Toward the end of the year 1915 the Commission encountered new and serious difficulties with the German officials in Belgium. It had been the policy of the authorities to entrust the supervision of all matters relating to the relief work to the Civil Administration of the German General Government in Belgium. The
diplomatic negotiations passed, however, through the hands of the Political Department of the General Government, headed by Baron von der Lancken. For some time a rivalry between these two departments had been developing as to which should have the privilege of surveillance of the activities of the Commission and the Comité National. One product of this rivalry was the attempt of the Civil Administration to control relief operations by forcing a reorganization of the Comité National in June 1915. This resulted in a threat by the British Government
to revise its policy with respect to relief unless the Germans gave new and specific assurances that they would not interfere with distribution.(25) The Governor- General, thereupon, had placed the control of relief operations largely in the hands of the Political Department. As the object of the attentions of these competing departments the Commission suffered. Matters came to a head in the fall of 1915 when the Political Department made the espionage charges described in Document 43. At this particular moment Hoover was discussing with the German General Staff a project for the relief in Poland,(26) in which the High Command was much interested. Hoover immediately declared to the military authorities that extension of the Commission's activities was out of the question since the civil officials
appeared unwilling to co-operate in the relief already in hand. The pressure which the High Command applied to the Governor-General in Brussels had prompt
results. The espionage charges, which were unfounded, were withdrawn, and, what was most important for the relief organizations, a new department, the
Vermittlungsstelle, was created to regularize relations between the Commission and the German authorities.
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DOCUMENT NO. 43 Memorandum,
GIBSON ON CONFERENCE WITH VON DER LANCKEN, covering German demands for removal of three American delegates on suspicion of espionage
BRUSSELS, 30 November 1915
This morning Baron von der Lancken requested me to call upon him and
immediately brought up the cases of the three men described in my memorandum of November 8th and stated that he desired to add to that list one more name, that of Mr. Poland,(27) to whom he objected as having written offensive letters (lettres grossières) to the Political Department. He showed me a letter from Mr. Poland, a copy of which is appended hereto. After reading the letter I stated that it had long been the custom of the Commission to deal on matters of loading, imports in Belgium, and general business with Doctor Rieth of the Politische Abteilung and that as a business letter the one in question contained nothing of an objectionable character, that the impatience shown in it was quite comprehensible owing to the interference to which the Commission had been subjected in the question of lighters and tugs entirely imperiling the work with which the letter dealt.
Baron von der Lancken began to take up the general question of removing the four men, but I interrupted him, stating that it seemed quite useless to consider the question at the present time as it was only one minor incident in matters of graver importance. I said that the conditions under which the Belgians were being fed had been steadily growing worse for some months, that the members of the
Commission had been subjected to all sorts of affronts and outrages and the entire work threatened in many directions, and that far from receiving that sympathetic co-operation and adherence to the spirit of the work to which we were entitled, the German authorities in the occupied territory in Belgium seemed to be placing endless obstacles in our way. I stated that this was not true in the north of France, where the military authorities evidently understood the vital importance of the work and where we had received co-operation and understanding support. Going back a little I told Baron von der Lancken that Mr. Hoover had, while in America,
informed the government officials of the character of the difficulties under which the Commission was working and that it was agreed that at any time he and his colleagues felt that their dignity and self-respect as Americans could no longer tolerate the treatment accorded them and they withdrew from the work, they would be supported in such action; that Mr. Hoover upon his return to England and
learning of recent developments laid the situation before British officials and had endeavored to arrange that in the event of necessary withdrawal the work could be taken over by other neutrals and that the British Government had emphatically declined to entertain such an idea. I impressed upon Baron von der Lancken that the British Government had permitted the shipping of food into Belgium only because of the pressure of public opinion and in order to avoid giving the Germans an opportunity to say that the British were starving their allies. I pointed out to him very frankly that if the Commission were to withdraw and justify its withdrawal by a statement that it could not tolerate the treatment accorded it by the German
authorities and the conditions under which the work was done, the British
Government would not of course fail to seize the opportunity to stop the work by saying that under such conditions no other neutral body could hope to succeed and at the same time placing the German Government in an unfavorable light before the world. I stated to Baron von der Lancken that we had put up with extremely bad treatment and many serious outrages for many months, but that the time had come when we could no longer ask any American gentleman engaged in the work to submit to the sort of treatment they had had in the past; that Mr. Hoover and his colleagues were now seriously considering the withdrawal of the Commission and the stopping of the work; that the American people would not for one moment stand that men engaged in a work which in effect represented the American people should lower the dignity of their country by acceptance of such treatment.
Baron von der Lancken then exclaimed somewhat impatiently that it was all right so far as Germany was concerned; that she had plenty of food now coming from the Balkans and that the Belgians would not starve; that they would be given a ration of black bread and that if they did not like it and caused any riots, they would be shot down. (Nous leur donnerons du pain noir à manger, s'ils n'aiment pas cela et précipitent des bagarres, nous tirerons dessus, tout bonnement.)
I said I was glad that he had informed me that we were no longer needed but I was sorry that he had not told me so before, inasmuch as we were continuing the work
only because we thought it was needed by the German Government as well as by other belligerents.
Baron von der Lancken's remarks, however, were apparently only a slight outburst of temper and he attempted to soften his remarks by saying very agreeable things about the work of the Commission. I told Baron von der Lancken that he must not think that the Commission was trying to avoid continuing the work, but that on the contrary it would be very happy if a satisfactory solution could be found under which the men engaged in the work of the Commission could be given treatment as gentlemen and proper facilities granted for carrying on the work.
I stated that I failed to see why a reasonable amount of time and attention by a high official should not be warranted by the Commission's work; that the President and the Secretary of State of the United States found it possible to give their personal attention to the matter, that the King of Spain was himself deeply interested in it, and that Mr. Hoover found no difficulty in securing the undivided attention of the British Prime Minister and of his colleagues in the Cabinet whenever the work of the Commission prompted him to do so. I intimated that it would be a very good thing if some one official with real authority could be delegated to deal with the work of the Commission. I concluded by saying that Mr. Hoover and his colleagues were very unhappy and discouraged about the whole matter, that they had come into the work full of enthusiasm and had made considerable sacrifices in order to devote themselves to the work, that it would of course be a keen disappointment to feel that they had so far failed through no fault of their own as to be obliged to abandon the work.
I added that I wished him to consider this conversation as quite informal and unofficial; that strictly speaking I should not have communicated with him upon the subject until plans had been more definitely formulated covering all the matters of first importance and could be formally presented to him by the Spanish Minister, the Dutch Chargé d'Affaires, and myself. I said, however, that I considered it only honest to tell him frankly what the situation was, rather than quibble on the minor matter about which he had wished to consult me; that he now understood how we felt and I hoped that he would understand that the Commission was very much in earnest and that a way might be found to solve the difficulties.
Baron von der Lancken apparently realized the seriousness of the situation and said that he would be very glad to talk it over with us further at the first opportunity, thanked me for my frankness in telling him of the matter so freely, and took leave of me in an unusually friendly manner.
(Signed) GIBSON .
DOCUMENT NO. 44 Memorandum,
ON CONFERENCE VERNON KELLOGG, CASPAR WHITNEY, AND
HOOVER WITH VON KESSLER, WENGERSKY, AND UHL OF GENERAL STAFF, regarding unsatisfactory treatment of Commission by German
administration in Belgium (by Kellogg)
BRUSSELS, 2 December, 1915
Mr. Hoover stated he was glad to have the opportunity to go exhaustively into the whole situation; that the relations of the Commission with the Staff in the north of France had always been so cordial and the Staff engagements so justly and liberally carried out, the Staff attitude so open and frank, that he felt he could be frank even to brutality. That the situation in Belgium was becoming intolerable and that the ravitaillement of Northern France must collapse with that of Belgium. He sketched briefly the history of the Commission and its relations to the General Government, laying stress on the fact that while Governor von Bissing's attitude was correct, if not cordial, he was surrounded by an absolute pack of bureaucratic underlings whose sole desire and mission seemed to be to seize anything in Belgium and dress it up in some form designed to attract the Governor's attention to themselves and their energies. That it was patent that the utmost jealousy existed among these departments, and that we were the shuttlecock with which they beat each other over the head, hoping the Governor would notice their valiant conduct. He sketched the relations, first when the C.R.B. and the C.N. were under the Civil Department: how their control had been seized by the Political Department last June from the Civil Department, on the impeachment of the committee's bad political activities; how this was but an incident in the war between von Sandt and von der Lancken, and how von der Lancken had been put to it ever since to justify his representations to the Governor of that time. That we had been subjected to intolerable destructive inquisition, no remote helpfulness in attitude, and how gradually this was
degenerating into violation of the spirit of the agreements.
He sketched the attempts to manipulate the relief, in violation of the undertakings about forcing labor through control of relief, and pointed out that the Commission would not go on one minute if it were to become an implement to force the
population, against its will and consent to work for the Germany Army. That to use the control of men's food to force the civilian population to disloyalty to its
government was a thing we would not stand for on humane grounds, to say nothing of the international undertakings upon which we were founded.
He took up the Poland incident as an example of bureaucratic tyranny and incompetence and gave them a sketch of this transaction and the notorious letter involved. They read the letter, and Kessler remarked that its contents were innocent and justified and that it was in text and character far different from that represented
to him by the authorities. Hoover pointed out that if experienced men such as Poland were to be jerked out of the country on the breath of an arrogant clerk, in this manner, we would have to chuck the job at once. Hoover went into the incident of the three men and the failure to get any reasons for the attitude about them. He pointed out the hopelessness of obtaining men of character and honor if they were to be treated in this way. He stated that the heads of the business had a right to know what the charges were. Von Kessler said that he had heard several items, one of which was that information was conveyed verbally by these men to Young at Rotterdam as to the September offensive and through this route to the Allied Governments; that Young had proposed to introduce two spies into Belgium with Commission passes but had been stopped by protest of his American colleagues.
He said he was unaware of the details but that in our position spread over the whole rear, the Staff were greatly disturbed by these reports. He said they had the utmost confidence in Hoover, Kellogg, Whitney, and most of the men, but that such matters as this transcended every food question.
Hoover agreed and stated at once that the matter must be gone into to the very bottom; that they would find him more Catholic than the Pope on the slightest breath of justifiable suspicion; that from his point of view he required no such evidence as was needed in law courts but the ground for reasonable suspicion would be sufficient; he expressed his absolute horror at the idea that --- would jeopardize the lives of 9,000,000 people by such conduct, for it must genuinely reflect on the neutral character of the Commission. He expressed his absolute disbelief that there was a word of truth in it and stated he believed that it was a tittle-tattle produced by von der Lancken in accord with his general attitude. He suggested that any capable German officer be given the dossier and that this officer and Hoover should jointly hold an inquiry to establish, not guilt, but reasonable suspicion.
Von Kessler also said there was some complaint about a Major Winchell that Mr.
Young had applied for a pass for, and gave the impression that they believed that he was an Allied agent. Mr. Hoover explained the circumstances of his belonging to the Salvation Army, etc., and that he had made the foolish inquiry whether he might be the head of their intelligence service, which joke had poor results. He stated he believed it could be proved to be absolute nonsense. As an example, neither Green nor van Schaick had arrived from America until after the date of the great offensive. Von Kessler agreed that more data should be given.
On the main issues von Kessler stated that he and his superiors had taken the matter up energetically with General von Bissing and recommended him to create a
special department to look after the C.R.B. and C.N. and that it had been done, and that he had brought Captain Uhl from the Staff to take charge of our relations to this department. We all expressed pleasure at this arrangement, learning
incidentally that Captain Uhl had been chosen because he was a good American resident of Santa Barbara, California. Von Kessler said that Wengersky would
remain in Brussels for a fortnight to get the new bureau running. Mr. Hoover
mentioned that Captain Merton had turned up, saying he was going to be associated with us; that we liked him and hoped it would be so. Von Kessler said it would be arranged as we wished.
Hoover then elaborated on the indivisibility of the C.R.B. and the C.N. in all departments, the fears and suspicions on all sides as to proposals made by the General Government, and the disastrous results that would follow to food and tranquillity, and hoped the new department would meet these matters in an intelligent manner. This, von Kessler and Uhl assured us would be the case. The discussion went on to the relief of Poland, which the General Staff wished the Commission to undertake.
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DOCUMENT NO. 45 Memorandum,
OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN HOOVER AND VON DER LANCKEN. Von der Lancken announces that the Governor-General has decided to set up the
Vermittlungsstelle
BRUSSELS, 4 December 1915
Von der Lancken said he was glad to tell me that the Governor had decided to set up a new committee, comprising representatives from each---the Political, Finance, and Civil Departments, together with an officer from the General Staff, which would take over all questions relating to the C.R.B. and C.N. That Blum would represent the first, Pochee the second, --- the third, and Uhl the fourth. Captain Merton would be censor and general intermediary. He stated he had sent for Poland and that incident was now out of the way happily and that all the broad, general, and detailed questions which had arisen lately could go over to the new
Commission which should be established in ten days or so.
We then talked peace, the relief of Poland, etc., for about an hour.
.