CDD: 501
How (Not) to Give a Semantic Analysis of Ceteris
Paribus Laws
1KAI-YUAN CHENG
Department of Philosophy
National Chung-Cheng University Chia-Yi 621, Taiwan
Abstract: The phrase of ceteris paribus (cp), i.e., other things being equal, is widely employed to state laws in non-basic sciences, such as economics, medicine, geography, biology, and psychology. However, what the phrase in question says is highly unclear, which results in severe philosophical problems calling into question the status of special sciences. The main purpose of this paper is to critically examine a lexicographic study of cp proposed by Michael Morreau (1999), who tries to provide an adequate semantic analysis of cp-laws through this study. It is argued that, despite Morreau’s attempt to excavate meanings possibly contained in a cp-phrase, his proposal is very limited in the progress it makes. Toward the end of this paper, an alternative approach is sketched, in which the pragmatic role played by cp in the sciences is emphasized.
Keywords: Semantic analysis. Lexicographic study. Pragmatism.
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the XIII International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Section of Philosophy of Science in Beijing, China, 2007 August and its pre-Congress in Taipei, Taiwan, 2007 April. I thank the audience for helpful comments. I am especially indebted to Cheng-hung Lin for valuable discussions on this topic. Thanks are extended to Eden Lin for emending a final draft. This research is sponsored by the National Science Council of Taiwan (NSC 96-2411-H-194-009-MY3) and by its Center for Humanities Research. The paper is completed during a seven-month visit at the Department of Philosophy, Princeton University in 2009. I am grateful to these Institutes in Taiwan and the United States.
Resumo: A oração cetaris paribus (cp), ou seja, “mantidas inalteradas todas as outras coisas”, é amplamente empregada para afirmar leis nas ciências denominadas non-basic (não-básicas), como economia, medicina, geografia, biologia e psicologia. Contudo, o que a oração em questão diz é extremamente obscuro, ocasionando uma série de problemas filosóficos que levam a considerar o status das ciências. O principal propósito deste artigo é examinar criticamente o estudo lexicográfico das cp proposto por Michel Morreau (1999), que tenta estabelecer uma análise semântica adequada das leis cp. Argumenta-se que, a despeito da tentativa de Morreau de escavar significados possivelmente contidos nas orações cp, sua proposta é muito limitada em vista do progresso alcançado. Ao final do artigo, apresenta-se uma proposta alternativa, ainda em fase preliminar, na qual o papel pragmático das cp para as ciências é enfatizado.
Palavras-Chave: Análise semântica. Estudo lexicográfico. Pragmatismo.
I. Introduction
The nature and status of ceteris paribus (abbreviated as “cp”) laws have recently received much attention and discussion in philosophy of science and related fields (e.g., Fodor, 1991; Cartwright, 1983; 1995; Earman and Roberts, 1999; Lipton, 1999; Mott, 1992; Pietroski and Rey, 1995; Schiffer, 1991; a special issue edited by Earman, J. Roberts, J. & Smith, S. on Ceteris Paribus Laws in Erkenntnis, vol. 57, No. 3, 2002; etc.). This controversy arises largely because what the phrase cp means is unclear. Consequently, a statement containing this phrase cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed. Given the prevalence and importance of cp-laws invoked in special sciences to explain and predict a wide variety of phenomena, doubt and uncertainty about the status of cp-laws are deeply troubling and perplexing. Clarifying what a cp-law statement may express and accordingly what the status of a cp-law may come down to is therefore an urgent task that justly deserves our attention.
The issue at stake can be explained a bit more clearly. The phrase cp is often used in non-basic (or special) sciences, and even in
basic sciences, as some may claim.2 Without this phrase, certain
significant generalization statements would simply be false. For example, a well respected law in economics states:
An increase in the supply of an article will cause its price to fall.3
This generalization statement, so stated, is clearly false, for an increase in the demand of the article, after the increase of supply, will cause its price not to fall. Practitioners of special sciences typically hedge against this possibility by adding a cp-clause to the above generalization:
Ceteris paribus, an increase in the supply of an article will cause its price to fall.
The problem with such a cp-generalization statement is that it lacks a clear content. This phrase, ceteris paribus, means other things
being equal. But what “other things” is, and how or when they are
“equal”, are left unspecified. A cp-generalization statement seems to express an incomplete proposition. This casts doubt on whether a cp-generalization statement expresses a genuine law or not. We may call the problem of a cp-clause’s lacking a clear content the “elliptical problem”.
A related problem caused by cp-clauses is that statements containing cp-clauses allow contrary generalizations which are both true. This problem is made explicit in a debate between Fodor (1991) and Schiffer (1991), concerning the legitimacy of employing
cp-clauses in special sciences. They have considered a proposal in
2 E.g., Cartwright (1983); Hempel (1988); Joseph (1980), etc. As it is said, cp is “all the way down” (c.f., Earman, Roberts, and Smith, eds. 2002).
which a notion of “completing events” is introduced to cope with the elliptical problem as follows:
For each increase in the supply of an article, there is some type of event, the occurrence of which, together with the increase, is causally sufficient for a fall in the price.4
On this proposal, what a cp-clause does is to quantify over some “completing event”, which, together with a cause stated in a generalization statement, constitutes a sufficiency condition for a certain effect stated in the statement to occur. The problem with this proposal, however, is that what a completing event is remains unspecified. The result is that the following pair of contrary generalizations is compatible with the other:
Ceteris paribus, an increase in the supply of an article will cause its price to fall.
Ceteris paribus, an increase in the supply of an article will cause its price to rise.5
Depending on which type of completing event is filled in, the above two generalizations can be both true. If the two contrary generalizations could be both true, then neither of them could be true, and hence neither of them could count as expressing any genuine law. We may call this issue concerning testing or confirming a
cp-generalization statement the “contrary generalizations” problem.
The elliptical and contrary generalizations problems present serious difficulties for anyone who wants to defend the legitimacy of
cp-laws. If the contents of generalization statements employing cp-clauses are hard to pin down, and if the choice between a pair of
contrary generalization statements is up in the air, we will not be
4 C.f. Morreau, 1999, p. 164. 5 C.f. Morreau, p. 164.
justified in holding that a cp-statement expresses any law, not to mention any respectable laws.
It is natural to think that the phrase cp as a matter of fact contains a clear meaning, once the phrase is suitably analyzed and clarified. This way of looking at the matter is what Morreau (1999) proposes to do. He undertakes a lexicographic study in which three different senses of a ceteris paribus clause, i.e., pragmatic, ideal, and comparative, are uncovered and distinguished. He further claims that the serious elliptical and contrary-generalizations problems do not arise in each of these three readings of cp. In other words, Morreau suggests that a proper semantic analysis of a cp phrase can help solve the two serious problems mentioned above and render the use of cp-laws in the sciences legitimate.
Morreau’s proposal is both stimulating and important in its attempt to shed light on the semantic issue of cp-clauses. Surprisingly, it has received little discussion or examination. The primary purpose of this paper is thus to conduct an assessment of the plausibility of Morreau’s proposal. I shall argue that it fails to assuage the worries concerning the content and status of cp-laws, but that we can nonetheless learn from its failure to paint a more plausible picture of how to characterize the role played by the use of cp in the sciences.
The rest of this paper is divided into four sections. In section II, I first clarify what the three interpretations of cp clauses amount to. In particular, I show that Morreau’s analysis of comparative interpretations is ambiguous. Clarifying the ambiguity in question can help illuminate the relationship among the three interpretations of cp in a way contrary to what Morreau suggests. In section III, I argue that none of the three interpretations of cp clauses offered by Morreau can avoid the elliptical problem. In section IV, I show that Morreau’s solution of the contrary generalizations problem is also a failure. Section V is a sketch of an alternative approach to the treatment of cp.
II. Morrerau’s Three Readings of CP: Pragmatic, Ideal, and Comparative
Seeking a solution to the elliptical problem, Morreau undertakes a lexicographic study of how cp-clauses are actually used. This study, according to Morreau, reveals three uses of a cp-clause: a) pragmatic, b) ideal, and c) comparative. Morreau makes it explicit that the purpose of carrying out this task is more than doing a lexicographic study; it is to show that in each of the three cases, there is actually a clear sense expressed by a cp-clause. As a result, a
cp-law is not elliptical after all. Morreau also points out that these
three readings of cp-clauses may be given a single sense: an ideal interpretation is a basic model on which the other two rely. I shall dispute with both of Morreau’s claims in this section. I maintain that in each of the three readings, the content of a cp-clause remains obscure, and that the pragmatic and comparative interpretations of
cp-clauses are more substantial and fundamental than ideal
interpretations.
Pragmatic reading
We may begin with the cp-law in economics described above to illustrate Morreau’s first reading of cp-clauses. We saw earlier that an increase of the supply of an article, say, gummi bears, might not lead to the fall of the price of the article. This is because certain relevant factors, such as an increase of the demand, could be present which prevents the price from falling. A cp clause is thus invoked, according to Morreau, to express the following provision:
…in the future, after the increase in supply, other relevant factors like the demand for gummi bears, will be as they are now.6
In this reading, a cp-clause serves to state the condition that certain relevant factors, other than the supply of an article, which may influence the price of the article, remain in the future as they are now. Morreau notes that Webster’s Dictionary (1983) clearly delivers this reading. It elucidates a cp-clause as expressing “other things being equal”, which in turn means “all other relevant things, factors, or elements remain unaltered.”7 In Morreau’s view, this reading of cp-clauses is pragmatic, for it creates a context for assessing a
nomologiclly significant relation stated by the cp-statement.
Morreau stresses that in this pragmatic reading, there is a clear sense in which there are “other things” and that they can be “equal”. In the example of gummi bears, “other things” refer to relevant
factors other than an increase of the supply which might affect the
price of gummi bears. Those relevant factors are “equal”, in the sense that “they are as they were beforehand”.8
Ideal Reading
In contrast to this pragmatic reading, a cp-clause has been used quite differently in other areas. In natural sciences, for example, a
cp-clause expresses the provision that certain relevant factors are absent. Take Newton’s second law of motion for instance. One of its
consequences can be stated as follows:
If a force acts on an object, then it will accelerate at a rate proportional to the magnitude of the force.
This statement would be false, however, if other interfering forces were present. A cp-clause can thus be attached to the statement to express the provision that certain interfering forces are not present:
7 See Morreau, 1999, p. 166. 8 Morreau, 1999, p. 167.
Ceteris paribus, If a force acts on an object, then it will accelerate at a rate proportional to the magnitude of the force.9
In this formulation, a cp-clause does not mean that there are “other things” which are “equal”. Rather, it means that there are other things (i.e., interfering forces) that are absent. Morreau agrees with Joseph’s (1980) observation that “ceteris absentibus” would be a better term to express the idea here. In this reading, what a cp-clause expresses is an ideal condition, in which certain factors have to be absent.
Morreau points out that such an ideal reading of cp is not limited to expressing the provision that other factors are absent. There exist cases where a cp-clause expresses the provision that other factors are present. Kripke’s (1982) discussion of semantic dispositionalism in the rule-following paradox provides a paradigmatic example. When answering the question about what fact it is about an individual person that may constitute her meaning one thing rather than another by a term such as “+”, semantic dispositionalists propose that the following counterfactual statement be true of the person:
If a person were given an addition problem involving m and n, then he would respond with their sum.
The problem with this counterfactual analysis of a semantic disposition is that it is clearly false. The reason is that an addition problem could involve numbers that are too large for any person equipped with limited mental capacities and time to calculate or even consider. Sophisticated dispositionalists try to cope with this problem by inserting a cp-clause to it,
Ceteris paribus, if a person were given an addition problem involving m and n, then he would respond with their sum.
and further flesh it out as follows:
…if my brain had been stuffed with sufficient extra matter to grasp large enough numbers, and if it were given enough capacity to perform such a large addition, and if my life (in a healthy state) were prolonged enough, then given an addition problem involving two large numbers, m and n, then he would respond with their sum.10
In this formulation of cp-clauses, certain factors relevant to a person’s mental and physical conditions are required to be present. Morreau echoes Joseph’s usage as mentioned above, in calling the use of cp-clauses here as “ceteris presentibus”. Again, no other factors are required to be “equal” in this case; only certain idealized conditions are required to be fulfilled, in order for a generalization statement to stand.
The difference between “ceteris absentibus” and “ceteris presentibus” seems only superficial. Both phrases express that certain ideal conditions are met. We may better appreciate this point by considering the case of Newton’s second law of motion discussed earlier. The use of “ceteris paribus” in stating this law is construed as
other things being absent, or more specifically, certain interfering
forces being absent. This provision is nonetheless tantamount to expressing that certain factors (ideal conditions) are present, e.g., the surface on which a force acts on an object is frictionless, the space in which this event takes place is in a vacuum, etc.11 What “ceteris
absentibus” really expresses turns out to be the same as the meaning of “ceteris presentibus”. Both phrases express the same provision
10 C.f. Kripke, 1982, p. 27; Morreau, 1999, p. 170. 11 See Morreau, 1999, p. 168.
that some ideal conditions are met. This is why Morreau construes both phrases by an ideal understanding.
Comparative Reading
The third, comparative reading of cp-clauses is illustrated by Morreau as follows. Consider the following statement:
If one boat is newer than another, it will be more expensive.12
The statement expresses a significant relation between the age of a boat and its price. However, it is evidently false, because a one-year old BMW boat may be more expensive than a brand new TOYOTA boat. To hedge the statement against this possibility, we again attach a cp-clause to it:
Ceteris paribus, if one boat is newer than another, it will be more expensive.
Morreau understands a cp-clause employed in this case as expressing the provision that “in other regards the two boats are about the same” (1999, p. 171). More specifically, in this construal of cp-clauses, regarding the relevant factors other than age that might influence the prices of boats, the two boats are comparable. Moreover, when those salient factors other than age are about the same, one boat is comparatively more expensive than another if the former is newer. Morreau calls this reading of cp-clauses a comparative interpretation.
In a nutshell, Morreau’s lexicographic study reveals three different readings of cp, according to which a cp-clause can be used to hedge a statement against three different possibilities: 1) changed circumstances, 2) circumstances that are not ideal, and 3) dissimilarity
or inequality with respect to other relevant factors. Morreau further suggests that the ideal reading provides a basic model to explicate the other two readings. The key is to construe both unaltered factors in a pragmatic reading and comparable factors in a comparative reading as relevant differences which are absent. My first objection to Morreau’s semantic analyses of cp-clauses illustrated above is that a comparative reading of cp is not clear as Morreau says it is. The reading can be clarified to express the following two different propositions:
a) Other relevant factors’ being “comparably equal” means although there may not be single feature or factor of those relevant ones other than age that is kept invariant (such as the color, brand, the place of construction, etc., of a boat), when all the relevant factors are given an overall consideration, they are found equal;
b) Each boat is equal with respect to every relevant factor. It is obvious that the way of comparing described in b) would render the application of a cp-law very restricted. For only a relatively small portion of boats would be equal in each of those factors other than age and can accordingly be allowed for comparison in terms of price. A cp-law under this understanding would be very limited and uninteresting. In contrast, the way of comparing illustrated in a) would render a cp-law to be more general and more interesting, for it allows other relevant factors to be crossly compared.
Having made the above clarification, my claim is that the more general understanding of comparative interpretations of cp as in a) is the more fundamental model on which an ideal interpretation of cp should be explicated. This can be illustrated by Sober’s version of Darwin’s principle of natural selection that Morreau also discusses:
If the organisms in a population that possess one characteristic (call if F) are better able to survive and reproduce than the organisms with the alternative characteristic (not-F) and if F and not-F are passed on from parent to offspring, then the proportion of individuals with characteristic F will increase.13
This principle, so stated, is clearly false, because the organisms in a population possessing F might not be better able to survive and reproduce, due to the possible occurrences of other evolutionary forces like gene mutations, migration, etc. Sober holds that a
cp-clause has to be added to protect this principle of natural selection,
and he understands a cp-clause as expressing some ideal condition to be met:
As in the Newtonian case, for a law’s prediction of the effect to hold true, what is required is not that all other forces be equal in magnitude, but that they be absent.14
In Morreau’s construal, Sober’s use of cp is an instance of an ideal interpretation. It expresses the provision that other relevant factors that might influence the survival and reproduction of organisms in a population are absent.
However, Morreau also points out, convincingly in my view, that a comparative interpretation of cp is better than an ideal interpretation in characterizing the function of a cp-clause. The main reason is that it is biologically impossible for evolutionary forces, such as mutation, to be absent. If a cp-clause is given an ideal interpretation, according to which these other evolutionary forces are absent, the principle of natural selection could never hold. A more reasonable and workable way to construe a cp-clause is hence this: a cp-clause expresses the provision that all those other
13 Morreau, 1999, p. 169; cf. Sober, 1984, p. 27.
evolutionary forces cancel each other out. That is to say, those relevant factors are present after all, but they are mutually comparable. Moreover, the total effects they bring about with respect to the survival and reproduction of organisms carrying F and non-F are the same. As Morreau sees it, a comparative interpretation is more advantageous than an ideal one in that
Darwin’s principle appears to have more empirical content under this comparative interpretation than under the earlier ideal one. (1999, p. 172; italic emphasis mine)
The superiority of comparative interpretations over ideal ones shows at least two things. First, Morreau obviously understands comparative interpretations of cp in the more general and interesting way as illustrated in a) some paragraphs back. For he regards other factors as comparable. Second, and more importantly, comparative interpretations of cp are conceptually more significant and plausible than ideal interpretations; the latter can be made (better) sense of relative to the former.
Morreau’s claim that an ideal interpretation is the more basic model on which the other two interpretations have to be characterized may be correct from a formal point of view, insofar as both comparative and pragmatic interpretations can be understood as expressing the common provision that relevant differences are absent, which is the core content expressed by a cp-clause in an ideal interpretation. This claim is, in my view, improper, and at best misguided. The reason is that an ideal interpretation of cp is likely a
bad interpretation of cp. No cp-laws are likely to exist given this
interpretation, since it is often physically or biologically impossible for ideal conditions to be fulfilled. It is thus unsuitable, or unnecessary, to hold that ideal interpretations are more basic than comparative interpretations, as Morreau suggests. Moreover, even
granting the legitimacy of ideal interpretations, they are clearly no more substantial in the contents they express and no more conceptually plausible compared to comparative interpretations. It is therefore misguided, or misleading, to view ideal interpretations as more basic than comparative interpretations.
III. Morrerau’s Solution to the Elliptical Problem
Having clarified Morreau’s semantic analyses of cp-clauses, we continue to address the issue of how much his three interpretations of cp have helped solve the elliptical problem.
Recall that this problem is that a statement containing a
cp-clause expresses an incomplete content. The phrase means “other
things being equal”, but what “other things” are and when they are “equal” are entirely unspecified. Is there progress being made in either one of the three readings of cp? We examine each in turn.
A pragmatic reading construes a cp-clause as expressing the provision that other relevant things remain unchanged in the future. This reading appears to be more specific in its content than the phrase “other things being equal”. But it still does not tell us what those “other things” are, and whether they remain unaltered in relevant circumstances. It would still be doubtful that a statement attached with such an obscure clause expresses any genuine law.
The same problem evidently also applies to a comparative reading of cp. It expresses the provision that “other things” are comparable and that the difference of the overall effect brought about by those things is absent. Again, this reading of cp appears to improve on the original “other things being equal” reading in clarifying its content. However, what the “other things” which are comparable are and whether the overall effect brought about by those factors is absent are again left unspecified. This renders a
An ideal interpretation fares no better. In this interpretation of cp, “other things” refer to certain factors and “being equal” means that those factors have to meet certain ideal conditions. Again, what those factors are which have to meet ideal conditions remain obscure and unspecified. What is worse is that the ideal conditions to be met by the relevant factors are normally impossible to be fulfilled. As a result, under this reading, a cp-law statement is not only elusive in content, but it simply could not be true.
In short, each of the three readings of cp has made some progress in clarifying what the “other things being equal” phrase means. Nevertheless, the progress each reading has made is very limited. If what other things are is vague and when those other things are equal is unclear, the specifications of what the factors are and whether those factors, whatever they are, meet the conditions mentioned in each of the three readings remain equally imprecise. The basic difficulty that besets the use of the original phrase persists. IV. Morreau’s Solution to the Contrary Generalizations Problem
Morreau’s further claim is that the contrary generalizations problem can also be resolved in each of the three readings of cp. Recall that this problem is that two contrary cp-generalization statements can both be true, due to the vacuity of cp. Morreau maintains that each of the three interpretations of cp is able to bestow a clear content to cp, and thus that the contrary generalizations problem can be solved. Given what has been shown in the last section, the prospects for Morreau’s claim to hold are dim, as I shall argue below.
Morreau’s basic idea for solving the contrary generalizations problems is to offer a sound epistemic ground on which we can choose between the pair of contrary general cp-statements. Morreau begins with a pragmatic interpretation. He considers the following pair of cp-statements, which we have discussed earlier:
Ceteris paribus, an increase in the supply of an article will cause its price to fall.
Ceteris paribus, an increase in the supply of an article will cause its price to rise.15
In Morreau’s view, these two statements are too general to be determined for their truths. They have to be instantiated by concrete instances, for which relevant inductive evidence can be collected in support of the choice between them. We may then consider the following pair of contrary instantiated cp-statements:
Ceteris paribus, this increase in the supply of gummi bears will cause their price to fall.
Ceteris paribus, this increase in the supply of gummi bears will cause their price to rise.16
Morreau supposes that, under a pragmatic reading of cp, all the factors other than an increase of the supply that might influence the price of gummi bears remain unaltered throughout an increase in the supply of gummi bears. Morreau maintains that we can then observe one salient thing about gummi bears, namely, their prices. If the prices fall, the correct generalization statement to choose is the first one. If the prices rise, the second one is to be accepted.
This does not work, however. Morreau assumes that the content of an instantiated cp-statement can be contextually determined. He further supposes that the provision expressed by the
cp-clause in this statement is actually satisfied. Based on these two
assumptions, we can decide which one of the two contrary instantiated cp-statements is correct. The problem is, however, that the cp-clause is not clearly fleshed out. In Morreau’s story, a
15 Morreau, 1999, p. 174. 16 Morreau, 1999, p. 175.
pragmatic reading of cp does not specify what “other factors” are. This results in the unfortunate fact that we do not know where to look to check if relevant factors are kept invariant throughout an increase of the supply of gummi bears. In other words, we cannot be sure whether “other factors” remain unaltered. Consequently, even if one of the two contrary instantiated cp-statements is inductively supported, it cannot be guaranteed that it is correct.
Faced with this difficulty, Morreau might retreat to a general
cp-statement and claim that what we have knowledge of is such a
general cp-statement. We then rely on the specification of its particular instances for clarity. This move would not work, either. For such a general cp-statement still expresses a vague proposition, and is of no use.
Morreau adopts the same strategy to handle the contrary generalizations problem under ideal and comparative readings of
cp.17 If the above criticisms are effective against Morreau’s proposal,
they will be equally applicable to his solutions based on the other two readings of cp. Take a comparative reading of cp for illustration. The underlying trouble is this. The confirmation by inductive support of either one of the contrary generations when instantiated is possible only when the assumption holds, namely that the effects brought about by relevant factors other than the one causing the price of gummi bears to fall (or to rise) are comparable and canceling each other out. Making sure that the assumption in question does hold is thus crucial to resolving the contrary generalizations problem. How then do we know whether the assumption obtains? It is necessary that the relevant factors be specified, so that each of them can be inspected and the total effect brought about by them can be measured and compared. This, however, cannot be done. For in Morreau’s proposed comparative reading of cp, no specification of
what the relevant factors are is offered. Hence, even if it were observed that the price of gummi bears falls while the supply increases, the generalization “Ceteris paribus, this increase in the supply of gummi bears will cause their price to fall” would not be inductively confirmed.
Using the same epistemic methodology, Morreau attempts to solve the further puzzle that the following cp-statement expresses a spurious law:
Ceteris paribus, tossing a fair coin will cause it to land heads.18
The puzzle is that, due to the vacuity of cp, the otherwise false statement could turn out trivially true. Morreau tries to solve this puzzle by claiming that this cp-statement is simply unbelievable. For given what we already believe about tossing a coin, we cannot accept it. More specifically, undertaking an inductive procedure will, in the long run, determine that neither this cp-statement nor its contrary is acceptable (or believable), since the choice of them will be random.
Morreau’s idea seems to be that there is no need to spell out the content of the cp-clause as it is contained in this coin-tossing statement, in order to determine that the statement expresses a spurious law. The inductive support which the statement receives will settle the issue. However, I do not think that merely relying on this epistemic method is sufficient to do the trick. We have to have some idea about what factors could influence the results of a coin’s landing heads or tails in each particular tossing. In other words, to determine the legitimacy status of a cp-statement describing coin tossing along the lines suggested by Morreau, a more specific semantic analysis of cp is necessary: more has to be said about what relevant factors are, and whether their effects on coin tossing are
18 Morreau, 1999, p. 176. This puzzle is raised and discussed by
kept either unchanged, absent, or comparably the same. Failing to do this, Morreau cannot be said to having solved the puzzle about coin tossing statements that employ cp-clauses.
V. Non-Semantic Analyses of CP
So far, I have argued that Morreau’s semantic analyses of
cp-laws through a lexicographic study do not solve the major
problems surrounding the use of cp in the sciences. Although Morreau’s work does clarify what a cp-clause may have implicitly meant in different areas of scientific disciplines, none of his three interpretations of cp has an advantage over the original “other things being equal” reading of cp with regard to solving the elliptical and contrary generalizations problems. To overcome this shortcoming, it is required that a list of relevant factors be fleshed out which could causally interfere with the factors mentioned in a cp-law statement. But since those factors are obviously open-ended and innumerous, a competent list of the factors is evidently extremely hard, if not impossible, to come by. These difficulties appear to render a Morreau-style semantic approach hopeless.
We have much to benefit from the failure of Morreau’s attempt, though. Morreau has done an impressive job of giving a comprehensive survey of some of the most plausible semantic readings of cp-clauses. If all this effort does not do the trick, some alternative approach is needed. A non-semantic treatment of cp naturally suggests itself. One way in which this alternative approach can be implemented is that a cp-clause is not viewed as itself contributing a semantic content to a statement in which it occurs. Put differently, it is wrong to think that a statement containing a
cp-clause does not express a complete proposition unless the meaning
of the cp-phrase occurring in the statement is independently specified or clarified. Some theorists have offered intriguing proposals to show how the idea of a non-semantic treatment of cp is cashed out.
Lipton (1999), for example, suggests that a cp-law statement actually refers to an underlying disposition, and the underlying disposition is capable of manifesting itself in some form of regular behaviors under various conditions. Nickel (manuscript) maintains that a cp-law statement is a disguised generic sentence of the form “As are Bs” common in our ordinary language, where a generic sentence expresses an exceptions-tolerating generalization having to do with the notion of natural kinds. Woodward (2002) takes a more radical route, where the view that a genuine science must contain “laws” and law-statements must describe exception-less regularities is rejected. On this position, the projects of analyzing the meaning of
cp-law statements and of defending the status of cp-laws are simply
founded on a false framework and wrong assumptions. Hence, any analysis of cp, semantic or otherwise, is redundant and futile.
The non-semantic accounts of cp mentioned above have much to recommend. Note, however, that these non-semantic treatments of an isolated cp-clause are intimately related to how the theorists construe the metaphysics of dispositions, natural kinds, or laws. Given the divergent metaphysical outlooks of these positions, no fair assessment of these proposals is forthcoming unless the metaphysical stance of each position is examined—a task beyond the scope of this paper.
Nonetheless, I shall point out that there is a different way to implement the alternative approach in which a cp-clause receives a non-semantic analysis. On this view, a cp-clause is attached to a law statement with the purpose of signaling to the readers that caution is required in the understanding, processing, and transferring of the law-statement. More specifically, in recognition of the fact that the world is extremely complicated and causally interrelated, theorists explicitly use cp-phrases to bring readers’ attention to the possibilities that the law statements they offer in the hope of explaining and predicting certain phenomena in the world might not
hold in some of the cases. By inserting a cp-clause into a law statement, a scientist can also convey a sense of vigilance and responsibility to the readers or listeners. These inter-subjectively available messages sent by the explicit use of a cp-clause could eventually lead to professional self-protection for a scientific practitioner. In this picture, the use of a cp-clause has an important pragmatic role to play in the practice of sciences. This pragmatic aspect of the use of cp is unfortunately ignored in the recent discussions of what cp-clauses may mean.
This pragmatic view of cp has an advantage over theories such as those offered by Lipton, Nickel or Woodward: the former does justice, while the latter do not, to our pre-theoretical intuition that a
cp-phrase, as a linguistic item used in a scientific context, must mean
something or serve a certain function. Morreau has tried to respect this pre-theoretical intuition and has something informative to offer in its attempt. However, he is on the wrong track in searching for a more complete answer. In my view, only by directing our attention to the function and effect of the use of cp-clauses in a scientific practice can we suitably address the question of why “cp” is there at all and the role in plays in the sciences.
Given that a cp-phrase is viewed as an explicit linguistic tool whose “content” is characterized by its pragmatic role, a cp-law statement and a law statement differ only in that the former contains an extra marker while the latter does not. Given that an extra marker is construed pragmatically, the originally urgent elliptical problem of answering what content such a marker contains can simply be bypassed. Moreover, the proposal on offer would render the status of a cp-law similar to that of a law, given the pragmatic role of a cp-phrase. This consequence would be consistent with the observation made by some theorists that not only do cp-laws in special sciences face counter-instances, laws in basic sciences have exceptions as well, and hence that laws in basic sciences and cp-laws
in special sciences are on a par.19 The contrary generalization
problem is then not a specific problem for cp-laws of special sciences, but a general problem of confirming laws in the sciences. Some may protest that the metaphysical nature of cp-laws and laws is left untouched in this treatment of cp. But this could be seen as another advantage of this proposal: it makes no commitment about the ontology of laws, and because of that, it is compatible with different theories of laws.
In short, I suggest that treating a cp-clause pragmatically is more promising to capture the role it plays in the scientific practice. A more thorough discussion of the remaining issues goes beyond the scope of this paper, and has to wait for another occasion.
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