After completion of loading on the day of the collision, the vessel left Zeebrugge bound for Kotka, Finland. The Baltic Ace disembarked the pilot at the walking station Wandelaar shortly after leaving Zeebrugge, Belgium, about 1615 (UTC).
Crew Particulars
Since qualifying as an officer in 2010, he has completed a total of four contracts, two of which have been on the Baltic Ace's sister ship. This routine included a 2-hour period on the bridge between 6:00 and 8:00 PM daily under the supervision of the 3rd Officer.
3 NARRATIVE OF EVENTS
- Baltic Ace – departure from Zeebrugge
- Corvus J – route from Grangemouth to Antwerp
- Other vessels in the vicinity
- Timeline of events leading to the collision
- Collision and Separation
- Search and Rescue Operation
- Evacuation from Baltic Ace
The vessel was engaged in trawling and had extended her gear astern and was heading in a southerly direction at the southern end of the precautionary area. The Master of the vessel witnessed the collision and provided a statement to the Dutch Safety Council Marine Accident Investigation Branch. The bearing from the Baltic Ace to Corvus J moved very slowly to the right6, indicating that the Corvus J intended to cross ahead of the Baltic Ace.
The Corvus J rotated clockwise as it moved along the starboard side of the Baltic Ace and penetrated the side shell plating with the bulbous bow and bow structure. Due to the angle of the list, the Master and C/O soon found themselves on the starboard bridge wing, with the water rising against the outside of the windows. Once upright, the AB was able to start the engine and maneuver it away from the vessel.
Once it was clear, AB shut down the engine to assess the situation, at which point the lifeboat was struck by Corvus J's bow.
4 ANALYSIS
General Observations
Prior to the collision, there is no evidence that either vessel had navigational difficulties in this particular sea area. Under the direction of the Chief Officer, in his capacity as Safety Officer, regular evacuation drills were held.
Manning on board Baltic Ace and Corvus J
The hourly routine allowed the OOW to develop professionally by providing adequate supervision from the Master or Chief if required. The appointment of a designated deck cadet as lookout, and an AB on standby (in the crew's mess) to supplement the bridge crew if the OOW deems it necessary to undertake lookout or helm duties as required, shows a precautionary measure suitable. In addition, the hours actually worked by the OOW during the previous 24-hour period ensured as a minimum that the allowed rest hours were maintained.
As the OOW was alone on the bridge, it is not possible to verify the physical and mental well-being of this individual during this observation period. In a sea area known for high traffic density, with the development of conditions on the starboard bow, the OOW at this time was left with the possible need to maneuver the vessel, visually monitor the direction of other vessels, monitor ARPA, navigate and answer VHF calls. This level of activity may have prohibited the OOW's ability to call for the assistance of another guard or meet any number of the many requirements of an appropriate standard, particularly of appropriate observation.
The decision to appoint the OOW as the sole observer during periods of darkness is not considered in accordance with the prescribed application of the regulation on the grounds that “the observation must be able to give full attention to maintaining a proper observation and no other. tasks will be undertaken or assigned that may interfere with that task"11.
Weather Conditions
The resulting factor of this effect makes swimming very difficult for even the most accomplished swimmer. In addition, due to the short wavelength, a person in the water may be visually obscured more often and as such the probability of being seen would be reduced. At the point of impact the ship was exposed to a 28-33 kts wind on the port beam which would have created a slight heeling moment to starboard before impact, the effect of this wind would have further exaggerated the list on her right after impact.
Action to Avoid a Collision
It is plausible that the Corvus J, knowing that it was the giveaway vessel, decided to pass ahead of Ice Point but behind the Baltic Ace as indicated by the relative red dotted line in figure 16. At this point the Corvus J steady on course 149° while the Baltic Ace agrees to change further to port. At this point the Baltic Ace was steering 025°, but immediately after the VHF transmission the vessel changes 4° to port.
It was not clear from the VDR documents or interview statements whether the Corvus J OOW was aware of the continued course change to the port of the Baltic Ace. The Baltic Ace turned to port at approximately 16° per minute during the turn. By this time, the two ships were about 3 cables (600 meters) apart when the Corvus J crossed in front of the Baltic Ace on a course of 182° and, of course, continued its course change to starboard.
Both vessels had considerable momentum in the turn, resulting in the development of a t-bone situation, with Baltic Ace presenting a starboard beam aspect to the bow of Corvus J.
Damage Assessment
20 The GHS model of the hull form was created based on the general arrangement plan provided by the owners. The craft's draft then remained steady with a slow increase until 13 minutes after impact, at which time the draft increased rapidly. All three data plots (Figures 24, 25 and 26) remain consistent and show the severity of the damage at the speed at which the vessel lost all buoyancy.
The damage stability booklet indicates that the vessel must survive complete flooding of the lower hold or flooding of the lower hold and the engine room providing deck 4 and above the watertight subdivision is not breached. Within the damage control plan, a statement is made emphasizing the importance of the only longitudinal subdivision. However, the majority of the crew were unable to climb from deck 9 to deck 10 due to the list angle assumed so quickly and therefore did not have access to immersion suits before leaving the vessel.
No.1 boat was damaged in the way of the tail hook which came loose from the wire trap.
Search and Rescue Effort
This loss of life reflects the consequences and severity of a rapidly developing emergency situation in particularly extreme environmental conditions. However, the front hook was closed with the drop block attached to the drop wire, which separated. The evidence indicates in all probable circumstances that the boat broke away from the vessel due to its inherent buoyancy.
During this call he read the GPS position as "50° 51N 002°53'E". Given the speed with which the Baltic Ace sank, this vital piece of information likely proved crucial in saving time, especially in helping the search and rescue vessels reach the reported GPS position. As soon as it became apparent that there was no water intrusion, the competent Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) was contacted to provide assistance in the rescue of the Baltic Ace. Affidavits submitted indicate that radio contact and lighting aboard the Baltic Ace failed shortly after the collision.
It was considered during the investigation that those involved showed courage and bravery in the midst of an extreme situation, the result of which ensured the safe return of 13 crew members.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Risk of Collision
Having determined that the risk of collision existed, and under regulation 15 of COLREGS, the OOW should then have taken "early action to avoid crossing in front of the approaching vessels". As a result, the OOW on board the Baltic Ace continued to change course to port under the false impression that the resolution was to proceed as agreed. The OOW aboard Corvus J, meanwhile, began to shift to starboard, a decision likely reflecting his concerns about the development situation.
Had each vessel been maneuvering in accordance with COLREGS, it can be considered that the probability of the risk of collision is unlikely to occur. Therefore, a more prudent course of action at this stage would be to comply with the provisions of Rule 17(ii), the content of which gives the ship's crew the ability to "take action to avoid only her maneuver, as soon as it becomes clear that the ship that is required to stay out of the way is not taking the appropriate measures". 22 Examples of which can be found via a Marine Guidance Note 324 para 7-13 courtesy of the MCA.
The OOW aboard the Baltic Ace may however have thought that a change of course to port might have improved the crossing distance between the two ships.
Safe Speed
Sinking of the Baltic Ace
Whether or not a full damage assessment had been completed at this stage is irrelevant - the ship was sinking rapidly. This resulted in only 2 crew members being able to don diving suits before being abandoned, both of whom were stationed on the bridge on deck 10. Had storage lockers been located in multiple locations on the upper deck, allowing crew access that the muster station could not reach, but instead gained access to the upper deck, it is considered much more likely that the crew members may have been able to don diving suits in time.
As these could not be launched on board to allow for a dry foot evacuation, crew members had to enter the water to abandon ship.
6 RECOMMENDATIONS
LIST OF APPENDICES
