais os instru-mentos dotados de condições para assegurar a base sólida onde assentem as dinâmicas sociais e o funcionamento dos mercados. Daí a equação que resume tais incertezas: espaços económicos e espaços de segurança. Esta questão foi escolhida pelo OBSERVARE (Observatório de Relações Exteriores,
unidade de investigação em relações internacionais da Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa) para constituir o tema de um ambicioso projecto de investigação. Tal escolha enquadra-se num contexto bem preciso. No ano lectivo de 2015-2016 teve início nessa Universidade o Doutoramento em Relações Internacionais: Geopolítica e Geoeconomia. A fim de articular devidamente a formação avan-çada com a pesquisa científica e ambas com a internacionalização dos proces-sos universitários, foi concebido um programa transnacional de investigação, para o qual foram convidadas a participar algumas Universidades estrangeiras com as quais se celebraram protocolos (com relevo para a Sapienza Università di Roma, a Universidad Complutense de Madrid e a Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo), bem como diversos especialistas vindos de outras comunidades científicas. A este conjunto foi proposto um plano de trabalho justamente centrado no ponto de confluência das duas dimensões presentes no título do Doutoramento: a geopolítica e a geoeconomia. E a questão colocada era a de averiguar até que ponto os sistemas e os subsistemas económicos do nosso mundo são ou não sustentados por sistemas ou subsistemas de segurança e como avaliar a situação daí resultante.
O que não se poderia imaginar era que essa proposta recebesse um tão grande número de respostas, todas elas de invulgar qualidade. Desde a conceptua-lização teórica até à análise de situações particulares, compilaram-se quase três dezenas de estudos científicos desdobrando os temas da equação de base: espaços económicos e espaços de segurança.
Não ignoramos o grau de imprecisão destes mesmos termos. Por exemplo, o que é ao certo um espaço económico? Um território delimitado por fronteiras precisas, embora permeável a trocas com o exterior? Ou, pelo contrário, algo difuso que se estende indistintamente sem contornos precisos, ao sabor de transacções distantes?
Vejamos um termo de comparação. Devemos ao historiador francês Fernand Braudel o conceito de “economia-mundo”, distinta da economia mundial, constituída exactamente por um espaço cujo tecido é unificado por um mercado, espaço caracterizado por uma grande extensão mas também por uma diferenciação hierarquizada, polarizado por um centro em torno do qual gravitam periferias. Ele pôde distinguir ao longo da história um certo
número de economias-mundo, desde a antiga Fenícia até à da Moscóvia no século XVI, contemporânea da chinesa e da indiana, destacando porém aquela que é porventura a mais importante e mais duradoura, a economia--mundo capitalista, primeiro mercantil, depois industrial, surgida nos finais do século XIV e sucessivamente pilotada por Veneza, Lisboa, Antuérpia, Génova, Amsterdão… mais tarde por Londres e Nova Iorque.
Ora bem: esta organização socioeconómica a que chamamos capitalismo triunfou de tal modo que nos nossos dias coincide praticamente com a economia mundial, tendo absorvido as economias ditas pré-capitalistas e até mesmo as que se pre-sumiam pós-capitalistas. A ser assim, poderia concluir-se pela existência actual de uma única economia-mundo, deixando a expressão braudeliana de ser operativa para identificar os espaços económicos referidos na nossa equação. Na realidade presente há, é certo, territórios transnacionais com economias de tal
modo integradas que deles se pode dizer com propriedade que constituem espaços económicos. É o caso, sem dúvida, do subconjunto europeu esta-belecido pelo “mercado interno” e mesmo pela moeda única: a “eurozona” constitui uma típica unidade deste género, embora seja uma área econó-mica essencialmente aberta, cujos interesses se estendem à escala global. Com distintos graus de intensidade, localizamos facilmente outros espaços em que os mercados nacionais são permeáveis e a integração transfrontei-riça facilita o sistema de trocas, como seriam a Comunidade de Estados Independentes na Eurásia ou a SADC na África Austral. Por alguma razão alguns autores falam da tendência para a “continentalização” das economias (veja-se o caso do NAFTA na América do Norte), ou então de macro-regiões que não respeitam as fronteiras tradicionais, como se o tradicional espaço económico nacional já não constituísse a escala óptima para o desenvolvi-mento dos mercados. Todavia, estas manchas de economias integradas ou zonas de comércio livre estão cada vez menos isoladas ou auto-suficientes, antes absorvidas por um mercado global. Assim se desenha uma geografia de novos contornos, fluidos, maleáveis, onde a importância dos fluxos parece prevalecer sobre a dos territórios.
Como se verá, neste estudo “espaço económico” tanto pode referenciar-se a uma entidade do tipo Mercosul na América Latina, como aplicar-se ao estreito de Malaca por onde passa grande percentagem das importações da China, donde se conclui que a expressão é usada com latitude, ao ponto de poder abranger o ciberespaço enquanto lugar de inúmeras operações comerciais e transacções financeiras. Esta latitude tem como preço a relativa imprecisão no uso das palavras, uma imprecisão não apenas compreensível como ainda útil, justamente porque adaptada a uma realidade movediça.
De algum modo, os termos “espaços de segurança” sofrem de idêntica imprecisão, tanto mais quanto o conceito de segurança se alargou para acolher muitas dimensões da vida individual e colectiva, bem expressas na conhecida fór-mula “segurança humana”, que ultrapassa em muito a tradicional ideia de segurança, da responsabilidade dos poderes de Estado e garantida essencial-mente por meios militares. Mesmo assim, é de admitir que a sobrevivência dos espaços económicos esteja condicionada por um conjunto de garantias nos domínios da segurança física das pessoas e das coisas, da liberdade de comércio, da aplicação do direito internacional e até da tolerância cultural. E de uma maneira ou outra, ainda que coexistindo com outras expressões de poder, nada disto se obtém à margem dos mecanismos de coacção, ou seja, pelo uso potencial da violência.
Casos conhecidos ilustram a articulação entre espaços económicos e espaços de segurança. Basta lembrar que a União Europeia constituiu um mercado único e adoptou uma política externa e de segurança comum, a qual, seja dito, mantém um carácter mais simbólico que operacional. Outros exemplos se poderiam referenciar, como o da Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental que, logo no início dos anos 1990, se dotou de um braço armado, o ECOMOG. Todavia, esta quase coincidência entre territórios económicos e dispositivos militares é relativamente rara, deixando em aberto um vasto campo de incerteza, uma incerteza talvez só compensada pela convicção de que existe uma realidade informal mas poderosa, a saber, a capacidade global de intervenção que a hiperpotência continua a poder assegurar. Mas até essa convicção parece hoje submetida a não poucas dúvidas.
Por tudo isto e não obstante as inevitáveis imprecisões, os temas aqui abordados são incontornáveis e situam-se naquele ponto estratégico para onde confluem a geopolítica e a geoeconomia, isto é, os processos socioeconómicos e os mecanismos político-militares. Vejamos mais em concreto e em síntese as questões tratadas nos vários capítulos.
Naturalmente que tem de se ter presente que a investigação que se realizou, não sendo definitiva, como nenhuma investigação pode pretender ser, também não é exaustiva. Seria completamente impossível que o fosse e representa-ria um erro presumir sê-lo. A abrangência e a complexidade do tema não o permitem.
São todavia muitas as questões estudadas. A sua grande variedade e complexidade convidaram a que o programa de investigação tivesse sido organizado sob quatro âmbitos principais de investigação. Um primeiro, ligado às questões de natureza conceptual que enquadram o conjunto do problema, que
aju-dam a percebê-lo e a melhor o situar e que, adicionalmente, sugerem alguns instrumentos para a sua compreensão e eventual regulação. São depois estudados alguns dos principais espaços onde, sob variadas formas, se entre-cruzam, com diferentes intensidade e vinculações, as dinâmicas do desen-volvimento e da segurança. O terceiro âmbito reporta-se à problemática das organizações, correspondentes, de modo real ou potencial, a espaços de grande relevância contemporânea. Finalmente, alguns recursos essenciais são também analisados, atendendo-se às circunstâncias antagónicas que cor-respondem a tanto promoverem melhor correlação entre desenvolvimento e segurança, como, opostamente, as que os constituem como sede e motivo de conflitos de natureza económica e securitária.
No domínio do conceptual tratam-se questões centrais como a dos regimes inter-nacionais e as suas virtualidades como ferramentas de análise e a temática da maior ou menor integração entre economia e segurança, nos planos da sua construção e dos seus limites efectivos. Reflexão importante é a que se baseia no desafio que se colocou aos Estados vencidos da 2ª Guerra Mundial (Alemanha, Itália e Japão) através das suas respectivas Constituições de, sem reserva no que respeita à sua busca de desenvolvimento e progresso económico, terem a sua política e organização de segurança condicionadas e mesmo limitadas. Mas o quadro conceptual prolonga-se com abordagens contextuais relativas à moderna leitura de soberania, à estruturação do poder no ambiente político e estratégico contemporâneo e a hipotéticas consequências do processo de globalização.
Não se pretendeu fazer um estudo exaustivo dos espaços geopolíticos. Mas, como é obrigatório num estudo com esta natureza e esta temática, elabora-se sobre os espaços identificados como sendo mais relevantes na actualidade: o Mediterrâneo, o Leste europeu, África e, naturalmente, a região da Ásia-Pacífico, nela também se incluindo abordagens mais particulares sobre o golfo Pérsico e sobre a bacia do Índico. O tema dos mares, na sua abran-gência de âmbito económico e de segurança, impôs tratamento particular, complementado por uma leitura moderna sobre a segurança dos pontos de articulação estratégica, entendidos à luz da sua importância fulcral para a circulação, em especial de carácter económico.
As organizações internacionais suscitam igualmente atenção neste estudo. A consideração de um desejável sistema global de segurança colectiva e da evolução de que as Nações Unidas parecem carecer para o assegurar, bem assim como as esperanças e porventura desencantos da acção concertada ou avulsa dos BRICS no plano da regulação internacional, abrem a terceira secção do programa de investigação. E, num momento como o presente, de
grande crise de afirmação europeia, de tanta tensão no interior da Europa e na sua periferia, a União Europeia e designadamente a sua Política Externa e de Segurança Comum são objecto de trabalho de estudo e investigação no contexto do programa, tanto pela sua importância específica para a Europa e para o Mundo, como pela aparente iminência de algo tão inédito e preo-cupante como o Brexit. Com manifestas conexões com tudo isso, a Rússia e a sua pretendida esfera de influência na ordem euro-asiática são também matéria de investigação. Tal como o são a América Latina, zona em que os processos de integração política e institucional, ainda que tendam a multipli-car-se, mostram dificuldades em se concretizar, e a África, continente onde, inversamente, é crescente o papel e o peso das organizações de escala con-tinental e regional, algumas revelando grande preocupação simultânea pelas duas vertentes que, constituindo objectivos essenciais das sociedades, são em última análise o propósito de estudo deste programa: o desenvolvimento económico e a segurança e, naturalmente, as suas relações.
O aparente contraponto entre livre circulação de bens e mercadorias e a regulação por contingentação dos fluxos humanos é um dos temas deste trabalho, tal como o é a questão muito interessante da articulação positiva que em áreas transfronteiriças se parece verificar entre segurança e desenvolvimento. Como cedo se considerou necessário para a coerência da investigação, também a
problemática ligada a recursos estratégicos é abordada neste estudo. Segundo um critério que procurou privilegiar recursos especialmente determinantes, a água, os recursos energéticos fósseis, o ambiente e a internet são trabalha-dos tanto sob a óptica da economia como da segurança.
A Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa e o OBSERVARE colocam assim à disposição da comunidade científica, portuguesa e internacional, os resultados desta multiforme investigação, na expectativa de que tais resultados tenham utili-dade, não apenas para o avanço do conhecimento científico e para estímulo de futuras acções de pesquisa acerca dos temas tratados, como ainda para o aprofundamento da decisão política e para o melhor esclarecimento da cidadania cosmopolita.
Isabel FerreIra NuNes
Isabel Ferreira Nunes holds a PhD in Political science and a post doc in International relations. Currently she is the Head of the Centre for studies and research and Director of the National Defence Course at the National Defence Institute. she was Deputy Director of the National Defence Institute between 2006-2008. she is also national delegate at the european security and Defense College. Her main fields of research are theories of International relations, foreign policy analysis, european foreign, security and defence policy and small states.
INtroDuCtIoN
like most approaches to International relations, regime theory emerged on a chang-ing analytical and political context. From the theoretical point of view, regime theory sought to overcome the narrow view of realism centred on national interest and competition among hegemonic states by focusing on state and non-state actors’ cooperation in international affairs. as a sub-field of International relations (brecher and Harvey, 2002:664) regime theory offers an alternative perspective to realism, liberalism and ‘percep-tive’ approaches to cooperation in international affairs. From the analytical point of view, literature on international regimes appears during the 1970s, at a time when uncertainty deepened the security dilemmas that character-ized global competition between the two superpowers, sourced in arms race and regional crises and when regulatory measures on international trade and economic regimes were on demand, to ensure states mutual interests, to increase cooperation, reduce asymmetries and increase predictability. In 1986, Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard ruggie published a seminal issue
of the academic journal International Organization entitled “International organization: a state of the art on an art of the state”. the article addresses ‘broader forms of international institutionalized behaviour’ linking inter-national institutions, with the problems of interinter-national governance and
international regimes. It examines how to connect “the informal ordering devices of international regimes with the formal institutional mechanisms of international organizations’ (Kratochwil and ruggie: 754) opening new analytical perspectives on international organizations, regimes and interna-tional cooperation. thirty years after the article’s publication, current inter-national challenges emphasize the need to review an all-inclusive approach to international governance and regimes, in the pursue of better cooperative strategies by states and international organizations.1 the effects of
globaliza-tion and growing interdependence among actors have renewed the require-ment for effective international regimes able to incentive the converge of preferences and interests, improve the sharing of information, capacities, knowledge and help reducing the impact of current security dilemmas, as perceived by states and communities. these analytical perspectives are par-ticularly important at a time when attempts to harmonize values, principles and practices face the demands of scarcity of resources and those of the complexity of current challenges.
regime theory attempts to explain cooperation in specific issue-areas of internation-al politics. Internationinternation-al regimes offer a platform to share common interests and preferences, provide legitimate frameworks through which agreements are feasible and make available the resources needed to address collective problems, leading to better cooperation. International regimes are also meant to reduce uncertainty and improve predictability, providing the incentive for regime participants to comply with norms and regulations and adopt new practices that may inform collective action. regimes presume a good degree of commonality of perceptions and general acceptance of principles, rules and norms. even when not sourced in international organizations, regimes aim at producing prescriptive impact over the external behaviour of regime partici-pants (Haggard and simmons, 1987:495-496). they presuppose an equalitar-ian application of rights and obligations, but they are not foreign to the effects of role positions claimed by actors, within the international system. this is perceptible in two ways. First, because relevant participants may use their power positions and authority to coordinate the international agenda through regimes, a view close to realism. second, because participants may, on the other hand, prefer to cooperate in problem solving on the base of information share and knowledge, generated by international institutions, a perspective closer to liberal institutionalism.
Generally speaking, literature on regimes addresses three broad research ques-tions: Why international regimes are formed? What are their consequences? a perspective shared by researchers concerned with evaluation of regimes impact or effects.2 and why do regimes persist? this article first briefly
reviews the conceptual boundaries of international regimes. second, it iden-tifies and reviews the main contributions that may lend analytical contribu-tions to understand what regimes are and what do they do.
CoNCePtual vIeWs IN reGIMe tHeory
a classical definition of international regimes regards “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area in international relations” (Krasner, 1982:186). this presumes that regimes are meant to harmonize, streamline and induce convergence around a domain politically relevant and where cooperation is required. Keohane (1997: 27) considers convergence as an essential condition for regime existence, noting that ‘a substantive definition of regimes provides that regimes only exist, if actor’s expectations actually converge’. levy, young and Zürn (1994:5) acknowledge that regimes presuppose the exis-tence of the following conditions: ‘explicit rules, regular references to the rules, rule-consistent behaviour’, consequently recognizing the relevance of formal guidelines, frequency with which they are invoked and regular-ity with which they are implemented, through consistent behaviour by regime participants. this condition of validity of a regime, when the agree-ments they entail are perceived as being feasible, is also valued by Keohane (1993:28) and by Kratochwil and ruggie (1986:759) by suggesting that regimes “are broadly defined as governing arrangements constructed by states to coordinate their expectations and organize aspects of international behaviour in various issue-areas (comprising) normative element, state practice and organizational roles”. this means that not only cooperation is a central effect of international regimes, but that regimes offer a platform for international cooperation and coordination on relevant issue-areas above the state level.
2 Impact and effectiveness regard the ability of a regime to change the behaviour of regime participants by means
of creating better conditions to mitigate or solve a given problem through compliance and rule implementation, in particularly among relevant actors.
International regimes are also an important part of international governance. ruggie (1975) observed another important element of characterization of regimes, perceiving them as defining the references and the boundaries of international governance, what rosenau and Czempiel (1992) came to refer to as ‘governance without government’. levy, young and Zürn (1994:6) emphasized the issue-specific nature of international regimes defining them as ‘social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue-areas’. the principles and norms that inform regimes are meant to reduce the impact of differentiation and ensure reciprocity of rights and obligations among all regime participants regarding specific aspects of the international agenda.
International regimes are not passive platforms to accommodate common national interests and preferences of regimes participants, but can rather have a restraining effect over their behaviour. they can constrain and condition the “behaviour of states towards one another” (Kratochwil and ruggie 1986: 760) because regimes offer “principled and shared understandings3 of
desirable and acceptable forms of social behaviour” (:764), suggesting what regime participants should (normative dimension of regimes) and can or cannot do (regulative dimension).
aNalytICal PersPeCtIves oN INterNatIoNal reGIMes
regime theory reflects the divides that characterize some of the long lasting debates between realists and liberal institutionalists on the role of power, rules and norms, on the role of systemic versus domestic influence over decision making (Koschut, 2014) and on how compliance may affect how regimes are formed and maintained (little 2008:290). Hasenclever, Mayer and rittberger (1996, 1997, and 2000) diverged from traditional views that sustained the idea that regime theory reflects competing approaches
3 the document presented by the High representative in brussels, at the european Council of last June, entitled “shared
vision, Common action: a stronger europe a Global strategy for the european union’s Foreign and security Policy”, is structured in a way closer to a regime. It identifies the ‘Interests’ (peace and security; prosperity; democracy; rule-based global order), the ‘Principles guiding external action’ (unity; engagement; responsibility; partnership), the ‘Priorities’ such as the security of the union including: security and defense; counter-terrorism; cyber security; energy security and strategic communications and like regimes is issue-specific, in the sense it applies to european foreign and security policy.
to international affairs. Conversely, they observe that regimes could help explaining how preferences convergence and improve cooperation rather than competition among states.
In regime literature, regimes are acknowledged as institutions that help regulating various fields of state affairs in the international governance sphere (abbott and snidal 1998; Kratochwill1984; Crawford 2006) from foreign policy, trade, climate change, human rights and even security and defence.
reGIMes, ratIoNal CHoICe aND NorMatIve PersPeCtIves
state centric lines of enquiry tend to dismiss the prescriptive role played by interna-tional regimes to suggest, change and enable regime participants to assume new preferences and practices. various perspectives (Ikenberry 1998-1999; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Mearsheimer 1994/95; schweller and Priess 1997, legro 1997, lake 2013) identify great powers as those who inform the contents, the terms of what is being agreed and the scope of inter-national regimes, determining and coercing changes in policy behaviour among regime participants.
During the process of incorporation of norms and recommendations, issued above the state government level, dense international socialisation4 may have a
positive effect on norm embedment, as a pre-condition for the acceptance and positive impact of international regimes. In this context, a high level of international socialisation facilitates norm incorporation, encouraging participants’ compliance with regimes, in particular when supported in the context of international institutions and provides them protection from major states national interests. the european security regimes established by the european union, through the Common security Defence Policy (CsDP) and the transatlantic security regime set by Nato, although informed by strategically relevant member states, both regimes help counterbalancing hegemonic coercion and both provide equal opportunities to participants, large and smaller, to influence and determine the terms under which rights and obligations leading to cooperation are agreed.
4 schimmelfennig (2000, p. 111) defines international socialisation as ‘a process that is directed toward a state’s
internalisation of the constitutive beliefs and practices institutionalised in its international environment’. this definition presupposes intersubjective knowledge of guiding principles of conduct, the interiorisation of a system of norms and the voluntary adherence to a system of international practices by state representatives and national communities of experts.
this does not mean that regimes are unfamiliar to power distributions and changes in structural power and they can be expected to impact on regime formation and persistence. socialization helps disseminating appropriate behaviour, independently from the power positions held by actors within international institutions. Checkel (1999:87) argues that socialization is the process by which actors ‘learn to internalise new norms and rules in order to become members of (international) society (…). actors are socialized into new norms and rules of appropriateness through processes of persuasion and social learning and redefine their interests and identities accordingly’ (Idem, ibidem).5 regimes may also encompass a transformative quality and
con-formant behavior with regimes may develop on grounds of principled value attributed to what is being contractualized among participants.
reGIMes aND CoMMuNItIes oF exPerts
other analytical views on regimes value the role of national communities of experts in informing and implementing decision making procedures, nec-essary for a regime to be established and produce some degree of evident impact. various authors (allison and Zelikow 1999; Janis 1982; Moravcsik 1997; Courpasson 2000) observe how states’ compliance and incorporation of norms formulated and adopted, within a given international regime, are influenced by national decision-makers and bureaucracies at the national level. National bureaucracies, in particularly when embedded in interna-tional organisations, are ‘crucial centres of interaction and decision-making’ (Goetschel 2000) providing the link between domestic and international actors facilitating change and adaptation of actors’ international identity, policy behaviour and practices. 6
literature on the role the communities of experts, although not primarily con-cerned with the prescriptive nature of international institutions such as regimes, emphasizes the role played by ‘knowledge elites’ in incorporating and disseminating normative and technical prescriptions, with repercus-sion on the external behaviour of actors. the notion of knowledge dif-fusion, underlining views on the role of epistemic communities, enables to understand how epistemic communities influence and determine the
5 brackets in the original.
agreements reached within international regimes, most of them reliant on the specific knowledge of experts. these communities of experts connect what is nationally and internationally prescribed, facilitating norms and rule incorporation by regime participants and influencing the adoption of new prescriptions. International institutions offer the organisational and social setting where these communities converge, being responsible for processes of social learning, for the development of specific levels of expertise and for guaranteeing the means to regime participants to coordinate and cooperate, leading to common problem solving. Communities of experts are a ‘cogni-tive authority’ in the sense they work as interpreters of specific policy issues. they also hold an important position in implementing and shaping the degree of relevance attributed to international regimes in the domestic and international contexts of policy formulation and decision-making.
Haas (1992:4) observes that expert communities have an important function in the diffusion of new ideas and new information and on how these may change actors’ preferences. He points out that, in the pursue of new national role concepts in foreign policy, state actors through their epistemic communi-ties, national bureaucracies can learn and alter their initial preferences. ‘the greater the extent to which epistemic communities are mobilized and are able to gain influence in their respective nation-states, the greater is the likelihood that these nation-states will in turn exert power on behalf of the values and practices promoted by the epistemic community and will thus help in their international institutionalisation’ (adler and Haas, 1992: 371 and 372). these views emphasize how knowledge communities can promote convergence of states’ interests and influence behaviour through interna-tional networks of experts.
the value attributed by these perspectives to information, knowledge diffusion and institutional learning offer important contributions to the explanation of how foreign policy roles and priorities change within national ministries or ministerial cabinets. these communities often operate within highly socialised international environments that help producing forms of collective learning.7 Changes in state preferences and variations in the willingness to
engage in more active international roles result from high patterns of sociali-sation among communities of experts. Haas and adler (1992:378) argue that socialisation and learning, generated among epistemic communities, have an
7 these are traceable in political innovation, information selection and knowledge diffusion and on how these practices
enabling effect in the diffusion of behavioural change. International institutions work as organisational platforms where communities of experts identify, filter and interpret policy preferences. epistemic communities are embedded in the institutional fabric of international organizations, within which they incorpo-rate new frames, ‘define interests and set policy standards’ (adler and Haas 1992: 375) providing the formal social setting where policies emerge, evolve and can be justified. they help communities of experts to ‘define’ interests by generating practices of consultation and negotiation and by establishing standards of behaviour that set principles and impose sanctioning mechanisms, a concern which regimes entail. the literature on communities of experts is valuable to understand how experts improve domestic conditions leading to adaptation of preferences and to the incorporation of regimes values, prin-ciples and practices.
academic research on the formation of imagined security communities and epis-temic communities have also offered a valuable contextual base to explain how international organizations contribute to produce security regimes.8 In
particularly in the domain of international security, international regimes convey ways to address and solve problems of cooperation, coordination and collective management, even on complex policy issues such as arms control and counter-proliferation (Müller 1997), based on an agreed-upon set of rules, procedures, information sharing, codes of conduct and security practices. security organisations, as one of the social settings where commu-nities of experts operate, enable the construction of imagined security com-munities that may reinforce common preferences, help interpreting policy meaning and encouraging conformant behaviour, contributing to develop conditions that guide and strengthen a given international regime.9 regimes
may also contribute to disseminate security values, produce specific infor-mation and codify security narratives, shared among the security communi-ties of regime participants. security communicommuni-ties also work as robust frames of identity that bind participants to similar policy interests, shared security practices and common strategic approaches to security problems, as in the case of Nato.
the evaluation of the strength of a given security regime may not always be related with a formal, regulative, doctrinal, functional and military capac-ity power base on which securcapac-ity practices were built, as in Nato’s case.
8 see Jervis 1982, Müller 1997 and Gheciu 2005.
security regimes may also be strengthened by the norms and rules they are embedded with, through processes of socialisation (Glaser 1993), by shared symbolic meanings and by the adoption of similar declaratory strate-gies regarding international security.10 these rhetorical strategies are often
translated into institutions official narrative that inform a given security regime, constructed on the base of norm conformant principles, expecta-tions, guidelines, strategies and procedural aspects of decision-making, as in case of the eu/CsDP.
this perspective is also substantiated by insights which point out that institutions and international regimes are not strictly guided by cost-benefit calculations, but rather by considerations of appropriate external behaviour, as perceived by sociological institutionalist approaches.11 International socialisation
ritual-ises conduct around frames of goodness and rightfulness. In this approaches (March and olsen 2004: 3) actors ‘internalize prescriptions of what is socially defined as normal, true, right, good, without, or in spite of, calculation of con-sequences and expected utility.’ empirical evidence shows us that participants may adhere to regimes on normative grounds (e. g. perception of common good), despite the fact considerations of national interest and self-help cannot be dismissed in situations of regime compliance.12
reGIMes aND INterNatIoNal orGaNIZatIoNs
International organizations are important contexts of regime formation, although regimes may exist without them.13 International institutions comprehend
formal and informal ‘sets of rules and practices that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain and enable international activity and shape the expectations of actors’ (Haas, Keohane and levy 1993: 4-5). this definition contains two important elements. First, it acknowledges the presence of international rules with prescriptive impact, which strengthens compliance with regimes,14
10 For further reading, see Williams and Neumann (2000).
11 on the possible application of sociological institutionalist perspective to the analysis of regimes, see March and olsen
1989, March and olsen 1998 and March and olsen 2004.
12 the cooperative initiatives between the european union and Nato against maritime piracy and in the reestablishment
of rule of law in the Horn of africa encompass both reasons. the maritime strategies that guide cooperation among the multinational force are strongly embedded in the general regime of international maritime law that both serve the interests of the international community and the national interest of participants.
13 For a comprehensive perspective on the role of international institutions, see Martin and simmons 1998. 14 For further reading on the incentives and rewards of regime compliance see Nielsen and simmons, 2015.
originated in international organizations. second, it recognizes the construc-tion of expectaconstruc-tions about constructive behaviour of states, under formal and informal conditions of norm acceptance. this view is reiterated by Keohane, Haas and levy (1993) when explaining how norm incorporation produces impact by constraining, enabling and shaping behaviour of participants. International organizations play an important part on how they strengthen the
impact of international regimes in various ways. this may occur because they help voicing common concerns and encouraging commonality of preferences. they interpret and confer political and social meaning to international policy prescriptions and they help developing cooperation and coordination practices among member states, which commonly resonate what international regimes do.15 various insights16 on how international
institutions help conciliating and converging policy positions lend important contributes to regime analysis, particularly in explaining why regimes are formed, what do they do and why do they persist.
International organizations also produce rules that define, constrain, enable and cre-ate expectations that may facilitcre-ate the impact of the international regimes they help to build.17 these perspectives argue that the diffusion of norms and
codes that govern inter-action among regime participants generate patterned forms of external behaviour. Institutionalist approaches to regimes attribute to international institutions a ‘power of their own’ in the way they ‘socialize their members into compliant behaviour’ (Müller 1997:362).
Perspectives affiliated with neo-liberal institutionalism attribute to regimes per-sistence, reasons that lay beyond the perpetuation of the conditions pres-ent at their origin. they privilege international institutions ability to solve problems such as: to reduce costs in the transaction of goods (including international security); to increment information distribution; to mitigate distributional conflicts; to persuade to compliant behaviour; to minimise bargaining costs; to incentive convergence and to ensure the monitoriza-tion of decision-making and policy implementamonitoriza-tion. levy, oran and Zürn (1994:18) point out that regime persistence may result from improvements in ‘the contractual environment and thus stabilize cooperation’. stabilization of cooperation reduces uncertainty and mitigates security dilemmas among regime participants, empowering regimes robustness, strength and impact.
15 For further reading on the role of international institutions see Goldstein and Keohane, 1993. 16 on a neo-liberal institutionalist perspective, see Keohane 1988; Keohane 1993 and Martin 2001.
reGIMes, CoMPlIaNCe aND CooPeratIoN
Institutionalist literature also underlines the utilitarian reasons that lead member states to comply with norms and rules ‘in response to their (states) interests and ideas and the ideas and interests of their leaders’ (Keohane 1988:5). as Martin observes (2001: 24) ‘states create institutions in response to stan-dard collective-action dilemmas and when states delegate to these institu-tions adequate monitoring capabilities to allow for effective enforcement, institutions generate convergent effects’. this perspective finds in external conditions (high and low externalities to state behaviour) and in institu-tional mechanisms (effective versus ineffective monitoring mechanisms) the explanation to the intended or unintended effects of international norms and rules on state behaviour. the link between calculated consequences and adopted rules is often subtle. In fact, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between choices prescribed and actions performed on the base of strict self-help and those choices steered by normative conformity, both being able to explain why state and non-state actors conform to international regimes. In the neo-liberal institutionalist tradition, international institutions are purposive
entities, which define the parameters of expected behaviour and aim at specific prescriptive paths. as Keohane (1988: 384) suggests, international institutions comprise long-lasting rules and norms that prescribe behav-ioural practices to actors, constrain international activity and shape actors expectations. International institutions, being purposive entities, convey norms and rules to regime participants consonant with ‘prescribed hierar-chies and capacity for purposive action’ (Keohane 1988: 384). Neo-liberal institutionalism emphasizes the prescriptive role of formal and informal international institutions and how a higher level of ‘certainty for the course of future competition’ determine how states ‘calculate their costs and bene-fits’ and how regime compliance, impact and persistence may be assessed.18
three perspectives help understanding what regimes do by how preferences are aggregate and common problems addressed. approaches to international regime theory privilege different aspects involved in the emergence and persistence of regimes. behavioural approaches believe that convergent behaviour on specific issue-areas increases the likelihood of regime for-mation (young 1989:13, Jervis 1982: 360-362). Cognitive approaches emphasize the role of intersubjective meaning, common understanding and
consensual knowledge on norms that ‘guide, inspired, rationalise and justify behaviour’, as the base for regime formation (Kratochwill and ruggie 1986: 759, 766-767). Formal approaches attribute to regimes formal constraining effects related with explicit rules agreed by actors and reflected in treaties or other normative instruments (Keohane 1997: 26-29). this means that commonality of understandings on specific policy issues is a strong base for compliance with regimes.
rationalist approaches are less explanatory of why regimes, sourced in interna-tional institutions, are formed and why do they persist. First, because they assume that international institutions do not possess authoritative qualities of an actor similar to those attributed to a state. second, due to the fact they believe that international institutions reflect self-interested compet-ing interests of major states, thus the conditions of institutional learncompet-ing, socialisation and appropriateness do not have prescriptive effects on par-ticipants’ behaviour. rationalist approaches limit international regimes efficiency to a ‘particular expression of capability’ (Waltz 1979: 88) led by relevant states national interests and by how they use international regimes to empower themselves and obtain an advantageous position in the strategic bargaining game. However, empirical and historical evidence allow refuting the idea that international institutions and international regimes have a modest prescriptive effect in international relations. the security regime represented by organizations like Nato proves its nor-mative and prescriptive power and explains its persistence in a post-Cold War era, long after the motive for its foundation has changed (legro 1997: 33-35). this is still valid even if one considers that Nato’s persis-tence as an alliance can be credited to the expansion of its geographical scope and functional role to out-of-area operations after 1991, leading to a reconfiguration of its own security identity. a lasting peace in europe would have not been possible, if incorporation of ‘principles, norms and rules’, to revisit Krasner (1982:186) definition of international regimes, the acceptance of policy roadmaps and security practices had not been incorporated by transatlantic allies.
the prescriptive impact of regimes, sourced in international institutions, is more effective due to their level of representativeness and embedded legitimacy, as compared to one-sided guidelines conveyed by major powers or informal agreements, with no juridical binding force. levy, young and Zürn (1994: 9) consider that the legitimacy of the rules entailed by a regime imply clarity, validation among participants and internal coherence in their application. regimes help developing in-group identities that contribute to the persistence
of international institutions foreign policy and security dimensions, as well as their capacity to successfully convey standards of international behaviour. Common beliefs and shared understandings influence the behaviour of states being important conditions of regimes perpetuation.
Hedley bull observations on the international society acknowledges the presence of ‘habits and practices (that) shape the realisation of common goals’ (bull 2002: 71) not necessarily considered within formal organisations. states in the international society are bound by common understandings, rules, norms, and mutual expectations (evans and Wilson, 1992) among constituent parts, as opposed to the idea of an anarchic international structure. to the advocates of the english school, pluralism and solidarity (Dunne 1998: 11) are driv-ing forces of state behaviour in the international society, a reasondriv-ing which regimes may also hold.
Conversely, intergovernmental perspectives centre the source of prescriptive effects on the policy preferences of states and not on the prescriptive appeal and the regimes and institutions they may entail. the influence of national leaders and availability of power resources play a crucial role in intergovernmental bargains (Moravcsik 1991:25-27). advancements in the study of integrated decision-making and policy implementation mechanisms conclude that states pursue self-interested preferences, rather than prescriptive formulas lead-ing to compliance with international roles (Moravcsik 1997: 519) and that national interest is the motivational element in the interstate bargaining game leading to cooperation. this perspective is dismissive of the binding and convergent effects of international institutions on regime participants, notably through the presence of systems of equal rights and responsibilities. However, intergovernmental views, by focusing on national preferences, may provide useful accounts regarding the domestic conditions under which international prescriptions are more likely to be complied with and to reconstruct how domestic preferences shape and are shaped by international regimes.
research affiliated with sociological approaches focuses on the relevance of insti-tutional constructions, on how they shape normative motivation and help changing actors’ identity and preferences. the state remains an important unit of analysis, but intersubjective arrangements, rather than material ones, constitute the base where units perceive, adopt and act in the international system. From this literature, analytical tools can be borrowed to understand the process of role taking in foreign policy, implicit to compliance with international regimes and to their successful implementation.
reGIMes aND INtersubJeCtIve MeaNING
International regimes also have a symbolic and representational purpose (Wendt and Duvall 1989, p.60), assuming an essential role in the formation of international identity of regime participants. Constructivist views are not interested in what international institutions do, but in what they represent and how the norms that emanate from them produce intersubjective meanings that influence behaviour. barnett and Finnemore (1999:700) sustain that international institutions define responsibilities giving them meaning and purpose.19 they are a source of
col-lective identity (Wendt 1994: 385-387; 388-391) that help actors selecting commonalties and changing interests and identities based on newly perceived roles. Wendt (1999: 93) argues that ideas and institutions provide the situational context where state interests are redefined by reference to new conditions. He suggests state actors do not carry a fix portfolio of interests, independently of their social context. security organizations are good examples of situational contexts that generate path-dependency in ‘cooperation, transparency and confi-dence-building’ (Johnston 2001: 509)20 that perpetuates internal cohesion and
generates conditions for the internalisation of new identities, with regard to the dynamics of regional cooperation.
Identities, as the foundation of preferences, are neither static nor exogenously given, but socially dependent qualities. they are framed by a context of relations with other actors, in the case relevant to this study, the context provided by inter-national regimes. If the external environment changes in a way that affects the definition of ones’ identity, constructed by reference to the identity of the other, then uncertainty may rise and the interpretation of identity may change. In this case, what security regimes do, on the base of norm incorporation, is to lower the level of uncertainty by enhancing the formal conditions of trust and predict-ability that will inform security regimes and pattern collective action.
FINal CoNsIDeratIoNs
levy, young and Zürn (1994: 31-33), drawing on the levy and young (1994) work, offer the best systematization on the impact of regimes helping to summarize the various perspectives referred earlier. Identify regimes
effec-19 see also Kratochwill and ruggie 1986: 763-769. 20 see also Gheciu 2005.
tiveness by acknowledging them as individual ‘utility maximizers’ for state and non-state actors. as ‘enhancers of cooperation’ contributing to solve collective action problems by improving the conditions of transparency and trust among relevant actors. as sources of ‘authority’ leading to regime par-ticipants to adapt, as a consequence of intense socialization. as inducers of social learning enabling more effective problem solving. and as ‘role rede-finers’ helping regimes participants to take new roles and reshape their own identities. a positive perception of the benefits associated with the adoption of new roles and practices results in changes in international identity and in external behaviour of regime participants. actors in highly socialised inter-national environments tend to reproduce and diffuse specific patterns of social order, reflecting institutionalised beliefs and practices found in these institutional environments. similarly, the internalisation of new behaviour results from routinisation and ‘ritualised behaviour’ that confirm the under-standings held domestically or internationally by actors involved in foreign policy making (barnett and Finnemore 1999: 718).
In politically integrated and densely socialised international institutions participants are all bound by the same principles, rules, rights and obligations. Member states perceive international regimes as opportunity equalizers. this pro-vides to regime participants, small and large, powerful and less powerful, the possibility to participate in the agreement contractualized under a given regime. elinor ostrom (1990) on her central work Governing the Commons:
The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action observed that the efficiency of
governing common goods also implies that those who are affected by the rules can actively take part in modifying them. Consequently, willingness to incor-porate norms, values, principles and practices is related to a combination of several conditions. First, the variety of regime participants, that is, the number and position of actors in the international system that participate in a given regime, affect perceptions of international legitimacy, authority, representa-tiveness and regime strength. second, the institutional design of international organizations that may accommodate international regimes may affect the impact of international regimes determined by better access to information, equal participation of participants in decision-making and harmonize regime implementation. third, the collective properties of regimes, that is the quality and significance of the resources available, may empower a given regime by means of: improved access to relevant issue-specific information, knowledge and efficiency of the formal mechanisms of monitorization of compliance and implementation, applied to regime participants. variations in any of these conditions may result in changes in the ability to persuade and influence, and
consequently to impact on the behaviour of regime participants. as Johnston suggests (2001: 494) ‘treating institutions as social environments means posit-ing that different social environments vary in terms of their persuasiveness and social influence, for which some may be better succeeded as social environ-ments than others’.
Perspectives on international regimes offer analytical tools that can bridge ratio-nal, institutionalist and intersubjective views connecting the importance of interests, power and material capabilities, with those of meaning, identity, common understandings, appropriateness, socialisation, institutional learn-ing and knowledge. the bridglearn-ing effect of regime literature enables to value the role of relevant actors, as much as the purpose of secondary states in regime formation and impact. regime literature suggests the constraining effects of regimes and the opportunities for compliance, in the face of com-monly beneficial problem solving. regime participant’s goals, policies and behaviour are in regime literature, influenced by domestic and international elements, such as national and international institutions and respective com-munities of experts that inform regime formation and implementation and play a part on how rules are domestically incorporated, affecting compliance and implementation of international regimes.
the analytical opportunities offered by a review of various bodies of literature, which contribute to understand international regimes, allow mapping four relevant sets of elements to understand what regimes are and what do they do. First, the observation that the presence of multilevel sets of political belonging and decision-making enhance collective action and facilitate prob-lem solving in various policy domains. In international affairs, actors take part in several international regimes with distinct purposes, for instance in security, environment, disarmament and arms control and trade, with differ-ent prescriptive authority, with diverse compliant appeal to participants and with various material capabilities. these overlapping layers of institutional belonging may cause conflicts of interest, thus limiting the effectiveness of a regime or conversely by offering opportunities to solve common problems and challenges, on the base of international complementarity in cooperation. second, it highlights the prescriptive appeal of international institutions to regime participants by inducing norm incorporation that helps behaviour and action to converge, by aggregating representations around common problems, by constructing narratives on how to deal with challenges and producing the necessary knowledge, information and resources to manage them. third, under conditions of dense socialisation, international regimes may change participants’ international identity in order to: meet
confor-mant behaviour, facilitate integration in the international society or help participation in the international agenda. last, literature on international regimes suggests an interesting possibility for cross-pollination of theoreti-cal and analytitheoreti-cal insights and provides the opportunity to interpret regime formation and impact, across various policy issues and regimes that coexist inside or independently of international organizations, present in different periods of international affairs.
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