the disenchanted citizen that blames the untrustworthiness of repre-sentatives actually acts upon the same assumption, and is just shifting responsibility to the person or organised group that obtained his/her consent under false pretences.
Political ethics as a functional requirement of democracy 189 The intimate connection between ethical principles and formal procedures provides citizens with a set of cognitive criteria for political judgement by means of which they can communicate and understand each other in public communication. Nevertheless neither the ethical principles nor the formal procedures are fully determined by each other:
there are several interpretations of popular sovereignty as there is more than one procedure to enact it. Democracies are also dynamic political systems inasmuch as the relationship between ethics and procedures shifts throughout time, propelled by the struggle for new political ma-jorities, political opportunities and semantical innovations. The “ambi-guities” of the ethical principles, their openness for ever further inter-pretation and reconsideration as well as the questionability of formal procedures (how apt are they to embody the ethical principles on which they rest? what are their unintended consequences?) are all dynamic elements in the evolution of political systems.
The study of “embedded” political ethics opens a new perspec-tive on legitimacy. It shows that the interplay of ethical semantics and formal procedures represents a key element of everyday normative as-sumptions in political communication and behaviour. Political ethics emerges as an ingredient of formal procedures beyond both the straight-forward distinction between normative and descriptive approaches and the opposition between moralism and realism in political theory. It may represent a new paradigm for the study of political ethics from the point of view of the social sciences, while having a positive impact on politi-cal theory inasmuch as it casts light on the normative assumptions that are a functional part of everyday political life.
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II – Arguing about values
Practical Rationality at Work – A New Argumentation Model
João Sàágua and Michael D. Baumtrog
Introduction
Conceptual ideals typically provide unobtainable standards from which to measure and evaluate the real. In philosophy, ideals are often concep-tualized and articulated not with the intent of literally dictating practice, but with the hope of providing norms from which reflective evaluation might lead to improved practice. Such is the case with any ideal model of reasoning or argumentation. No philosophy working with ideal rea-soning or argumentation expects real reasoners or arguers to follow the ideal model perfectly or always. Rather, many of the models of reason-ing and argumentation put forward thus far serve as standards against which poor or fallacious practices become apparent. Thus, the ‘phil-osophical punch’ of an ideal model is two-fold: the model itself is an articulation of the way things ought to be, and if correct, the way things ought to be informs, motivates, and justifies articulations of failures in practice.
In what follows we provide our first articulation of a new ideal model of integrated practical reasoning and argumentation. It is ideal in two senses. First, its method is prescriptive, although it may never be executed perfectly in practice. Second, as an ideal standard, applying it to an instance of real life reasoning or argumentation will provide evaluative insights (see Baumtrog 2015). However, although an ideal model, we have tried to keep its ideal and prescriptive aspects relevant, pertinent, and realistically representative of intuitions regarding what we actually do when we practically reason and argue.
As alluded to above, we are not the first to put forward an ideal model for practical reasoning or argumentation. Philosophers have long
focused on practical reasoning, with recent models/schemata coming from Broome (2002) and Audi (2006), to name but a few. Argumen-tation scholars such as Walton (1990, 2007, 2013a, b), van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans (2002 pp.101–102),1 and Fair-clough & FairFair-clough (2012) have provided recent models of practical argumentation. As such, if we are to be responsible academics, we must then justify the need for our current contribution; we must answer the question ‘What is on offer here that cannot be found elsewhere?’
The answer will become clearer below, but here we would like to of-fer one brief answer explained through three supporting points. The main answer is that the new model is an integrated model of practical rea-soning and argumentation. Philosopher’s working on practical rearea-soning and ethics have thus far paid little attention to argumentation theory.
Similarly, argumentation scholars have paid little attention to the work of those in practical reasoning and ethical decision-making. In short, there is a gap between the two areas. This could be in part due to the explanation Walton (2007: 212) gives that there is a contrast between his
‘commitment’ model and the ‘Belief, Desire, Intention’ (BDI) models.
As integrative, then, we consider our model a novel contribution.
The three supporting points indicate the main ways the model is integrated. The first is that it can be used by both commitment and BDI proponents. For those viewing the model with a mind to argumentation, we invite the reader to feel welcome to think in terms of commitments interlocutors have and can be held accountable for. Viewing the model as an instance of reasoning, we invite the reader to view the model in terms of attitudes that connect to reasons in an inferential process. In both cases, however, we side with the view that practical reasoning and argumentation conclude in an intention to act rather than, as many in argumentation have it, a belief that one should act. For argumentation, this means maintaining a discursive commitment that one intends to perform some act.
The second way the model is integrative is that we reconceptualise and reposition what have come to be known as ‘argumentation schemes’
as producing pro tanto reasons. In this way, we use one concept from argumentation – argumentation schemes with critical questions – while
1 They refer to their scheme as ‘pragmatic argumentation’ rather than ‘practical’.
Practical Rationality at Work – A New Argumentation Model 195 using them as providing support for reasons used on a BDI conception of the role of reasons. The importance of this move will be made clearer below.
The third point of integration is that we attempt to integrate explic-it moral considerations into the production and evaluation of practical reasoning and argumentation. While moral components have been a focal point for philosophers of practical reasoning, many in argumenta-tion have stayed away from including them on the basis that procedural accounts of argumentation ought to remain silent on content. As will be shown below, our account takes moral considerations into account, without, however, dictating or advocating for an authoritative moral theory or threshold.
Without further ado then, the next section will introduce our start-ing points: what we take as background and assumptions from which to proceed. Section 3 provides an overview of the model, looking at its functioning on a macro scale. Section 4 zooms in on each of the model’s component parts, detailing and justifying the selection of the schemes so as to provide a picture of the scaffolding of practical reasoning. In section 5 we provide a summary and some concluding remarks.