and India, have introduced capital controls with the aim of dampening capital inflows.
has taken over banks in Sweden (1997), Norway (1999), the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland (2005) and, most recently, in Finland (2006). The ac- quisition of Sampo Bank in Finland brought with it activities in the Baltic countries. Most of the foreign activities in Danske Bank have been organised as branches, making them fully integrated parts of the main bank, which is registered in Denmark and is under the supervision of the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority.
Prices in the Danish property market reached their peak in the third quarter of 2007. Since then, large falls in real estate prices have taken place. By the end of 2009, prices for one-family houses had fallen by around 19 per cent relative to their peak. This places Denmark among the countries that have experienced the largest falls in house prices. In addition to falling prices on residential prop- erty, Denmark has also, alone among the industrial countries, experienced large declines in prices of commercial and agricultural property. The sharp fall in prices for residential and commercial real estate has caused big losses for Dan- ish banks that had financed construction projects. From 2007, Danish banks also experienced increasing difficulties in raising finance through the interna- tional wholesale financial markets.
In July 2008, the problems in the Danish financial sector came to a head when the seventh-largest bank, Roskilde Bank, ran into difficulties. Roskilde Bank had been among the banks which had expanded lending most aggres- sively. From early 2008, customers began to withdraw their deposits from the bank. At the beginning of July 2008, the bank was downgraded by the interna- tional rating agency, Moody’s. The management of the bank sought to solve its problems through a merger with another bank, but no buyers could be found.
In mid-July, the Danish authorities intervened to prevent the bank from col- lapse. The Danish central bank, Danmarks Nationalbank, declared itself ready to supply Roskilde Bank with all necessary liquidity and issued a guarantee on all debt obligations incurred by the bank except subordinated debt. The Danish banking sector declared its willingness to cover losses in Roskilde Bank up to 750 million DKK, with additional losses being covered by the state. In late August 2008, total assets and liabilities in Roskilde Bank (excluding equity and subordinated debt) were transferred to a new company jointly owned by the state and by the Danish banking sector. The new company would continue the activities of the distressed bank until a permanent solution could be found.
After the collapse of Roskilde Bank, it became harder for Danish banks to obtain funding from foreign sources and, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, foreign funding virtually dried up. The fi- nancing requirements of the Danish banks had to be covered by loans made available by Danmarks Nationalbank.
On 30 September 2008, the Irish Government issued a government guar- antee for the debt commitments incurred by the six largest Irish-owned banks.
The Irish guarantee led to the withdrawal of deposits from the Irish branches of Danske Bank and thus aggravated the financing problems of the Danish bank- ing sector. On 10 October 2008, in order to alleviate the financing restraints in the Danish banking sector, a special scheme was adopted by the Danish Par- liament, the so-called Bank Package 1. As part of Bank Package 1, a special procedure was established for the resolution of banking crises. Banks which could not meet the minimum capital requirements would be dissolved, with the costs being shared between the government and the Danish banking sector.
Bank Package 1 met with the support of all Danish political parties with the exception of the most left-wing party, Enhedslisten (the Unity List).
From mid-2007, the fall in stock prices and a decline in the price of Danish mortgage bonds caused large losses for the Danish pension institutions (pen- sion funds and life insurance companies). This caused a situation in which as- sets in the pension institutions were unable to cover their future pension ob- ligations. The Danish authorities intervened by changing the accounting rules for the calculation of future pension obligations. This made it possible to avoid a situation in which the Danish Financial Supervisory would be obliged, under Danish legislation, to intervene to force changes in the management of the pension institutions.
Through the remainder of 2008 and into 2009, the funding situation of Danish banks remained difficult. It was difficult to raise funding through in- ternational markets. The situation was aggravated because Danmarks Nation- albank maintained relatively high interest rates to prevent capital outflows. For the Danish authorities, it was essential to maintain the fixed exchange rate.
By the end of 2008, there were reports of mounting losses in the Danish banking sector. This caused fears that there would be a collapse in a number of Danish banks, including the largest bank, Danske Bank. The government feared a situation in which banks would be forced to cut down on lending in
order to minimise losses, causing a credit squeeze which would lead to a fall in production and a rise in unemployment. To avoid such a situation with further bank collapses and lending restraint, in early February 2009 the Danish Parlia- ment adopted new legislation – the so-called Bank Package 2 – which gave banks access to subordinated capital in the form of preferred shares from the government. The aim of the capital injection was to raise the solvency of Dan- ish banks, thus making them able to withstand future losses without a further need to raise capital. If it is necessary to meet solvency requirements, the pre- ferred shares can be converted into common equity.
The guarantee scheme established under Bank Package 1 will expire at the end of September 2010. As part of Bank Package 2, a scheme was introduced whereby, for a fee, banks can obtain a government guarantee for loans until the end of 2013.
The difficulties in the Danish financial sector can partly be explained by international factors. Thus, prior to 2007 the low interest rates imported from the international financial markets were a main factor behind the growth of debt in Danish households and non-financial enterprises too. Due to the Dan- ish exchange rate policy involving a fixed rate against the euro, the interest rate set by the Danish central bank has closely followed the interest rate in the euro zone. From August 2007 the difficulties associated with obtaining fund- ing in the international markets hit Danish banks especially hard as Danish banks had financed a large part of their expansion by short-term funding raised through the international markets.
However, a number of purely domestic factors have also contributed to the difficulties in the Danish financial sector, meaning that the international finan- cial crisis can only be seen as partly responsible for the Danish crisis. Various financial innovations particular to Denmark were a major factor behind the increase in Danish debt levels. Thus, the proportion of mortgages with variable interest rates increased as a proportion of total mortgages from 3.8 percent at the end of 1999 to 51.8 percent at the end of 2007. The fact that, with effect from October 2003, Danish mortgage banks were allowed to issue interest- only loans also tended to boost lending. A ceiling on real estate taxes was a further factor behind the sharp increase in house prices.