Avaliação sobre o Protocolo II

A posição do Terceiro Mundo nas discussões sobre o Protocolo II esteve pautada pela defesa quase intransigente de sua soberania e pela oposição a qualquer ameaça de intervenção externa, especialmente em assuntos de segurança nacional. Esses países defenderam o maior grau possível de liberdade para reprimir movimentos rebeldes e controlar situações de guerra civil. Isso fica claro em todas as intervenções da delegação que mais abertamente se manifestou contra o Protocolo, a Índia:

348

FORSYTHE, Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977 Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts, p. 280-282.

349 _{CASSESE, The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and Customary}

International Law, p. 109.

350

FORSYTHE, op. cit., p. 282-283.

351 _{BLONDEL, From Saigon to Ho Chi Minh City: The ICRC's Work and Transformation from 1966 to}

My delegation believes that the provisions of Protocol II will only militate against the sovereignty of States and will interfere in their domestic affairs. The internal law and order situations are the sole concern of sovereign States and these problems are to be dealt with according to the domestic laws of the country.

It must be remembered here that the newly independent developing countries which are endeavouring to consolidate their newly earned independence are jealous of their sovereignty and will guard it against any action which might constitute an interference in their internal affairs under whatever form or guise. They are aware of the powerful means of communication and propaganda which the powerful countries of the world possess. The developing countries cannot rule out the possibility of misuse of Protocol II in this ideologically divided world.352

Nessa linha, não era menor o temor com a possibilidade de que grupos minoritários iniciassem levantes em busca da secessão e invocassem o Protocolo. A delegação do Paquistão também foi clara quanto a essa preocupação:

the concept of armed conflict of a non-international character would not be applicable to armed conflict on the part of a racial or ethnic group against its own central government. Nor could any group of the people of a country which had successfully overcome foreign domination and gained its national Independence legitimately claim that a movement for secession from the national government was a struggle for self-determination. The necessary distinction would have to be made in such cases.353

Soma-se a essa posição soberanista outro aspecto que não pode ser desconsiderado. Trata-se do fato de que essas discussões, tanto do artigo 1o, quanto do restante do acordo, ocorreram após a definição sobre o artigo 1o do Protocolo I. Assim, já se sabia, de antemão, que as guerras de libertação nacional seriam tratadas como conflitos armados internacionais e reguladas pelo Protocolo I. Com isso, o Protocolo II deixava de ser interessante nessa batalha por reconhecimento jurídico travada pelo Terceiro Mundo.354 A delegação da Índia foi explícita quanto a essa vinculação entre as duas questões:

The recognition and status of liberation movements was no longer in doubt. It was the subject of innumerable United Nations resolutions, into whose details he would not go. The Conference had recognized those liberation movements and had invited their representatives to participate fully in its deliberations. Many national liberation movements were participating in the Conference on a basis of complete equality as the sovereign representatives of their people. Wars of liberation were now treated as international conflicts and the Indian delegation was glad that the Conference had accepted the status of liberation movements in Article l, paragraph 4 of Protocol I. The

352 _{CDDH Official Records, v. 7, CDDH/SR.49, p. 81.} 353 _{CDDH Official Records, v. 5, CDDH/SR.11, p. 107-108.} 354

CANTRELL, Charles L., Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict: the Third Diplomatic Conference,

Marquette Law Review, v. 61, n. 2, p. 253–278, 1977, p. 277; DRAPER, Humanitarian Law and Internal

Indian delegation therefore believed that common Article 3 reflected the historical situation as it had then existed and was no longer applicable to present circumstances. Consequently, draft Protocol II, which was supposed to be based on common Article 3, was pointless.355

Superada a questão dos movimentos de libertação, restava pouco incentivo ao Terceiro Mundo para defender a extensão de regras humanitárias a conflitos sem caráter internacional. Corrobora essa constatação o fato de que as delegações dos movimentos de libertação nacional praticamente não participaram das discussões do Protocolo II, diferentemente do que ocorreu com o Protocolo I.

Esse contraste não passou despercebido. O comentário da delegação da Áustria foi certeiro:

At the first session of the Conference, a large majority of representatives had wished to have such protection extended to one of the two categories of non- inter-State armed conflicts, by broadening the field of application of Protocol I. Why should the same extension of humanitarian protection now be refused to the victims of the other category of non-inter-State conflicts which had to be regulated by Protocol II? Public opinion would be astonished at such discrimination. It might begin to suspect that the protection given to the first category under Protocol I had been accorded not just for humanitarian reasons, but for other reasons as well.356

O Protocolo II, portanto, tornou-se desinteressante (pois não regularia as guerras de libertação) e ameaçador (pois atacava a soberania nacional – em muitos casos, recentemente adquirida) na visão do Terceiro Mundo. Assim, ao mesmo tempo em que defenderam leque maior de proteção aos combatentes no caso de guerras de libertação nacional, essas delegações rejeitaram a possibilidade de aceitar normas mais protetivas em conflitos internos.

355 _{CDDH Official Records, v. 7, CDDH/SR.56, p. 203-204. A afirmação da Índia contrasta com o argumento}

utilizado pelo Egito nas discussões do artigo 1o do Protocolo I, negara que o objetivo do Terceiro Mundo fosse descartar o Protocolo II. CDDH Official Records, v. 8, CDDH/I/SR.5, p. 34-35.