Networking happens at multiple levels; hence, the benefits also relate to multiple levels. Overall, networking benefits cities in two broad ways: it offers first, political support to justify climate action and second, practical support for city officials working with climate change. General benefits, such as learning and information sharing, are present at all levels of governance from local to global. This is not surprising, given how networks describe themselves and the findings of previous studies (e.g. Lenhart et al. 2014, Bulkeley &
Newell 2015, Bansard et al. 2017, Busch et al. 2018, Mocca 2018, Papin 2020, Karhinen et al. 2021). Global cooperation has the potential to contribute to
global change, which in the context of a global problem such as climate change is considered more meaningful than changes at lower levels. EU- and national- level cooperation endows cities with the potential to use networks strategically to impact national legislation and structures. Jänicke and Quitzow (2017) found that EU-level support is important for cities in countries with less ambitious national-level climate policies. My results suggest that this benefit may be valued by cities in relatively ambitious countries as well. Local- and internal-level networking is especially important for breaking barriers between city departments and creating public–private partnerships. Although networking happens at multiple levels even within a city, my research did not find formal networks that try to bring together city officials and citizens. This result is in line with a previous finding that cities tend to focus on internal governance and co-operation with private sector, while co-operation with citizens is less typical (Klein et al. 2018). The benefits highlighted for different levels of governance are summarised in Table 11.
Table 11. Benefits of networking in different levels of governance; Roman numbers refer to articles
Global level Cooperation with similar cities (I)
Creating global (= meaningful) change (I, III)
Global brands and competition engaging local politicians (I)
Possibly supports the adaptation process (III) EU level EU projects (I)
Influencing national legislation from the top down through the EU (I)
National level
Influencing national legislation from the bottom up (I) Cooperation in a similar national context (I)
Spreading information from global networks (I)
Local level Getting the private sector to support the climate goals (I, II)
Creating business opportunities from climate action (I, II)
Breaking silos between the public and private sectors (II) Organisation
level
Breaking silos for effective climate action (I) Putting together scarce resources (I)
Although the most typical benefit associated with networking is information sharing, this may be too general to be the most important benefit that prompts cities to join and engage with the network. My findings (Article I, partly II and IV) and other studies all suggest that offering clear benefits,
such as tailor-made solutions, makes a network successful (Rashidi & Patt 2018, Karhinen et al. 2021). One clear benefit is possibly better than a wider set of different, less clear benefits (Cortes & van der Heijden 2021). Offering tailored support instead of one-size solutions across different contexts is also justified, since a good solution can be less good or even harmful in the wrong context (Gupta et al. 2015, van der Heijden 2017). However, it is clear that offering tailored solutions is more costly for a network. This may also mean that networks offer this kind of solution to some members but not all (I, IV).
When asking how beneficial these networks are, it is important to first consider how to define benefit and from whose point of view. A network can offer valuable contacts for an individual city official or create needed pressure for politicians to allocate resources for climate action. However, not all cities have access to these benefits or networks in the first place (Lee 2015).
Cooperation typically occurs among similar cities (I). Global networks seem to support adaptation, but wealth also plays a role, and if a city is not wealthy, it is less likely to even be a member of a global climate network (II). In terms of information sharing and learning, wealthy cities with pre-existing green brands are considered leaders in global and national-level networks (I), which is in line with previous research (Lee & van de Meene 2012, Mocca 2018).
These results support the earlier analysis that networks may end up replicating existing inequalities (Bouteligier 2013, Bansard et al. 2017, Davidson et al.
2019a), even if they are successful in their aim to diversify membership, a goal which C40, for example, has actively tried to achieve (C40 2017). The lack of active participation from the Global South is potentially problematic since the growth in the urban population is highest there (UN-DESA 2015), and climate vulnerability is often high as well (Bulkeley et al. 2011, Shi et al. 2016, van der Heijden 2018). However, many climate-focused city networks were beyond the scopes of my four papers, and some of these focus especially on cities in the Global South. Because of this diversity, the polycentric system of all the climate-focused city networks may be inclusive even if none of the networks is able to offer similar opportunities to all cities in different contexts (Cortes et al. 2022). Nevertheless, if global urban climate networks aim for meaningful change in adaptation, directing support to cities in the Global South should be considered.
This thesis focuses mostly on cities that have participated in various networks. Hence, it is probable that at least some city officials find networking mostly beneficial, although of course this does not mean that there are no individual city officials who regard participation less positively. The results might change if those cities outside, or which have left, the networks were included as cases. For example, in Article III we noticed that a couple of cities scored high in API but had decided not to join the three major global climate TMNs, at least until 2019. Finding examples of cities that had left networks out of frustration or disappointment could produce interesting results but is also difficult, since announcements in this vein are not normally made. In the interviews for Article I, I asked if the respondents knew that the cities had
taken a decision to leave or not to join a certain network. While in every city it was pointed out that some degree of selectivity is required from cities because of (lack of) resources, there were no clear results about what kinds of networks are considered unattractive. It also seems that even if a network is no longer considered very important, the city may stay in as a passive member.
My intention in the interviews was to ask about impacts without specifying if they were negative or positive so that the respondents would be free to choose between the two points of view in their descriptions. I also asked about unexpected or surprising impacts. However, in practice the conversations tended to revolve around the benefits, or lack thereof, of networking. It is possible that because networks are expected to be beneficial and, hence, the impact is expected to be positive, I should have asked more directly about negative impacts or sources of frustration.
Nevertheless, some critical comments were made about networks. For example, some respondents did not consider TMNs visible or important in their work. One respondent said that the goals set by the local CBN are partly unrealistic or unreasonable. In Stockholm, one respondent pointed out that they are only remaining a member of certain networks through good will, since the city already reached the promoted goals some time ago. When it comes to more direct negative impacts, it was mentioned that participation in several networks can lead to the need to report emissions in several different ways to the various portals. On the other hand, it was pointed out that a network can and sometimes does address this problem by harmonising reporting procedures. Developing better and more comparable emission calculation methods can also be a benefit of networks (Huovila et al. 2021). In general, some networks were considered more beneficial than others. However, the overall tone used to talk about networking was positive, and respondents concentrated on the benefits of networking.
Although beneficial at the city level, a network may not necessarily contribute to changes so fundamental that it significantly supports the transformation towards sustainability. Based on my results, institutionalised networks provide limited support for transformative change and may even end up supporting the status quo. This situation became visible when we analysed the degree of change proposed in the adaptation and mitigation plans of the members of C40, who should represent the most advanced climate leaders paving the way towards sustainability (IV). Similarly, although city officials think that institutionalised networks are beneficial, they rarely describe them as offering transformative solutions (I). Despite the hype around cities being the global solution and the hope of creating meaningful global change through global networks, the climate plans of global cities are quite locally oriented, with the exception that they all want to be the new hubs of green growth (I, IV). The proposed changes to mitigate climate change were mostly incremental or reformistic and focused on infrastructure and economy, leaving citizens with a smaller role (IV), which is in line with previous findings (Boyd & Juhola 2015, Castán Broto & Bulkeley 2013, Klein et al. 2018).
Krähmer (2021) analysed the sustainability strategy of Copenhagen, including an update to the climate plan analysed in Article IV, and came to a similar conclusion, namely that the strategy focuses on green growth and technical solutions. A political imagination dominated by solutions based on technology and economic efficiency easily misses opportunities inherent in behavioural changes as insignificant or too demanding, which is significant since it is improbable that fundamental changes, such as decarbonisation, can be achieved without them (Bulkeley et al. 2022). Focusing mostly on rather similar technological solutions (IV) is also problematic because it does not support plural pathways, which are likely needed for sustainability transformation (Scoones et al. 2020, Bulkeley et al. 2022).
Although Articles I, II and III present evidence that networks are beneficial for some actors and to a certain extent, the results of none indicate a transformational direction. In Article I, although the respondents considered networks mostly beneficial from both practical and political points of view, they did not describe them as an element that would transform the climate actions of cities. Although we found that global networks may offer some support for urban climate adaptation processes in Article III, we also found that both the cities that do participate in the three networks considered in our analysis and those that do not had remarkably low average API scores, and there is a risk that the situation would be even worse if implementation, rather than planning, were evaluated (see also Revi et al. 2014, Woodruff & Stults 2016). While it is possible that the situation has improved since the evaluation of API, this is not necessarily the case. A recent study found that formal public adaptation planning in large cities is probably ineffective (Olazabal & Ruiz de Gopegui 2021).
Of course, this does not mean that formalised networks cannot consider themselves transformational or market themselves as such. It is probable that their definition of transformational is merely different to the one used in this thesis. After all, ideas of green and clean growth or so-called ‘weak sustainability’ have been the mainstream for some time, even in the scientific community, and there remains much to be understood about the scale of change we need (Newell et al. 2021) and how to scale urban climate action and governance (van der Heijden 2022). To imagine solutions that make a fundamental difference and bring these ideas into practice have proven to be challenging even for those who clearly see the need for such solutions.
My thesis does not include any study that focuses directly on C40’s views on transformation. In Article IV, I included a couple of documents produced by C40 as additional material, and they did not challenge the economy- and technology-focused picture of the analysed plans and strategies. However, it is possible that the material was not sufficient, and it is also possible that C40 has changed since 2016. Apart from the document cited earlier, the network had published a plan about how its members can do they share for meeting the Paris Agreement goals. In Deadline 2020 (C40 & Arup 2016), the green growth viewpoint is highlighted from the foreword onwards, and words such as
‘biodiversity’ and ‘justice’ are not mentioned at all. The strict focus of the document is, of course, understandable since it is about climate change mitigation. Nevertheless, the fact that the network thought it relevant to address maintaining economic growth but not to ensure that climate action does not contradict biodiversity goals shows that it was not considering climate action as part of a wider sustainability transformation. Krähmer (2021) made a similar observation about the focus on green growth in regard to both C40 and wider urban sustainable development discourse at the time.
In 2023, the network seems to have adopted a different point of view. For example, the description of the Global New Green Deal1 includes both justice and equality considerations, and biodiversity loss is also mentioned. However, analysing whether this change is principally rhetorical would require a study of its own.
In networking between city and businesses, it is evident that networks follow the rules of business and do not redefine them (I, II), which is in line with the ‘hub of green growth‘ focus found in Article IV. Furthermore, the CP network of the City of Helsinki seems to face a regulation dilemma (Potoski &
Prakash 2004): in its current form, the network is easy to access, but it does not require a great deal from members, leaving it to them to be ambitious if they wish. This compromises the goal of networking to support the carbon neutrality target of the City of Helsinki. However, if the network merely adds control for reasons of ambitiousness, for example by increasing regulation and requirements, there is a risk that members will simply leave it and that those who do not currently participate will not be interested in joining it (Potoski &
Prakash 2004). The tendency toward participation in networks that do not demand too much (or even demand nothing explicitly) has been noted in the context of TMNs as well, which is worrying (Cortes & van der Heijden 2021).
One option to tackle this is to offer clear benefits that are significant enough to accept demands for measurable emission cuts, for instance (Lee et al. 2016, Nielsen & Papin 2020, Cortes & van der Heijden 2021).
The finding that formalised networks do not seem to be supporting transformation begs the question of why they are uncapable or unwilling to do so. While I focus on degree of change in the context of the C40 network (Article IV), I do not think that the lack of ability, or possibly even of willingness, to make the members aim for transformational changes is characteristic only of that specific network. This perception is supported by the results of Articles I to III: they consider several networks, and neither suggests that networks could be a truly transformational force. There are possible overall factors that restrict the promotion of transformative change. To start with, transformation, if understood as a fundamental change of structures, values and beliefs, is not an easy concept, as there are no clear measures for what counts as ‘fundamental change’. Combining it with sustainability does not make things easier, since sustainability is also a complex concept with several
1 https://www.c40.org/what-we-do/building-a-movement/global-green-new-deal/
different definitions (Purvis et al. 2019, Ruggerio 2021). This leaves us in a situation in which the academic literature has multiple definitions or ends up using the concept without defining it (Salomaa & Juhola 2020).
At the same time, the networks, as well as their member cities, act in a world in which economic growth has long been considered as self-evidently important. Questioning current economic structures and the need for growth have been topics of conversation for decades, but mainly in academic circles (Schneider et al. 2010). The institutionalisation of sustainability in the form of sustainable development also supports the idea of the win-win solution presented by green growth (Purvis et al. 2019). When a fundamental structure is defined as something that cannot be changed, it naturally narrows down the number of possible pathways to sustainability thought to be realistic. The situation may be changing as understanding of the planetary boundaries deepens (Rockström et al. 2009, Steffen et al. 2015). For example, a recent study found that the environmental protection specialists at the German Environment Agency were predominantly critical of the concept of green growth, favouring a- or post-growth, and those with most knowledge of the topic tend to be the most critical (Lehmann et al. 2022). In my materials, this kind of thought was not commonly expressed, and the idea of green growth was highlighted, especially in Article IV and in the context of CBNs.
If transformation, and especially sustainability transformation, is hard to define and calls for established ways of measuring the development of a society to be abandoned (i.e., measures related to economic growth), what follows is that it is also hard to measure. This makes it harder to plan and hard to combine with the idea that we should focus on measurable climate action.
Overall, sustainability transformation is most probably not a clear linear process that will have an end point, after which we can declare that we have reached it, but rather a circular and iterative process (Newell et al. 2021) with various possible paths (Scoones et al. 2020, Bulkeley et al. 2022) and possibly no clear end point. For example, adaptation to climate change is probably not a process that can be declared ‘done’, but more likely something that has to be revised from time to time. While measuring GHG emissions is not always an easy task, climate adaptation does not even have a similar general variable that could be measured to ensure that all members of a given network are reaching it.
All in all, sustainability transformation is a process that requires acceptance of a certain level of insecurity and the readiness to re-evaluate plans. Reaching a fundamental transformation towards sustainability in economic and social equality also means that some currently rich and powerful groups need to agree to become less rich and powerful than others. Many central cities in climate networks, such as London, NYC and Paris, are used to being the powerful ones in the global economic network of cities (Allen 2010).
Although their power does not necessarily take the form of domination, it is possible that they are not willing to reformulate the economic structures that maintain their position.
All of the above makes sustainability transformation a less easy target to sell through a network. Indeed, it may make it rather tempting to frame the transformation to sustainability as a mostly technological project that can be neatly planned, measured and accomplished before a set deadline, especially since such an approach is supported by the still strong paradigm of sustainable development through green growth. Fundamental changes are probably needed at a more fundamental level than institutionalised networks before networks can be transformational. As O’Brien and Selboe (2015) stated, we need to adapt to the idea that we can change the climate and have already done so before we can make transformative changes to solve the problem. The challenge is how to create and scale this kind of change, since we cannot rely on people changing their behaviour without any support at a systemic level (Newell et al. 2021). Here, we find an interesting interplay between the individual and collective levels: the change needs to happen at both levels, and there is an interaction between the two.