Complex interdependence and information power

When communication meets international relations perspectives:

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its sources of information. Despite overestimating their analytical skills, cit- izens are always looking for alternative sources. This overestimation could undermine information management capacity in an increasingly complex political environment. Citizens’ autonomous and emotional discernment is the key to transforming them into affective publics (Papacharissi, 2015), and this judgment is sometimes seen as an aggregate that can be modulated based on fluctuating interests. Exaggerated news often targets such audi- ences, playing on their sense of credulity and encouraging oppositional and populist instincts.

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3. A large army cannot resolve all problems: for example, it cannot combat economic crises or climate chaos.

By deconstructing the phenomena associated with interdependence, some preconditions that have contributed to the rise of misinformation can be clarified. Media are allowed to engage in politics as actors other than the state intervening in international affairs. Additionally, the proliferation of relevant political issues has dramatically expanded the topics covered by legacy and digital media. This has required an increased focus on the part of audiences. Finally, this setup determines the actors’ unpredictability in the political game. It is possible for anyone with organizational and eco- nomic strength, driven by interests, to actively participate in international debates, at least theoretically.

The marginalization of military forces influences conflict representation.

The role of armies in international disputes appears and disappears. The rise of arrested wars results from political leadership’s willingness to dis- play conflicts (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015). Mediatization (Hepp, 2019) encourages policymakers to consider the media in policy formulation and presentation. This centrality of representation is particularly problemat- ic for events that exacerbate conflict and, at the same time, constitute a second-hand reality for most people. As well as amplifying the nonlinearity of political events, this interdependence can be viewed as a tangled net- work of flows. Conflicts are difficult to hide from public opinion today, but their understanding can be arrested by increasing the fragmentary nature of confrontations and creating gray areas where disinformation can thrive (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015). For example, how the Syrian conflict has been portrayed to Western viewers has been marked by uncertainty, delib- erate disinformation, and discrediting sources (Merrin, 2018).

Keohane and Nye suggest that the decline of traditional security man- agement has two main consequences: first, it implies a flexible kind of power quite different from the traditional concept. Two, political interests can be domestic, transnational, or governmental, suggesting a variety of

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presidiums, including the one for information. Two conditions are essential when interdependence arrives. The first is the sensitivity associated with public opinions’ reactivity to political, social, and economic themes and issues, regardless of governmental actions. A second condition is actors’

vulnerability to external interference, such as informational interference (Chong, 2007).

The increased use of information and interdependence will not erase tradi- tional power struggles, as Keohane and Nye are aware:

As traditionalists maintain, much will be the same: states will play im- portant roles; vulnerability will lead to bargaining weakness and lack of vulnerability to power; actors will seek to manipulate cyberspace, as they manipulate flows across borders, to enhance their power. Yet as modernists insist, the information revolution is not ‘déjà vu all over again’: cyberspace is truly global; it is harder to stop or even monitor the flow of information carrying electrons than to do so for raw materials or goods; and dramatic reductions in the cost of information transmission make other resources relatively scarce (Keohane & Nye, 2012, p. 212).

A state can, however, cultivate its power through the competitive role of information: “the information revolution creates a new politics of credibility in which transparency will increasingly be a power asset” (Keohane & Nye, 2012, p. 213). According to the authors, there are three types of information.

1. Free information. All forms of information produced and distributed with- out charge fall under this category. When recipients believe what is said and consider the information reliable, those with this information gain an advantage.

2. Commercial information. When it comes to this type of information, who- ever arrives first sets standards and acquires advantages (Castells, 1996).

Modern examples include the ability to interact with online platforms. In recent electoral propaganda, a symbolic gain is achieved through occupy- ing commercial information spaces before competitors.

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3. Strategic information. It is only when a competitor does not possess this kind of information that it generates advantages. Using listening techniques, A/B testing methods, and advanced targeting can lead to asymmetric information about competitors, as was demonstrated by Cambridge Analytica (Vaidhyanathan, 2018).

The information revolution must not be welcomed with naive enthusiasm.

Emerging actors are not automatically favoured by the production of infor- mation as a competitive tool. Rogue formations can also benefit from political disorder. Arquilla and Rondfeldt (2008) claim that organized oppositional and terrorist movements can destabilize the noopolitik arrangements. In a digital world that favours economies and scale distribution (Van Dijck &

Poell, 2013; Van Dijck et al., 2018), states do not disappear. However, more organized and well-structured actors are favoured (Castells, 2009).

Moreover, “it is usually better to be a first-mover than a fast follower”

(Keohane & Nye, 2012, p. 217). Therefore, those who reach internation- al audiences first can expect better results. However, misleading news is one of the primary strategies for eroding trust and credibility when novel- ty prevails over the accuracy, and those who narrate first set the tone for subsequent conversations. In fact, “credibility is the crucial resource, and asymmetrical credibility is a key source for power” (Keohane & Nye, 2012, p. 219), opening the road to soft power (Nye, 1990) that will be discussed in the next paragraph.