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• Quelle:
ACCORD - Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation
• Titel:
Query response on Occupied Palestinian Territories: West Bank: Can the Palestinian Authority provide support and protection to the inhabitants of zone A against Palestinian violent gangs and military groups (e.g. Hamas)? [a-8154- 3 (8156)]
• Veröffentlichungsdatum:
12. Oktober 2012
• ecoi.net-Zusammenfassung: Anfragebeantwortung zum Schutz von EinwohnerInnen der Zone A im Westjordanland gegen gewalttätige oder militärische Gruppierungen durch die palästinensischen Behörden [ID 239014]
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Palästinensische Gebiete Empfohlene Zitation:
ACCORD - Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Query response on Occupied Palestinian Territories: West Bank: Can the Palestinian Authority provide support and protection to the inhabitants of zone A against Palestinian violent gangs and military groups (e.g. Hamas)? [a-8154-3 (8156)], 12. Oktober 2012 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/239014/363295_de.html(Zugriff am 18. September 2013)
Query response on Occupied Palestinian Territories: West Bank: Can the Palestinian Authority provide support and protection to the inhabitants of zone A against Palestinian violent gangs and military groups (e.g. Hamas)? [a -8154-3 (8156)]
12 October 2012
This response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to ACCORD within time constraints and in accordance with ACCORD’s methodological standards and the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI).
This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status, asylum or other form of international protection.
Please read in full all documents referred to.
Non-English language information is comprehensively summarised in English. Original language quotations are provided for reference.
On the UN Security Council meeting of 19 June 2012, Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, mentions the situation in the West Bank in his briefing:
“Palestinian security forces have continued working to maintain law and order in the West Bank, for which the Palestinian security forces need to be adequately equipped. Palestinian security forces defused a number of unexploded devices and returned to Israel a number of Israeli citizens, including a soldier, who had entered the West Bank. A Palestinian security operation aimed at restoring order in Jenin following the death of its Governor in May was extended to Nablus in early June. Around 50 suspects have been detained. The recent opening of state-of-the-art police training and corrections/rehabilitation facilities in Jericho provides further evidence of Palestinian progress in advancing their governance and rule of law agenda. Support from the international community remains essential if continued progress is to be ensured.” (UN Security Council, 19 June 2012) In the meeting of the UN Security Council on the situation in the Middle East in September 2012, Robert Serry, the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General reported the following on the situation in the West Bank:
“Palestinian security forces have continued working to maintain law and order in the West Bank. On 5 September, a senior Palestinian Authority security commander was shot dead in Jenin, where extensive security operations have taken place since the death of its Governor in May. For the Palestinian Authority security forces to continue operating effectively, it is necessary that they receive a delivery of equipment that is currently awaiting approval for import.” (UN Security Council, 17 September 2012)
The International Crisis Group (ICG) published an analysis of the Palestinian Security Reform in September 2010 where it states that the Palestinian Authority largely has restored order and a sense of personal safety in the West Bank. The first phase of reform focused mainly on checking Hamas and was largely successful:
“In the past few years, the Palestinian Authority (PA) largely has restored order and a sense of personal safety in the West Bank, something unthinkable during the second intifada. Militias no longer roam streets, uniformed security forces are back, Palestinians mostly seem pleased; even Israel – with reason to be sceptical and despite recent attacks on West Bank settlers – is encouraged. Initial steps, long overdue, have been taken to reorganise an unwieldy security sector, where overlapping, unaccountable branches had become fiefdoms of powerful chiefs. West Bankers applaud the changes but are far less comfortable with their accompaniment:
unparalleled security cooperation with Israel and crackdown on opposition groups – notably but not exclusively Hamas – affecting civil society broadly. Without serious progress toward ending the occupation and intra- Palestinian divisions, support for the security measures risks diminishing, PA legitimacy could further shrivel, and ordinary Palestinians’ patience – without which none of this can be sustained – will wear thin.
Security reform was high on President Abbas’s agenda from the moment he assumed office in January 2005.
Israeli uncooperativeness, resistance from Palestinian security chiefs and, a year later, Hamas’s triumph in legislative elections got in the way. But conditions changed after the Islamists’ June 2007 takeover of Gaza.
Ramallah, Israel and the donor community alike all saw great urgency in bolstering Palestinian security forces (PSF). Their reasons overlapped: the PA sought to achieve a monopoly on the use of force and, importantly, pre -empt any potential Hamas challenge to its West Bank rule; Israel was intent on dismantling militant groups; and the West saw an opportunity to shore up its Palestinian allies and strike a blow against their Islamist foes.
Unsurprisingly, the first phase of reform focused mainly on checking Hamas, but also on restraining Fatah militants and restoring order.
In this, the PA was largely successful. Most West Bankers – including many sympathetic to Hamas – plainly liked what they saw, satisfied at a restoration of normal life that, only a few years earlier, had seemed out of reach. Structural reforms aimed at establishing clearer lines of authority and reducing redundancy were less visible but important.” (ICG, 7 September 2010, p. i)
Israeli security officials, however, have questioned the reliability of Palestinian forces in case of new disturbances and their ability to withstand a Hamas assault:
“With memories of the second intifada – when Palestinian security personnel turned their guns on the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] – and of Gaza – when Hamas effortlessly routed PA forces – still fresh, many security officials continue to harbour doubts even as they commend Palestinian progress. They question the reliability of Palestinian forces in the event of renewed West Bank disturbances as well as their ability to withstand a Hamas assault should the IDF withdraw. The result is a cautious, tight-fisted Israeli approach save in one area: the PA’s anti-Hamas efforts, where convergence of interests is greatest. ” (ICG, 7 September 2010, pp. i-ii)
At the same time, it is widely assumed that Hamas no longer has the capacity to carry out coordinated, largescale operations in the West Bank, the ICG paper continues. However, Hamas still retains important residual capacities:
“As Fatah-affiliated security forces collapsed in Gaza, repressing Hamas became, in the words of a Palestinian security official, a matter of self-preservation for the PA. Three years later, Hamas remains its primary target even though whatever military strength the Islamists had in the West Bank in June 2007 appears to have been significantly degraded if not decimated. An interior ministry official said, ‘We do not want to fight Israel, Egypt or Jordan. The main target of our security services is Hamas’. While precise information on the subject is extremely difficult to obtain, a West Bank governor reflected the prevailing assessment of PA security officials, Hamas members and independent analysts when he claimed that Hamas, while capable of conducting isolated attacks, no longer has the capacity to carry out coordinated, largescale operations. In the words of a senior PA
intelligence official, Hamas has some scattered individual cells, but no broad military structure’. […]
There is no doubt that the movement and its allies retain important residual capacities in the West Bank. Still, the challenges Hamas faces are legion and its ability to undertake coordinated, large-scale attacks highly questionable. Indeed, Palestinian but also Israeli security officials argue the recent attacks do not alter their basic assessment. According to a PSF official, ‘these attacks can have serious ramifications, and we know Hamas intends to keep on trying; we expect new attempts very soon. But our general evaluation has not changed: they are only capable of small-scale attacks here and there’. Likewise, a former Israeli defence official said, ‘these attacks undoubtedly represent a failure for both the PSF and the IDF. But no one can contain terror fully, and the broad picture remains very positive’.” (ICG, 7 September 2010, pp. 25-26)
The ICG analysis also mentions that the operational area of the Palestinian security forces covers most of Area A and parts of Area B. However ultimate control over Area A still remains with the Israelis and between midnight and five in the morning Palestinian forces can only operate in coordination with the Israeli army:
“Since 2007, Israel has allowed the PA to expand its area of operation without decisively reducing its own.
Today, the PSF’s [Palestinian security forces] operational area (ie, the area in which the PSF can operate without prior coordination with the IDF) covers most of Area A and some immediately adjacent swathes of Area B.
[Footnote 159:] A PA security official estimated that the PSF’s operational area covers 90 to 95 per cent of Area A, as well as small pockets in Area B. However – with the exception of central areas in the main Palestinian cities – the PSF is still subject to a partial night-time curfew and can operate between midnight and five in the morning only in coordination with the IDF. Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, August 2010.” (ICG, 7 September 2010, p. 18)
“A Fatah Central Committee member summarised the situation as follows:
Any reference to the PA’s growing control of Area A relates exclusively to inter-Palestinian affairs, that is, the PA’s control over other Palestinian groups, like militias and clans. Ultimate control over Area A still remains with the Israelis. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as Area A anymore. […]
In other words, as a U.S. analyst put it, ‘Israel recognises the divisions between Areas A, B and C when it comes to defining Palestinian zones of operation but tends to ignore them when it comes to defining its own’.” (ICG, 7 September 2010, p. 20)
In two articles published in May 2012, the Israeli daily Jerusalem Post reports that security forces launched a massive crackdown in Jenin and surrounding villages, detaining Fatah militiamen and security officers suspected of involvement in criminal activities:
“Palestinian Authority security forces arrested dozens of Palestinians in Jenin and surrounding villages in the past 48 hours, sources in the city said on Sunday. Many of those arrested are Fatah members and officers working for PA security services. They said the clampdown, the biggest launched by the PA in the West Bank, came after unidentified men shot at the home of Jenin Gov. Kadoura Musa last Wednesday. Musa was not hurt in the attack. However, he died shortly afterwards of a heart attack, prompting PA President Mahmoud Abbas to order a massive security operation against "outlaws" and "criminals" in the area.
The attack on Musa's home came one month after Palestinian security forces shot and killed a local man who had been wanted for criminal activities. It was not clear Sunday whether the attack on Musa's home was related to the killing of the fugitive.
Jenin residents have long complained about lawlessness in the city and surrounding villages. Many residents blame Fatah gangs for the chaos. They also hold senior Palestinian security commanders responsible for maintaining close ties with the gangs. In April 2011, unidentified men shot and killed Israeli Arab actor and producer Julian Mar-Khamis in the Jenin refugee camp. The PA security forces have failed to capture the assailants, sparking rumors about the possible involvement of Fatah gangsters and security officers.
Radi Asideh, commander of the PA security forces in the Jenin area, said that his men were conducting a "huge manhunt after outlaws and thugs." He said that scores of suspects have been arrested since the start of the security operation over the weekend. "The criminals will be brought to justice," Asideh said without revealing the number of people arrested. Palestinian security forces were searching for the men who shot at the governor's house and other people involved in various crimes, including extortion and murder, he added. Eyewitnesses said at least 2,000 PA policemen and officers were taking part in the operation. They said the forces were conducting house-to-house searches and combing fields and mountains. "They are even searching in the caves for wanted men," said Ahmed Abu al-Rub, a merchant from Jenin. "This is the biggest operation ever."
Among those arrested is Zakariya Zubeidi, the commander of Fatah's armed militia, the Aksa Martyrs Brigades, in the Jenin refugee camp. Zubeidi, who was once wanted by Israel for his role in terrorist attacks, was pardoned a few years ago and later became a member of the PA security forces. The PA also arrested Muhammad al- Zalafi, the former security commander of Jenin. Two officers working for the PA's General Intelligence Service, Raed Dabaya and Ahmed Turkeman, were also rounded up. All the suspects have been transferred to the PA's central prison in Jericho. The arrests triggered angry reactions from many families. Mothers of some of the detainees staged a demonstration in Jenin to protest against the clampdown, calling for their sons to be released.” (Jerusalem Post, 6 May 2012)
“The Palestinian Authority commander in Jenin, Radi Asideh, who earlier this week said that PA security officers and Fatah ‘outlaws’ were responsible for the state of lawlessness in his city, has been dismissed from his job.
Asideh’s accusations came in response to the death of Jenin governor Kadoura Musa, who suffered a fatal heart attack last week shortly after unidentified gunmen opened fire at his home.
On the instructions of PA President Mahmoud Abbas, security forces launched a massive crackdown in Jenin and surrounding villages, detaining scores of Fatah militiamen and security officers suspected of involvement in criminal activities, including murder, extortion, kidnapping, armed robbery and rape. Asideh’s remarks angered the PA leadership, a Palestinian security source told The Jerusalem Post. On Thursday, Asideh was informed of the decision to remove him from his job and appoint him commander of the Kalkilya area, the source said.
Asideh was replaced by Muhammad al-A’raj, who assumed his new job Thursday.” (Jerusalem Post, 11 May 2012)
The New York Times (NYT) also reports on the secutity situation in the West Bank in May 2012:
“In the week since his death, Mr. Moussa has been embraced here as a martyr to the Palestinian national struggle, his visage plastered on car windshields and building facades, behind candy kiosks and in front of protest tents. The Palestinian Authority and others close to the governor say he died battling gangs that
threatened to bring chaos back to the streets of Jenin, a notorious hub of violent crime during the second intifada reborn in recent years as a model of Palestinian self-rule, cooperation with Israel and economic growth.
“It is a significant setback for the dovish wing of the Palestinian national movement as well as the American and the quartet’s attempt to keep hope afloat in these times when the ‘peace process’ is in tatters,” Prof. Mark Rosenblum, a left-leaning Queens College historian of the Middle East, said by e-mail, referring to the four Middle East peacemakers: the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations. Professor Rosenblum described the “Jenin model” as an important “symbol of a secure and successful de-occupation.”
Brig. Gen. Radi Assidi, commander of the security forces in the region, said people throughout the West Bank
“realize that law and order started in Jenin, so any lawlessness that starts in Jenin could spread throughout the West Bank.”
Scores of Palestinians have been detained for questioning in connection with the shooting at Mr. Moussa’s home, officials said, including a number of security officers. While Jenin’s downtown vegetable market bustled with life as usual Monday afternoon, as night fell convoys of heavily armed officers rolled onto the streets and out to a village connected to the leading suspects.
[…] General Assidi traced the resurging lawlessness back about a year, to the murder of the legendary director of the Freedom Theater, an oasis for decades of so-called cultural resistance. The violence picked up over the past seven or eight months, he said, and escalated in an April confrontation in the nearby village of Bir al Basha between police officers and a man wanted for killing his cousin. The wanted man’s brother fired on the police and ended up dead, General Assidi said, and many here believe that the attack on the governor’s home was retaliation.
“Unfortunately, our leadership in Ramallah heard the bell ringing late,” General Assidi said in an interview at his headquarters here, not yet entirely rebuilt after having been destroyed during the intifada. “We informed them that some members of the security establishment have no loyalty, but nobody paid attention to our request.”
On Monday, General Assidi said, nine of his counterparts from across the West Bank met here with the
authority’s top security official, part of a crackdown in which the leadership has vowed to question, arrest and try anyone connected with the attack on Mr. Moussa’s house, the Bir al Basha affair and other recent flare-ups. A new governor, Talal Dwaikat, arrived Sunday, walking the streets for an hour to proclaim his commitment to safety.
“Jenin will not be a place for the gangs,” Mr. Dwaikat told a delegation of Israeli Arab women who came from Nazareth on Monday to express condolences and meet him. “Jenin will be a place of security so we can receive you warmly.”
In an interview afterward, Mr. Dwaikat said he would prosecute every criminal in the region. “There will be no exception,” he said. “Whatever his status in the community or history, law and order is above all of us.” (NYT, 9 May 2012)
Associated Press reports in July 2012 on an attack on a Palestinian politician, the attack may have been linked to the crackdown of security forces on armed gangs in Jenin:
“JENIN, West Bank // A Palestinian politician was shot twice in the leg as he returned to his home early yesterday, the latest attack in a wave of violence in Jenin, a town once seen as a Palestinian model of law and order. Shami Al Shami said eight bullets were fired at him as he got out of his car at about 1.30am. He said he ran for cover and then noticed he had been hit twice in the right thigh. Mr Al Shami, a member of the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah movement, said he did not know the assailants or why he was targeted.
The attack may have been linked to a growing crackdown by Mr Abbas's forces on armed gangs in Jenin. It was the scene of some of the worst violence during the second Palestinian uprising in the early 2000s but in recent years, Mr Abbas's security forces have made great inroads in restoring law and order. That period of calm, however, has been tested since the Israeli Arab actor Juliano Mer Khamis, who founded a community theatre in town, was gunned down in April last year.
In May this year, gunmen shot at the home of the area's governor, Kadoura Mousa. He was not injured but suffered a fatal heart attack several hours later. The new governor, Talal Dweikat, said yesterday's shooting was an attempt to undermine the work of the security forces.” (Associated Press, 2 July 2012)
References: (all links accessed 12 October 2012)
• Associated Press: Palestinian politician shot in Jenin, 2 July 2012 (published by The National) http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/palestinian-politician-shot-in-jenin
• ICG – International Crisis Group: Squaring the Circle: Palestinian Security Reform under Occupation, Middle East Report N°98, 7 September 2010
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/98%20Squaring%
20the%20Circle%20--%20Palestinian%20Security%20Reform%20under%20Occupation
• Jerusalem Post: PA arrests dozens of Fatah members, officers, 6 May 2012 http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=268921
• Jerusalem Post: PA chief fired after blaming Fatah for Jenin chaos, 11 May 2012 http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=269537
• NYT - New York Times: Model West Bank City Loses a Crime Fighter, 9 May 2012
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/world/middleeast/jenin-loses-leader-as-west-bank-violence-returns.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0
• NYT - New York Times: The Third Intifada Is Inevitable, 22. Juni 2012
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/opinion/sunday/the-third-intifada-is-inevitable.html?_r=0
• UN Security Council: 6788th meeting, S/PV.6788, 19 June 2012
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/7596796528557BEF85257A450063CA83
• UN Security Council: 6835th meeting, S/PV.6835, 17 September 2012
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.nsf/40FDC200EC43046A852577290052125F/C33D028560C355C385257A7F005370DC
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