In modern times, the “circle of power” depicted above is explained with the people’s “sovereignty”. The specific procedures that give to the po-litical system its input-output structure tell us how such sovereignty is exercised and exactly what it consists of: it generally consists of the capacity to periodically (and more or less directly) determine who is au-thorized to make collectively binding decisions, while the legally valid procedures determine the specific articulation of such a general ethical relationship. Procedures are thus intelligible as embodiments of more specific ethical principles (such as the exact entitlements to the exercise of sovereignty, the interpretation that is given to political equality, the constitution of social, geographical and cultural subgroups as political constituencies, etc.). On the other hand, ethical principles only become effective by means of procedures. Ethical principles make procedures
“meaningful” inasmuch as they are the reason why certain procedures are in place: for instance, for the sake of popular sovereignty, collec-tive self-determination, freedom, etc. On the other hand, procedures tell us what kind of a difference ethical principles make in the practice.
Generally, “popular sovereignty” makes the world different inasmuch as voters contribute to the periodical selection of decision-makers. More specifically, the exact entitlements will determine who is exactly part of
“the people”, what “popular” therefore means, which specific cultural or geographic interpretation is given of the set of actors who share this entitlement.
However, the liaison between procedures and principles will also show the limits of the latter: in contemporary democracies, sovereignty can only be exercised indirectly by means of a relation of political rep-resentation, and is filtered by a complex set of institutional, commu-nicative and organisational infrastructures. Moreover, procedures are independent of the ethical principles that they are supposed to embody inasmuch as time can change some of the sociological assumptions that are part of those principles, while the procedures continue to take place unperturbed. For instance, the feelings of the actors that compose a constituency may change throughout time as regards the reasons for
Political ethics as a functional requirement of democracy 181 their coexistence: separatisms may arise just like separations may lose their reason to be. Conversely, procedures can also become obsolete as they may be perceived as more or less satisfactory embodiments of a changing concept of sovereignty, representation, etc. Although institu-tional procedures are intelligible as embodiments of ethical principles, this does not mean that they are also their truthful implementation, nor does it mean that such an implementation would not be possible otherwise.
Far from being an endpoint, the double relationship between proce-dures and ethical principles is the starting point of political communica-tion, for both the exact “embodiment” or realisation of ethical principles by means of institutional procedures and the reasonableness of ethical principles in the light of what we can actually achieve procedurally are open for discussion. Thus, the reform of an electoral system will likely be motivated through reference to a “better” representation of “the peo-ple”, the reform of an institutional system might prompt discussions about the exercise of sovereignty in a complex and multifarious constit-uency (as has been the case in Italy when elements of a federal system were introduced in 2001).
Despite historical mutations of procedures and semantical nuanc-es, the interpretation of the electoral mechanism as an authorisation and of its reiteration as a form of accountability is a common feature of contemporary democracies. They make sure that decision-makers are not self-referential, but – on the contrary – interrogate themselves as to the “requests” that come to them from “outside” the political system.
What ought to be, however, the result of such an interrogation?
Again, the history of political semantics provides us with “representa-tion” (of the people’s interests, needs, etc.) as an apt normative reference.
5. “Representation” as an ethical relationship
What ought to be represented, and how, is subject to interpretation, but the semantical reference to representation is a starting point for political communication: something is expected to be represented and somebody
is expected to represent something and somebody else. What, how and by which means will be a further object of political communication and, ultimately, a matter of choice, preference and evaluation by means of the electoral process. Notwithstanding its openness, a relation of representation fulfils the goal of entitling the represented people with the legitimate expectation to be the addressees and the arbiters of de-cisions and decision-makers. Thus, a formal procedure makes an eth-ical assumption true inasmuch as it prompts politeth-ical actors to enact corresponding patterns of behaviour: as a political representative I will have an interest in being accountable to my constituency and will be motivated to interpret my role as a role of representation with a strong ethical character. And, vice versa, as a citizen and a voter I will also be induced to look at political representatives as more or less satisfactory interpreters of my political preferences, for it is the very structure of the political process that motivates me to do so.
Thus, representation calls for responsiveness and accountability.
It requires that decision-makers address citizens as the ultimate sover-eigns. “Representation” is one of the core assumptions of democratic politics in that it structures political communication around the need to interpret the citizens’ “will”, “needs”, “demands” and so on, and address them adequately. “Representation” shows how the relationship between formal procedures and ethical principles is structured in such a way as to make sure that not anything goes, but is also “loose” enough to open up a space for controversies, alternatives and civilized struggles.
The space for controversies that opens up in the interplay of ethical principles and institutional procedures allows for – roughly – two levels of communication: the first concerns the “content” of inputs and out-puts, the second concerns the adequacy of the principles and procedures themselves. This is the point at which the “dialectical” relationship be-tween procedures and semantics sets in: ethical principles become real only through their embodiment in procedures, while procedures are meaningful only against the background of some ethical principle. Po-litical equality is a case in point.
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