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The Role of Intelligence in Maritime Security
Fernando Ângelo,1 with the assistance of D.H. Gray, US Navy (Intelligence), retired.
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained, you will also suffer a defeat. If you neither know the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” (Sun Tzu, “The Art of War”, approx 400 BC)
Defining maritime security is not easy. The large number of entities from international, private and public sectors involved in activities of preserving the freedom of the seas, protecting and facilitating the commercial routes and maintaining good governance at sea, increases the complexity of maritime security. The lack of systematic and persistent surveillance of a nation’s waters, as well as the stovepipe approach by government departments and agencies with a responsibility for maritime security, are all prejudicial factors to maritime situational awareness. Several countries identified similar challenges in recent years and have developed comprehensive strategies to improve their capabilities and to mitigate the intelligence gaps inside their maritime spaces. The lack of awareness or
knowledge of what is going on inside a country’s maritime space may have repercussions on a vast spectrum of activities, not only from a security or defence standpoint. The situation stated by Sun Tzu that, ‘if ignorant both of your enemy and yourself, you are certain to be in peril,’ has remained unchanged throughout history. Indeed, success in the different spectrum of activities is dependent upon the provision of timely, relevant and accurate intelligence that is of a better quality than that of an enemy or competitor. Intelligence means ‘knowing the threat, and therefore intelligence collects information about the threat and develops expert knowledge about the threat, using evidence from all sources [...]. Intelligence is about knowledge, and also about forecasting [...]. It must reach its clients in useable forms and in time. The key question is what use they make of it, which is rarely easy to establish.’2
1 The author is a Portuguese Navy Officer and a Master's candidate in Intelligence and Security Studies at
University of Salford, Manchester, United Kingdom.
2 Michael Herman, ‘Why Does Military Intelligence Matter?,’ Oxford, Changing Character of War seminar,
This includes answering the main questions of who, what, where, when, why and how, which provide the context and narrative of events, introducing also the “So What?” effect. As Kent recognizes, intelligence is both information and an organized system for collecting and exploiting it. It is both an activity and a product of this activity.3
Concomitantly, Mark Lowenthal also assumes that intelligence is several things, such as information, process, and activity.4 Some difficulty seems to lie in the word ‘intelligence,’ and its articulation with information and knowledge meanings. Describing the intelligence process in practical terms of what people in the trade do, Jay Liebowitz writes, ‘data is patterned in some way, and it becomes information. Information plus insight and experience becomes knowledge. Knowledge in a specialised area becomes expertise. Expertise morphs into the nirvana state of wisdom after many years of experience and lessons learned.
Knowledge and experience go hand-in-hand in developing intelligence, especially in an organisational setting.’5
Some of these processes and activities are conducted by
governments, usually operated under secrecy, which include the ‘collection and interpretation of information drawn from a mixture of open and [secret] sources to arrive at a product – knowledge - useful to illuminate’6 the decision-makers deliberations. The final product is supposed to sustain an adequate maritime situational awareness through the creation of an appropriate early warning component in the decision-making cycle. Decision-makers are 'inbox driven' since they ‘only have time and energy to deal with their areas of responsibility or issues of immediate importance.’7
As Richard K. Betts argues, ‘The warning is a
continuum in several dimensions: the amount of weight of threatening intelligence indicators
http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/Research/OIG/Documents/herman%20paper%202007.pdf, accessed 3 January 2014.
3 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press,
1996, p. 12.
4 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, London, SAGE Publications Lda., 2012, p. 7- 8. 5 Jay Liebowitz, Strategic Intelligence: Business Intelligence, Competitive Intelligence, and Knowledge Management, Auerbach Publication, Taylor & Francis Group, NW, 2006, p. 7.
6 Loch K. Johnson, ‘Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence,’ Comparative Strategy, 2003, 22:1, (1-28),
p. 1.
7 James J. Wirtz, The Intelligence-Policy Nexus, p. 141 in Loch K. Johnson, Strategic Intelligence, London,
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detected; the ratio between these and contradictory non threatening indicators; and the timing of receipt, evaluation, dissemination, and reaction to indicators.’8
The importance of having clear maritime situational awareness is driven by realities such as: 90 per cent of the world’s commerce moves by sea; 95 per cent of the world’s telecommunications is carried via undersea cables; 165,0009 ships sail through Portuguese waters each year, and if fishing vessels and nautical leisure boats are added this number might be greater than 200,000 per year. Another challenge derives from the widening of the Panama Channel, which Professor Armando Marques Guedes sees as potentially enabling Portugal to become the “gateway” to the European Union from major markets such as the Americas and Asia. In view of European Union Maritime Security Strategy four important issues should be highlighted. The first is “marimitization” and the rise of economic
challenges, such as the dependence of the globalized economy on maritime transport flows (90 per cent of EU external trade and 40 per cent of EU internal trade goes by maritime routes), increased competition over oil and fishery resources as well as mineral resources, and increased activities at sea (40 per cent of EU GNP is generated by sea-related activities). The second is the ownership of maritime areas with the extensions of the continental shelf,
disputes over jurisdiction, and exploration and exploitation licences in Deep Sea Zones. The third is the development and interweaving of transnational crime and intra-state threats, such as piracy and terrorism in Somalia and terrorism and drug trafficking in the Sahel. Finally, the fourth is technological progress of criminal organisations, such as the use of
unsophisticated submarines or other devices by traffickers.10
The globalised economy and the nations’ perpetual interests relies on the safety and security of the maritime domain, where it is possible to identify hundreds of potential threats and risks such as smuggling, fisheries violations, oil theft, illegal immigration, drug
trafficking, human trafficking, environmental degradation, piracy, terrorism and criminal activity. First of all, it is important to clarify the differences between the terms “threat” and “risk,” since from an intelligence approach the lack of a coherent and common terminology
8 Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defence Planning, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution,
1982, p. 88.
9 This number reflects the ships with AIS (Automated Information System), which means these are ships of 300
gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on international voyages and all passengers ships irrespective of size
(www.imo.org/OurWork/Safety/Navigation/Pages/AIS.aspx, accessed 16 December 2013.
might affect correct interpretation by the readers. The Oxford English Dictionary defines threat as ‘a person or thing likely to cause damage or danger,’ and risk as ‘the possibility that something unpleasant or unwelcome will happen.’
Threats and risks are global and diffuse, and it is not correct to assume that maritime terrorism is the primary concern in terms of national maritime security risks. Maritime terrorism is not different from other forms of terrorism, caused mostly by political,
ideological or religious motivations. Contrary to the late 1960s and 1970s, where terrorism was mainly seen as a revolutionary tool used to fight colonial empires, now it is used by ‘entirely ideologically motivated organizations,’11
and as Bruce Hoffman contends, they represent a ‘potentially far more lethal threat’ and ‘certainly a far more amorphous and diffuse one.’12
Nonetheless, terrorism at sea has been significantly less of a problem than that of terrorist attacks in general. Incidents such as the hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean in 1985 by terrorists from Abu Abbas faction of the Palestinian
Liberation Front, or the hijacking in 1961 of the Santa Maria cruise liner by the Portuguese Henrique Galvão, allegedly to incite Salazar’s overthrow, are scenarios unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. To the contrary, in the last fifteen years the world has seen very few terror occurrences at sea, despite their destructiveness. The most notable attacks include the Qaeda attack against the US Navy destroyer USS Cole in Aden harbour in 2000, with seventeen sailors dead and 39 injured, the French oil tanker MV Limburg attacked by a terrorist group linked to al-Qaeda two years later off the coast of Yemen, and the most lethal maritime terrorist attack to date in February 2004 against the passenger vessel SuperFerry 14 as it left Manila harbour, which killed about 100 people. Maritime terrorist attacks are likely to occur against vulnerable ships, even if the percentage of occurrence has been minimal comparatively with other incidents globally. While terrorist attacks are not unique threats against the maritime domains, however, they tend to be the worst case scenarios faced by coastal countries’ security and military forces.
Piracy, though a low probability scenario to occur in Portuguese waters, has been an enduring global maritime security concern to seafarers and to international trade, especially in Somalia and Gulf of Guinea regions. Notwithstanding that piracy hotspots are situated far away from the Portuguese coast, the impact on the international trade costs has a direct effect
11 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, New York, Columbia University Press, 2006, p. 16. 12 Hoffman, 2006, p. 127.
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on Portuguese’s economy. Therefore, the integration of Portuguese naval and air assets into counter-piracy multinational task forces, as the NATO Ocean Shield Operation or the
European Union naval operation Atalanta, demonstrates the necessity of Portugal’s joining an international common effort to deter imminent threats and provide security in the maritime domain. The economic costs of piracy are high. ‘Oceans Beyond Piracy’ 2012 estimates Somali piracy cost $5.7-6.1 billion in burden to the global economy. The fact that the pirates have not taken a single ship this year does not mean that Somali piracy is defeated – it has just been suppressed temporarily. If international naval forces leave the region before
Somalia has built up its own governance, legal and coast guard capabilities, piracy is likely to resume and be even more effective than before due to lessons learned throughout these last five years.
With motivations different than those in Somalia, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea might be characterized as armed robbery of personnel and ship’s property, kidnap for ransom and the hijack of tankers for oil theft (also known as “bunkering”). The pirates in the Gulf of Guinea are better organised and armed, and more violent, than the Somalia-based pirates. The absence of effective control and surveillance of international and territorial waters by the Gulf of Guinea countries gives pirates, especially the Niger Delta gangs, freedom of
movement for whatever they want to do, such as the necessary time to transfer oil illegally at sea. Portugal is exposed to piracy in Gulf of Guinea by its use liquefied natural gas (LNG). In 2010 Portugal consumed 5,155 million cubic meters (mcm) of natural gas, of which 52.62% was imported from Nigeria by sea as LNG.13 Any disruption of natural gas supplied by sea is likely to have significant impact in the Portuguese gas supply.
These examples that for Portugal security in the maritime domain influences a large array of economic, security, political and military concerns, whether the insecurity occurs inside or outside Portugal's jurisdiction and sovereignty. Given the extensive maritime domain under Portuguese responsibility, it is vital to have an accurate awareness of what is happening within those areas of interest.
Portugal's maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ) area is approximately 1,720,560 square kilometres, which is roughly 18.7 times the territory of Portugal itself. Furthermore,
13 Energy Delta Institute, Energy Business School,
the Portuguese claim for the extension of the Continental Shelf14 increases the maritime area by more 2.1 million square kilometres, approximately 23 times the area of Portugal. In this claimed area, Portugal claims the rights of economic sovereignty for under the soil and subsoil exploitation, which means that Portugal could potentially hold the rights on the extraction of minerals, hydrocarbons and other biogenetic resources founded in this area.15 With this vast dimension, surveillance capacity is crucial for the construction of a picture of the maritime domain and, as Vice Admiral Alexandre Reis Rodrigues argues, to ‘reach this capacity it is necessary to integrate [or fuse] all the information gathered by the different sources.’16
Addressing all the threats that might be present in this massive area, excellent intelligence is necessary to “observe” and “orient” those responsible for “deciding” and “acting.” Maritime security is directly proportional to the maritime situational awareness level that a state is able to build. It is therefore important to establish a cross-government methodology to collect information on maritime activity, de-conflicting and sharing departmental knowledge and information, and fusing all-source intelligence from other networks and frameworks into a single intelligence assessment.
The nature of the missions and the dimensions of the areas of jurisdiction are
introducing new challenges for law enforcement and military stakeholders which will ‘strain the surveillance resources of most nations with an EEZ to protect.’17 The number of naval and air assets required to patrol and conduct reconnaissance missions in maritime areas with such size are extremely expensive and impracticable from an economic and sustainability viewpoint. Jasjit Singh, a military strategist and a former Air Commodore in the Indian Air Force, contends that the ideal solution ‘lies in greater reliance on aerial surveillance to provide maritime security.’ 18 The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) systems and remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) as primary maritime surveillance assets might be a
14
On 11 May 2009, Portugal submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, in accordance with Article 76, paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_prt_44_2009.htm, accessed 27 Jan 2014.
15 M. Bessa Pacheco, ‘A Plataforma Continental,’ Revista da Armada, nº480, Dezembro 2013, p. 20.
16 Alexandre Reis Rodrigues, ‘Portugal, sem estratégia de segurança marítima?,’ Jornal de Defesa e Relações Internacionais, 2013/10/24, p. 7.
17 Jasjit Singh, ‘Aerial Surveillance for Maritime Security,’ Strategic Analysis, 7:12 (1984), p. 1047. 18 Singh, 1984, p. 1047.
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short to medium-term aspiration of countries with an interest in protecting their maritime spaces. However, excluding the most common intelligence collection assets, such as
maritime patrol aircraft, navy ships and synthetic aperture radars mounted in coastal stations, there are other valuable sources of information, ranging from the open sources such as AIS (Automatic Identification System) and Lloyds databases, to classified all-source intelligence shared via national agencies, NATO, EU, coalition forces or bilateral/multilateral
partnerships. Beyond international maritime information sharing agreements on a bilateral and wider basis that countries might signed, there are other surveillance initiatives such as EuroSur (European external border surveillance system) and MARSUR (Maritime
Surveillance for Europe) that Portugal should be part of. On maritime surveillance, for example, the NATO Maritime Strategy and European Union Integrated Maritime Policy have this in common: both place a great emphasis on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) because the most important operational requirement identified for an efficient
international collaboration are communications interoperability and information and
knowledge sharing. For example, the EU Commission has settled the “Common Information Sharing Environment” (CISE), which engage member states’ military and civil authorities operating in the maritime domain in a political, organisational and legal environment to enable information sharing regarding the transport, environmental protection, fisheries control, border control, general law enforcement, customs and defence.19 The CISE is planned to reach its full operational capability by 2020. On the NATO side, its current early warning capabilities are extremely dependent on joint ISR, which has been used frequently in several theatres. This joint ISR is on the map of NATO's future capability, and is ‘among the seven key capabilities that should be designed as priorities’ at the next NATO summit in Wales in September 2014.20 The operations that NATO has conducted in recent years, such as Unified Protector (Libya), ISAF (Afghanistan) and Ocean Shield (Somalia counter-piracy), are intelligence-driven and therefore extremely dependent on ISR assets, with UAVs
assuming a base role as intelligence collection platform.
The information collection activity is still the main concern rather than the processing and analysis itself. As Michael Herman writes, ‘Intelligence is a sequential, inter-agency
19 EU Commission webpage, www.ec.europa.eu/dgs/maritimeaffairs_fisheries/consultations/cise/index_en.htm,
accessed 10 December 13.
20 Douglas Lute, ‘US ambassador to NATO declarations on 10 December 2013’, Janes’s Defence Weekly, 13
process. The first stage is collection, with “single-source” output […] and the second stage is “all-source analysis”, which draws on all available information to produce finished
intelligence.’21
This all-source analysis is mainly done through the “fusion” of different intelligence disciplines, such as IMINT (Imagery Intelligence), HUMINT (Human
Intelligence), COMINT (Communications Intelligence), ELINT (Electronic Intelligence), GEOINT (Geospatial Intelligence), OSINT (Open Source Intelligence), and other “INT” disciplines. The technological advance of the sensors used to collect raw data has increased demand for faster processing and delivery systems. As John Beck, C4ISR business
development manager at Lockheed Martin, states, there is ‘just a whole host of advanced sensors that vacuum up massive amounts of data, whether it is a wide area sensing system for EO/IR [electro-optical/infrared], a collection system for SIGINT22 of some kind, or
something that tries to bring in every newspaper published every day. Whatever it might be, it is a heck of a lot more data.’23
Consequently, these megastores of data needs more people to analyse it and to produce actionable intelligence. On the other hand, the organisational budgets have been drastically reduced during the last years and the trend is likely to continue into the foreseeable future. As a direct consequence, the reduction of personnel is the easiest means of reducing expenses. Investment has therefore been driven into systems that in a more automated way might be able to collect, process and present the information to decision makers, reducing direct human intervention as much as they can. As a Raytheon company official argues, ‘Sailors cannot be looking at pictures of a vast ocean, they need to know where the ships are,’ which means that it is a ‘matter of intelligence identification, packaging, and distribution of relevant data but not necessarily of all the data.’24
Today’s paradigm is centred on the fact that intelligence is produced near real-time, and for this reason system-of-systems defenders are thinking that the “machine” is ultimately the solution against data overflow and recurrent analytical setbacks caused by cognitive failures and lack of imagination.
Contrarily, from the data exploitation angle the imagery collected is a challenge, since it is up to a human to understand what is going on. The computer is not able to tell us ‘that is
21 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 39. 22 Signals Intelligence results from ELINT+COMINT.
23 IHS Jane’s, ‘Sticking around: sharing the value of persistent surveillance’, 05 December 2013, p.1. 24 IHS Jane’s, ‘Sticking around: sharing the value of persistent surveillance’, 05 December 2013, p.1.
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a fishing vessel involved in an illicit activity’ or ‘the pattern and behaviour used by this merchant vessel is likely to be assumed as a critical contact of interest.’ Reporting an event is one thing; answering the question, “What does this mean?” is analysis.25 Intelligence
analysis moves beyond what happened to assess what to make of it, usually providing the “So What” answer to the decision-maker. Arguably, the intelligence analyst is the centrepiece on this complex machine, and therefore the education and training of these intelligence officers should not be neglected, even in a period of budget constraints. Analytical intelligence expertise to ‘sound the alarm’ about potential threats and to refuse ‘crying wolf’26
noise is extremely appreciated within the intelligence community, even with the inherent risk of different interpretations which might cause a ‘great deal of friction’27
among different organizations. In terms of reacting to surprise, successful warning is an inherently complex process, dependent on the efficient interaction of multiple factors, including how far in advance the intelligence community can provide warning and how quickly or to what extent policymakers react.28 Throughout this process, several organisational hurdles must be overcome with information that must ‘pass through numerous bottlenecks’29
and with warning indicators that are often ‘scattered across individuals or bureaucratic units’.30
Some issues particular to intelligence bureaucracies, such as security concerns, are also a legitimate and necessary element of the system that prevents optimal data sharing and communication.31 In recent times, there has been much emphasis on over-zealous security classification, poor communication between agencies and ‘stovepiping’ of information within organisation
25 John Hollister Hedley, The Challenges of Intelligence Analysis, p. 123, in Loch K. Johnson, Strategic Intelligence, London, Praeger Security International, 2007.
26 Jeffrey A. Friedman & Richard Zeckhauser, ‘Assessing Uncertainty in Intelligence,’ Intelligence and National Security, 27:6 (2012), p. 832.
27 Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security, New York,
Columbia, 2007, p. 101.
28 Betts, 1982, p. 88.
29 Richard K. Betts, ‘Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed,’ Political Science Quarterly,
95:4 (1980-81), p. 555.
30 Betts, 1980-81, p. 555.
31 Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and Iraq War, Ithaca & London,
databases as factors that contributed to intelligence failures.32 Technology can help analysts meet maritime threats, but can also be a hindrance, as the ‘Information Revolution’ and the increase in intelligence collection has led to an explosion of data which can increase the difficulties of separating ‘signals’ from ‘noise’ for even the most expert of analysts.33
Intelligence related issues such as warning failures and organisational disputes are not the only challenges confronting maritime security. As Admiral Sir Jonathon Band admits, these challenges might include the ‘need for increased co-operation between armed forces, police and intelligence agencies,’ ‘security as a shared responsibility and the overlapping responsibilities and actions of the Military, the Foreign Affair, Interior, Transport,’ etc., and finally the ‘need to break down the stovepipes of communications [..] both in a national and international context.’34
A cultural change is needed in the organisation, process and activity vectors, with the domain subject matter experts from the cross-government agencies or departments being part of the equation. The organisational barriers should be removed and the jealous and stingy mentality must be converted to a benign approach where the supreme national interest is the only goal. The raw data collected by coastal radars and infrared systems are not exclusive property, as many organisations may argue. The data collected are a state property paid for with taxpayers’ money, and as such nobody has the right to not share information with other government departments and agencies with overlapping
responsibilities for maritime security. An integrated maritime domain information
environment is needed, not only in words but also in deeds. As Sherman Kent stated in 1949, ‘Intelligence is the knowledge which our highly placed civilians and military must have to safeguard the national welfare.’35
The mentality shift may require small steps in a long process of building trust and confidence among all involved in maritime situational
awareness. To date, the “Achilles’ heel” has been the lack of co-operation and coordination
32 Amy B. Zegart, ‘“CNN With Secrets:” 9/11, the CIA and the Organisational Roots of Failure,’ International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 20:1 (2007), pp. 22, 29.
33 Frederick p. Hitz and Brian J. Weiss, ‘Helping the CIA and FBI Connect the Dots in the War on Terror’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17:1 (2004), p.8.
34 Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, ‘Maritime security and the terrorism threat,’ The RUSI Journal, 147:6 (2002), p.
27.
35 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press,
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between the different stakeholders in the maritime domain, and more importantly the lack of intelligence sharing consistent with the “need to know” approach.
It is true that differences arise even more frequently when law enforcement and intelligence organisations are acting in the same domain, where ‘detective work and intelligence collection may resemble each other, but they are really completely different.’36
Alan Breakspear corroborates this argument in stating that, ‘Intelligence is seen to be less useful to the police than is evidence.’37
The exhibition of evidence in court usually results in the disclosure of intelligence techniques and sources which, frequently, compel even more stovepiping between law enforcement agencies and intelligence organisations. Bruce Berkowitz concludes that detectives aim to prove a ‘probable cause’ or ‘preponderance of evidence’ in a specific legal issue, and intelligence rarely ‘tries to prove anything; its main purpose is to inform officials and military commanders.’38
Nonetheless, in recent years some information sharing arrangements have been established between military and law
enforcement agencies to counter transnational crime in the maritime domain. Without interfering in the different specificities that each government department might have in maritime security, it is possible to create synergies in terms of intelligence gathering and information sharing for maritime situational awareness purposes. It is, therefore, clear that much more fundamental barriers exist which can prevent analysts from producing good intelligence even if they follow all the right procedures and utilise correct techniques.39
Curiously, a number of intelligence failures that contributed to famous historic events were triggered by organisational or analytical cognitive issues. For example, the 9/11
Commission concluded that organisational deficiencies led to failures of coordination because ‘information was not shared... [And] analysis was not pooled’.40
The same report also implies that cognitive errors were a factor because the intelligence community lacked the
36 Bruce Berkowitz, ‘Commentary: The Big Difference between Intelligence and Evidence,’ Washington Post, 2
February 2003, http://rand.org/commentary/020203WP.html, (accessed 2 December 2013).
37 Alan Breakspear, ‘A New Definition of Intelligence,’ Intelligence and National Security, 28:5 (2013), p. 691. 38 Berkowitz, 2 February 2003, http://rand.org/commentary/020203WP.html, (accessed 2 December 2013). 39 Richard K. Betts, ‘Fixing Intelligence’, Foreign Affairs, 81:1 (2002), p. 58.
40 Joshua Rovner and Austin Long, ‘The Perils of Shallow Theory: Intelligence Reform and the 9/11
‘imagination’ to predict a terrorist attack could occur.41
The most infamous assessment of organisational roots of failure was the post-mortem investigation into the Pearl Harbour attack in 1941, which highlighted the uncoordinated nature of the intelligence community, but which also criticised the reliance on ‘mind-sets’ which presented cognitive barriers to correctly interpreting signals of a Japanese attack.42 Since then, it has been cited in dozens of commission reports, triggered by several publicised intelligence failures, recommending an organisational change as a solution for almost all of them. Yet, as Richard Betts has highlighted, repeated efforts to reform intelligence through structural changes are nothing new and have nonetheless failed to overcome entrenched inefficiencies of bureaucracy.43 In some countries, organisational changes in the intelligence apparatus are not based in in-depth studies about past failures, incorrect procedures or organisational inefficiency, but on
anecdotal factors prompted by hidden political agendas or corporate interests. Part of the explanation for the resilience of organisational inefficiency is the fact that large bureaucracies often have deeply entrenched priorities and cultures which are sustained by the parochial interests of its members.44 In addition, what makes intelligence failure not merely
‘inevitable’ but also ‘natural’ is the external environment in which intelligence has to operate. In an insecure world characterised by fragmentary information and ambiguity, it is clear that the intelligence community is operating under difficult conditions, defined by the presence of a competing adversary whose intentions may appear contradictory and whose unpredictable actions may cause misinterpretations that lead to intelligence failure.45
Lock K. Johnson, a well-recognised expert on intelligence issues, stated in his Handbook of Intelligence Studies that ‘regardless of which aspect of intelligence one has in mind – product, process, mission, or organisation – the bottom line is that good governmental decisions rely on accurate, complete, unbiased, and timely information about capabilities and intentions’46
of potential threats and risks against their national interests. The basic barriers
41 The 9/11 Commission Report, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf, p.339, accessed 02
April 2010.
42 Rovner and Long, 2005, p. 621. 43 Betts, 1982, p. 17.
44 Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective, Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, Harvard
University Press, 2004, p. 176.
45 Jervis, 2010, p. 174-175. 46 Lock K. Johnson, 2009, p. 5.
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to obtaining useful, actionable and timeliness intelligence in an insecure world are
compounded further by the often confusing or contradictory actions of adversaries47 and the apparent irrationalities of their decision making processes.48 Roberta Wholstetter argues that true ‘signals’ of enemy intentions are often subsumed in an atmosphere of ‘noise’ –
conflicting background data which obscures clear understandings of a situation.49 The notion that the intelligence community failed to ‘connect the dots’ does not account for
environmental barriers of ‘noise’ that obscured the real signals for attack.50
This is coupled with the fact that many of the ‘dots’ could have been assembled in multiple ways, indicating different possible scenarios of what was likely to occur.51 The complexity of intelligence dynamics has increased since the second industrial revolution, also referred as the
technological revolution, where intelligence assumed a role that was ‘more crucial than ever before.’52
Bennett cites the Marconi transmission as symbolic. ‘The revolution in intelligence began on the day in December 1901 when Marconi showed that wireless communication over long distances was possible.’53
The ability to foresee potential surprise has always been a benchmark of leadership, as was recognized by the first Duke of
Marlborough when he wrote no war could ever be conducted without early and good
intelligence. According to Atkinson the success in developing this new level of accuracy and usefulness was due to the evolution of communications means, the large amount of data collected, and the rapid development of aviation.54 The resources used to gather information during pre-industrial times were primarily those centred on the human intelligence
(HUMINT) activity, using spies, diplomats and military attachés. With the advent of the
47 William E. Odom, ‘Intelligence Analysis’, Intelligence and National Security, 23:3 (2008), p. 328.
48 Christopher Brady, ‘Intelligence Failures: Plus Ca change... ,’ Intelligence and National Security, 8:4 (1993),
p. 89-90.
49 Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, California, Stanford University Press, 1962, p. 3. 50 Richard K. Betts, ‘Two Faces of Intelligence Failure: September 11 and Iraq’s Missing WMD,’ Political Science Quarterly, 122:4 (2007-2008), p. 593-594.
51 Betts, 2007-2008, p. 593-594.
52 Michael Handel, ‘Intelligence in Historical Perspective’ in Keith Neilson & Brian McKercher, Go to Spy the Land, Praeger, London, 1992, p. 193.
53 Ralph Bennett, Behind the Battle – Intelligence in the War with Germany 1939-1945 (1994), p.xvii. 54 CF Atkinson, Intelligence Military, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 12 (1922), p. 508.
First World War modern intelligence sources were developed such as signals (SIGINT) and imagery (IMINT) intelligence, which meant that the war’s primary sources of intelligence were now derived from what technological developments enabled. The use of the telephone, telegraph, radio, and aerial photographs caused a dramatic change in the reliability, relevance and data transmission velocity of intelligence, summarized as the ‘closeness of
intelligence/action relationship’ the main motive of the change of preferences.55
The previous need had been to know where the enemy was. The static nature of the warfare during the First World War prioritised the need to know ‘what is the enemy doing?’ instead of ‘where is he?’56 The development of these sources of information - aerial
photography and signals intercepts - have been seen as a turning point in the battlefield or maritime domain awareness and were mainly the result of an ‘unprecedented mobilization of science and technology.’57
From the First World War until today the technology that supports the intelligence work has evolved immeasurably. New generations of systems and more educated and trained intelligence officers have required a substantial increase in the budget to run intelligence operations. Contrarily, the period of austerity seen in the last years has resulted in calls for budget cuts, and intelligence organisations are not immune to these cuts. Military
intelligence has often been historically undermined by poor analysis when underlying
departmental pressures sustained pessimistic assessments of enemy capabilities, which would in turn be used to justify high defence budgets;58 at the moment, this manoeuvre is likely to be useless. To a greater or lesser degree, this problem is endemic for all intelligence
agencies. In countries with less significant involvement in intelligence-driven operations or without immediate internal or external threats, intelligence organisations are more likely to be targeted by budget cuts than countries with imminent threats against their own territory or engaged in combat operations abroad. As an example, the 1920s depression had a dramatic impact on British defence expenditure, starting in 1919 with the Ten-Year Rule, imposed by Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill, which determined cuts in the armed forces
55 Bennett, 1994, p.xxi.
56 Jim Beach, ‘From Art of Reconnaissance to the Yellow Book: British Military Intelligence, 1902-1915,’ Guerres mondiales et conflicts contemporains, 232 (2008), p. 10.
57 Michael Heffernan, Geography, cartography, and military intelligence: the Royal Geographic Society and the
First World War, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 21 (1996), p. 504.
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spending ‘on the assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years.’59
Based on the premise that Britain would not be involved in any sort of conflict, this rule proved to be a paralysing factor for British Armed Forces
development. When the Second World War assumed a global scale, at the strategic and operational levels a considerable impact on trade shipping routes was imminent, and
therefore British subsistence and sustainment was extremely dependent on the ‘residual trade activity’60
and the capacity to support their military operations. As a consequence, the navy’s participation in ‘economic warfare’ was required to ‘disorganise the enemy’s economy to prevent him from carrying on the war’61
by means of sea denial, since the Alliance’s centre of gravity was clearly its shipping. The control of shipping trade routes in the Atlantic was vital for Britain and the Allied war efforts as well as for the prosecution of the economic war against the enemy. A clearly recognised maritime picture with the location of Allied and enemy forces determined the rate of the sinking of merchant ships, which adds some support for the thesis that ‘no factor in the battle of the Atlantic was more important than
intelligence.’62
Despite the confidence that a new Battle of the Atlantic is a highly unlikely scenario in the foreseeable future, disinvestment in maritime security, defence and
intelligence has proved to be an unreasonable decision, even in times of austerity or budget constraints. Traditional maritime threats are not allegedly being subject to any
“disinvestment” or budget austerity, and they will be always watching for a target country’s weaknesses. As happened in 1919 with the disinvestment imposed by Churchill's “Ten-Year Rule,” what seems an unlikely threat today does not mean that tomorrow it will not be our enemy or competitor. As Lord Palmerston argued during a speech to the House of
Commons, in 1 March 1848, ‘We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.’ Maritime situational awareness is extremely dependent on surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, very expensive capabilities to maintain and very exposed to the budget cuts. The major challenge is the ‘age-old problem of intelligence coordination’ as the information explosion
59
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, Penguin, London, 2004, p. 273.
60 WJR Gardner, Decoding History. The Battle of the Atlantic and Ultra, MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1999,
p. 36.
61 WN Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol.1, London, HMSO, 1952, p. 23.
gathered by modern collection assets has drastically increased the complexity of ‘distinguishing really important intelligence from background noise.’63
Coordination among civilian or military authorities and agencies is therefore the centrepiece to counter the threat and mitigate the risks against national and international interests. National and international cooperation with so many different actors involved in such complex arena is needed in the building of a comprehensive picture of maritime
activities. This is extremely dependent of the establishment of civilian-military cooperation, information sharing and maritime surveillance, and ultimately the coordination and
integration of all organisations and partners. The information sharing among all these actors is the real “muscle” behind maritime situational awareness, and as a corollary the integration and fusion of ‘all-source glut’64
information to achieve a comprehensive recognised maritime picture is the biggest challenge. As an example of synergy among NATO state-members, the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC) is a successful model of intelligence and
knowledge sharing by the national intelligence officers to support SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) and Allied Command Operations (ACO) operations and planning. NIFC comprises over 200 multinational military and civilian intelligence and support
professionals from 26 of 28 NATO nations and one North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved non-NATO nation. NIFC was created to facilitate the sharing and fusion of intelligence, contributing to fill intelligence gaps within ACO and to support the planning and execution of current operations as well. As such, NIFC has an experienced, culturally diverse (about 37 languages spoken and read fluently) workforce who are able to support decision making for senior leaders through well informed, insightful all-source analysis.
Some level of intra-organizational commitment and consensus among maritime stakeholders in Portugal should be undertaken in the near-term because there is the necessity to create a robust, sustainable and capable joint maritime operational centre to disseminate timely and relevant intelligence in support of a clear situational awareness within our maritime space. Taking into account the dimensions of Portuguese Economic Exclusion Zone and the Search and Rescue area of responsibility, there is a national commitment and responsibility to have a clear maritime picture of what is going on in our waters from a
63 Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, The Missing Dimension, Urbana and Chicago, University of Illinois
Press, 1984, p. 12.
17
security and safety viewpoint. As a result, it is necessary to have surveillance assets and maritime operational centres (as Portuguese Navy Operations Centre - COMAR) with strong inter- and intra-agency composition, and intelligence organisations focused on the maritime domain. In 2008, COMAR was the first centre inaugurated in Portugal with the vision of congregating in the same space several domain experts, such as National Maritime Authority (represented by the Maritime Police - Polícia Marítima), Border Service (Serviço de
Estrangeiros e Fronteiras - SEF), Republican National Guard (Guarda Nacional
Republicana – GNR), Judiciary Police (Polícia Judiciária – PJ) and National Authority for Civil Protection (Autoridade Nacional de Protecção Civil – ANPC), among others.65 Its mission is focused on maritime security, such as drug trafficking and illegal immigration, civil protection support, military operations and crisis responses, with search and rescue assuming a primary role. To accomplish its mission, COMAR is manned 24 hours per day, 7 days a week by navy and maritime police personnel and supports from a military and law enforcement standpoint all the maritime operations inside Portuguese maritime jurisdictional spaces. Since then on occasion COMAR had GNR and SEF’s officials co-operating
alongside the European Union mission against illegal immigration, FRONTEX. As an intelligence provider, COMAR is connected through secure systems to the navy intelligence analysis centre (Centro de Análise e Gestão de Dados Operacionais – CADOP), which disseminates all-source intelligence related to maritime domain awareness on a “need-to-know” basis. Because, as Richard Betts argues, ‘secrecy mandates “compartmentation” and “need-to-know” as criteria for access to classes of data,’66
and therefore the establishment of security layers of access among the different authorities involved in this kind of centres is by far the best approach.
Experience dictates, though, that it is difficult to build a “perfect model” from scratch while avoiding deeply entrenched tendencies and cultures sustained by ‘parochial interests.’67 The easiest way is to copy an existing model from other countries, even sometimes those without any similar needs or resources equivalent to our own reality, while keeping our overriding corporate interests safe. We need to admit in principle that the United Kingdom National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) is a coherent and holistic approach to 65 http://www.marinha.pt/pt-pt/meios-operacoes/comando-apoio/centros/Paginas/Operacoes-Maritimas.aspx, accessed 27 January 2013. 66 Betts, 1982, p. 93. 67 Kam, 2004, p. 176.
maritime security and maritime domain awareness. Declared fully operational capable in October 2012, the domain experts involved are the MCA (Maritime & Coast Guard Agency), SOCA (Serious Organised Crime Agency), UKBF (UK Border Force), SO15 (Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command), MoD (Ministry of Defence), FCO (Foreign &
Commonwealth Office) and MMO (Marine Management Organisation - fisheries). This cross-governmental organisation has similarities with the UK JTAC (Joint Terrorism
Analysis Centre), a multi-agency body with staff attached from government departments, the military and law enforcement, and the CSOC (UK Cyber Security Operations Centre), which means that NMIC personnel provide links back to their parent departments whilst supporting NMIC objectives. NMIC declares in its manifesto that it is a ‘One Stop Shop,’ bringing together ‘Government Departments to optimise the use of maritime information, avoid duplication and benefit from best practices. Be the national voice for MSA [Maritime Security Awareness] issues.’68
Per its mission statement, NMIC produces Maritime Situational Awareness69 information, providing a ‘hub for national maritime surveillance information and co-ordinate the input of maritime departmental data’ to create a ‘trusted, coherent, robust, accurate and up to date picture of maritime activity affecting the UK and its interests.’ 70 The maritime information inputs that feed the NMIC are systems such as the UK coastal AIS network (MCA), radar and AIS data from Offshore Oil and Gas platforms,
Vessel Monitoring System (MMO) from the fishing vessels, Long Range Identification and Tracking (IMO – International Maritime Organisation), port, harbour and traffic separation zone radars that provides a coastal coverage, and information derived from partnerships. The vision shared by all the maritime security and maritime domain awareness participants is centred in a more collaborative approach in terms of information exchange and intelligence sharing as the main goal to an optimal security, since ‘optimal security decisions will inevitably be based not on perfect knowledge but rather on optimal intelligence
68 National Maritime Information Centre – Information Guide 2011 Version 1.01, p. 8,
http://www.nautinstlondon.co.uk/nautinstlondon/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/NMIC-information-booklet.pdf, accessed on 26 December 2013.
69 Maritime Situational Awareness is the understanding of activities carried out in the maritime domain, to
support timely decision making in the fields of Maritime Security and Maritime Safety.
70 National Maritime Information Centre – Information Guide 2011 Version 1.01, p. 4,
http://www.nautinstlondon.co.uk/nautinstlondon/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/NMIC-information-booklet.pdf, accessed on 26 December 2013.
19
assessments.’71
These assessments will have challenges to overcome such as the fact that maritime global trade has been growing, an increasing number of small and non-cooperative reporting vessels have been noticed, feeds provide multiple sources of data which sometimes have low accuracy, vessels with no identification and duplicate reports, and finally a
multiplicity of vessels with the same name or constant changes of name, ship-owners, etc. Among the most expected threats within the Portuguese maritime spaces are the illegal immigration and drug trafficking most likely to occur. In terms of illegal immigration, Europe’s economic downturn and its immigration and integration policies have been reducing the flows of immigrants. However, factors such as extreme poverty and high rates of
unemployment in Africa, eastern Europe and Asia, and the demand for low-skilled labour in Europe keeps pulling immigrants to the European continent. According to Oxford Analytica, the top sources of immigrants have shown a huge increase in emigration in the first half of 2012, compared with the same period in 2011: Syria (+639%), Algeria (+88%), Somalia (+62%), Albania (+55%), and Bangladesh (+35%).72 It is strongly believed that immigrants from these countries are unlikely to travel to Portugal as a final destiny, since the economic crisis conditions and lack of employment makes it unattractive for economic migrants. However, migrants may use Portuguese territory as a gateway to reach other countries in Europe. The main routes connecting North and Western Africa with Europe are extremely dynamic in magnitude and in detected nationalities as well. Illegal border-crossing
detections, per FRONTEX, have decreased slightly from 2011 to 2012 along several routes. Western Africa route detections decreased from 340 to 170, Western Mediterranean route detections from 8,448 to 6,400, and Central Mediterranean route detections from 64,261 to 10,380.73 The Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia and Libya influenced the Centre
Mediterranean route, and the turmoil in Syria has increased the number of immigrants in several different routes. To deal with this problem affecting Europe's southern borders, the EU budget for 2014-2020 increased by 26.5 per cent the Internal Security Fund and the Migration and Asylum Fund compared with the total budget for the previous period
71 CH Allen, ‘The Limits of Intelligence in Maritime Counterproliferation Operations,’ U.S. Naval War College Review, available online at
www.law.washington.edu/Directory/docs/Allen/Article_NWC_Intelligence.pdf, p. 44, accessed 26 December 2013.
72 Oxford Analytica, ‘North Africa migration persists despite new EU laws,’ 6 February 2013.
2013.74 These increases include the establishment of national coordination centres, the creation of national and European situational and intelligence reports that analyse and
forecast future developments, and the utilisation of unmanned aerial vehicles to detect vessels that are too small to be detected by radar and other detection systems. In terms of drug trafficking, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) World Drug Report 2013 states that ‘Traffickers are increasingly looking for new routes to supplement the old ones while it is clear that the African continent is becoming increasingly important and vulnerable in terms of proliferation of trafficking routes.’ The report also highlights that ‘Cocaine seizures in Colombia indicates that the Atlantic route may be gaining in prominence compared with other [routes in] maritime trafficking; linguistic ties appear to play a role in cocaine trafficking from South America to Europe via Brazil, Portugal and lusophone countries in Africa.’75
The same report states that the ‘maritime seizure is consistently more likely to be larger than the seizure involving transport’ by other means. Although maritime seizures are ‘no more than 11 per cent of all cases across all drug categories globally, each maritime seizure was on average almost 30 times larger than seized consignments trafficked by air.’76
In conclusion, Portugal's permanent interests rely on the safety and security of its maritime domain. The vastness of the maritime spaces under Portuguese jurisdiction and sovereignty have great potential to be threatened by an enormous variety of threats and risks to maritime transport flows, economic activities and national security. Maintaining adequate maritime situation awareness is paramount, as Sun Tzu stated several centuries ago, because knowledge of the threat in a timely, accurate and reliable way is essential to the decision-making process. Forecasting and preventing surprise is extremely dependent on intelligence gathered by different government departments. The knowledge obtained by the analysis of all-source intelligence collected by different state assets will ultimately “illuminate” the deliberations of those decision-makers. The diversity of threats is not exclusively the concern of one specific department, or even of one particular country. The threats and risks are global and diffuse, and to deter and contain them it is necessary to build a cross-government holistic
74 European Commission – Press release, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1096_en.htm, accessed 5
January 2014.
75 UNODC 2013 World Drug Report, p. ix, x. 76 UNODC 2013 World Drug Report, p. 20.
21
approach where information on maritime activity should be collected, processed, analysed and disseminated among all the maritime authorities’ stakeholders. In a time of profound budget constraints, and with limited assets to cover such immense areas, it is necessary to merge capabilities and maritime domain experts from military, law enforcement, and other government departments under the same roof. An intelligent use of the limited resources to contain the ‘omnipresent multi-threat in the maritime domain’77
would transform the final product into a valuable “tool” to support governments, international organisations, and the commercial sector as well.
What might be the result if one day a group of subject matter experts with direct involvement in maritime situational awareness are placed in the same room, sharing their personal knowledge and their organisations’ intelligence? There is at least one operational maritime centre manned by military and law enforcement personnel in a 24/7 basis, with access to the intelligence of several national, NATO, EU and other international
organisations, with secure and unclassified communications circuits and systems, and with spare seats to receive other maritime domain stakeholders. Are the deeply entrenched priorities and cultures maintained by parochial interests more important than the supreme national interest?
As a matter of reflection, our international partners, as well as NATO and the EU, are extremely committed to the establishment of national coordination centres, interconnected and interoperable within a network capable of sharing data on a real-time basis, with the reinforcement of ISR assets to collect intelligence, assigning unmanned aerial vehicles a pivotal role. With the growing expansion of our maritime space and the rising level of illicit activities that are using maritime routes to reach the European continent, a clear maritime situational awareness in our area of responsibility is needed, or we ‘are certain to be in peril.’ This is not a question of law enforcement or military business, but a problem of national security.
77 Lutz Feldt, Dr. Peter Roell and Ralph D. Thicle, ‘Maritime Security – Perspectives for a Comprehensive
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