Politicians’ Perceptions of Populism and the Media: A Cross-National Study Based on Semi-Structured Interviews

Routledge Studies in Media, Communication,

and Politics

Digitizing Democracy \

Edited by Aljosha Karim Schapals, Axel Bruns, a'nd Brian McNair Communicating Populism

Comparing Actor Perceptions, Media Coverage, and Effects on Citizens in Europe

Edited by Carsten Reinemann, James Stanyer, Toril Aalberg, Frank Esser, and Claes H. de Vreese

Communicating Populism

Comparing Actor Perceptions,

Media Coverage, and Effects

on Citizens in Europe

Edited by Carsten Reinemann,

James Stanyer, Toril Aalberg,

Frank Esser, and Claes H. de Vreese

I~ ~~o~J~~n~~;up

NEW YORK AND LONDON

First published 2019 by Routledge

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Contents

List af Figures List af Tables Acknawledgments

1 Introduction: Comprehending and Investigating Populist Communication From a Compara tive Perspective CARSTEN REINEMANN, ]AMES STANYER, TORIL AALBERG, FRANK ESSER, AND CLAES H. DE VREESE

PARTI

Populism and Communicators

2 Perceptions of Populism and the Media: A Qualitative Comparative Approach to Studying the Views of Journalists and Politicians

SUSANA SALGADO AND JAMES STANYER

3 Journalists' Perceptions of Populism and the Media: A Cross-National Study Based on Semi-Structured Interviews

]AMES STANYER, SUSANA SALGADO, GIULIANO BOBBA, GERGO HA]ZER, DAVID NICOLAS HOPMANN, NICOLAS HUBÉ, NORBERT MERKOVITY, GOKAY OZERIM, STYLIANOS

PAPATHANASSOPOULOS, KAREN B. SANDERS, DUSAN SPASO]EVIC, AND LENKA VOCHOCOVÁ

X Xli XlV 1

15

17 34

viii Contents

4 Politicians' Perceptions of Populism and the Media: A Cross-National Study Based on Semi-Structured Interviews

SUSANA SALGADO, JAMES STANYER, GERG6 HA]ZER, DAVID NICOLAS HOPMANN, BENTE KALSNES, GUIDO LEGNANTE, ARTUR LIPINSKI, NORBERT MERKOVITY, STYLIANOS PAPATHANASSOPOULOS, ANO KAREN B. SANDERS

PARTn

Populism in the Media

5 Dimensions, Speakers, and Targets: Basic Paúerns in European Media Reporting on Populism SINA BLASSNIG, PATRICIA RODI, KEREN TENENBOIM-WEINBLATT, KINGA ADAMCZEWSKA, LILIA RAYCHEVA, SVEN ENGESSER, ANO FRANK ESSER

6 Journalistic Culture, Editorial Mission, and News Logic: Explaining the Factors Behind the Use of Populism in European Media

PETER MAURER, NICOLAS HUBÉ, VÁCLAV STETKA, CRISTINA CREMONESI, ANTONELLA SEDDONE, SIGNE RINGDAL BERGAN, JAMES STANYER, MARIAN TOMOV, NAAMA WEISS,

SVEN ENGESSER, ANO FRANK ESSER

7 Event-, Politics-, and Audience-Driven News: A Comparison of Populism in European Media Coverage in 2016 and 2017

FRANK ESSE R, AGNIESZKA STç:PINSKA, ONDRE] PEKÁCEK, ANTONELLA SEDDONE, STYLIANOS PAPATHANASSOPOULOS, DOBRINKA PEICHEVA, ANA MILOJEVIC, SINA BLASSNIG, ANO SVEN ENGESSE R

PART III

Populism and Citizens

8 The Persuasiveness of Populist Communication: Conceptualizing the Effects and PoliticaI Consequences of PopuIist Communication From a Social Identity Perspective

MICHAEL HAMELEERS, CARSTEN REINEMANN, DESIRÉE SCHMUCK, ANO NAYLA FAWZI

51

69

71 102 123

141

143 Contents IX 9 Investigating the Effects of Populist Communication:

Design and Measurement of the Comparative Experimental Study

MICHAEL HAMELEERS, IOANNIS ANDREADIS, ANO CARSTEN REINEMANN

10 Cognitive Responses to Populist Communication: The Impact of PopuIist Message Elements on Blame Attribution and Stereotyping

NICOLETA CORBU, LINDA BOS, CHRISTIAN SCHEMER, ANNE SCHULZ, JÓRG MATTHES, CLAES H. DE VREESE, TORIL AALBERG, ANO JANE SUITER

11 AttitudinaI and BehavioraI Responses to Populist Communication: The Impact of PopuIist Message Elements on Populist Attitudes and Voting Intentions IOANNIS ANDREADIS, CRISTINA CREMONESI,

EVANGELIA KARTSOUNIDOU, DOMINIKA KASPROWICZ, ANO AGNIESZKA HESS

PARTIV

Conclusion

12 Adapting to the Different Shades of Populism: Key Findings and Implications for Media, Citizens, and Politics

CLAES H. DE VREESE, CARSTEN REINEMANN, JAMES STANYER, FRANK ESSER, ANO TORIL AALBERG

Appendix A: Compara tive Experiment: Stimuli for Ali Eight Conditions

Appendix B: Comparative Experiment: Background Characteristics of Respondents (Entire Sample vs. Cleaned Sample)

Appendix C: Comparative Experiment: Blame Perceptions (Overall Means by Country; 7-Point Scale)

Appendix D: Compara tive Experiment: Stereotypes (Overall Means by Country; 7-Point Scale) List of Contributors Index 168 183 207

233

235 253 261 264 266 268 271

50 James Stanyer et aI.

Van Dalen, A., & Van Aelst, P. (2014). The media as political agenda-setters:

Journalists' perceptions of media power in eight West European countries. West Eurapean Politics, 37(1), 42-64. doi:10.1080/01402382.2013.814967

Wettstein, M., Esser, F., Schulz, A., Wirz, D., & Wirth, W. (2018). News media as gatekeepers, critics and initiators of populist communication: How journalists in ten countries deal with the populist challenge. The International Journal af Pl'ess/Politics, 23(4),476-495. doi:10.117711940161218785979

( 1

4

Politicians' Perceptions of

Populism and the Media

A

Cross-National Study Based

on Semi-Structured Interviews

1

Susana Salgado, James Stanyer, Gergõ

Hajzer, David Nicolas Hopmann,

2

Bente Kalsnes, Guido Legnante,

Artur Lipinski, Norbert Merkovity,

Stylianos Papathanassopoulos, and

Karen B. Sanders

3

Introduction

Why is it importam to study politicians' perceptions of populism? The way in which something is regarded and understood is of the utmost importance for its impact on politics and society in general. Given the complexities in defining 'populism' and understanding its meaning, and in view of it being commonly referred to as a 'vague', 'slippery', 'elusive' concept (e.g., Canovan, 1981, 1984; Taggart, 2000; Barr, 2009; Lucardie, 2009; Woods, 2014), this study addresses the concept and its potential implications through the views of politicians who represent some of the most importam politicaI parties in 11 European countries and who are therefore important opinion-makers. The main objective is to discern what politicians from the various countries and different types of politi-cai parties understand by populism and how they perceive the causes and implications of these phenomena in their countries, and, more broadly, in European and global contexts.

Interviews were conducted with politicians from 11 European countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, ltaly, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Spain. The sample is therefore composed of countries representing different regions in Europe, including from Southeastern, Eastern, Central, Northern, and Southern Europe. The politicai parties were selected taking into account their overall electaral expression in their respective countries and their representativeness on the right-Ieft politicai spectrum. ln addition, populist and non-populist par-ties were included in alI countries, except Romania. The study therefore includes a varied sample of politicaI parties, including mainstream and fringe, center-Ieft and center-right, radical and/or extreme left and right, and populist and non-populist parties (for further information about the

52 Susana Salgado et aI.

research decisions and the methodological approach, see the chapter by Salgado and Stanyer in this volume).4

This chapter is divided into five main sections which correspond with the five main topics addressed in the interviews with politicians, namely:

'What do you understand by populism?', 'What are the consequences of populism?', 'What explains the p pularity of populist leaders and par-ties?', 'What social issues are mo t related to populism?', and 'What role do the media play in populism?'

What Do You Understand

by

Populism?

For several years, populism in Europe was a ~ynonym for far-right

par-ties and closely related to the issues of immigJ;ation, law and order, and

often also nationalism (see Mudde, 2004, 2007; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Rydgren, 2017). The Euro crisis and the emergence of success-fui social movements, which in some cases evolved into politicai parties

(e.g., Podemo Syriza), launched the discussion regarding what popu-lism mcan and what it is in Europe currently. The fact that Podemos,

for example, identifies itself as a populist party, is extremely interesting

(see Sanders, Molina, & Zoragastua, 2017), since often even commonly labeled populist parties avoid the denomination due to its negative con-notation in European politics.

ln th' study, we eek to leam more about what politician l'ecogl1iz

as popllli f i and how they pel'ceive thi phenomel1on today. Tbe sample

included a variety of counr.ries Erom differ nt European r gions and politi-cians representing various politicai parties with different politicai

orienta-tions, including populist and non-poplllist parties. Both the descriptions

and the examples given by politicians in the interviews were assessed to

see whether they had a clear view of what populism is and what it means,

and if they perceive it as something inherently negative, positive, or both,

depending on the contexto

Politicians from most of the countries inclllded in our sample stated that populi m had illultiple, ften contradiet ry, meaning (e.g.,

Bul-gari a, Denmark, Gree e Hungary Italy Orw, y Poland, Portugal, and Romania). The ambi uity

oE

th oncept, noteel by more rhan half of

the interviewees, clearly reflects the current use of the word to refer to different and often contradictory matters such as far-right ideology and nationalism, citizen participation, advocacy for the people,

Euroscepti-cism, demagogy, empty rhetoric, exploitation of emotions, and so on. AIso adding to the ambiguity is the fact that in the politicians' descrip-tions of populism there is also some propensity to label as populist aJl politicians and parties that have a more aggressive politicai strategy (e.g.,

openly confrontational with opponents, clearly aiming to convince

vot-ers at any cost), since they seem to be willing to do more than others to

gain popularity and achieve power, but when asked to provide examples,

Politicians' Perceptions of Populism 53

a Jarge majority

oE

poJiticians focu ed on the m t well-known cases of European P p~li m such as Marine Le Pen and the French ational

Fro

nt eer.t Wdders and

r~e

.

~aJ

-ty f

r

Freeelom, 01' Donald Trump in rhe US.lnterestmgly Greek polltlclan referred I.nainly tO xamples in TlJ[key,

Hungal'y a~l~ Poland, or

even

to

Angela

Merkel'

p

itiol1 ia relation to

th

Euro CfI I •

An o~erwhe.lming mai.0rit~ of t/lese poliricians perceive popllli m a

sornethmg malnly negaLlve, lOc1uding ali pulitician inrerviewed from

I30sllia and Herzegovina and Romania. ln mo r other cOllnrrie the

I'eslllt ,:el'e mixed ".'irh son~e politi ian rd rring to popllli m a being

predommantly negative whde orber tated that chey per ive ir to be mainly ~ositive. A third grou.p tended to shap· thi answer according to the peclfic example chey had in l11ind.

There i

no~ethele

a lear pattern to b noced in this particular as.pect

oi

che perceptlon of wha populi rn is and what ir entail . A x e ted in

general, polirician from pOlulist politicai partie hav mo tlyas iar d

pO~t~1i

m witll.a po Ítive thange in demoeraric polities and wirh p itive

politicai behavlOfs (e.g. Podemo in pain, FOl'za Italia and Lega ord in ltaly

th

~

HU;lgari~!1Jobbik

the a.tional Ren wal Par:ty in P rtugal and the DaOlsh I eople Party). They vlew citem elve a rhe true democl'ats

and rhe only one truly COI1 emed with th people and the people' inter-ests

a~ld

11 ed .

Howeve~ i

r is worrb n ting thar even for ome polirician

~rom p~pt~

l

i

t p litical parti populi m can be both negarive and p itive

ln erram mstan e. (e.g. Fide 7. in Hungary rhe Bulgarian Coaliti n

Patri-oti Front Syr.iza in reece M 5 in Iraly). Jntere tingly, in ome a e

LI b a tlte

on.~~gian

Progre Party rhe P !ish party L and Ju tice

ar the Greek polmeal parcy o!den DawJ1, which are widely considered and

r~cogllized

a P?pllli t, their politician haraeterized populism a

nc?aclve. The mo r Iakely explanation for tbis is tbat they d nor a cept belOg.labeled a poplIli t because society in general perc i e p puli m

n

egat

l

v~

l

y

and chey

~o

\lOt wanr to be as oeiated \Vith th e negative p~'~eptl,on and entlments' 01', another p ibility i that the)' want to di tlngUlsh and distance them elv from orher kn wo national 01' inter

-nacional popu!i t politicai parties and leader .

The definition of popll!i 111 provided by th se interviewces eonfirm thi .

Although O ca.

i

on~

lIy

politician irom mainstream pareies recognized tbat t.he centralaty t th people .i.n poplllist policies i rhe pidt f

democ-racy It elf (and therdore something that init elf ha to be con idered

p icive), anel

0r.n

e poJitician fmm populi t partie alludecl to dema ogy and to th exclu Jonary nature

f

many populist id ais (e.g. the invariable pre ente oí out-group who e eomposirion hang nevertheless accord -Ing to

iele~l?gy

)

as xpec.ted most politicial1 fl'Om mainstream parties

gave

~efil1ltJ

n of pOpU!1 m tbar presuppo ed negative perception of

~ pl

.

tlt.m,

.

a~cl

mo t politi.cians from populist parcies con id r d it

54 Susana Salgado et a!.

The most common themes in these politicians' definitions of what pop-ulism is and what it means were thus mainly related to negative percep-tions: deceitful rhetoric; demagogy; manipulation; deception; a strategy to gain power and win election . vaio promi e; implification o i .ues; misconceprion of reality· cxploitation of emotion llch as fe~r, anxlety, and resentm nt· aver ion [O mediatiou; and code words for racl m. Ab ve ali else, populi:m is perceived as a communication style and a politicai tyle based on opportuni f i and exploitati n of emotions to ga~n.power.

Ir i n c frequently a sociated with p i'fie i sue and wher It I (e.g., orway), the i sue is mainly immigration. A ivic Platform MP fr·.om Poland, for example linked populi m directly to the fear of terrOrlSITI and outsiders'.

The idea of populism as ideology as defined by, Canovan (2002), as a 'paliti ai app ai co the peopl 'and the 'ideology of democraey', is pre. ~nt

in the popuu r politicians' own perceptions of their approach to politlcs and i substanciat d in the following themes that are imultaneously posi -tive perceptions of populism: 'a form of politics ,focus:d on ~he people:s interests and concerns' (M5S); 'speak the people s case (Dalllsh People s Party)· caring abont the people s real problem Uobbik)· and 'hegem . ny

f

che people ( yriza). Politicians from oppo ite side. a~d ideol?~l , right and leie of che politicai pectrum gave these very sJnlllar denmtlOll of populismo Podemo elf-percepti n i slightly different; it appe~l·s ro be parti. ularly fo u ed on chang~ in ciety and technology. m~e l~ per

-ceives popllli m mainly a a 'rea tlon to pro e e of moderlllzatL n and

a form of popular mobilization. . .

As we can observe, there are no notable differences accordlOg to reglOn in perceptions of populism from this sample of politicians: There are no marked differences across regions in Europe, north and south, west and east. There is also no clear dividing line between right- and left-wing populism, at least in what constitutes the way in which these politicians perceive populism.

What Are the Consequences of Populism?

For the vast majority of politicians interviewed across countries and main-tream pareie', the effeet of populi m were negative. ~~wever, the~e were

me exceptions. Although m re rare, there were po Itlve perceptJons

of

the impact f popuU m on demo racy which ~ere lar~ely . al:hough not exclnsively, confined to representatives o.f popult t partle, Imdar tO what we have already noted regarding perception of popllli m. . . .

ln Hungary a politician belooging tO the rigbc-wing popllhsc pohcl-cal party in gov nunent Fide z con idered populi.sm not to ~ave c . ~

e-quence. ince ir wa , in hi view, a fearure embracmg

me

entlre P?~~lcal y tern.. 1 n particular, he de rib d it as an ef:fective tool for ali pohuclaos

Politicians' Perceptions of Populism 55 being

~hrown

into the fight of

~he

elections which is dev id f any effects on saC1et~. ln Denmark, a Dalllsh People s Party poliei ian noted that po _ ulisr partles were a

ch~~k

.

on ~Iected

eljtes.

!~:se

view were ai o appar

~t

fram a Lega Nor~ polItlclan m ltaly. polm lan of a center-right poptlli r party (Forza ltaha) also noted thae it may contribute to making known

unhear~

needs

o~

citizens. ln P rtugal the Na ti nal Renewal Part)' l'ep-resentatlve percelVed populJsm as putting rhe nation fust. ln Bulgaria a palitician from the party Citizens for EUfopean Development of Bulga;.ia claimed that neoliberalism is more dangerous than populismo And in Nor-way, the Progress Party provided a more nuanced view but one that was largely positive as well. There were no major differences between left- and right-wing populismo For example, in Spain a member of Podemos talked abour the positive effects of populism as putting the 'Iast ones in front of the first ones'.

The interviewees were also asked specifically about what kind of effects populism and populists have. A wide range of effects Were mentioned, both in a negative and positive contexto Although there were no clear patterns, concerns tended to focus around societal impacts; in fact, the most commonly mentioned were some possible social effects. Social crises seem to be common (at least in the countries in our sample) and therefore a range of social effects were mentioned in the interviews. This kind of cri i

~ke

n~any

differenr forms but a/l dire rly affect the gualiry of pC()-pies Ilfe: oClal cha and citizen hip in 'vi.rrual' realit}' anel jn a deficienr

demo

.

cr,a~)'

marked by the ver-simpliflcation of public debate (Greece);

?

l

anzatl~n

(PoJ.and)·

gen~ral

social divi ion and conrr ntatiOll re ulting m a negative context of dlscouragement and frustration (Spain);

dema-gog~

and treatment of people as inferior (Portugal) or idiots (Hungary); declme of the public debate (Greece, Spain); as well as marginalization of significant issues (Italy). ln Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria inter-viewees pointed to a possible growing intolerance among citizens' and a fracturing of societies.

Some respondents mentioned specific politicaI effects. Politicians from the populist parties included in the study attribute populism to the

~any

weaknesses of democracy, such as the malfunctioning or destrllc-tlOn of democratic institutions (Golden Dawn in Greece and Jobbik ln RUllgary respectively), irresponsible policies against the common good (Law and Justice in Poland), and inflated politicaI conflicts which render the formation of coalitians and governments a difficult process (Lega Nord in ltaly).

ln three Southern Enropean countries (Greece, Spain, and Portugal), the

rep~esentatlves

fram the left-wing parties (Syriza, PSOE, and PCP, respectlvely) seem to share a common perspective: They associate the undemocratic forces derived from populism with a tendency of the politi-cai sysrem to oversimplify issues, adversely affecting the public debate,

56 Susana Salgado et aI.

which is regarded harmful to democracy. But positive politicai effects were also mentioned in Poland: The perception of the positive aspect of populism is adopted by a left-wing politician (Demo rati Left Alliance) who considers populism to be a double-sided phenomenon, and its posi-tive si de lies in the fact that it can assist politicai systems in addressing policy issues and implementing policy plans which would otherwise be difficult to address and implemento

When the interviewees were asked to reflect on the consequences of

populism borh for their own countrie and dero cracies m r widely

a range of con cqucllces were menti n d for democ.ratic regime in

gen-eral and for their pecific countries. Q obvious pattem em rged amQng

those interviewed, but the consequences of populisln are widely regarded

by polirician as detrimenral t the effective funct'oning of democracy.

With some exceptions, it e m. to be a positi n that goe beyond politi

-cai orientarioll. me ce p ndents spoke ab ut the undermining of rhc

entire democratic process (the Greek politician from Golden Dawn, for

example, cxplicitly 'tated chat democracy j not working dlle t

popu-lism). Other rai ed the specter of incre a ed polarization and conflicc

across democra ie . some mentioned declining faith in d mo ra y and

trust in politics, while still others pointed to the perennial simplification of complex factors that affect alI states.

The consequences for specific countries were similar. Many mentioned social disorder and chaos and a wider fracturing of society as a risk to peace in extremis. Others noted increased polarization and a disillusion-ment with national politics and politicians. Some of those interviewed also mentioned the negative effects of populism on the economy and what this

might mean for democracy. But some pointed to positive consequences

for their countries, including greater inclusivity and politicai engagement.

ln addition, populism has, in some countries, led to a greater awareness

of

key

is ue uch a immigration which could n longer be ignored

by

politicai elit .

ln

Spain a P demo p litician con idered thar eh re had

been a re-politicization of society in luding a kind f rapprochcmcnt

of people with politicians, resulting in further involvement of citizens in poliei aI life a we!! a in politicians' obligarions to chink about program

and a pirarion more adapted to popular laims. ln Portugal the leader

of the exerem right-wing popllli t party P R ( ational Renewal Party),

argued that populism benefits national identity, social justice, national production, and security forces in the context of a democracy that requires corrections and repairs.

ln sum, the interviewees' perspectives do conform to the commonly

held expectation that populism has a negative impact on democracy; however, there are important exceptions in which populism is viewed as a response to ill-functioning institutions that brings the promise of revitalizing democracy.

Politicians' Perceptions or Populism 57

What Explains the Popularity

of

Populist Leaders

.

~

and Partles.

rhe politicians interviewed characterized a situation in which populists

have been more 01' less successful in describing problems in their national

context and proposing sollltions. This means that, in their view, disil-lusionment and disappointment with established parties and mainstream politicians, neglected voters, and real problems remaining unresolved are some of the most important reasons which explain why populists have been gaining electoral support in several European countries. While

estab-lished parties have failed to address significant issues such as immigration

and social issues in the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis in Europe, populist pareies and politicians have taken the opportunity to occupy the empty space.

Politicai actors, particularly those from Eastern European countries and

mainly from Hungary, maintain that the low levei

oE

education,

dictator-ship, and communist politicaI socialization have given leeway for populist politics and a popular demand for simple solutions. Disappointment with the establishment is not only directed towards national parties, but also towards European institutions such as the European Union: The more disappointed people are with mainstream national parties or the EU, rhe more vulnerable they appear to be to populismo

To solve these problems, populist politicaI actors are offering new

approaches to democratic politics and different models of government

to ~h.e .disappoi~ted people, according to our interviewees. ln Norway,

pOIItl.Clans descnbed populists as talented at describing and appealing to c.onflict, cr~ating div~ding lines to engage people based on their descrip-Hon of socIety, and Identifying 'the others' who are different from 'us'. They argue that populists will say anything the people want to hear and anything that is popular and engaging to them. The interviewees also

described ~opulists' adroit management of the complicated balancing act

between tnggenng fear and offering hope as one of the reasons for their

success: 'They know how to take advantage of the citizens' fears and

anxieties' (Italy, Portugal) and 'playing with the most intense emotions

and presenting themselves as saviours' (Bosnia and Herzegovina). . Personal characteristics were not mentioned frequently by the politi-clans to describe the reasons behind the popularity of populist leaders and parties. Charisma, which is often identified in the research literature (e.g., Weyland, 1999; Mény & Surel, 2002; Lubbers, Gijsberts, &

Scheep-ers, 2002? ~at:v.'ell, 2004· Albertaz.zi & McDonnell, 2008) as a t:ypical

chara~ten t!

oE

(successful) poplIlist leaders, was hardly mentioned in these Intcrvlews. ln fact, personal characteri tics were not mentioned ar

ali by the in~erviewees in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, Hungary,

Poland, Spam, and Portugal. When per anal characteristics were

58 Susana Salgado et ai.

trajts charisma, rhetoric, or networking

kiJl,

uch as

(iooks)

amiable handsome (Bulgaria)' attractive (Greece);

(charisma

)

charm (Bulgaria);

hari matic leader (Greece)·

(rhetoric)

attractive, but uperficial rhetori (Greece); communicate in a more lIndersrandable manner (Iraly); l e.ad-er fo ter people fear, people ' mOllthpiece and elite ar rhe same tllne (Ttaly); omml1nicate in a implified tabloid-style maoner (Norway)'

(ttet-working)

connected to both left-and right-wing voters (Italy).

With varying wei bt, four p litical factor ar mentioned in expl a-nation of the popula.rity of populist leader and partie . Wc can divide them according to issues European Dnioll (EU) relation " 'the estab-lished politicai y tem', and populists olutíons': Fir t, among

issues,

example include references to th ethruc division

6f

the country and the election y tem (Bosnia), mig 'ation and immigraeion (BlIlgaria orway) poveny (Bulgaria, Norway), and centralization ( orway), ali of which are pecifically mentioned by mo t of th interviewee in t}lese countries. econdly along those ame line

EU relatioJls

are repeatedly voiced as troubling either because of the orthl outh deavage in the EU (ltaly), EU and ATO relatiol1s (Bulgaria) oe that the EU m de of functioning ha di torted deJUocracy (P rtugal). Thirdly critici m

f

the established

politicaI

system

weighs in a a major politicai factor to explain. che popu-larity of populí t ; factor include di appointment with majnstream par-ties or the politicai

y

tem (Portugal,reece, ltaly, pain); established pareies have failed tO di cuss significant i sues ( Ol'way, Poland); lack of ref rms (Spain); incapacity to fully implement poli ie (Gree e); ablle of p wer and corruption ( pain Italy)' and that p lítical socialization (as a communi t country) ha discouraged criticai debate (Hungary). Fourth and la dy, popl-tlists solu.tiol1S are m ntioned as au importam factor.

ln

thi r gard, incerviewee argued thar populi ts are addr ssing i su of cancero

f

l' many peopl.e (Italy, rway), a well as reaching out to those neglected by ather partie (oJ'way). evertheles, it wa ai o men.tioned that populists are making unreali tic electoral promise (Romania, Portu-gal) and that they are destroying past con en tiS on whi h the tatu quo was based (Greece).

Social and economic causes were also mentioned by these interview-ees a potencial explanatory factor for the success of populist actors. Although there are difference iu th empha is placed on specific aspect of economic hard hip its impact on ocial grievances i reflected in most interviews, with the exception of the Northern European countries included in our sample. Tbe tronge t tatemenr are provided by Bo nian and Romanian politicians, who spoke abour p verty and unemployment as the major o ial force driving support for populi m. Ali the Bll.lgarian politi ian argued that popuü m i linked to poverty which permeate

ocio-political i ues. Alo, in Poland, eial welfare is ue' and unequal redistribution of the effects of economic modernization were noted as important factors.

Politicians' Perceptions of Populism 59 Many Southern European countries' interviewees linked sorne of the causes behind the success of populism to the economic crisis. The rise of popuUsr partie wa explained by the un,employment and fear of becom-ing peripheral (Italy), the economi cri i and inability of the in titutional structLU'e to deal with it (Spain) economic insecw'ity and social uncer-taiJlty (Greec ), and oVeI'all ocial dissati faction and economic hardship (Portugal). Greek poUricians even .referred to real problem faced by the population as the genuine rea on b hind the succ s of populi m.

Additi nally ame of the politicians incerviewed, maillly f1' m Hungary an.d Romania, have ai a related economic hard hip and poverty tO the low levei

oi

edu ation al110ng ection of the electorate, wbjçh makes some people uncritical and more prone to believe in this type of electoral

promise. Other politicians placed more emphasis on country-specific

eth-nic problems, for example, stigmatization and scapegoating of various minorities, i.e., Roma people ar immigrams, as a tool for building politi -cai capital (Romania), or specific, long-la ting inter-ethnic conflict (Bo n.ia and Herzegovina).

The role of mainstream and social media as a factor io the popularity of populist actors was I1Jentioned in several countries. The imerviewees des ribed difierem siruations. On the one hand news media actively

engag in populism in their new coverage through the u e of populi r trategies: for example, ome poLitician (e.g., HlIogary, orway, Por-tugal) referced to appealing ritle and tabloid implicirya importam facrors facilitating rh popularity of populi m wbile implined dichoto-mizations and the over-personalization of politicai leaders were men-tioned by interviewees from 1taly and Romania. On the other hand, the cases in which news media simply cover populist politicai actors were also mentioned. A Spanish politician assessed this as a failure of the media system, but it was also cOllsidered both a structuraI, inadvertent effect of news values, as well as a consequence of commercialization and an attempt to garner mOre alldien,ce attention by overing the most spectacular a pect of party poliric (Norway Portugal). Or, simply, it wa a a result of ucces fuI po.litical commllni ation strategie by skill-fui p jiticians (Portugal).

Some of these politicians have also emphasized the deliberate decision of specific news outlet tO openly upport populist politicaI actor uch as the

~olish

pl1blic media. The Hllngarian politician member of

J~bbik

recogruzed the weight of politicaI control over rhe m dia which coerces journali r into pr moting th idesz agenda, rhus providing Fidesz witb extr.a sali~nce and medi.a vjsibi.lity. A simllar sirllation was reporred by the mtervlewees Irom Bulgaria where the politicization

oi

new media i an issue (Raycheva & Peicheva, 2017).

. Finally, the role of social media in amplifying populi m wa also empha-slzed (e.g., Gl'eece, Portugal, pain, Poland). Becall e oeial media allows for direct communicatiol1 withou[ barriers and in bypa sing gateke p rs

60 Susana Salgado et ai.

it contributes to augmentation of the visibility and, in some cases, the appeal of populists.

Although other more specific and country-related factors were also mentioned by these politicians (such as, for example, the efficient organi-zation of populist parties (Spain) 01' the religious slogans used by populist politicians to attract support in the most traditional sectors of society (Romania)), they have clearly highlighted the effects of economic and politicai representation crises, as well as of communication and media factors, as causes explaining the success of populist actors.

,

What Social Issues Are Most Related to

Populis~?

ln and of itself, populism does not need to be tied to ~pecific social issues in the politicai debate. That is, by defining a politicai actor as populist, one has not implicitly defined which social issues that politicai actor primarily campaigns on. Populist politicians often argue that they address popular grievances and opinions that are supposedly ignored by governments, traditional parties, and mainstream media in order to show that they are on the side of the people (Canovan, 1999, p. 2). Often politicians will not define the people, but the appeal to 'the people' will be demonstrated in their campaign, to show how they would defend them from outsiders 01' economic downturns (see, e.g., Csigó & Merkovity, 2017; Stanyer, Salgado, & Strõmbiick, 2017; see also the introduction to this volume).

Yet, some social issues may be more suitable to populistic politicai campaigning than others. First, immigration as an issue in public debate is often tied to anti-globalization policies where the main goal of the politicians is to defend 'national' or 'traditional' values. When this topic is used, the 'us' and 'them' politicai rhetoric becomes evident. Moreover, the issue is often linked to economic questions because (im)migrants are seen as a problem and politicai discourse often turns into debate about immigrants exploiting the welfare system and committing crime (Rydgren, 2004, pp. 485-486; Wodak, 2015, pp. 46-69).

Another important issue linked to populism is the economy itself. Recently, we have seen major economic upheaval in the Western world, e.g., the financial crisis beginning in 2007-2008, which was followed by the Euro crisis. During these crises, politicians were often faced with the dilemma caused by a clash between long-term economic interests and short-term benefits. Previous research has argued that populist politicai actors ignore this dilemma by focusing on short-term benefits (Gál, 2011, p. 159). Crises and economic uncertainty are considered important rea-sons behind the emergence and success of some forms of populism (e.g., Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; Salgado & Stavrakakis, 2018).

We therefore expected populist politicians, in particular, to focus mainly on immigration and the economy. To examine this expectation, politicians were asked the following question: 'Which social issues are

Politicians' Perceptions of Populism 61 most related to populism in your country?'. ln line with our expecta-tions, the economy-including poverty, social-economic inequality, and corruption-wa mentioncd frequenrly by politicians in the majority of the ampled countries (including Bulgaria, Denmark reece, Hungary, Italy orway Poland, Portugal, R mania, and pain). AI o in line with Qur expecration, (im)migration and ethJJic differen e. w re freql1emly mentioned acro s numerous countries (includjng Bo rua and Herzegovina, Dennlark, Gr cee, Hungary, Italy, Norway Poland, and Portugal). Ofren the immigration debate is linked to a debate about the European Union, which wa mentioned by Bulgarian, Danish, and Polish politicians. Less fren, welfare i . ues such as childcare or healthcare were mentioned by rhe . politician .

Immigration and the economy are international topics that could origi-nate from the so-called European (im)mi rarion crisis of 2015 or the financial crisis beginning in 2007-2008. Yet, it is important not to over-look substantial differences across countries and their historical roots. For instance, Hungary was one of the countries most severely affected by the migration crisis (see, for example Thorpe, 2017). This circumstance was exploited by populist parties, namely by Fidesz and partly by Jobbik. Yet th !-Juogarian media outlets were alxeady divided long before rhe migra -tion cri i with one. ection of the media pl'oviding a platfo.rm for popu.list sty/ccomn1lllli ation (incJuding 011 topie related to imn)jgration), and the other section split between adapting to a populist and simplified debate or a criticai approach, but in the latter case likely facing consequences (e.g., refusal of interviews 01' rejection of factual information on certain issues). The Hungarian interviewee cmphasized chat Fide z wa partly re ponsible for the previously mentioncd media environnl,ent (simpl ifiea-tion, lack of eritiei m in maio tream media etc.) because the el ctorate were resonating positiveJy with anti-immigrant messages, which served Fidesz's aim to be re-elected.

Ti mention other exampl.e immi ration has been disCll ed in populi t

term fox evel'aJ decades in Deumark (Bachler &H pmann,201.7). ince at l.ea r th late 19905, immi >rati n ha beeo one of the major p liti ai j sues in Danish polities learly linked to the ri e of the Dani h People's Parry foullded in

995

but ai driven by a number

f

individual puo -dir who were given aee to oew papers op-ed page . Immigxation bas emerged as thc mo t d ei iv i sue in Dani. h el.ection ampaigns since at lea [2001, yer we h ve not witoe ed a polarization of rhe Dani b media land ape 01' of pl1blic opinion a we have in Hllngary. ln B oia ancl F:1erzegovina the politicai debate i le c ncerned with reeem migra -ti n but more with the Ol1teomes of eh

1995

Dayton Agreel1l,em anel ir power-sharing acro the ulturally and r ligiou ly diver e populatioll

oC

Bosnia and H rzegovi_na.

L.a0king in more detail at the politicians' answers to our study, two notlCeable results emer e. First, the answers provided by the políticians

62 Susana Salgado et aI.

did not reveal systematic differences between populist and non-populist actors within the analyzed countries. That is, both the group of politi-cians typically described as non-populist and those considered populist stated that populist politicai communication is mainly concerned with immigration or the economy. Second, in response to the question about what are the drivers of the populist politicai debate, the vast majority of politicians across countries see these issues as a cause for populism. That is, the reasoning appears to be that certain issues on the politicai agenda, such as immigration, for example, clearly call for a populist politicai style. A reverse reasoning, arguing that it is populist actors who promote issues such as immigration because they accord with a populist style of com-munication, did not receive support from those interviewed.

ln short, across the sampled countries, issues rela.ting to the economy (crises and economic uncertainty) and migration were most often per-ceived to be related to populism. Moreover, the politicians argued that these issues cal! for a populist style, rather than arguing that certain issues are promoted if they lend themselves more to a populist style of politicai communication.

What Role Do the Media Play in Populism?

As well as exploring politicians' perceptions of politicai populism, we were also seeking to understand whether politicians believed that popu-Iism extends beyond the politicai realm and is considered to be a feature of their country's media environment. ln particular, we wished to exam-ine whether politicians view media outlets themselves as being populist and whether media outlets in their country are supportive, or criticai of, populist actors. ln examining their responses, we sought to identify commonalities and differences in views related to politicians' place on the politicai spectrum and whether they were in government or in opposition.

Politicians were questioned on their views regarding whether or not leading media outlets were supportive or criticaI of populism, and if they consider that media outlets themselves behave in a populist manner. Their responses enabled us to understand further details about politicians' perceptions of the relationship between the media and populist politi-cians, namely, whether populist politicai actors are in fact covered by the media; whether they believe that the dominant perspective, if there is one, is primarily criticai or supportive of politicai actors in either leading and/or populist media, and the reasons they consider this to be so; and, finally, whether they consider that leading media cover populist actors in a populist way.

Most politicians in most countries reported that populist politicai actors are indeed covered by the media, with the exception of Bulgaria, where only one centrist opposition politician thought that this was not the

case. Asked whether the dominant perspective of this coverage by leading

Politicions Pel'ceptíons

of Populisl11 63

media outlets was criticaI the majority of po.liticians from B nia, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, and half of the Bulgarjan intervi wee considered ir to be llncritical. However, in orne case, even if th cov rage

was considered t be uncritical, it wa ugge ted that ic unintentionally

works in favor of the populi t agenda becau e of its over-simplified and en ational character, aimed ar attracting higher ratings. A variery of rea-son were offered for the media's uncrirical stance, inclllding e onomkally weak media (Bosma) a dy funccional media ystem (Hungary), rhe align-rnent of the media' new value witb p pulis! commllnicati 11 (Poland),

and p litical in crllm ntalization (Bosnia). M t p lirician hom Den-mark, Icaly, Poland, Spain, P reugal, and orway, and half of the Bulgar-ian interviewees, con idered the media to be generally criticai of popuLists. Politician Í1'om Iraly anel Spain ar ued tbar a criticaI per pective wa conoected to th capacity of the media to be objective and independent.

Mediain Bo nia, Greec Hungary, P land and R mania wece con-sidered by politicians

Eram

the e countries to be upportive of po uli t

poliei ai act r . Two main rcasol1 wexe given by tbe interviewee for

media upport. Th fi1' c wa a form of dependency on the politicaI phere

derived Erom either financial 01' ideol gical factors. This reason wa empha ized by politicians from more rhan balf of the countries illcluded in om research (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria reece, Hungary, Iraly, Poland, and Portugal). The ther main reasoo offered for media supporr, indirect 01' otherwisc, of populi t politicai actor wa related to the form, style, and narra tive ad pted by media utlets so thac a cord-ing to a Portugue e politi ian, 'p pulist p litical atol' make ood front pa es and headlines that eU and, according tO a Norwegi.an politician, popnli ts

fit

so well imo what is the media s parameters' 01' as one Greek politician stated 'moderation does not sell'.

Among rhe ba ic charact ristic f media coverage noted by many

inter-viewee i an emphasi on hort catchy di kbait-type headlines, coo mllch

focu 00 trategy and per onalities and tOO lirtle on ub tantive politi (Bo aia and Herzegovina, Denmark, Poland and Portugal). Accordjng tO

a Polish politi ian che media provide a implified vision of reality llSing langllage which bolsters populism-a view also shared by politicians from Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria, HLU1gary, Italy, and orway. P litician

Irom Italy were particularly criticai of wbac they thought t b superfi ial and pool'-qualjey media new coverage. 1edia upport for popllli t actors

wa ai o attributed to the competi tive pre ure being brouglu to bear on traditional new outlets by an inc1'ea in Iy fragmented media landscape

and fierce compctition for audience hare ( ree e).

Policician were also expLicitly a ked wherher they beli ved che media in

tbeir country co be populist, 01' whether main tl'eam media covered event in a populist way and if so which. A nUll1ber of incerviewee named media outlets chey believe to be populist including politician from Bosnia and Herzegovina Denmark Greece, Hungary Italy Norway Poland, Portugal

64 Susana Salgado et aI.

Romania and Spain. ln rhe ca e of Greece only the repr entative of the two populi t parties considered this to be the a. e. Thi wa ai . t(ue of pain. M t f the media named are in privare hand . ho~ ... ever. 10 o.n~e

ca (Bo rua and Herzegovina, Hungary and Poland) publlc erVl e medIa

were also rh u ht to have ad pted a populi t t}r1e. Every Huo arian politi -cian on idered the cOllntry' leading media to be poplllist in Illding dle

publi servic broael a 'ter which they ele ribed a gov rnment media. Mo t poütician Irom Bulgaria anel Spain, on the other hal1~. reported th~t they did not believe that there are p puli t media or thar malll tream media

c ver i ue in a populist manner. However: a panish politi ian rated thar the media ar 'unwittingly playing the populi ts' game by over-simplifying the p litical c nversati n (I r a different approach on lactors that promote popuLi

m

in the media, ee Mamer et a\. in rhi volum ).

Om findings I ad t the foll wing conclu i ns. Politi ian from aero Europe, in governmenr or in oppoition and from almo t ev ry

ideologi-ai tripe regard the media as increa iogly adopting, or having al:e~dy ad pred, new value which are populi t-underst od a over-sll11pllfymg an I nsationalizing coverage-and therefore contribute to populi r poh-tics. Politicians identified with some populist parties, however, do not

ac ept this under tanding of populi ·111. ln Spaio and Portugal, for exam-pie politicians identified with p puli 111 from widely diverse ideologkal

Iamilies (left-wing in the formeI" a e aod right-wing in the latter) argue

that mainstream media reject populism and that this is a cause for regret. They argue that truly populist media are of the people. ln general, how-ever, politicians are concerned that populist-in a negative sense-news

coverage is intensifying, while criticai and high-quality politicai coverage, understood as objective and independent reporting, is decreasing.

There is also widespread concern in countries as varied as Denmark and

Hun ary that th m dia are either insufficiently criticai, utter1y uncritical,

or supportiv of populi ta torso A Danish liberal-right counterpart tated that she considcrs the media to b 'supportive to such an exrent that I become furious about it'. Politicians from former communist countries (Bosnia and H rzegovina Hungary, and Poland) attribute this uncrirical and/or supporti e tane to the politi ai instrumentalization of the media and clickbait approach to politi , while poliri ians Erom Northern and

Southern European countries (Denmark, Norway, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) attribute it more to a tabloid approa h to politics. However, the outcome is, in their view, similar: reinf rcement of the populist agenda with the attendant problematic implications for liberal democracy.

Conclusion

A first noteworthy conclusion is that, although the sample inc!udes coun-tries from different parts of Europe with different experiences of populist politics and varying amounts of eJectoraJ success, as well as different types

Politicians' Perceptions of Populism 65

of populism, there are no clear di cernible patterns in these European regions regarding how politicians perceive populism, its consequences, and explanatory reasons, as weU as the role of the media in spreading or

containing populism. There seems to be some general consensus, however, regarding the issues that are most related to populist approaches to poli-tics in Europe, namely immigration and economic hardship, which are in tum Iinked more recently to the migration crisis and the financial and economic crises (see ais o the introduction to this volume).

From among the various results obtained through this study based on interviews, it is interesting to note thar charisma is not considered

an important component of populism in Europe. Extant Jiterature often relates charisma with crises, presenting the larter as opportunities for charismatic leaders to engage in simple, emotional, politicai communica-tion that exploits peoples' anxiety and fears and offers straightforward, uncomplicated solutions to problems (e.g., EatweU, 2004). Regardless, at least as politicians across these different regions in Europe perceive it, the spread of populism in Europe is not Iinked to the politicians' personal characteristics, and particularly not to charisma.

These politicians have ,mainJy pointed to the malfunctioning and even failure of estabJished democratic institutions, inc!uding mainstream politi-cai parties, in addressing problems and in producing convincing discourse

and solutions as one of the main reasons behind the development of popu-lism in Europe. AIternative politicai proposaIs then have a fertile ground upon which to grow and capitalize on existing crises. ln fact, our sample of interviewees referred to the migration crisis and the Euro crisis as being the main issues exploited by current popuJist politicai actors in Europe.

These politicians have aIs o pointed to broad understandings of popu-lism, from ideology (democracy, left and right) to communication and politicaI styIe and strategy. But populism is usually perceived as something

inherently negative, either because it is based on over-simplified (mis) conceptions of reaIity, or because it is deliberately intended to deceive. There are, however, some exceptions, especially from populist politicians, that Iink populism to the roots of democraey (sovereignty of the people) and perceive it as a Iogical response to an ill-functioning system. lt is aIso noteworthy that the notion 'corrupt elites', often present in definitions of populism, was not emphasized by these politicians, probabIy as a result of the presence of seIf-serving bias.

A lingering disillusionment with polities was also presented as an explanation of the success of populist politicai actors, as well as a nega-tive consequence of populism. Given the perceptions of populism as over-simplifieation of issues and vain promises, for example, it should be no surprise that eitizens would aIso feel disappointed with populist parties and governments, in addition to being disillusioned with main-stream politics. However, some of the interviewees have also referred to contradietory positive consequences of popuIism as greater inc!usivity

66 Susana Salgado et ai.

and politicai engagement. Different types of populism as well as different effects of populist discourse on citizens (for further insight into the effects of populism on citizens, see the theoretical chapter by Hameleers et aI. in this volume) might easily explain the contradictory perceptions of the consequences of populism.

The media, both mainstream and social media, are also seen as an important part of the equation by these politicians. Factors such as the instrumentalization of the media by populist governments (e.g., Hungary, Poland) or high market competition and commercialization objectives

(identified everywhere) are usually seen as determinants heightening the

salience attributed to populist actors and to theiti messages in politicai

news coverage. Additionally, mainstream media were also seen as

respon-sible for facilitating an environment of over-simplified and distorted

polit-icaI debate, due to some of their news values and personalization (overall tabloidization), which fits perfectly with populist politicai styles and tends therefore to result in more media exposure for populist politicai actors. Social media, as a means through which to communicate directly with citizens, bypassing mainstream media gatekeepers, allows a conveyance of non-mediated, user-generated content, and has a great deal of influence on facilitating an environment conducive to increased polarization and to

greater levels of populism (see also Salgado, 2018).

ln sum, this study of the perceptions politicians hold of populism has

shown that, although this sample includes politicians from different types of politicai parties and countries that have experienced various leveis of success of populism as well as different types of populism, there seems to be strong similarity in their views. Populism is mainly perceived as something negative and with damaging consequences for democracy; there is a crisis of politicaI representation and a crisis of democratic values that seem to be opening up space for alternative, and sometimes, extremist, politicaI actors; and the media are not seen as a

neutral bystander.

Notes

1. This tudy benefited fcom funding from the following in tirutíon : Bulgarian

Seien e Researeh Fund, referen e DCO T 01/01-17.05.2017 and DCOST

01/02-17.05.2017· Darush re earch program 'Reforming \Xlelfare tate Insri-tution ' fcom rhe Unível" ity of Southern Denmarkj Hungarian budget and

European oeial Fund, pl"ojecr number EFOP-3.6.2-16-2017-00007j Poli h

Nacional cience Center granr number 201 118/M/HS-100080· and

POrtU-gue e FOllndation for cience and Technol gy referenee fF/01451120141 CP1239/CT0004.

2. David Nicolas Hopmann is thankful for the support of his student, Mie Foged Filrenborg.

3. ln addirion to the listed authors in this chapter, there were other members of the CO TA tion who were ai O involved in the data collection and analysis stages:

Delia Balaban (Romania), Nedzma Dzananovic (Bosnia and Herzegovina),

Politicians' Perceptions or Populism 67 Dobrio~a Peicheva (Bulgada), Dor ta Piontek (Poland) and Lilia Raycheva

(Bulgarl.a). . . . .

4. The pohtJcal parnes mclllded ln the tudy were as follow : Bosnia and

Herze-govina: Democratic FroJU, Serb Dem cratic Pany, Alliance for a Berrer Future rnde~~nde~t B.lo~k· Bulgaria: Citizen, .for European Developmenr of Bulgaria,

Coalmon I atnonc Fronr \XlIII, Coalmon Ior Bulgaria· DCl1mark: Danish [

co-pie' Parey, Ven tre (Rigbt-Liberals), Social-Democrat rhe Altefllarive· Greece: To Potami rr.he Rive~), Nea Dimokratia (New Democra y) Chri i Avgi (Golden

Dawn), yn~~ ( oalmon ~f ehe Radj,calleft); HlIngary: Fide z Jobbik Inde

-pendem Polme Cao Be Dlfferent (LMP)· Traly: 5 Srar Movemenr Forza halia

Dcmocraric Pan>:, ~cga Nord; orwa)': onservative Pany, Pr~gres Party:

Cemer Parey clallst left Parry· PoJand: Civic Platform Nowoczc na (Mod

-e 'n). Law and Ju tice Demo~ra.ric Le!rAllia,~ce; Portugal: Commllrust Parey,

~Hlonal Ren~wal ~arty, oClah r Parry Social Democratic Pany· Romania: Thepcll10<7a~e U~lon oE. th~ HlIJlgarians in ~omani.a, Social Democratic Parr)', Na:,o?al LtbeHlll arry UIl.lon Save ROlllama· pall1: People's Parry pani h

SocJa" r Workers' Party ClUdadano, Podemo. Anonymüy wa nor an isslIe

fOf.mosr .of thcse poliricians except in the a e of Bulgaria and Poland, where

ali rncervlewe have reque ted char their names n t be disclosed.

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Part II