staphylococcus aureus (MrSA) in Latin America
aBstract
Afterthefirstreportsoftheemergenceofmethicillin-resistantStaphylococcus aureus (MRSA)inthe 1970s, numerous measures intended to prevent its transmission were initiated in hospitals. However, inmostcases,large-scalemeasuresfailedtobeimplementedandthetransmissionofMRSAhassince ledtoaglobalpandemic.Presently,doubtsstillremainaboutthebestapproachtopreventandcontrol MRSAandmoreoftenthannot,controlmeasuresarenotimplemented.Therefore,wereviewherethe currentsituationinLatinAmericawithrespecttoexistingpoliciesforcontrolofMRSA,andevaluatethe evidenceforcontrolmeasuresinhospitalsandthecommunity.Welookattheriskfactorsforinfection andtransmissionofMRSAbetweenhospitalpatientsandwithinspecificpopulationsinthecommunity, andattheeffectofantibioticusageonthespreadofMRSAinthesesettings.Finally,wesummarizerec-ommendationsforthepreventionandcontrolofMRSA,whichcanbeappliedtotheLatinAmerican hospitalenvironmentandcommunitysetting.
Keywords:MRSA,prevention,infectioncontrol,LatinAmerica.
introDuction
Oxacillin-resistantStaphylococcus aureus (MRSA)is theprincipalmicro-organismresponsibleforcaus-inginfectionsinthehospitalandhealthcaresetting. Itsprevalencehasprogressivelyincreasedovertime and,althoughcontrolmeasuresintendedtoprevent itstransmissionwereinitiatedinhospitalsafterits emergence in Europe,1,2 large-scale implementa-tionwasbelated,andasaresult,thetransmissionof MRSAhasledtoaglobalpandemic.
In addition, during more recent years, com-munity-associated MRSA (CA-MRSA) has also increased;anincidenceof59%ofCA-MRSAin skin and soft tissue infections was reported by emergencydepartmentsin11UScities,3making MRSAthemostfrequentlyisolatedagentinthis type of pathology. These figures, together with theriskofdevelopmentofglycopeptide-resistant
S. aureus, make the need for worldwide imple-mentation of effective measures for the preven-tionoftransmissionofMRSAessential,bothin hospitalsandwithinthecommunity.
AlthoughtheexactburdenofMRSA-related
diseaseremainslargelyunknown,consensusex-ists among most infectious disease (ID) physi-cians that MRSA infections are an important clinical and public health problem.4,5 Within LatinAmerica,althoughcountrytocountryvari-abilitymeansthatdataonMRSAincidencefrom specific hospitals may not be representative of thenationalsituation,itisacceptedthatoverall, theprevalenceofMRSAinfectionsintheregion is probably high.6,7 However, despite published epidemiologic and microbiologic data, the best approach to prevent and control the endemic MRSAhasnotbeenagreedupon.
HospitalcontrolofendemicMRSAhasbeen basedonseveralcomplementarystrategies:early identification and isolation of asymptomatic carriers to help prevent spread; antiseptic body washes;systemicand/ortopicaltreatment,aswell asimprovedcompliancewithhandhygieneand other standard precautions to reduce carriage; and antimicrobial control measures to reduce antibioticselectionpressure.Thisapproachmay helpminimizethespreadofMRSA,andreduce carriage and infection rates in hospitals where MRSA is endemic. Furthermore, compliance
withthesemeasuresshouldhaveapositiveclini-Authors
CarlosAlvarez1
JaimeLabarca2 MauroSalles3 onbehalfoftheLatin AmericanWorking GroupforGram PositiveResistance.
1HospitalSanIgnacio
andPontificia Universidad Javeriana,Bogotá, Colombia. 2Pontificia UniversidadCatólica deChile,Santiago, Chile.
3HospitalIrmandade daSantaCasade MisericórdiadeSão Paulo,SãoPaulo, Brazil.
Correspondence to:
calimpactonkeyhigh-riskpatients,suchasthoseinthein-tensivecareunit(ICU).
Publishedguidelineshaveaddressedthepreventionand control of MRSA transmission, including guidelines from the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and from the UK, Belgium, and Spain.8-14 This article summarizes the principalrecommendationstocontrolMRSAinthehospital and community settings, and discusses their implementa-tioninLatinAmerica.
prevention anD control of Mrsa in the healthcare setting
The status of prevention and control of MRSA in hospitals in Latin America
In1997,theInternationalNetworkfortheStudyandPre-ventionofEmergingAntimicrobialResistance(INSPEAR) performedanobservationalstudyinhospitalsin30coun-tries,includingsixcentresinLatinAmerica(Argentinaand Brazil),tohelpdeterminetheprevalenceandmeasuresfor controloftransmissionofMRSAatthattime.15 Oftheiso-latedcasesofS. aureus, 67%wereidentifiedasMRSA,and therewasanincidenceofMRSAinfectionof0.5per1,000 patient-daysofhospitalization.Only4/6centres(67%)had anactiveMRSAsurveillanceprogram,withameanpropor-tionofoneinfectioncontrolnurseforevery191hospital beds (range from 1:80 to 1:324). These rates were higher thanratesintheUS,EuropeanandAfricancenters.Isola-tioninanindividualroomwasusedonlyoccasionallyby 50%ofLatinAmericancentersandusedregularlyby0% (comparedwith39.5%and53.5%,respectively,inEurope-ancenters).OfLatinAmericancenters,33%regularlyused gloves and aprons, 67% followed hand hygiene protocols and put up isolation posters on a routine basis, and 50% had implemented an antimicrobial control program (the control methods most frequently used were limited drug listsandevaluationbyanIDspecialist).Fromthisreport, controlofMRSAwasevidentlynotoptimalinLatinAmer-ica,andsinceratesofMRSAinfectioncontinuetorisein manyareas,implementationofcontrolmeasuresstillneeds tobeimproved.
Risk factors for MRSA infection in hospitals
Whileitisclearfromcase-controlstudiesthatpatientsin-fectedbyMRSAandpatientsinfectedorcolonizedbyother multi-resistantbacteriasharecommonriskfactors,suchas personal circumstances, length of hospital stay and use of antimicrobial agents,16 the principal risk factor for MRSA infection is the transmission of MRSA between patients. ThisideaissupportedbythefactthatS. aureus,oranyofits antibiotic-resistantforms,isaskin-carriedagentthatcanbe easilytransmittedbycontact,andbythefactthatdissemina-tioninhospitalsisclonal,i.e.veryfewclonesarecurrently
circulatingthroughouttheworldand,commonly,eachhos-pitalhasonlyoneortwoclonescirculatingatthesametime.
Transmission of MRSA
Hand-contamination of healthcare personnel repre-sents one of the principal mechanisms for transmission of various bacterial agents from patient to patient, and has been recognized as such for more than a century.17 In numerous studies, MRSA and other multi-resistant micro-organisms, such as vancomycin-resistant ente-rococci (VRE), have been isolated both from the hands andgloves,apronsandotherinstrumentsusedbyhealth-care personnel involved in the andgloves,apronsandotherinstrumentsusedbyhealth-care of patients infected orcolonizedbytheseagents.18,19Devineet al.20reported isolation of MRSA from computer keyboards used only bydoctors,whileBoyceet al. (1997)21foundanincidence of42%contaminationofglovesusedbynurseswhohad nodirectcontactwiththepatient,butwhohadtouched surfacesinanMRSA-infectedpatient’sroom.
Contamination of healthcare personnel’s clothing has also frequently been reported in the literature as a factor in the transmission of pathogens from patient to patient. Boyceet al.(1998)22reportedanincidenceof40%and69% contamination of isolation and white aprons, respectively, followingthecareofpatientscolonizedwithMRSAorVRE. In27%ofcases,contaminationwasfurthertransmittedto the hands of the healthcare personnel. In the Boyceet al. (1997)study21MRSAwasreportedtocontaminateaprons oruniformswornby65%ofhealthcarepersonnelwhohad caredforpatientswithwoundorurinaryinfectionscaused byMRSA.
Instruments used in the daily care of patients, such as thermometers, sphygmomanometers, phonendoscopes and otoscopes have been reported23,24 to act as vectors for the transmissionofpathogenssuchasMRSAandothermulti-resistant bacteria between patients, both through direct patient-instrument contact, and indirectly through con-tact with the hands of healthcare personnel. In addition, new communication technologies can easily be contami- natedwithMRSAandmayhaveanimpactoncross-con-tamination.25
Use of antimicrobials
Theuseofantimicrobialshasbeenfoundtobeariskfactor forMRSAinfection,andthemostconsistentfactorincase-controlstudiesistheuseofmultipleantibioticsratherthan one on its own (odds ratio [OR] 1.7-11.3). However, in a systematicreviewandmeta-analysis,theriskratio(RR)for useofsingleclassesofantibioticswas3(95%CI,2.5-3.5) forquinolones,2.9(95%CI,2.4-3.5)forglycopeptides,2.2 (95%CI,1.7-2.9)forcephalosporinsand1.9(95%CI,1.7
-2.2)forotherβ-lactams.29
eviDence anD recoMMenDations for Mrsa control Measures in hospitals
Standard precautions
Standardprecautionsarethebasisforpreventingtransmis-sion of multi-resistant agents in hospital environments. However,thesemeasuresdonotseemtobesufficientinthe caseofMRSAtransmission.Jerniganet al.30demonstrated thatMRSAtransmissionriskwas15.6timesgreaterwhen usinguniversalproceduresthanwhenusingcontactisola-tion in a Neonatal ICU. Marshallet al. described rates of MRSA colonization of 11.4% during hospitalization in an ICU31whichusedonlyuniversalprecautions.
Recommendationsforstandardprecautions: • Handhygieneisoneofthemostbasicmeasures
ininfectioncontrol,andshouldbeperformed beforeandafterpatientexamination,before enteringapatient’sroom,andbeforeandafter wearinggloves.Itshouldbenotedthattheuseof glovesISNOTasubstituteforhandwashing.
Contact precautions
Theimplementationofcontactprecautionsisrequiredfor thosepatientswhoarecolonizedorinfectedbymulti-resist-antmicro-organismssuchasMRSA.Sinceclinicalcultures detectonlyasmallpercentageofMRSA-colonizedpatients,32 andbecauseasymptomaticcolonizedpatientsserveasres-ervoirsforperson-to-persontransmission,MRSAneedsto beidentifiedquicklythroughactiveanalysis,sothatcontact precautionscanbeinitiatedearly.
Recommendationsforcontactprecautions: • Contactprecautionsshouldbeimplemented
withallpatientswherecolonizationorMRSA infectionissuspectedorconfirmed.Itinvolves theuseofalong-sleevedisolationapronorbib, aswellasgloves,whichshouldbewornbefore entryintotheunit,andremovedbeforeexit. • PatientscolonizedorinfectedbyMRSAshould
ideallystayinisolatedunits.Ifthisisnotpossible, isolationincohortsmaybeconsidered.
Active surveillance of colonization for patients The use of active surveillance cultures (ASC) involves screeningpatientsatthetimeofhospitaladmissiontoiden-tify MRSA carriers (prevalent carriers), followed by peri-odicscreeningtoidentifypatientswhoacquireMRSAwhile stayinginhospital(incidentcases).Numerousstudieshave demonstratedthattheimplementationofASCsandisola-tionmeasureshavemadeitpossibletosignificantlyreduce patient colonization and infection, while there have been reports of a gradual increase in the prevalence of MRSA in those hospitals that do not apply an active surveillance program.33-39 Calfeeet al. (2002)40 showed a significantly lowerrateofbacteremiaassociatedwithMRSAintheUni-versityofVirginiaHospitalthaninotherhospitalsthatdid notimplementactivesurveillanceandisolationofMRSA-colonizedpatients(20casescomparedwith30-70casesof bacteremia/yearin1999).
Following hospitalization, asymptomatic MRSA car-riers constitute the main reservoir and source of further spread.TheSocietyforHealthcareEpidemiologyofAmer-ica (SHEA) published guidelines in 2003 supportingASC, in combination with other basic infection control prac-tices, to identify MRSA-colonized patients.11 The Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention’s Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee offered a more conservative recommendation for ASC as a second tier for preventing transmission if baseline infection control measures fail.10 Nevertheless, questions remain regarding the viability ofASC as a worthwhile method for reducing MRSA prevalence, considering the cost associated with its implementation.Abramsonet al.41estimatedthatacaseof
MRSAbacteremiaisassociatedwithanincreaseinmedian totalhospitalcostofUS$27,083,whileacaseofmethicillin-sensitiveS. aureus(MSSA)bacteremiainvolvesanincrease ofUS$9,661.Ontheotherhand,Calfeeet al.(2002)40 esti-matedthatthereductioninMRSAbacteremiaasaresultof activesurveillanceandisolationmeasuresisassociatedwith a saving of US$313,596 to $975,632 for one hospital over one year. Papiaet al.42 demonstrated that early identifica-tionofsixormorenewMRSA-colonizedpatients,andthe consequentdecreaseintransmission,makestheactivesur-veillanceprogramcost-effective.Karchmeret al.43estimated thatthecostofactivesurveillanceandisolationofpatients colonizedandinfectedbyMRSAwas19-27timeslowerthan thatattributabletoMRSAbacteremiaasaresultofanun-controlledoutbreak.
antibiotics). The strain responsible for this outbreak was thecauseof40%ofnosocomialbacteremiacasesinvolving MRSAand49%ofsurgicalsiteinfectionsduringthisperiod. Inasystematicliteraturereview,McGinigleet al.46 evalu-atedtheassociationbetweenASCandMRSA-relatedevents in hospitalized patients; they analyzed more than 2000 complete citations or abstracts, and found inconsisten-cies in the literature onASC, which attempted to provide evidence-based conclusions. This extensive review identi-fiedonly20of2578articlesthatmettheinclusioncriteria. Giventheinherentdifficultyandcostsofperforminglarge population-basedstudies,McGinigleandcolleaguesfound fewstudiespresentingstrongscientificevidence,andnone ofthestudieswereofgoodquality.Theauthorsconcluded thattheuseofASCreducestheincidenceofMRSAinfec-tions,buttheoverallqualityoftheevidenceispoor;thus, definitive, evidence-based clinical recommendations can-notbemade.46Indeed,therehasbeenconfusionregarding theprecisionandconsistencyofoutcomemeasuresinpa-persaddressingASC.Traditionally,ASChasbeenusedwith the primary goal of preventing MRSA transmission and a secondary long-term goal of reducing hospital-associated MRSAinfection.SomestudiesmeasuredtheimpactofASC onMRSAcontrolbycomparinghospital-associatedMRSA infectionratesastheprimaryoutcomevariable,whileoth-erscomparedMRSAtransmissionrates(incidentcases)as a primary outcome measure. Combining these outcome measuresinthesameanalysisdoesnotaddresstheprimary, clinically-significant question about whether ASCs reduce MRSAinfections.Therefore,furtherstudiesarerequiredso thatmoredefinitiverecommendationscanbemade.
RecommendationsforASCsforpatients:
• Amultidisciplinarygroupofprofessionalsisrequired toestablishanddevelopanactivesurveillanceprogram. • Thepopulationtobesubjectedtothissurveillance
shouldbeselectedandidentifiedonthebasisof thepatient’sriskofbeingcolonizedbyMRSA (forexample:recenthospitalization,resident inanold-people’shome),andthespecific riskfortheunit(e.g.CriticalCareUnit).
• Themosteffectivesamplingtechniqueforidentifying MRSAisthenasalswabwhichhasanegativepredictive valueof98%,47withonly2%ofpatientswithanegative MRSAnasalswabhavingapositiveperianalculture.A negativenasalswabalsohadalowernegativepredictive valueforMRSAfromwoundcultures(83%).47
• MRSAcanbedetectedusingculture-basedmethods, themostcommonly-usedtechnique.Alternatively, molecularbiologytechniques,themostcommonof whichisthepolymerasechainreaction(PCR),can alsobeusedatthepointofcareforthescreening ofMRSA,withasensitivity,specificity,positive
predictivevalueandnegativepredictivevalueof 83.9,98.8,88.0and98.4,respectively.48Themajor benefitofMRSApoint-of-caretestingthroughPCR, isthelargereductioninthetimetoobtainaresult comparedwiththelaboratory(>10hquicker). Furthermore,theuseofPCRtestingcouldhelp lowerthecostofcontactprecautionmeasures. • Thesurveillanceprogramshouldstatewhether
theresultsoftheexaminationsshouldbeavailable beforecontactprecautionmeasuresareimplemented. Althoughsettingthesemeasuresupbeforethe resultsareobtainedpermitsminimizationofthe riskoftransmissionfromsourcesthathavenotbeen recognized,thisisassociatedwithgreaterfinancialcosts, andtherefore,eachhospitalwillneedtodefineitsown policyaccordingtolocalneedsandcostrestrictions.
Active surveillance culture for healthcare workers Astrongassociationbetweenpatientandhealthcareworker (HCW)carriagewasfoundbyarecentreviewofMRSAout-breaks, which recommended that screening efforts should focusonHCWswithsymptomaticinfection.49Albrichet al. recentlypublishedasystematicreviewrevealing18studies showingproventransmission,and26studiesshowinglikely transmission, to patients from MRSA-colonized HCWs.50 ThelatterreviewsuggestedthatscreeningofHCWsshould notberestrictedtooutbreaksettingsbecausethereisatrend forhighercolonizationratesinsettingswhereMRSAisen-demic.50 Others have also suggested that screening should take place irrespective of the presence of risk factors or purulent infections, as part of pre-employment examina-tion,orevenperiodicallyandunannouncedbeforeawork shift, to avoid detecting only transient carriers.49However, implementing routine HCW screening is not feasible in manyhealthcaresettingsbecauseofitshighcost.Therefore, whereresourcesarelimited,priorityshouldbegiventostaff workinginhigh-riskareas,suchastheICU,dialysisareas, burnunitsandsurgicalwards(especiallycardiovascularand orthopedic surgery), where prompt detection of asympto-maticcarriageofMRSAbytheHCWwouldhaveagreater positiveimpact.
Anadditionallimitationtothesystematicsurveillanceof HCWsisthefactthatonlyasmallproportionofHCWshave persistentcolonization.49TheliteraturereviewbyAlbrichet
Althoughnosingleapproachwillworkuniversally,aggres- sivescreeninganderadicationpoliciesseemjustifiedinout-breakinvestigations,orwhenMRSAhasnotreachedhighly endemiclevels.50
RecommendationsforASCforHCWs: • Ifused,screeninganderadicationofMRSA
colonizationinHCWsshouldalwaysbepartofa comprehensiveinfectioncontrolpolicy,whichshould includestaffeducationandemphasizehighcompliance withhandhygieneandcontactprecautions.
• Feelingsofguiltorstigmatizationamongcolonized HCWsshouldbeavoided,andtherelationshipbetween HCWsandtheinfectioncontrolteamshouldbe treatedwithgreatcare,avoidinganydisruption.
Decolonization
Themajorsiteofstaphylococcalcolonizationinhumansis theanteriornares,althoughthroat,perinealorgastrointes-tinalcolonizationalsooccursrelativelyfrequently.Surgical wounds,decubitusulcersandmedicaldeviceexitsitesmay alsobecolonized.
MRSAdecolonizationtherapycanbedefinedasthead-ministration of topical antimicrobial or antiseptic agents, withorwithoutsystemicantimicrobialtherapy,toMRSA-colonized persons for the purpose of eradicating or sup-pressing the carrier state. Not all staphylococcal or MRSA carriageisthesame;carriagemaybetransient,intermittent orpersistentformonthsoryears.Thepersistentcarriersare morelikelytobecolonizedatmultiplesites,totransmitto others and eventually become infected.51 The main reason toconsiderstaphylococcaldecolonizationistopreventthe subsequentdevelopmentofinfectioninacolonizedpatient, andsecondly,topreventtransmissionoftheorganism(pri- marilyMRSA)toothers.AnadditionalbenefitofMRSAde-colonization,ifeffective,wouldbetoeliminatetheneedfor useofisolationorcontactprecautions.
The use of MRSA decolonization therapy in conjunc- tionwithactivesurveillancetestingmaybeausefuladjunc-tivemeasureforpreventionofMRSAtransmissionwithin ahospital.Despiteuncertaintyregardingtheefficacyofthis approach,recommendationstoconsidertheuseofdecolo-nization are often made based on randomized controlled trialsexhibitingsignificantheterogeneity.Interpretationof studiesaddressingdecolonizationstrategiesmightbecon-founded if transient MRSA carriers spontaneously clear their colonization, even in the absence of effective thera-py.51 A recent systematic review analyzed the evidence for interventionsinthepreventionandcontrolofMRSA,and showedthatthecurrentevidencedoesnotsupporttherou-tineuseoftopicaland/orsystemicantimicrobialtherapyfor eradicatingMRSAineverycolonizedpatient.52
Therefore, there is little evidence that decolonization re-ducestheriskofstaphylococcalinfectionortransmission,and
thereiscurrentlynoindicationforroutinedecolonizationpre-operatively, or to prevent transmission in hospitalized non-surgical patients. Additionally, the optimal decolonization therapy regimen has not been determined. Most experience to-datehasinvolvedtheuseof2%mupirocin,administered intra-nasallywithorwithoutchlorhexidinebathing.Routine washingwithchlorhexidineforpatientsintheICUwasfound toreducetheincidenceoftransmissionofMRSAandbacter-emiaassociatedwithintravasculardevices.53Theuseofnasal mupirocinincombinationwithchlorhexidinegelinadecolo-nization program, in association with an active surveillance programforMRSA-colonizedpatients,isreviewedbyCalfee
et al. (2008)8 and recommendations for the decolonization regimen are proposed by Rodríguez-Bañoet al. (Table 1).14
However,thisiscurrentlynotpossibleinsomeLatinAmerican countries(e.g.Brazil),wherethelackofavailabilityofnasal mupirocinpreventsthistypeofdecolonization.
Eradication of MRSA carriage in colonized HCWs or patients may be considered as a component of outbreak managementinhealthcarefacilities.However,manystudies addressing MRSA decolonization strategies among HCWs haveshownmarkedheterogeneityintermsofthedefinition of successful decolonization, the length of follow-up, and thenumberandsourceofrepeatedspecimens.50
AlthoughS. aureus and MRSA decolonization may be achieved, at least in certain patient populations, further studies are required to identify more effective agents for long-termeradicationofnasalandextra-nasalsitesofcolo- nization,toevaluatetheefficacyofthisstrategyforprevent-inginfectioninvariousclinicalsituations,andtodetermine whether it has any significant role to play as an infection control measure.54 For example, adequately powered, ran-domizedcontrolledtrialsofdecolonizationforpreventing postoperative infections in surgical patients known to be colonized withS. aureus should be conducted. Outcome measuresshouldincludeoverallinfectionratesandstaphy-lococcalinfectionrates.Decolonizationtopreventrecurrent
table 1. Decolonization regimen for Mrsa-colonized healthcare workers and patients
Population regimen
Health care workers Nasal mupirocin at
2% + washing with chlorhexidine gel 5 d
Patients with nasal colonization without skin lesion/implanted devices
Nasal mupirocin at 2% + washing with chlorhexidine gel 5 d
Patients with skin lesions or implanted devices or multiple site colonization
Nasal mupirocin at 2% + washing with chlorhexidine gel 5 d
Systemic antibiotic 7 d
infectionsinpatientswhohaveCA-MRSAneedstobeeval-uated.54Theroleofdecolonizationasaninfectioncontrol interventiontoreduceMRSAtransmissionneedstobede-fined.Ongoingsurveillanceofmupirocinresistanceshould beconducted,especiallyinsettingswithrepeatedorlong-termmupirocinuse,suchasdialysisunits.Theeffectiveness ofnovelagents,particularlythoselesslikelytoinduceanti-microbialresistance,shouldbedetermined.
Recommendationsfordecolonization:
• Currentevidencedoesnotsupporttheroutineuse oftopicaland/orsystemicantimicrobialtherapyfor decolonizationofMRSAinpatientsorHCWs. • Mupirocin-susceptibilitytestingshouldbedone
beforeusingthisagentfordecolonization. • Decolonizationwithmupirocinorrifampin
maybeconsideredinthoseundergoingdialysis, althoughthereisariskofresistanceemerging withlong-termuseofeitherofthesedrugs.
• Decolonizationalsomaybeusefulinpatientswhohave recurrentstaphylococcalskinorsofttissueinfection.14
Environmental cleaning
There are many studies showing control of outbreaks of MRSA with improved cleaning and/or disinfection of the environment.9,55,56 Surfaces in rooms occupied by MRSA-positivepatientscancontaminatethehandsofHCWseven intheabsenceofdirectHCW-patientcontact.57MRSAhas been isolated from various fomites, including beds, linen hampers,doorknobsandwindowledges.Studieshavedem-onstrated that these antimicrobial-resistant pathogens can persist on room surfaces even after discharge cleaning.58,59 Goodmanet al.60 have recently shown that increasing the volume of disinfectant applied to environmental surfaces, providing education for environmental services staff, and instituting feedback regarding the adequacy of discharge cleaning,reducedthefrequencyofMRSAcontamination.60 Indeed, studies have shown that environmental cleaning educationandsurveillancereduceslevelsofenvironmental contaminationwithmulti-resistantpathogens.
Recommendationsforenvironmentalcleaning: • Cleaningisessentialtoreduceenvironmental
reservoirsofknownhospital-associatedpathogens. • Althoughthegoalofenvironmentalcleaningand
disinfectionisnotsterilization,adequatecleaning requiressufficientremovalofpathogensto
minimizepatients’riskofacquiringinfectionsfrom hospitalenvironments.Thisisparticularlytruein areasservinghigh-riskpatients,suchasICUs.
Hospital overcrowding and understaffing
TheglobalepidemicofMRSAhascoincidedwiththeemer-genceofpublichealthpoliciesthatpromotehigherpatient
throughputinhospitals,andhasledtomanyservicesoper-atingatnear-fullorfullcapacity.Hospitalovercrowdingand understaffinghasresultedintheinabilitytoadaptservices tothevaryingnumberofpatientadmissionsandavailable staff,61andhasledtothefailureofMRSAcontrolprograms duetodecreasedHCWhand-hygienecompliance,increased movementofpatientsandstaffbetweenhospitalwards,de-creasedlevelsofcohortingandoverburdeningofscreening andisolationfacilities.Inturn,ahighMRSAincidencein- creaseshospitalstayandbedblocking,whichleadstoover-crowdingandaviciouscyclecharacterizedbyfurtherfailure ofinfectioncontrol.61
Recommendations for the control of hospital over-crowdingandunderstaffing:
• Maintenanceofanappropriatepatient/staffratio • Epidemiologicandeconomicevidence
shouldbeusedinfuturedecision-makingto evaluatetheeffectofhealthsystemchanges ontheincidenceofMRSAinfection.
Control of the use of antimicrobial agents
Eventhoughtherehasbeenalackofstrongscientificevi-dencesupportingthestrategyofantibioticusagecontrolfor the purpose of reducing MRSA infection, different papers have already addressed this situation. Over-use of cepha-losporins62-65 and fluoroquinolones66,67 has been associated with MRSA selection in some settings, and quinolone use hasbeenlinkedwithprolongationofMRSAcarriage.The roleoftheseagentsforresistantofS. epidermidis iswellrec-ognized,especiallywithquinolones.68SHEAguidelineslay emphasis on good antibiotic stewardship and, specifically, onfluoroquinolonecontrol.11
Controloftheuseofantimicrobialagentsisalsoameans ofpreventingtransmissionofMRSA,althoughtheimpactof thismechanismislessthanthatoftheothercontrolmeas-uresdescribedabove.Fukatsuet al.69reportedareduction inratesofpostoperativeMRSAinfectionfollowingareduc- tionintheuseofthird-generationcephalosporinsinsurgi-cal prophylaxis, while Landmanet al.70 demonstrated that restrictions on the use of carbapenemics, cephalosporins, vancomycinandclindamycinresultedinareductioninthe rateofinfectionswithMRSA(from21.9±8.1to17.2±7.2 patients/1000 discharges), and with ceftazidime-resistant
Klebsiella pneumoniae(8.6±4.3to5.7±4.0patients/1000 discharges).Likewise,Grusonet al.71 showedthatarestric-tionontheuseofciprofloxacinandceftazidime,alongwith the rotation of other β-lactams, resulted in a reduction in theproportionofmethicillin-resistantstrainsofS. aureus,
causingpneumoniaassociatedwithmechanicalventilation. The proportion of resistant Gram-negative bacilli, such as
Inallcases,interventioninthecontrolofantimi- crobialswasusedinconjunctionwithmaintenanceorim- plementationofmeasurestoavoidpatient-to-patienttrans-mission,andtherefore,interpretationoftheeffectivenessof thisstrategyislimited.
Information on the value of restriction of the use of thesecompounds,inparticularforreducingMRSAselec-tion,issparse.Anassociationbetweenusageofmupirocin andresistanceratehasbeendemonstrated.72Therefore,for treatment and clearance of mupirocin-susceptible MRSA inpatientswithcarriageorpossibleinfectionofsofttissue lesions,mupirocinshouldbeusedwithasystemicallyac-tiveagenttoimproveclearanceratesbeyondthoseachieved with nasal or topical mupirocin alone. There are limited dataregardingtheuseoforalvancomycinasprophylaxis oraspartofclearanceregimensforMRSA.Formupiroc-in-resistantstrains,therearenotrialstoassessefficacyof other agents.A range of agents have been used topically, buttheemergenceofresistancetotopicalantibioticsiswell documented.73
Recommendationsforcontrolofantimicrobials: • WhilecontrolofMRSAisbasedessentiallyon
controlofpatient-to-patienttransmission,the controlofantimicrobialsisauniversalmeasure forpreventionofantimicrobialresistance.The approachensuresafocusonothermulti-resistant bacteriaaswellasMRSA.Generalstrategiesaimed atlimitingtheunnecessaryuseofantimicrobialsand optimizingtheirefficiencyshouldbeimplemented. Toachievethis,itisveryimportantthataprogram ofantimicrobialcontrolsbeimplementedin eachhospital.Thisprogramshouldinclude:
• Surveillance of the consumption of antimicrobials. Thisis performedthroughco-operationwiththepharmacist andisexpressedasthedensityofconsumptionof antimicrobialsusingdefineddailydoses(DDD)of antibiotics,adjustedbypatientdays.Thissurveillance enablesinfectioncontrolcommitteestoknowwhether consumptionisrelatedtotrendsinbacterialresistance. • Protocols and guides for use of antimicrobials for
community and hospital-associated infections and guidelines for surgical prophylaxis. Useofthese protocolsandguidelinesconstitutesaneffective meansforavoidingtheunnecessaryadministration ofantimicrobialsandincreasingtheeffectivenessof theprescribedregimes.Theguidesmustbedesigned locally,takingresistancepatternsintoconsideration. • Restriction of antimicrobials. Thisinvolvesthe
mandatoryrequirementtohaveanauthorised teamofprofessionalsqualifiedintheuseofcertain antimicrobials.Thisselectionwilldependona localdecisionthatisbasedoncostsandresistance patterns.Suchrestrictionpoliciesmakeitpossible
toreducetheuseofantimicrobialsandtheir associatedcost,butwithahithertoundefined impactonbacterialresistancetoantimicrobials. • Supervision of compliance with standards and
intervention programs.Implementationofallofthese policiesmustbesupervised,soastoassessadherence andinordertobeabletointerprettheirefficacy.
prevention anD control of
coMMunity-associateD Mrsa (ca-Mrsa)
The growing problem of CA-MRSA in Latin America CA-MRSAhasbeendescribedinLatinAmericainBrazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Chile and Argentina.74-77 CA-MRSA has begun to replace hospital-associated isolates (HA-MRSA) during recent years, especially in the USA and Taiwan,whereCA-MRSAprevalence(52%)isveryhigh.78 The circulation and nosocomial transmission of invasive CA-MRSAinfectionshasalreadybeendescribed79inLatin American countries. This is a source of concern, as CA-MRSA strains with greater virulence could be related to poorer clinical outcomes. The spread of CA-MRSA may be due to limited resources and inadequate adherence to control measures.80 This has posed a new challenge for hospitalswithlimitedresourcesandtheirinfectioncontrol committees,asendemicMRSAmaybegeneratedwithina particularhospitalwhenCA-MRSA-colonizedpatientsare admittedwithoutsuitablescreeningandcollectionofthe pertinentisolates.
TheguidelinesrecentlypublishedbySHEAandtheIn- fectiousDiseasesSocietyofAmerica(IDSA)includestrate-giestopreventthetransmissionofCA-MRSA.8Inorderto facilitatetheirimplementationinthecontextofLatinAmer-ica,wedescribetheadaptationoftheserecommendations.
Risk factors and transmission of MRSA in the community
FactorsthathavebeenassociatedwiththespreadofCA-MRSA skin infections include close skin-to-skin contact, openingsintheskinsuchascutsorabrasions,contaminated itemsandsurfaces,crowdedlivingconditions,poorhygiene, participationincontactsports,skinorsofttissueinfection withapoorresponsetoβ-lactamantibiotics,andrecentor frequentantibioticuse.85
Evidence for control measures in the community Recently,theSociedadEspañoladeEnfermedadesInfecciosas yMicrobiologíaClínica(SEIMC)andSociedadEspañolade Medicina Preventiva, Salud Pública e Higiene (SEMPSPH), collectedtheavailablescientificevidenceonpreventionand controlofMRSA(includingcommunity-acquiredMRSA).14
In addition, several websites of public health departments werefoundtohaveguidelinesforthistopic.80,85-87 Recommen-dationsfromsomeoftheseguidelinesaresummarizedbelow.
recoMMenDations for control of Mrsa in the coMMunity
Increased awareness
Healthcareprovidersshouldbeawarethatcommunity-ac-quiredMRSAisapossibilityinpatientswithskinandsoft tissueinfectionsandinthosepresentingwithmoresevere illnesscompatiblewithS. aureusinfection.80,85-87
Early detection and appropriate treatment
Screeningmethodsforearlysignsandsymptomsofskinand softtissueinfectionsshouldbeimplementedincorrectional facilities,amongcontactsportsparticipants,andinsettings wherepersonssharecloselivingspaces(e.g.homelessshel- ters,camps,boardingschools,daycaresettings).Closecon-tactofpersonswithconfirmedcommunity-acquiredMRSA infectionsshouldbemonitoredforsignsandsymptomsof MRSA infection. If treatment is necessary, healthcare pro-vidersshouldbeinformedthatthepatientisaclosecontact ofanMRSA-casepatient.87
Reporting of community-acquired MRSA
Outbreaks of MRSA in community settings should be re-portedtothelocalpublichealthauthorities.86,87
Maintaining a clean environment
Implementing steps to improve personal hygiene and en-vironmental cleanliness appears to help control transmis-sionofMRSAincrowdedconditions,andwheretheuseof shareditemsandequipmentiscommon.
The following are the specific recommendations for preventioninnon-hospitalenvironmentsaccordingtoLos AngelesCountyDepartmentofPublicHealth(withpermis-sion),86whichcanalsobeusedasabasisforpreventionin LatinAmericancommunities.
Guidelines for reducing the spread of S.
aureus/MRSA in non-healthcare settings86
Personal hygiene
Whileonthepremises,patronsandstaffshouldbeencour-agedto:
• Washhandsusingliquidsoapandwaterupon enteringandexitingthepremisesandbeforeand afteranyhands-oncontactwithotherpersons. Alternatively,analcohol-basedhandrubcan beusedaccordingtolabelinstructions.Visibly soiledhandsshouldbewashedwithsoapand waterratherthananalcohol-basedhandrub. • Dryhandswithdisposablepapertowelsor
airblowers(e.g.avoidsharingtowels). • Keepskinlesions(e.g.boils,insectbites,open
soresorcuts)coveredwithacleandrydressing. • Limitsharingofpersonalitems(e.g.
towels,clothingandsoap).
• Useabarrier(e.g.atoweloralayerofclothing) betweentheskinandsharedequipment. •
Showeriftherehasbeensubstantialskin-on-skincontactwithanotherperson.
• Theuseofsportsglovesisanoptionforbarrier protectionofthehands,providedthatthisis consistentwithsafeuseofgymequipment.
Shared equipment (e.g. exercise machines and massage tables)
While using shared equipment on the premises, patrons shouldbeencouragedto:
• Useatowelorclothingtoactasabarrierbetween surfacesofsharedequipmentandbareskin. • Wipesurfacesofequipmentbeforeandafteruse,
especiallyifthesurfacehasbecomewetwithsweat. • Assistfacilitystaffwiththedisinfectionof
frequently-touchedequipmentsurfacesif spraybottlesofdisinfectantaremadeavailable andinstructionsforuseareprovided.
Facility staff should be encouraged to:
• Considermakingspraybottlesofdisinfectant availableforpatronsandstafftocleanfrequently-touchedsurfacesofsharedequipmentbetweenusers andprovideinstruction(e.g.new-userorientation orposters)forthesafeuseofdisinfectant.
• Cleansharedequipmentsurfacesdailytoremovesoil. • Disinfectsharedequipmentsurfacesdaily
• Checkwithequipmentmanufacturers forrecommendationsontheappropriate maintenanceoftheirproducts.
• Repairordisposeofequipmentandfurniturewith damagedsurfacesthatcannotbeadequatelycleaned. • Cleanlargesurfaces(e.g.floorsandtabletops)
dailywitharegistereddetergentdisinfectant accordingtomanufacturer’sinstructions.
• Participateinongoingassessmentandtrainingfor appropriatedisinfectionpracticesatthefacility.
Steam rooms and saunas
Whileusingthesefacilities,patronsshouldbeencouragedto: • Useatowelorclothingtoactasabarrier
betweenthebenchesandbareskin. • Allowsteamrooms/saunastodryatleast
onceaday(thiswillhelptominimizethe developmentofabacterialbiofilm).
• Cleananddisinfectfrequentlytouchedsurfacesdaily. • Considerpaintingwoodbencheswithawaterproof
paint,tosealandsmooththesurface,facilitate dryingandreduceareaswherebacteriamaygrow. • Ensureahalideresidual(e.g.chlorine)isusedas
recommendedforswimmingpools,spapoolsandother basinsortanksusedforimmersionbymultiplepatrons. • Fillspapoolsusedforsingle-useimmersion(e.g.
tanksorpoolsthataredrainedaftereachuse) withtapwaterand,accordingtomanufacturer’s instructions,cleanthepoolsurfaceswitharegistered detergentdisinfectantorwitha1:100dilution (500-615ppm)ofhouseholdchlorinebleach.
Laundry
Staffinfacilitylaundriesshouldbeencouragedto: • Washsharedlinens(e.g.towels,sheets,blanketsor
uniforms)indetergentandwaterat160ºFforatleast25 minutes,orifalowertemperaturewashcycleisselected, uselaundrydetergentthatisappropriateforcoldor warmwatercycles(e.g.oxygenatedlaundrycompounds). • Uselaundryadditivesaccordingtothe
manufacturer’sinstructions.
• Useamechanicaldryeronhottemperature cycle(i.e.avoidairdrying).
• Distributetowels,uniforms,etc.only whentheyarecompletelydry.
Recommendations for control of CA-MRSA in the healthcare setting
AccordingtotheSpanishguidelines,therecommendations forpreventionandcontrolofCA-MRSAinthehealthcare settingshouldbethesameasforcontrolofHA-MRSA.14
prevention anD control of Mrsa: conclusions
TheeffectivecontrolofMRSAisbasedonagroupofmeas-ures,rangingfromfirmadherencetobasicinfection-control principles(suchashandhygiene),toearlyidentificationand isolationofpatientscolonizedorinfectedbyMRSA,aswell asdecolonizationinspecificsituations.Thissetofmeasures, appliedaggressively,hasmadeitpossibleforcountriessuch asDenmarkandTheNetherlandstohavetheworld’slowest ratesofnosocomialinfectionscausedbyMRSA.88,89 Knowl-edgeoftheriskfactors,transmissionmechanisms,preventive measuresandlocalepidemiologyofMRSA,willhelpimprove compliancewiththerecommendations.Finally,withthein-creasingspreadofCA-MRSAstrains,itisnecessarytoeducate notonlytheHCWs,90butalsothegeneralpublicinmeasures topreventandmitigatetheimpactofMRSA.
acknowleDgeMents
Financial support
PfizerInc.,NewYork,NY,USA,providedsupportformeet- ingsoftheLatinAmericanWorkingGrouponGramPosi- tiveResistance.PfizerInc.hadnoinvolvementinthecollec-tion, analysis and interpretation of data, in the writing of themanuscripts,orinthedecisiontosubmitthearticlesfor publication.
Manuscript preparation
The support provided by Choice Pharma (Hitchin, UK), funded by Pfizer Inc., consisted of manuscript formatting andwritingassistance.
Disclosures
C.Alvarez:Advisory Board member for Pfizer; consultant for Pfizer, Janssen-Cilag, GlaxoSmithKline, Baxter, Merck Sharp&DhomeandBristolMyersSquibb.
J.Labarca:AdvisoryBoardmemberforPfizer;consult- antforPfizer,MerckSharp&DhomeandWyeth;investiga-torforlinezolidstudiesfundedbyPfizer.
M.J.C. Salles: Advisory Board member for Pfizer and Wyeth;consultantorspeakerforPfizer,Wyeth,Merckand UnitedMedicals.
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