President Muhammadu Buhari has also shown greater respect for INEC's independence than some presidents have done in the past. A first priority is to push back armed groups, especially in the North-West and South-East.
Introduction
6 Nigeria's 84 million voters in 2019 were already eleven million people larger than those in the other fourteen West African countries combined (73 million). The election will take place amid more widespread risks of violence than in the past.
Widespread Insecurity
27 Crisis Group telephone interview, researcher, Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta based in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, 20 November 2022. Armed groups, such as these cult groups – along with ex-militants – in the Niger Delta and Lagos, can intimidate voters or otherwise disrupt the proceedings .
Inter-party Tensions
Inter-party Tensions
Since Buhari is a Muslim Fulani from the north, many Christians, based on the informal principle mostly followed by Nigerian elites in recent decades, that the presidency should be rotated between Nigeria's two largest religious groups, strongly believe that the next president a Christian. Christian organizations also protested when Tinubu chose a fellow Muslim, former governor of Borno State, Kashim Shettima, as his running mate, deviating from an unwritten convention whereby parties on each ticket fielded both a Christian and a Muslim.54 Tinubu insists that he has elected Shettima on the basis of ability, not religious conviction, and has promised, if elected, to rule without religious bias.55 However, many Christians are unconvinced and religious sensitivities surrounding the election are deepening.56 In the predominantly Muslim Far North, many voters are wary of Obi, as he is Christian.57 Opposition to Abubakar is particularly strong among southerners. Many Igbos in the southeast strongly support Obi, who hails from that zone, especially since an Igbo has not led the country since 1966.58 Particularly in Lagos, friction is growing between the large, pro-Obi Igbo population and many Yorubas who ethnic kinsman Tinubu for president.
Spokespersons and supporters of APC and PDP spread such damaging messages through both social media and the mainstream press.60 Obi's Labor has not engaged in this practice, but many of his constituents have. We have not shifted on the same creed ticket – CAN,” Vanguard, Nov. 23, 2022; “PFN Denies Northern Bishops Fraternizing with Tinubu,” Leadership, Sept. 26, 2022. 58 The last Igbo to lead the country, Major General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi -Ironsi, was assassinated on July 29, 1966 by northern officers in a "revenge coup" following the country's first coup on January 15, in which predominantly Igbo officers overthrew leading politicians and senior military officers from the north, southwest, and south of the south. killed.
Some state governments have employed vigilantes to intimidate opponents.63 In Ebonyi State, members of the South-East Security Network, Ebubeagu, have been widely accused of engaging in such activity.64 Some candidates have said that the governor, David Umahi, is a master- mind.65 Umahi says the group is simply helping the police fight crime and maintain order. If any member has committed an offence, he continues, that person must face justice.66 Some candidates have also engaged trade unionists, unemployed youth and, in the Niger Delta, ex-militants - to scare rivals from campaigning.
Risks of Post-election Tensions
Flashpoints
Lagos State
Based partly on these criteria, but also based on other factors, the risk is likely to be highest in six states – Lagos, Rivers, Kano, Kaduna, Ebonyi and Imo.
Rivers State
In addition to this central rivalry, there is a significant risk of violence between the PDP and other parties. In December, an NGO, the Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta, reported that INEC offices in Port Harcourt suffered thirteen attacks in the three years from January 2019 to October 2022. They pulled down the rostrum, smashed chairs and Abe's billboards torn up 93 On February 6, 2023, thugs stormed the venue of an APC rally in Omuma local government area and destroyed the equipment set up for the programme.94.
He accuses Wike Amaechi, who was governor from 2008 to 2015, and businessman Cole of looting the state treasury. 87 “Appeal Court clears all APC House of Assembly candidates in Rivers for 2023 election,” Daily Post, January 5, 2023. 90 Crisis Group telephone interview, Social Democratic Party member based in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, November 12, 2022.
91 “Election: Orderly dies as Rivers APC deputy gov candidate escapes assassination”, The Nation, 6 July 2022. 93 “Wike warns Atiku campaign team as thugs vandalize SDP office in Rivers”, International Center for Investigative Reporting, 27 December 2022.
Kano State
Kaduna State
The 2023 elections could further strain inter-faith relations in the state and campaign frictions could degenerate into violence, especially after the elections.
Ebonyi State
Imo State
What Should Be Done
Improving the Security Landscape
Security is essential if President Buhari is to honor his promise to ensure free and fair elections in 2023 as part of his legacy.107 Monguno, his National Security Adviser, Usman Alkali Baba, the Inspector General of Police, and General Lucky Irabor, the Chief of Defense Staff, have assured Nigerians that the vote will take place safely.108 Making these promises a reality will require efforts to improve security and reduce tensions among the main contenders for office. The police and other agencies, under the Inter-Agency Advisory Committee on Election Security, have already undertaken efforts to improve security around polling stations. In the final weeks before the election, security agencies must focus on three key areas.
First, they should expand training programs to ensure that all relevant police personnel are involved. These programs should emphasize officials' obligation to maintain strict neutrality in the midst of voting, thereby building confidence in the electoral process. They should deploy security teams to INEC facilities nationwide and intensify intelligence gathering, including by dedicating staff to generating data, monitoring flashpoints and formulating plans to contain any violence that breaks out.111 They should themselves also prepare to protect vulnerable groups - such as women, the physically disabled and minorities - especially in areas where violence around the elections seems particularly likely.
Thirdly, security agencies should work more closely with civil society to establish observation posts for, among other things, providing early warning of threats of electoral violence.112 The community relations committees that the police have established in many places should focus on detecting such threats. Security agencies should especially monitor groups, such as state-sponsored vigilantes and the National Union of Road Transport Workers, that could be used to disrupt the vote.
Defusing Inter-party Tensions
Dial down the rhetoric
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission should step up efforts to deter vote-buying, including by tightening oversight of money transfers by candidates, parties, banks and exchange office operators. A well-regarded NGO, the National Peace Committee, helped curb violence around the 2015 and 2019 polls. Other non-partisan organizations should also initiate interparty peace agreements at the state and local levels, as some have already done.115 All parties and their candidates must honor their commitments under these agreements.
Curb impunity and establish an election offences commission
If they are back, they need to pass the bill quickly so that it can be signed into law as a matter of urgency and used to deal with cases of violence that will be pending long after the elections are over.
Curb fake news and misinformation
The Central Bank should boost its supply of the new naira notes to commercial banks. Foreign partners lend their support to the elections.124 Above all, they must maintain their contribution to reducing violence and guaranteeing the credibility of the polls. Reports on poll credibility could help manage post-election tensions and disputes.
Crisis Group is co-chaired by President & CEO of the Fiore Group and founder of the Radcliffe Foundation, Frank Giustra, and by Argentina's former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chef de Cabinet to the UN Secretary General, Susana Malcorra. Between her two posts at Crisis Group, she worked for the International Center for Transitional Justice and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Liberia. Abdulaziz Al Sager Chairman and founder of Gulf Research Center and president of Sager Group Holding.
Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, Open Society Foundations Maria Livanos Cattaui Former Secretary General of the International Chamber of Commerce Ahmed Charai. Chairman of the Center for Liberal Strategies (Sofia); Member of the Founding Board of the European Council for Foreign Relations. Former Chief Executive BG Group (UK) and Statoil (Norway) Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown Former UN Deputy Secretary-General and Administrator of the United Nations Development Program William H.
Federica Mogherini Former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
Boost Confidence in INEC
End Scarcities of Fuel and Cash
Support from Outside
Conclusion
The candidate who wins the presidential race and will be sworn in on May 29 will take the reins of a country pulled in several different directions by security threats, a situation not seen since a civil war in 1970. If violence electoral will damage the country, deepening its divisions, it will be even more difficult to govern.
About the International Crisis Group
Avoiding proxy wars in Eastern DR Congo and the Great Lakes, Africa Briefing N°150, 23 January 2020 (also available in French and Portuguese). A first step towards reform: Ending Burundi's system of forced contributions, Africa Briefing N°153, 8 April 2020 (also available in French). Relieving unrest in Eastern DR Congo and the Great Lakes, Africa Briefing N°181, 25 May 2022 (also available in French).
Waldhabdee Itoophiyaa Federaalaa fi Tigraay, Africa Briefing Lakk.160, 14 Hagayya 2020 (Afaan Amaaraa fi Tigrinyaanis ni argama). Giddugaleessa Saahel: Mul’ata Waraana Haala Qilleensaa Haaraa?, Ibsa Afrikaa Lakk. 154, 24 Ebla 2020 (afaan Faransaayiinis ni argama). Ivory Coast: Mariif Harkifannaa Filannoo, Ibsa Afrikaa Lakk. 161, 29 September 2020 (afaan Faransaayiinis ni argama).
Killing in Tillabery: Calming the Emerging Community Crisis in Niger, Africa Briefing No. 172, 28 May 2021 (also available in French). After Shekau: Confronting Jihadists in Northeast Nigeria, Africa Report No. 180, 29 March 2022 (also available in French).
Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Africa since 2020
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