CASES
CITATIONS
PROMULGATION
1. TATEL vs. VIRAC GR 40243 March 11, 1992
2. LIM vs. PACQUING GR 115044 January 27,
1995
3. LLDA vs. CA GR 120865-71 December 7,
1995
4. VILLACORTA VS BERNARDO, GR L-31249 August 19, 1986
5. CRUZ VS PARAS GR L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
6. QUEZON CITY VS ERICTA GR L-34915 June 24, 1983
7. ORTIGAS VS FEATI GR L-24670 December 14, 1979
8. BALACUIT VS CFI - AGUSAN DEL NORTE GR L-38429 June 30, 1988
9. SANGALANG VS CA GR 71169 August 25, 1989
10. PILAPIL VS CA GR 97619 November 26, 1992
11. MACASIANO VS DIOKNO GR 97764 August 10, 1992
12. CRUZ VS CA GR L-44178 August 21, 1987
13. ARDONA VS REYES GR L-60549 October 26, 1983
14.CHIONGBIAN vs. ORBOS GR 96754 June 22, 1995
15.MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE GR 111097 July 20, 1994 16.ALVAREZ vs. GUINGONA, JR GR 118303 January 31, 1996
17.TY vs. TRAMPE GR 117577 December 1,
1995
18.JAVIER vs. CA GR 49065 June 1, 1994
19.MARIANO vs. COMELEC GR 118577 March 7, 1995
20.LIMBONA vs. MANGELIN GR 80391 February
28, 1989
21.TAN vs. COMELEC GR 73155 July 11,
1986
22.FLORES vs. DRILON GR 104732 June 22,
1993
23.VILLANUEVA vs. CASTAÑEDA, JR. GR L-61311 September 21, 1987
24.CITY OF MANILA vs. IAC GR 71159 November 15, 1989
1968
26.JIMENEZ vs. CITY OF MANILA GR 71049 May 29, 1987 27.GUILATCO vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN GR 61516 March 21, 1989
28.PARAÑAQUE vs. V.M. REALTY CORP GR 127820 July 20, 1998
29.PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. CA GR 103125 May 17, 1993
30.PATALINGHUG vs. CA GR 104786 January 27, 1994
31.PILAPIL vs. CA GR 97619 November 26,
1992
32.FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC GR 120295 June 28, 1996
33.GREGO vs. COMELEC GR 125955 June 19, 1997 34.DAVID vs. COMELEC GR 127116 April 8, 1997
35.FARIÑAS vs. BARBA GR 116763 April 19,
1996
36.BUNYE vs. ESCAREAL GR 110216 September 10, 1993
CHIONGBIAN v. ORBOS G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995 FACTS:
Pursuant to Article X, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. 6734 (Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao). On November 16, 1989, in the plebiscite held, four provinces (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi) voted in favor of creating an autonomous region which became ARMM. With respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region, Article XIX, Section 13 of R.A. 6734 states that they shall remain in the existing administrative regions provided however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
Executive Order No. 429 was issued by President Aquino “Providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.” petitioners contend that Article XIX, Section 13 of R.A. 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to “merge (by administrative determination) the existing regions.”
For its part, the Solicitor General contended that the reorganization of regions in Mindanao was merely the exercise of a power “traditionally lodged in the President” and as a mere incident of his power of general supervision over local governments and control of executive departments, bureaus and offices under Article X, Section 16 and Article VIII, Section 17 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article XIX, Section 13 of R.A. 6734 is valid HELD: YES.
The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been (made) by the Presiden
As what the Supreme Court observed in Abbas, “while the power which has traditionally provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments.”
While Article XIX, Section 13 provides that “the provinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions,” this provision is subject to the qualification that “the President may by administrative determination merge the existing regions.”
While non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require.
The regrouping involves no more than a redefinition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services.
Administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation. (They) are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 FACTS:
Mayor Pablo Magtajas and the city legislators denounced the establishment of PAGCOR within their city through an ordinance prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for using and allowing to be used in its premises or portion thereof for the operation of casinos. Also, an ordinance was passed prohibiting the operation of casinos and providing penalty for its violation. PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and is the third highest revenue-earner in the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances are valid as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City
HELD: NO.
Petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. TEST OF A VALID ORDINANCE:
• Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute • Must not be unfair or oppressive
• Must not be partial or discriminatory • Must not prohibit but may regulate trade • Must not be unreasonable
• Must be general and consistent with public policy
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.
Although LGC is permissible to modify P.D. 1869, there is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal by the former.
LGUs may prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869.
This decree has the statutes of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.
ALVAREZ v. GUINGONA G.R. No. 118303 January 31, 1996 FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of R.A. 7720, entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela Into An Independent Component City To Be Known As The City Of Santiago,” mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city
HELD: YES.
The annual income of a local government unit includes the IRAs.
It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have an average annual income of at least P20M for the last two consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance.
A local government unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however to be an imperium in imperio, the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.
With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a LGU must now operate on a much wider scale. The vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every LGU is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions.
Availment of such resources is affectuated through the vesting in every LGU of: 1. The right to create and broaden its own source of revenue
2. The right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments(IRAs), and
development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.
The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the Local Government Code and its IRRs.
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the LGU. The IRAs regularly and automatically assure to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the LGU. They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that “the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-accruing income.”
Department Order No. 35-9313 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above disquisition when it defined annual income to be “revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290, and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others.”
TY v. TRAMPE
G.R. No. 117577 December 1, 1995 FACTS:
Alejandro B. Ty is a resident of and registered owner of lands and buildings in the City of Pasig, while MVR Picture Tube, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and is likewise a registered owner of lands and buildings in said city. Aurelio C. Trampe is being sued in his capacity as presiding judge of Branch 163, RTC of National Capital Judicial Region.
Respondent assessor sent a notice of assessment respecting certain real property of petitioners located in Pasig, Metro Manila. Petitioners, through a letter, requested the municipal assessor to reconsider the subject assessments. Not satisfied, petitioners filed with the RTC of National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 163, presided over by respondent judge a petition for prohibition.
Respondent judge denied the petition “for lack of merit,” also the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The court a quo ruled that the schedule of market values and the assessments based thereon prepared solely by respondent assessor are valid and legal, they having been prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160). It also held that said Code had effectively repealed the previous law on the matter, P.D. 921, which required, in the preparation of said schedule, joint action by all the city and municipal assessors in the Metropolitan Manila area.
In its September 30, 1994 Order denying the motion for reconsideration, the court a quo ruled that it is still inclined to sustain the view that P.D. 921 was impliedly repealed by R.A. 7160.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 repealed the provisions of P.D. 921
HELD: YES.
Section 9 of P.D. 921 states that:
Sec. 9. Preparation of Schedule of Values for Real Property within the Metropolitan Area. – The schedule of values that will serve as the basis for the appraisal and assessment for taxation purposes of real property located within
the Metropolitan area shall be prepared jointly by the city assessors of the districts created under Section 1 hereof, with the City Assessor of Manila acting as chairman in accordance with the pertinent provisions of P.D. 464, as amended, otherwise known as the Real property Tax Code, and the implementing rules and regulations thereof issued by the Secretary of Finance. On the other hand, Section 212 of R.A. 7160 states:
Sec. 212. Preparation of Schedule of Fair Market Values. – Before any general revision of property assessment is made pursuant to the provisions of this Title, there shall be prepared a schedule of fair market values by the provincial, city and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area for the different classes of real property situated un their respective local governments for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned. x x x
R.A. 7160 has a repealing provision (section 534) and if the intention of the legislature was to abrogate P.D. 921, it would have included it in such repealing clause, as it did in expressly rendering of no force and effect several other presidential decrees. Any repeal or modification of P.D. 921 can only be possible under paragraph (f) of said Section 534.
The two laws are no co-extensive and mutually inclusive in their scope and purpose. While R.A. 7160 covers almost all governmental functions delegated to local government units all over the country, P.D. 921 embraces only the Metropolitan Manila area and is limited to the administration of financial services therein especially the assessment and collection of real estate (and some other local) taxes.
Section 9 of P.D. 921 requires that the schedule of values of real property in the Metropolitan manila area shall be prepared jointly by the city assessors in the districts therein, while Section 212 of R.A. 7160 states that the schedule shall be prepared “by the provincial, city and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area for the different classes of real property situated un their respective local governments for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned.”
Harmony in these provisions is not only possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent with the legislative intent and policy. By this harmonization, both the preamble of P.D. 921 decreeing that the real estate taxes shall “not unduly burden the taxpayer” and the “operative principle of decentralization” provided under Section 3 of R.A. 7160 encouraging local government units to “consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services and resources” shall be fulfilled.
The schedule of values prepared solely by the respondent municipal assessor is illegal and void.
JAVIER v. CA
G.R. No. 49065 June 1, 1994 FACTS:
Provincial engineer Maximiano Sentina and 40 officials and employees of the Office of the Provincial Engineer filed a petition for mandamus and damages against the entire Provincial Board of Antique. They contended that the abolition of the OPE was a circumvention of the constitutional mandate on security of tenure and intended only to weed out provincial officials and employees who opposed the Provincial Board’s candidacy in the 1971 elections.
Respondents insisted that the abolition of the OPE was motivated instead by a provision of P.D. 17 which lowered the internal revenue allotment to the road and bridge fund of the province from 50% to 17.5% thereby leaving an inadequate allotment for materials, salaries and operating expenses of the OPE. They averred that the power of the provincial board to create an office carried with it the power to abolish it.
The lower court held that the “drastic decrease in the amount available for appropriation” was the principal consideration that impelled the Provincial Board to abolish the office. The Court of Appeals reversed the court a quo’s decision and held that “the passage of Resolution No. 206 was prompted in the main by reasons other than those stated therein” and that personal and political animosities on the part of Sentina and respondents caused the respondent Provincial Board to enact said resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Provincial Board had the authority under the then existing laws to enact the questioned resolution
HELD: YES.
Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did convey an authority to carry out a valid reorganization in any branch or agency of the Government but this general provision could not have meant or envisioned an absolute proscription on local governments, if and when minded, from themselves creating or abolishing positions, an authority that they theretofore had under the then existing laws.
One such law was Section 18 of R.A. 5185 (Local Autonomy Act), then still in force, which empowered provincial governments to create, among other positions, the office of a provincial engineer.
While the law did not expressly vest on provincial governments the power ot abolish that office, absent, however, any contrary provision, that authority should be deemed embraced by implication from the power to create it.
The power of the Province of Antique to abolish the office in question did exist at that time.
MARIANO, JR. v. COMELEC G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995 FACTS:
Petitioners assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. 7854 entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati” as unconstitutional on the following grounds:
a. Section 2 did not properly identify the land or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code.
b. Section 51 attempts to alter or restart the “three-consecutive term” limit for local elective officials in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
c. Section 52 is unconstitutional for:
1. It increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three years following the return of every census. 2. The increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill 3. The addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the property of Makati stands at only 450,000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said provisions of R.A. 7854 are valid HELD: YES.
The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires.
Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide or multiply the established land area of Makati, it merely stated that the city’s land area “shall comprise the present territory of the municipality.”
The existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts.
The Solicitor General’s submission was sustained. x x x “the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions” – was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. The requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of local government units. x x x So long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e. by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.
Congress did not intend that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles. x x x The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national development. x x x
MACASIANO v. DIOKNO GR 97764 AUGUST 10, 1992 FACTS:
Respondent municipality Parañaque passed Ordinance No. 86, series of 1990 which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, Series of 19779, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and /or municipal streets, roads, and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea markets and/or vending areas under certain terms and conditions.
On June 20, 19990, the municipal council of Parañaque issued a resolution authorizing Parañaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. On July 20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. 86 of the municipal council of respondent municipality subject to conditions.
On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and
manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.
On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 of the Municipality of Parañaque and enjoining petitioner Macasiano from enforcing his letter0order against respondent Palanyag.
ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid
HELD: NO.
Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public property unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress (e.g. Section 10, Chapter II, Local Government Code – Closure of Roads)
However, the afore-stated legal provision should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law.
Article 424 of the Civil Code provides that property of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or used by the local government unit to private persons.
The closure of a road, street or park should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit concerned. It is only then that the respondent municipality can “use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed” in accordance with the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of B.P. Blg. 337, known as the Local Government Code.
Those roads and streets which are available to the pubic in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local government has no power tom use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.
Even assuming, in gratia argument, that respondent municipality has the authority to pass the disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the MMA due to non-compliance by respondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance. Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it has complied with the foregoing conditions precedent to the approval of the ordinance.
TATEL v. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC G.R. No. 40243 March 11, 1992 FACTS:
Based from the complaints received from the residents of Barrio Sta. Elena against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca boiling machine inside the warehouse of the petitioner, the Municipal Council of Virac passed Resolution No. 29 declaring the warehouse a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. The said machine affects the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine. Respondent municipal officials contended that the petitioner’s warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13 which prohibits the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties
by accidental fire.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Ordinance No. 13 is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power of the municipal council
2. Whether or not the trial court gave Ordinance No. 13 a meaning other than what it says
HELD: 1. YES.
Ordinance No. 13 passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code. Also, the ordinance passed according to the procedure prescribed by law and in consonance with certain well-established and basic principles of a substantive nature.
HELD: 2. NO.
The trial court did not give the ordinance in question a meaning other than what it says. Basically, what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are located at a distance of 200m from a block of houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligations of the government. Clearly, it merely stated the purpose of the ordinance and what it intends to prohibit to accomplish its purpose.
TAN v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986 FACTS:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective December 3, 1985 (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite in January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and
contending that the B.P. Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
1. The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included I the plebiscite.
2. The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute.
The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition was not timely considered. Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January 4, 1986, after the plebiscite sought to be restrained was held the previous day, January 3. ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites under Article XI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution
HELD: NO
In interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held that whether a province is created, divided, or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, “the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be obtained.
The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental.
“Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.”
The Supreme Court further held that the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes v. Hon. Executive Secretary to the President, et. al. (128 SCRA 6), which respondents used to support their case, should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, it held that the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos in the aforementioned case is the forerunner of the applicable ruling, quoting that: “…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected”, it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision.”
It appeared that when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte was passed for approval, it recited therein that “the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act.” However, when the bill was enacted into B.P. 885, there was an unexplained change from “areas affected” to “the proposed new province, which are the areas affected.” The Supreme Court held that it was a self-serving phrase to state that the new province constitutes the area affected.
“Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous, and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.”
Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
“Wherefore, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are also declared null and void. SO ORDERED.”
CRUZ v. PARAS
GR L-42571-72 JULY 25, 1983 FACTS:
The petitioners are operators of nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan. They filed prohibition suits to stop the municipality of Bocaue from enforcing an ordinance
prohibiting the operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance halls in that municipality or renewal of licenses to operate them. The CFI upheld the validity of the ordinance and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation can prohibit the operation of nightclubs
HELD: NO
A municipal corporation cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business. R.A. 938, as originally enacted, granted municipalities the power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. While it is true that on May, 21, 1954, the law was amended by R.A. 979 which purported to give municipalities the power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained the same so that the power granted to municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as granting municipal corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that it violates the constitutional provision that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” Moreover, the recently-enacted LGC (B.P. 337) speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment.
QUEZON CITY v. ERICTA GR L-34915 JUNE 24, 1983 FACTS:
Quezon City Council passed Ordinance No. 6118 where under Section 9 of which provides for regulation of private memorial type cemetery and providing penalties for non-compliance thereof. The said section ordered private cemeteries to allot at least six (6) percent of the total area for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and who have been resident of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. But respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted and alleged the ordinance to be contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act and the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police lower and that land taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers.
ISSUE: Whether Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 is a valid exercise of police power
HELD: NO.
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process by law and even without just compensation. Police power usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally-possessed article such as opium and firearms.
GR L-24670 DECEMBER 14, 1979 FACTS:
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas & Co., a partnership involved in real estate particularly the Highway Hills subdivision along EDSA in Mandaluyong entered into a contract of sale on installment over two parcels of land with Augusto and Natividad Angeles who later transferred their rights and interests to a certain Emma Chavez. Under the agreement, it was stipulated among others that: “xxx this shall be used exclusively for residential purposes xxx”.
Eventually, defendant FEATI Bank and Trust Company acquired the lots and started the construction of a building on the said lot devoted to banking purposes. Ortigas then filed for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain and enjoin the defendant from continuing with the construction of the commercial bank in violation of the restrictions set in the contract of sale that was imposed by the plaintiff as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision. Defendant maintains that the area in question has been declared as a commercial and industrial zone by the Zoning Regulation of Resolution No. 27 on February 4, 1980 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal.
The trial court ruled in favor of defendant bank FEATI holding that the restrictions set by plaintiff Ortigas were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 27 because of the Municipal’s valid exercise of police power. It stressed that the private interest should “bow down to the general interest and welfare.” Plaintiff appealed until it reached the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of police power 2. Whether or not the said resolution can nullify or supersede the
contractual obligations assumed by defendants HELD: 1. YES
Although the validity of the resolution was never questioned in the past proceedings, its validity was at lest impliedly admitted from the facts. Section 3 of R.A. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) empowers a municipal council “to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the municipality. It gives more power to local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and material progress of the community. The only exceptions are a contract between “a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other hand,” in which case the original terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not apply in the case.
HELD: 2. YES
The resolution as an exercise of police power can supersede contractual obligations assumed by defendants. While non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power.
Police power is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable power, the greatest and most illimitable of powers. It is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. Its exercise may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
Resolution No. 27, in declaring that the western part of EDSA is an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality.
Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area. Industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances and regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal Council, was reasonably justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.
BALACUIT v. CFI OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE & BUTUAN CITY G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
FACTS:
The municipal board of the City of Butuan passed Ordinance No. 640 which penalized any person, entity, or corporation engaged in the business of selling tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, who shall require to pay full payment of tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of said ticket. The ordinance also provides for a penalty by fine and imprisonment. Petitioners are the aggrieved party by the effect of the ordinance as they were the managers of the different theaters in the city.
ISSUE: Whether or not the police power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement
HELD: NO.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.
FRIVALDO v. COMELEC G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996 FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo filed for candidacy for governorship. This was contested by Raul Lee who filed a petition with the COMELEC praying that Frivaldo be disqualified because he was not a Filipino citizen. COMELEC granted the petition. Frivaldo filed for Motion for Reconsideration but was unacted upon until after the elections. His candidacy continued and he was voted. Three days after election, the COMELEC affirmed the previous resolution. The Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election and determined that Frivaldo garnered the largest number of votes, followed by Lee. But Lee filed another petition praying for his proclamation as Governor. Petition was granted. Lee was declared Governor.
Frivaldo filed a new petition alleging that he already took his oath of allegiance or in the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the case of Labo v. COMELEC, the Vice-Governor should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the COMELEC First Division annulled the proclamation of Lee and proclaimed Frivaldo as rightful governor. Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation is enough to qualify him to be proclaimed governor? Stated in the alternative, whether or not citizenship requirement must exist the date of election or filing of candidacy? HELD: NO.
Section 39 of the Local Government Code does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship. Purpose of the citizenship qualification is so that no person owing allegiance to another nation shall govern our people. Impediment no longer existed. It should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of qualifications of officials, not of candidates. Citizenship is necessary at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term.
GREGO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 125955 June 19, 1997 FACTS:
On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by the Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by Nena Tordesillas. Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the 1988, local elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office.
After his term, he sought reelection in the 1992 election. He again won. However, a case for quo warranto was filed by Cenon Ronquillo (Candidate for councilor), who alleged Basco's ineligibility to be elected councilor on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. Other complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman and in the DILG. In 1995, Basco ran again for councilor.
William Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of Precinct No. 966, District II, City of Manila, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for Basco's disqualification, for the suspension of his proclamation, and for the declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila's Second District. The Manila BOC however proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor of the Second District of Manila.
In view of the proclamation, Grego filed an urgent motion seeking to annul the illegal proclamation. The COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification ruling that the administrative penalty imposed by the SC on Basco was wiped away and condoned by the electorate who elected him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992
HELD: NO
Petitioner submits that although the Code took effect only on January 1, 1992, Section 40 (b) must nonetheless be given retroactive effect and applied to Basco's dismissal from office which took place in 1981. It is stressed that the provision of the law as worded does not mention or even qualify the date of removal from office of the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder to attach. Hence, petitioner
impresses upon the Court that as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the disqualification applies. We do not, however, subscribe to petitioner's view. Our refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of Section 40 (b) is already a settled issue and there exist no compelling reasons for us to depart therefrom.
Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively. It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to the present case."
DAVID v. COMELEC G.R. No. 127116 April 8, 1997 FACTS:
In his capacity as Barangay Chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as President of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, Alex L. David filed a petition for prohibition to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997.
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter represented by its president Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a petition "to seek a judicial review by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional:
1. Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which reads as follows: (c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994;
2. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities related thereto;
3. The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in Republic Act No. 8250 otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1997 intended to defray the costs and expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections
Both petitions though worded differently raise the same ultimate issue: How long is the term of office of barangay officials? Petitioners contend that under Sec. 2 of RA 6653 "(t)he term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years . . ." This is reiterated in RA 6679. Petitioners further aver that although Sec. 43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three years, such reduction does not apply to barangay officials because (1) RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to barangays while RA 7160 is a general law which applies to all other local
government units; (2) RA 7160 does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA 6679 insofar as the term of barangay officials is concerned; (3) while Sec. 8 of Article X of the 1987 constitution fixes the term of elective local officials at three years, the same provision states that the term of barangay officials "shall be determined by law"; and (4) thus, it follows that the constitutional intention is to grant barangay officials any term, except three years; otherwise, "there would be no rhyme or reason for the framers of the Constitution to except barangay officials from the three year term found in Sec. 8 (of) Article X of the Constitution."
COMELEC maintains that RA 7160 repealed all other special laws relied upon by the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the term of the barangay officials should be limited only to three years
HELD: YES.
In light of the brief historical background, the intent and design of the legislature to limit the term of barangay officials to only three (3) years as provided under the Local Government Code emerges as bright as the sunlight. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. And three years is the obvious intent.
RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. The rationale is simple: a later law repeals an earlier one because it is the later legislative will. It is to be presumed that the lawmakers knew the older law and intended to change it. In enacting the older law, the legislators could not have known the newer one and hence could not have intended to change what they did not know.
Under the Civil Code, laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and not the other way around. Under Sec. 43-c of RA 7160, the term of office of barangay officials was fixed at "three (3) years which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994."
RA. 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. It specifically and definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that "the term of office of barangay officials . . . shall be for three years." It is a special provision that applies only to the term of barangay officials who were elected on the second Monday of May 1994. With such particularity, the provision cannot be deemed a general law. Petitioner may be correct in alleging that RA 6679 is a special law, but they are incorrect in stating (without however giving the reasons therefor) that RA 7160 is necessarily a general law. It is a special law insofar as it governs the term of office of barangay officials. In its repealing clause, RA 7160 states that "all general and special laws . . . which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." There being a clear repugnance and incompatibility between the two specific provisions, they cannot stand together. The later law, RA 7160, should thus prevail in accordance with its repealing clause.
enactments, the latter is deemed repealed.
BUNYE v. ESCARREAL G.R. No. 127116 April 8, 1997 FACTS:
The petitioners sought a reconsideration of the order of suspension by the Sandiganbayan. The suspension rooted from the enactment of Kapasiyahan Bilang 45 by herein petitioners, which forcibly took possession of the New Public Market in Alabang, Muntinlupa despite of a valid and subsisting lease contract for a term of 25 years between the municipality of Muntinlupa represented by former Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr. and the Kilusang Magtitinda.
Petitioners’ main argument against the preventive suspension is that nothing can possibly be compromised or hampered by their remaining in office, since the said proceedings will no longer be for the purpose of receiving evidence on factual issues but only to hear arguments, position papers on memoranda, on the purely legal issue of whether the rescission of the Cooperatives market contract is a valid exercise of police power by the municipality. Another point asserted by the petitioners is that their preventive suspension will paralyzed the local government and the Sangguniang Bayan will be without a quorum to perform its functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan abused its discretion in ordering the preventive suspension of the petitioners
HELD: NO.
The Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion in ordering the preventive suspension of the petitioners. On the first argument, citing the comment of the Solicitor General, that the prosecution must be given the opportunity to gather and prepare the facts for trial under conditions which would ensure intervention and non-interference for 90 straight days from petitioners’ camp.
On the second assertion by the petitioners, there will still remain eight (8) councilors who can meet as the Sangguniang Bayan. The President or his alter ego, the DILG Secretary, will surely know how to deal with the problem of filling up the temporarily vacant positions in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code.
FLORES v. DRILON
G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993 FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Under said provision, “for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority.”
Petitioners, as taxpayers, contend that said provision is unconstitutional as under the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may
be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts
HELD: YES.
The rule expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of an executive department described in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency.
In this case, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA).
In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency; the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary. However, the court held that the Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would have been used. Even in the Senate deliberations, the Senators were fully aware that subject proviso may contravene Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, but they nevertheless passed the bill and decided to have the controversy resolved by the courts.
CITY OF MANILA v. IAC
G.R. No. 71159 November 15, 1989 FACTS:
Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and was buried in North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. The wife paid the full amount of the lease. Apart, however from the receipt, no other document embodied such lease over the lot. Believing that the lease was only for five years, the city certified the lot as ready for exhumation. On the basis of the certification, Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal of the remains of Vicencio. His bones were placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the cemetery. The
lot was also leased to another lessee. During the next all souls day, the private respondents were shocked to find out that Vicencio’s remains were removed. The cemetery told Irene to look for the bones of the husband in the bodega. Aggrieved, the widow and the children brought an action for damages against the City of Manila; Evangeline Suva of the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the latter's predecessor as officer-in-charge of the said burial grounds owned and operated by the City Government of Manila. The court ordered defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of another lot. The CA affirmed and included the award of damages in favor of the private respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental, or a corporate or proprietary function of the City of Manila HELD: It is under the proprietary functions of the City of Manila
Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila. They conclude that since the City is a political subdivision in the performance of its governmental function, it is immune from tort liability which may be caused by its public officers and subordinate employees. Private respondents maintain that the City of Manila entered into a contract of lease which involves the exercise of proprietary functions with Irene Sto. Domingo. The city and its officers therefore can be sued for any-violation of the contract of lease.
The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or proprietary capacity. The New Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use and patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further enumerates the properties for public use as provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, the Court declared that with respect to proprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu.
Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila. The administration and government of the cemetery are under the City Health Officer, the order and police of the cemetery, the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and
the purification of the same are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. With the acts of dominion, there is no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract.
VILLANUEVA v. CASTAÑEDA G.R. No. L-61311 September 21, 1987 FACTS:
Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stags and sell in the said place. A protest was filed and the CFI decided that the land occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy. This decision was not enforced for the petitioners were not evicted. In fact, the petitioners paid daily fees to the municipal government. On January 12, 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution No. 29, to restore the subject property "to its original and customary use as a public plaza. Vicente Macalino (officer in charge in the office of the mayor) required the municipal treasurer and engineer to demolish the stalls. Petitioners filed a prohibition with the CFI claiming that the disputed area was leased to them by the municipal government. The CFI denied the petition
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have a right to the said land HELD: NO
There is no question that the place occupied by the petitioners and from which they are sought to be evicted is a public plaza pursuant to the previous case. It does not appear that the decision in this case was appealed or has been reversed.
A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. This is elementary. Indeed, this point was settled as early as in Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, where the Court declared as null and void the lease of a public plaza of the said municipality in favor of a private person. In Muyot vs. de la Fuente, it was held that the City of Manila could not lease a portion of a public sidewalk on Plaza Sta. Cruz, being likewise beyond the commerce of man. We rule that the petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. They should have realized and accepted this earlier, considering that even before case was decided, the municipal council already adopted Resolution No. 29, declaring the area as the parking place and public plaza of the municipality.
It is the decision in Civil Case No. 2040 and the said resolution of the municipal council of San Fernando that respondent Macalino was seeking to enforce when he ordered the demolition of the stags constructed in the disputed area. As officer-in-charge of the office of the mayor, he had the duty to clear the area and restore it to its intended use as a parking place and public plaza of the municipality of San Fernando, conformably to the orders from the court and the council. It is, therefore, not correct to say that he had acted without authority or taken the law into his hands in issuing his order.
Neither can it be said that he acted whimsically in exercising his authority for it has been established that he directed the demolition of the stalls only after, upon his instructions, the municipal attorney had conducted an investigation, to look into the complaint filed by the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando. There is evidence that the petitioners were notified of this hearing, which they chose to disregard. Photographs of the disputed area, which does look congested
