Brexit, or “enough with the foreign”

and Northern Ireland chose to stay in the union with respective results of 62% and 55.8%.

In contrast to the 1975 referendum results, which indicated strong support (67%) for remaining in the European Economic Market, how can these results be explained? It is suggested that rather than economic developments, these percentages are the outcome of numerous societal changes. Therefore, it is asserted that Brexit is a profoundly social and cultural event – despite the significance of economic reasons. Eric Kaufmann argues that

“Brexit voters, like Trump supporters, are motivated by identity, not economics” (“It’s NOT the Economy, Stupid”). Brexit is also argued to be a result of a combination of historical events, political decisions, and identity conflicts rather than just the EU alone.

One of the driving forces behind this vote may be the decline of the British Empire, which was once the largest Empire in the world, as well as multiculturalism and the difficulty of Britain to assert its superiority as it once did.

Britain struggled to find a new place in the world after losing the Empire. It also addressed the issue of coexisting with its earlier subjects in the same area and on an equal footing. In the 1970s, Britain perceives the possibility of joining the EEC as its new position in global affairs. Even though Margaret Thatcher disagreed with the Community's supranational principles, she was confident in the advantages this relationship would have for her nation. In order to regulate it, she “just wanted to redirect its path from a supranational movement to national cooperation and hence to control it”

(A. Chochia et al. 124). This meant that the EEC should stand for a union of states and be a vehicle for enhancing the economic well-being of the people of Europe without putting political interests first. Britain wanted independence so that it could trade with other superpowers like the United States as well as to take part in international issues through the EEC. It was crucial that the Community avoided adopting federalist strategies because doing so would harm the member states and go against Thatcher’s views on

nationalism and national independence. As the EEC evolved into the EU, Britain opted out of as many clauses as it could to oppose the rapidly approaching supranational power of Brussels because, according to A. Chochia et al., “Britain was at risk of losing its independence and sovereignty because of the transfer of decision-making power to Brussels” (130).

Despite this, it seems that the problems go beyond a matter of sovereignty. The British did not appear to comprehend the EU’s function in relation to Britain'’ own governance, as Applebaum notes: “It imposed some constraints upon U.K. politicians, but also expanded their power in other areas by giving Britain a role in shaping the decisions of European leaders” (54). Becker et al argue in tandem with Applebaum, saying that:

The political system also needs to better explain what the EU does and what it doesn’t do. This is particularly important in the British context. For instance, the EU has essentially no influence over house-building and health care provision in the UK – two salient issues on voters’ minds (5).

Since the EU is a foreign entity, Applebaum argues, it is used as the pretext for larger social changes taking place in British society. The “foreignness” of Britain, in terms of its political system, its demographic, and its way of life, is thus the country’s dilemma.

Therefore, Brexit represents the tipping point for an intolerant society against a rapidly modernising and diverse Britain, “(...) a symptomatic of longer-term social changes”

(Ford and Goodwin 17) which have been rewriting the fabric of society.

In order to understand how the UK voted beyond the percentages of the four nations, the discussion must turn to figure 7. The data demonstrates that people’s voting preferences varied depending on where they were; this is particularly true in England, which exhibits pro-European sentiment in both major cities and university towns

(London, Oxford, Cambridge, Newcastle, Exeter, etc). Investigating who voted where and why will help to explain these results. With the modernization of society, there were more individuals with university degrees and middle-class affiliations. As a result of a greater presence of middle-class voters than working-class ones, the country’s class distribution was then changing. The working class in Britain lost faith in the political system as a result of the two major parties’ modernization efforts because they felt underrepresented by both as they attempted to appeal to the new audience – “Leavers (…) feel that these institutions have come to be dominated by a left-liberal cultural establishment that looks down on them and sells the country short” (Mounk, “Brexit is a Cultural Revolution”). This new electorate resided in and around major cities and frequently engaged with citizens from other countries. As a result, it differs from those in smaller regions and afterwards referred to as the “left-behinds” in terms of how they view the nation and their place within it, specifically “older white voters, the working classes, and school leavers” (Ford and Goodwin 19). Kaufmann follows Pat Dade’s line of argument, concluding that those who are keen on the politics of belonging, roots and safety are “settlers”, whereas those for whom individualism, cultural equality, and diversity are “prospectors” and “pioneers” (“It’s NOT the Economy, Stupid”).

The left-behinds sought assistance elsewhere because they felt cut off from values like the advantages of diversity and independence, as well as how nationality and belonging are seen. Nationalistic parties responded to the working class's request by combining their original goal of exiting the EU with the escalating worries about immigration, diversity, and globalisation. After the EU welcomed new members from Eastern Europe in 2004, immigration issues began to be associated with a rising dissatisfaction with the EU. The number of foreigners in the UK expanded exponentially as a result of Blair's failure to stop eastern citizens from entering the country, posing a

threat to those who did not want their status quos to change: “The share of voters naming migration as one of the nation’s most important issues increased from under 3 percent at the start of 1997 to around 30 percent in 2003 and then to over 40 percent toward the end of 2007” (Ford and Goodwin 20). Becker et al conclude that “we find evidence that the growth rate of immigrants from the 12 EU accession countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 is linked to the Vote Leave share” (“Who Voted for Brexit?” 3).

Concerning issues of nationalism and community, the left-behinds were passionate, displaying “feelings of cultural loss, even a symbolic threat to the British way of life” (Chan et al. 835). Thus, and as Ford and Goodwin conclude, as do Chan et al., the voting process had largely to do with class, education, and ethnicity, with Brexiteers revealing themselves in poorer and least diverse areas. Leave was also high among those who identified as English rather than British (Ford and Goodwin 26), thus contributing to the concerning rise of English nationalism.

Furthermore, many voters did not know what they were voting for due to the Brexit campaign’s ambiguity and deceit. Esler remarks that “English people talk of

‘independence’ from Brussels, but it is not clear what any of this means in practical terms in an increasingly interdependent world. (…) National solutions are useless without international cooperation” (How Britain Ends, ch. 1). Leaving the union, according to Applebaum, was how the British planned to address their immigration problems.

Nevertheless, a large number of immigrants living in the U.K. “are not affected by EU laws” (Applebaum 57), indicating that the immigration problems would never be fully handled. The Leave campaign was led by two organisations, “Vote Leave” and

“Leave.EU,” and was primarily focused on immigration, public spending, and concerns of sovereignty. The Remain campaign underlined the risks to the economy of leaving the Union, while the Leave campaign emphasised how Britain was now a colonial instead of

the coloniser. The campaigners, which included MPs from both the Conservative and Labour parties, also emphasised the need to invest in the country (Ford and Goodwin 24).

The IMF issued a warning that was related to the Treasury’s statement that “each household would be £4,300 worse off annually,” claiming that the British standard of life would suffer (Ford and Goodwin 24). Moreover, Brexiteers were encouraged to believe that the money not spent in the EU would be allocated to the National Health Service (NHS) and the overall welfare budget. It has been revealed that “Brexit will not, in fact, provide anything close to the additional £350 million per week for the British budget that some Leave campaigners had claimed it would” (Applebaum 57). The author is alluding to the campaign claim that the amount of money spent on EU membership would be sufficient to establish and staff a new hospital every week.

This campaign was distinguished by the weak campaigning efforts conducted by

“remain,” which mainly concentrated on economic reasons (not even Cameron’s discussions with the EU earlier that year could divert away from the economy), as well as the minimal engagement of the Labour Party, led by Jeremy Corbyn. A motion of no confidence that was passed soon after the referendum was largely motivated by the leader's ambiguous stance on this matter throughout the entire campaign. But as the results were published, it was not the Labour Party that suffered: the Conservatives lost Cameron and UKIP lost Farage, forcing Britain into a serious political crisis.