Chapter 1. Biological Weapons Convention: Issues and Challenges
3.2 Enhance the effectiveness of existing measures in the BWC
3.2.3 Enhancing the role of the Intersessional Process
In 2002, as a reaction to the discord that followed the deadlocked 2001 Review Conference, and as a damage control and resuscitation, States Parties agreed an annual program (Meeting of Experts and Meeting of States Parties) of work to take place between the years where there is no Review Conferences, so-called intersessional process.
Under the absence of the wanted organisation, the annual meetings became a real structure to institutionally strengthen the Convention. Since the RevCons are infrequent, which occurs about every five years, States Parties are hard-pressed to effect far-reaching changes
186 Genera Statement by H.E. Ambassador Michael Biontino, Permanent Representative of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament, “First Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Eighth Review BTWC Review Conference, Geneva, April 26, 2016, 2.
187 South Africa, Future planning for the Implementation Support Unit, 9/08/2016, BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.23.
188 See annual reports of the ISU (2012-2016): BWC/MSP/2012/2, p.6; BWC/MSP/2013/4, p.6;
BWC/MSP/2014/4, p.6; BWC/MSP/2015/3, p.6; BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/7, p.11.
given the shot three weeks duration of the gatherings.189 Thus, the ISP is a platform in which a new innovative ideas and mechanisms could be introduced and discussed. It is an opportunity also to maintain a continuous and effective dialogue among States Parties and keeping them focused on providing approaches to develop agreed understandings that strengthen the treaty or expand its scope. With broad participation of national experts and officials from different agencies (foreign affairs, defence, health, agriculture and law enforcement, among others), as well as experts from intergovernmental organisations, scientific and professional bodies, industry and academia.190
Although the intersessional meetings have yielded numerous advantages and benefits, however, the current format of the intersessional process is not without serious shortcomings and limitations:
According to Nicholas Sims, the current design of the intersessional process has a major flaw, the voluntary191 basis of the process and the lack of decision-making mandate prevents from making lasting improvements of any type to the structure or the mechanisms that could enhance the function of the Convention, referring to its institutional, operational, or legally binding aspects.192
From the process aspect, the agenda with the list of topics addressed during the annual meeting had to be approved by consensus during the previous RevCon. Initially, this creates a limited scope of issues addressed, turned to be a "self-contained" event. Additionally, it might be true that the topics covered by the ISP are highly relevant and appropriate, but at the same time many other topics could be relevant and deserves to be addressed too are not included.
Lastly, there is no mechanism to keep the list updated, where it is possible add or alter topics in between the RevCons in response to current developments, which will affect the efficiency of the meetings.
189 Kirk C. Bansak, Enhancing Compliance With an Evolving Treaty: A Task for an Improved BWC Intersessional Process, Arms Control Association, accessed May, 21, 2020, https://bit.ly/2WPbGKu.
190 Richard Lennane, Building on Success: The Future of the Intersessional Process, In: Improving Implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention The 2007–2010 Intersessional Process, Piers Millett Ed (Geneva:
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2011), pp.260-261.
191 It is worth mentioning that some States Parties and experts, sees the non-mandate of the ISP provides a better climate of relaxations, flexibility, less politically-charged, and more collaborative and focused on practical issues.
192 Nicholas Sims, An Annual Meeting for the BTWC, Review Conference Paper, 22 (2010): 6.
In addition, and since the States Parties addresses the institutional strengthening with its wide definition, the list of topics chosen are partially related to the concept, which open the doors to the interpretations of political manipulation with states pushing and bargaining to add, remove, or ignore different topics depending on their political interests.193 The risks of cherry- picking or selective approach to addressing the deficiencies of the BWC's institutional strengthening were made known. In the latter case, the vision of the bigger picture may become lost and negotiations reduced to matchmaking between and among various individual proposals or initiatives put forward by States Parties. This attitude created a deadlocked where the diversity of topics is so big that the results cannot be synthesised to a joint agreement.
Moreover, The Chairman during the Intersessional Processes bears many responsibilities in for the year's work; preparing for the meetings, chairing the meetings, steering the discussions, attending workshops and seminars around the world, promoting universality and many other tasks that could undermine the quality of the outcomes.194
Another shortcoming that was noticed too after several meetings is the limited participation caused by financial constraints. The lack of a structured sponsorship program deprives many developing states of sending experts to Geneva and participate in the meetings due to lack of funds. This resulted in uneven involvement of different states, regions and organisations, and probably missed opportunities to inform, develop and fully exploit the potential benefits of the meetings.195
Some States Parties expresses their concern about the limited progress achieved under the ISP and expressed the concern that this may lead to a loss of relevance after a surprising success during the first attempts. Others underlined their firm conviction concerning the usefulness of the intersessional work programs. However, the majority agrees on the need to discuss the future enhancement of the functions and effectiveness of the process during the next Review Conference.
193 Caitriona McLeish, Status quo or evolution: What next for the intersessional process of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention?, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, accessed May 21, 2020.
194 Richard Lennane, Future Intersessional Process., 262.
195 Ibid.